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The problem of evil has been an issue for all religions over the centuries.  But it  
is a crucial issue for theism because of its affirmation of the co-existence of an 
omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God and evil.  Theologians and 
philosophical theologians have developed a plethora of materials in response to the 
problem.  However, according to critics, none of the responses in and of themselves 
adequately deals with theism’s problem of suffering and evil.  As a result, this study 
explores the warfare theodicy, a Christian response to the problem of sin, suffering, and 
evil, which seems to have been neglected by scholars for a long time.  The study focuses 
on the writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A. Boyd, the two foremost detailed and 
exhaustive presenters of the warfare theodicy in the nineteenth and twenty-first centuries 
respectively.  The goal is to assess the relationship between the two models of warfare 
 
 
theodicy and the plausibility of the warfare theodicy as a Christian response to the 
problem of suffering and evil. 
The approach to this study is descriptive, analytical, comparative, and evaluative.  
Chapter 1 provides a survey of the historical background for the problem of evil and 
introduces the problem, the purpose, and the methodology of the study.  Chapter 2  
describes three major Christian approaches to the problem of evil and scholarly critiques  
of these approaches, while chapters 3 and 4 analytically describe Boyd’s and White’s  
models of warfare theodicy, respectively.  The first section of chapter 5 compares and  
contrasts the two models of warfare theodicy and the second section evaluates them.   
Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the study and then answers the questions 
concerning the relationship between the two models of the warfare theodicy and their  
plausibility as a Christian response to the problem of evil. 
The study shows that the differing outlook of the authors’ use of science in  
theology leads to divergence in the two models of warfare theodicy.  Therefore, to the 
question of the relationship between the two models, the study concludes that they may 
be related, but given the degree of their differences they are two distinctive warfare 
theodicies.  Concerning the question of the viability of the warfare theodicy, the study 
concludes that although both models of the warfare theodicy leave some philosophical 
questions unanswered, the Great Controversy Theodicy is a more satisfactory Christian 
response to the problem of suffering and evil, and, the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is a 
less satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
THE PROBLEM WITH THE PROBLEM OF EVIL 
 
WITHIN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Evil and suffering have long been a puzzle to humanity and, as a consequence, 
there have been numerous myths and theories attempting to explain its existence.
1
  The 
major world religions, such as Buddhism, Hinduism,
2
 and Christianity, have offered 
different explanations for it.  However, the Christian theistic response to evil has been 
subject to criticism due to the theistic belief in a God who is omnipresent, omnipotent, 
omniscient, and infinite, and who eschews all evil.  This study continues the exploration 
of the theistic debate on the problem of evil.  
                                                 
1
Paul Ricoeur groups myths concerning the origin of evil into four categories: the 
drama of creation, tragic hero, Adamic myth, and exiled soul. For detailed discussions of 
these myths see Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil: Religious Perspective, trans. 
Emerson Buchanan (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 161-346. 
2
For detailed information on how Buddhism and Hinduism explain evil, see 
Wendy Doniger O'Flahaerty, The Origins of Evil in Hindu Mythology (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1976); David Parkin, ed., The Anthropology of Evil (New 
York: Basil Blackwell, 1985); John Westerdale Bowker, Problems of Suffering in 
Religions of the World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); Bruce R. 
Reichenbach, The Law of Karma: A Philosophical Study (New York: SUNY Press, 
1990); Barry L. Whitney, Theodicy: An Annotated Bibliography on the Problem of Evil 
1960-1991 (Bowling Green, OH: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1998), 378-383.    
2 
Historical Background  
 
The conceptual questions raised by evil and suffering are discussed under the 
subject theodicy.
3
  The earliest theodicial question is attributed to the Greek philosopher 
Epicurus by Lactantius.  Epicurus’s question of the problem of evil is articulated in triad 
propositions:  
 God either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is able, and is 
unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able, or He is both willing and able.  If He is 
                                                 
3The term “theodicy” was coined by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz.  He coined the 
term from two Greek words: ϑεός (God) and δίϰη (justice). Leibniz used the word in the 
title of a book.  He used the word in two senses: defend the justice of God in the face of 
the evil in the world and as an inquiry into how the existence of a good God is compatible 
with the existence of evil in the world. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée 
sur la bonté de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal [1710] (Paris: Eerdmanns, 
1946); idem, “Correspondance with Des Bosses, 1709-15,” in Philosophical Papers and 
Letters, 2nd ed., trans. and ed. Leroy E. Loemker (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer 
Academic Publisher, 1989), 596-617.  
Scholars argue that a change occurred in the reflections on the problem of evil 
with Leibniz; therefore, the term theodicy must be used in reference to post-
Enlightenment discourse on the problem of evil. They argue that while, prior to the 
Enlightenment, reflections on the problem of evil focused on practical concerns, the post-
Enlightenment strategies for encountering the problem of evil are discourses focused on 
theoretical issues. See also Mark Larrimore, ed., The Problem of Evil: A Reader (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), x-xxix; Kenneth Surin, Theology and the Problem of 
Evil (New York: Basil Blackwell, 2004); Terrence W. Tilley, “The Use and Abuse of 
Theodicy,” Horizons 11 (1984): 304-319; idem, The Evils of Theodicy (Washington, DC: 
Georgetown University Press, 1991), 221-255; idem, “The Problems of Theodicy: A 
Background Essay,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of 
Natural Evil, vol. 1, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, 
S. J. (Vatican City State and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2007).  
I agree with these scholars that the reflections on the problem of evil shifted from 
practical to theoretical strategies with the Enlightenment. However, it is evident that, 
while evil plagues all of God’s creation, evil is a problem for monotheistic religions with 
their core beliefs in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God.  In other 
words, though theistic strategies for encountering the problem of evil may have changed 
before and after the Enlightenment, discussions on the problem of evil are attempts to 
make sense out of theists’ core beliefs and the existence of evil.  Therefore, this study 
uses the term theodicy for any reflection on the theistic problem of evil irrespective of the 
strategy adopted. 
3 
willing and is unable, He is feeble, which is not in accordance with the character of 
God; if He is able and unwilling, He is envious, which is equally at variance with 
God; if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envious and feeble, and therefore not 
God; if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to God, from what source 
then are evils? or why does He not remove them?
4
 
Christianity in its early stages did not see this theodicial question as a challenge to 
the belief in God, but as a problem within Christian faith and therefore did not formulate 
a systematic response to the question.
5
  Christians ascribed the cause of evil to fallen 
angels.  The Apostolic Fathers, such as Clement of Rome and Ignatius, argued that these 
angels misused their free will, which resulted in alienating themselves from God and His 
government.  The alienation led to a war between God and Satan.  Satan, the chief prince 
of the fallen angels, influenced humans to misuse their free will, which led to human sin 
as a cause of evil; however, the ultimate cause of evil is Satan and his angels.  The war 
which began in heaven between Christ and Satan resulted in a contest between the church 
and Satan.
6
  A well-defined approach to the theodicy began with Augustine in the fourth 
                                                 
4Epicurus, quoted in Lactantius, “On the Anger of God” (ANF, 7:271). According 
to Mark Larrimore, Epicurus’s use of the trilemma is not to deny the existence of gods or 
a God who is omnipotent and benevolent. “It is a lesson about how to respond to evil.” 
Mark Larrimore argues that Lactantius wrongly attributed the triad proposition of the 
problem of evil to Epicurus.  According to him, “The form of the trilemma makes it more 
likely that the question was of ancient skeptic provenance, perhaps the work of Carneades 
(214-129 BCE)” (Larrimore, The Problem of Evil, xx). 
5
Stanley Hauerwas, Naming the Silences: God, Medicine, and the Problem of Evil 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990), 49-53.  
6
The Apostolic Fathers decisively based their writings on the teachings of the 
Scriptures. Scripture’s personification of diseases, famine, pestilence, and death (Pss 
91:5-6; 18:4-5; 1 Sam 2:12; Hos 4:12), its concept of monsters (Isa 7:1; Ps 73:13-14), 
fallen angels (Isa 14:12; 2 Pet 1:19; Rev 22: 16; Matt 25:41), and its distinction between 
good and evil or light and darkness (Isa 5:20; 1 John 1:5; 2:8; 1 Pet 2:9; 2 Pet 2:4; Acts 
26:18) influenced their understanding of the origin of evil. See Clement Epistle to the 
Corinthians 51 (ANF, 1:19); Ignatius Epistle to the Ephesians 13 (ANF, 1:55); idem, 
Epistle to the Trallians 8 (ANF, 1:69); idem, Epistle to the Philadelphians 2 (ANF, 1:80-
 
4 
century A.D.  While he was aware of the conceptual difficulties of the triad propositions 
of the problem of evil, his approach to the problem was to wrestle with Manichean 
dualism.
7
 
                                                 
81); Barnabas Epistle 2, 4, 15, 18, 21 (ANF, 1:137-139, 146-147, 148); Polycarp Epistle 
to the Philippians 7 (ANF, 1:34); Shepherd of Hermas Similitude 1, 6, 9 (ANF, 2:9-
11,36-38,43-54); idem, Visions 2-4 (ANF, 2:10). 
By mid-second century, Christianity was faced with heretics.  The Apologetic 
Fathers such as Justin Martyr and Irenaeus spoke up for Christianity.  They defended the 
Christian faith against Gnostic dualism, which taught that evil and God are two 
independent principles. They argued that “the spirit of evil was no way equivalent in 
power or eternity to the good Lord, nor did his evil derive from imperfection introduced 
by emanations.  Rather, he was a creature of God, and as such he had a nature that was 
created good, a nature that he deformed through his own free will” (Jeffrey Burton 
Russell, Satan: The Early Christian Tradition [London: Cornell University Press, 1981], 
60). In effect the Apologists affirmed the apostolic teachings on the problem of evil. See 
Justin Martyr Second Apology 5-13 (ANF, 1:190-191); idem, First Apology 5, 14, 28, 54-
58 (ANF, 1:164,167,172, 181-182); Irenaeus Against Heresies 1.5; 3.8, 17-18, 20; 4.33-
41 (ANF, 1:326-327, 421-422, 444-451, 506-524); Tertullian On the Apparel of Women 
1.2 (ANF, 4:14-15); idem, Apology 22-23 (ANF, 3:36-38); idem, Against Marcion 1; 
2.10; 5.19 (ANF, 3:300-301, 470-472). 
However, the efforts of these Fathers explained only the origin of evil. Clement of 
Alexandria was the first church father who attempted to explain the problem of evil in 
terms of ontological and theological privation. Clement believed the devil exists 
metaphysically and objectively; on the other hand, the devil is a metaphor for evil activity 
in the human soul. According to him, God is the only perfect, absolute, and good being.  
Out of love God created the world, but because He alone is perfect, His creation is 
necessarily imperfect. Clement asserted that there is a hierarchy of beings. God is at the 
top, followed by angels, then humans, animals, plants, stones, and at the bottom of the 
hierarchy is unformed matter. Beings lower on the scale are less real, they lack reality 
and goodness, they are more deprived and consequently more evil. See William E. G. 
Floyd, Clement of Alexandria's Treatment of the Problem of Evil (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1971). 
By the third and fourth centuries, evil was seen as necessary. It was also perceived 
in platonic terms as privation. Besides this, dualism was kept alive in various forms by 
Manicheism, Donatism, and some church fathers such as Lactantius. Origen Against 
Celsus 4.65-66, 42-44, 92 (ANF, 4:516-517, 526-527, 538). For details of the early 
development of the explanation for the problem of evil see John N. D. Kelly, Early 
Christian Doctrines (New York: Harper and Row, 1958); Russell, Satan, 107-230; Sigve 
Tonstad, “Theodicy and the Theme of Cosmic Conflict in the Early Church,” Andrews 
University Seminary Studies 42 (2004): 169-202.  
7
Larrimore, The Problem of Evil, xxvii. 
5 
Augustine adopted Neo-Platonic ideas in his definition and explanation of evil.
8
   
He proposed that God is eternal, immutable, infinite, and a perfect Being.  He created ex 
nihilo and “the things that He made He empowered to be, but not to be supremely like 
                                                 
8
As a young man, Augustine was interested in discovering the truth. Besides this 
burning desire, he was eager to find the solution to the problem of evil in the world. 
Although he was brought up by a Christian mother, his classical education caused him to 
look down on Christianity as philosophically and culturally inferior, while believing that 
spiritual things can be accessed through the means of philosophy.  
In his pursuit, he found Manicheism to be effective in fulfilling his passion and 
solving the problem of evil. However, after his conversion to Christianity, he recognized 
that Manichean dualism is not the answer to the problem of evil.  A principle of evil, an 
absolute being in itself or a lord independent of God, cannot exist to resist the plans of 
God. Consequently, he turned his back on Manicheism and composed works to expose 
the falsehood of Manicheism. 
As he turned away from Manicheism, he found the Neo-Platonic approach to the 
problem of evil very promising, specifically the concepts of Plotinus (A.D. 204-270). 
Plotinus turned away from the dualism of middle Platonism toward monism.  Plotinus 
posited that there is only One principle of the universe, and it is the only thing perfect and 
good. The One is prior to all existents, transcends the world, simple, and absolute.  He 
explained the plurality of things by the principle of hierarchy of emanation; each 
emanation is the cause of the next-lower emanation. The first emanation from the One is 
nous, mind, the universal intelligence that signifies the underlying rationality of the 
world. The nous emanated the world-soul, the world-soul emanated the human soul, and 
finally, the human soul emanated the physical universe in which sense objects exist as a 
combination of forms with prime matter.  Emanation from the One represents a decline in 
the degrees of perfection; as a result, the last emanation, matter, is the farthest and least 
like the One. It is opposite of the One, it is nonbeing, a privation of good. It is evil. 
This leads to two main sources of evil: One is matter itself; its evil lies in the 
privation of good and it is responsible for natural evil.  The second source of evil is the 
wrong choice of the human soul tempted and corrupted by its union with the body; this is 
the cause of moral evil. Augustine adopted the conception that matter is a privation of 
good. Neo-Platonism provided Augustine the bases for his explanation to the problem of 
evil. Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 1.136; Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Socrates to 
Sartre: A History of Philosophy, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 124-150; 
Jeffrey Burton Russell, The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive 
Christianity (London: Cornell University Press, 1977), 161-167; idem, Satan, 195-202; 
Gillian R. Evans, Augustine on Evil (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); 
Bertrand A. Russell, History of Western Philosophy, and Its Connection with Political 
and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, 1946), 284-297. 
6 
Himself.  To some He communicated a more ample, to others a more limited existence, 
and thus arranged the natures of beings in ranks.”9  For these reasons, Augustine argued, 
evil is only a privation of good, which does not exist in itself but only as an aspect of an 
actual entity, a malfunctioning of good.  According to Augustine, the cause of evil, both 
moral and natural,
10
 is the misuse of the will of a being who is changeable, which began 
first with the highest creature and then man.  That is, free will is the cause of pain and 
suffering, but since all things occur in accordance with God’s will, pain and suffering 
ultimately play a good role in God’s plan.11 
Augustine’s approach to the problem of evil was very influential for centuries.  
Medieval theologians
12
 adopted Augustine’s approach in advancing theistic discussion on  
                                                 
9
Augustine, City of God 12.2 (NPNF, 2:227). 
10
Moral evil is that which human beings originate, such as hatred, stealing, and 
murder. Natural evil is that which originates naturally independent of human actions, 
such as tornadoes, droughts, and earthquakes. Augustine believed that all evil is moral 
evil or a consequence of moral evil.
 
11
Augustine Enchiridon 4.12-15; 9; 8.23 (LCC, 7:343-346, 353-359); idem, City 
of God 10.6 (NPNF, 1: 183-184); idem, On Free Will (LCC, 6:102-217).  
12
At the advent of scholasticism, scholars like Anselm of Canterbury, Peter 
Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas argued intensely that “evil is a privation of good” in their 
attempt to rebut dualism.  Among them, Aquinas was most influential. He asserted that 
the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle because every evil is caused 
by good.  He claimed evil has neither formal nor final cause, but has an efficient cause 
that acts indirectly.  According to Aquinas, there are two ways by which evil is caused 
indirectly.  First is when, out of necessity, a form or an agent producing its effect 
deprives another form or agent from producing its full effect.  The second is when an 
agent or a form is not able to perform its full effect because of deficiency in material or 
active principle.  He contended that deficient cause of evil in voluntary actions proceeds 
from deficient will, but deficient cause of evil in natural actions happens when a form is 
blocked by something outside of itself.  On the other hand, evil that involves decay of 
something both in natural and voluntary things is caused by God. “God’s principal 
purpose in created things is clearly that form or good which consists in the order of the 
universe.  This requires . . . that there should be something that can, and sometimes does 
 
7 
the problem of evil as did the Protestant Reformers.
13
  The Continental rationalists René 
Descartes and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz also adopted Augustine’s approach in their 
explanation of the problem of evil.
14
   
Although, the influence of Augustine’s theodicy can be traced beyond Leibniz, 
with the Enlightenment the strategies adopted for the reflections on the problem of evil 
became anthropocentric and “detached from any system of conviction based on divine 
revelation.” The existence of evil was raised as counter-evidence against the belief in the 
                                                 
fall away.  So then, in causing the common good of the ordered universe, he causes loss 
in particular things as a consequence and, as it were, indirectly” (Thomas Aquinas, 
Summa Theologica, vol. 8, Creation, Variety and Evil, trans. Thomas Gilby O. P. [New 
York: Macmillan, 1965], 1a. 48-49); see also Whitney, Theodicy, 14. 
13
The Protestant Reformers believed evil is the result of sin. However, since God 
is omnipotent and sovereign, He is responsible for evil. They claimed everything happens 
according to God’s sovereign will.  Thus, He wills both good and evil, but ultimately all 
evils are good because whatever God does is good.  John Calvin strongly suggested that 
God carries out “his judgments through Satan as the minister of his wrath, God destines 
men’s purposes as he pleases, arouses wills and strengthens their endeavors” (John 
Calvin, Calvin Institutes of the Christian Religion [Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of 
Christian Education, 1936], 1.14.1-9, 2.4.3). 
14
Descartes stated that any real cosmos is not identical to God. Since God is the 
perfect being, the cosmos is not identical to Him. The cosmos is full of things different 
from God in different degrees. Hence, metaphysical imperfections are necessary. By 
analogy, error and evil are necessary. Leibniz argued that God is an absolute being and 
nothing exists that limits Him. As a result, there cannot be a real cosmos without 
imperfection. Evil and disorder are compatible with a benevolent God. God created the 
best of all possible worlds that is in accordance with moral requirements; furthermore, it 
contains the greatest possible amount of good. Evil is necessary, but the source is not 
God; it is the nature of things that God has created. Evil, then, is a mere privation, 
absence of perfection. He stressed that God wills antecedently the good and, 
consequently, the best. Some things in themselves seem evil, but they turn out to be 
prerequisites for good. Jeffrey Burton Russell, Mephistopheles: The Devil in the Modern 
World (London: Cornell University Press, 1986), 85-86; Stumpf, Socrates to Sartre, 257-
258. 
8 
existence of an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God.
15
  Therefore, theistic 
formulations of theodicies focus on addressing questions about Christian faith.  In 
addition, a sharp turn in the influence of Augustine’s tradition in formulating theodicy 
occurred with the repercussions of the Enlightenment.  The Enlightenment denied 
Christian theology its epistemological independence based upon the principle of the 
competence of human reason.   
The Enlightenment, to a large extent, created a secular society in which natural 
reason and social experience disposed of the authority of Scripture.  Religious beliefs, 
like any other theories, were evaluated by rational and scientific evidences.  Specifically, 
discoveries of astronomers and geologists discredited the classical theistic interpretation 
of Gen 1.
16
  Theology, faced with the above-mentioned critical challenges, adjusted itself 
to keep abreast with the philosophical and scientific developments.  Consequently, the 
existing Augustinian theodicial paradigm
17
 and warfare theory were seen as insufficient 
                                                 
15Niels Christian Hvidt, “Historical Development of the Problem of Evil,” in 
Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, ed. 
Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, S. J. (Vatican City State 
and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, 2007), 1:26-27. 
16
James C. Livingston, Modern Christian Thought: The Enlightenment and the 
Nineteenth Century, vol. 1 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1988), 6, 17; Neil B. 
MacDonald, “Enlightenment,” The Dictionary of Historical Theology, ed. Trevor A. Hart 
et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 175-183; Gysbert Van Den Brink, 
“Rationalism,” The Dictionary of Historical Theology, ed. Trevor A. Hart et al. (Grand 
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000), 456-458. 
17
Augustianian theodicy is a technical term for theodicies that follow Augustine’s 
tradition.  
9 
concepts, leading to the development of alternative theodicies, such as that of John Hick
18
 
and Process theodicies. 
After a careful study of all types of theodicies from the time of Augustine up to 
the eighteenth century, Hick sums them up as Augustinian tradition.  He argues that 
Augustinian theodicy is “so familiar that it is commonly thought of as the Christian view 
of man and his plight.  Nevertheless it is only a Christian view.”19  He claims the 
Augustinian theodicy is based on Christian mythology, a pre-scientific view, that the 
modern world considers as incredible.  It is without “grounds in scripture or science” and 
it is self-contradictory.
20
  According to him, defenders of the Augustinian theodicy “have 
become involved in ever more desperate and implausible epicycles of theory to save it.”21   
Therefore, he suggests the need for an alternative theodicy that will be without 
contradiction and scientifically credible to the modern mind.   
Hick finds in the writings of Irenaeus an outline of an approach to the problem of 
evil that will serve as an appropriate alternative to the Augustinian type of theodicy.  On 
the basis of Irenaeus’s concept of the image and the likeness of God, Hick argues that 
God’s aim for humankind is to create, through evolutionary process, personal beings in 
relationship with their Maker.  For God’s intention to be realized without coercing or 
infringing on genuine human freedom, He created humans with epistemic distance from 
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John Hick developed this theodicy in his classic volume, Evil and the God of 
Love (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). The first section deconstructs Augustinian 
theodicy and the second section is restricted to the development of his theodicy.  For a 
list of Hick’s publications on theodicy, see Whitney, Theodicy, 119-124.  
19
Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 207-208. 
20
Ibid., 287. 
10 
Him.  His creation is not perfect, but it is a world that functions as an autonomous system 
and from within which God is not overwhelmingly evident.  Human beings were created 
spiritually and morally imperfect, but as intelligent social beings capable of awareness of 
the divine within a dangerous and challenging environment.  The imperfections in the 
environment are necessary aspects of the process through which God’s goal for human 
beings is achieved.  God intended evil to draw humans close to Him as they tussle 
through the challenges of the evils of the world.  In this sense, argued Hick, moral and 
natural evils are compatible with the existence of a creator who is both unlimited in 
goodness and power.
22
 
Barry Whitney indicates that Hick’s theodicy has “awakened many of us from our 
Augustinian slumber.”23  However, critics claim it is a hybrid of Augustinian theodicy.  It 
shares the Augustinian affirmation that suffering is planned by an omnipotent God who 
could, but will not take away the evils of the world.  Furthermore, it denies the reality of 
genuine evil.
24
 
Hick’s theodicy did not meet the expectations of the modern mind.  Charles E. 
Hartshorne calls for a “New Look at the Problem of Evil” and describes the traditional 
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Ibid., 286. 
22
John Hick, “An Ireanaean Theodicy,” in Encountering Evil: Live Options in 
Theodicy, ed. Stephen T. Davis (Louisville, KY: Westminster, 2001), 38-52.  
23
Whitney, Theodicy, 115.  
24
Roland Puccetti, “Loving God: Some Observation on John Hick’s Evil and the 
God of Love,” Religious Studies 2 (1967): 255-268; Keith Ward, “Freedom and the 
Irenaean Theodicy,” Journal of Theological Studies 20 (1969): 249-254; Stanley G. 
Kane, “The Failure of Soul-Making Theodicy,” International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion 6 (1975): 1-22; C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist 
Critique (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991). 
11 
theodicy discussion as “pseudoproblem.”25  In his view, the difficulties in the theodicies 
of Augustine and Hick arise because they distinguish God from everything else by 
putting God on one side of a list of contraries: finite-infinite, temporal-eternal, relative-
absolute, contingent-necessary and physical-spiritual.  The only solution to the problem 
of evil, according to Hartshorne, is that which uses the idea of freedom, but generalizes 
it.
26
 
Process theodicy was developed on the basis of Hartshorne’s passionate call for a 
new look at the problem of evil and the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead.  
Although they did not develop a systematic theodicy, many theologians and philosophers 
have worked out theodicies from their works.  Specifically, David Ray Griffin is the first 
to develop a systematic theodicy from the writings of Whitehead and Hartshorne.  
Process theologians reject traditional theodicy, Hick’s theodicy included, by arguing that 
such theodicy holds a misconception of the nature of God.  They explain the existence of 
evil by advocating that God did not create ex nihilo, but created the universe from pre-
existent entities.  These entities, both human and non-human, possess a degree of 
creativity necessarily and independently of God without whom nothing could exist.  The 
interaction of this creativity results in both moral and physical evil.  God’s function is 
“not to enforce a maximal ratio of good to evil, but a maximal ratio of chances of good to 
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Charles Hartshorne, “A New Look at the Problem of Evil,” in Current 
Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse, ed. F. C. Dommeyer 
(Springfield, IL: C. C. Thomas, 1966), 201-212. 
26
Charles Hartshorne, Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes (New York: 
State University Press, 1984), 1-27. 
12 
chances of evil.”27  His purpose is only to lure us towards experiences that avoid the 
extremes of absolute order.  In this way, they argue, while evil is real and devastating, 
there is some minimal value in every experience, a value we can appropriate if we follow 
God’s lure towards its actualization.28  Opponents have argued that this kind of theodicy 
portrays a God whose power is limited and does not deserve worship.
29
 
The search of Hick and Process theologians to develop a theodicy informed by 
modern philosophy with the intention to satisfy the curiosity of the modern mind did not 
yield an acceptable result.  If these theodicies could not satisfactorily deal with the issues 
associated with the problem of evil, is there an alternative theodicy that does better?   
 
Statement of Problem 
 
The three main Christian responses to the problem of evil—Augustine’s approach 
and the alternative theodicies proposed by Hick and Process theology—have not proven 
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Charles Hartshorne, Reality as Social Process (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 
1953; reprint, New York: Hafner Publishing Company, 1971), 107.  
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Revisited: Responses and Reconsideration (New York: State University Press, 1991); 
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to be satisfactory responses to the logical and evidential arguments from evil
30
 or address 
specific evils from within a Christian perspective.  Ellen G. White
31
 and Gregory A. 
Boyd
32
 come to the problem of evil by employing a warfare concept.  They propose that 
no approach will satisfactorily clarify the problem of evil without appealing to the 
concept of a war between God and Satan.  However, there are irreconcilable differences 
in their warfare models.  The basic question that needs to be explored is whether their 
warfare models are able to deal with the logical and evidential arguments from evil and 
address specific evils from within the Christian perspective.     
 
Purpose of Study 
 
In the context of the rigorous search for an understanding of the idea of a good 
God who co-exists with evil, the purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the works of 
                                                 
30
The logical argument from evil is an argument whose premise says that God and 
some known fact about evil are incompatible. The evidential argument from evil is an 
argument that asserts that the evil in the world is evidence against the existence of God.  
Thus, according Feinberg, the “issue with either the logical or evidential problem is 
whether that theological position is logically coherent and/or probable” (John S. 
Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problem of Evil, rev. and 
exp. ed. [Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004], 75, 21, 297). See also Michael L. 
Peterson, Evil and the Christian God (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1982), 35-78; 
Stephen T. Davis, ed., Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, rev. ed. (Louisville, 
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Ellen G. White was one of the leaders of the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 
the late 19th century. She authored many books including a five-volume work on 
theodicy, called the Conflict of the Ages Series. These are Patriarchs and Prophets, 
Prophets and Kings, The Desire of Ages, The Acts of the Apostles, and The Great 
Controversy.  
32
Gregory A. Boyd is a contemporary Evangelical theologian, professor of 
theology at Bethel College and a pastor at Woodland Hills Church, both in St. Paul, 
Minnesota. He has written many books, two of which are on the subject of theodicy: God 
 
14 
Ellen G. White and Gregory A. Boyd in order to ascertain the viability of their warfare 
theodicies.  How does the warfare approach deal with the tensions associated with 
Augustinian, Hick, and Process theodicies?  Is Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
synonymous with White’s Great Controversy Theodicy?  Are they contradictory, 
unrelated, or complementary?  In a nutshell, this study is an enquiry into whether the 
warfare approach to the problem of evil has an advantage over the Augustinian, Hick, and 
Process theodicies and, if so, in what way.   
 
Significance of the Study 
 
The various manifestations of evil in the world sufficiently justify the study of 
theodicy.  A significant amount of work has been done on the subject, but the problem of 
evil is still a challenge to human thinking.  Some sufferers are unable to reconcile the 
experience of suffering to the view of a loving God.  Evil is often seen as incongruous 
with all the doctrines of Christian theism.  Not only is the atheist disturbed about the 
perplexing challenges of evil, but also the theist wonders at the rate at which evil gallops 
in the contemporary world and often questions the reality of the existence of God.  None 
of the major responses to the problem of evil seem to be completely satisfying.
33
  Hence 
the study of this problem is an issue that, by itself, pleads for attention.  Therefore, this 
study focuses on warfare theodicy, a long neglected approach to the problem of evil.  
The reasons for the choice of White as one of the authors on warfare theodicy are 
self-evident in her books.  She “integrated a warfare perspective into the problem of evil 
                                                 
at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict and Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing 
a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.  
15 
and the doctrine of God perhaps more thoroughly than anyone else in church history.” 34  
In her five-volume work on the Conflict of the Ages Series, she emphasizes that many 
have struggled in vain to find a solution to the problem of evil, and others have failed to 
understand the problem of evil satisfactorily because tradition and misinterpretation have 
obscured the biblical teachings on the character of God.  She argues that the problem “is 
the outworking of the principle at war with the great law of love which is the foundation 
of the divine government.”35  
 In the same manner, Boyd argues for the war between Satan and God as the only 
sufficient explanation to the problem of evil.  He develops his views in two volumes: God 
at War
36
 and Satan and the Problem of Evil.
37
  Although Boyd recognizes that the 
modern perspective on Satan, angels, and demons has drifted away from the perspective 
of the Apostolic Fathers, he insists that “the warfare thesis requires, as a central 
component, a belief in angels, Satan and demons as real, autonomous, free agents, as well 
as a belief that the activity of these beings intersects with human affairs, for better or for 
worse.”38   
                                                 
33
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of God (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1999), 3. 
34
Gregory A. Boyd, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1997), 307, endnote 44. 
35
Ellen G. White, The Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan (Mountain 
View, CA: Pacific Press, 1911; reprint, 1950), 493. 
36
See footnote 34.  
37
Gregory A. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil: Constructing a Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 22n19. 
38
Boyd, God at War, 32. 
16 
After White and before Boyd, some scholars had constructed an explanation of 
the problem of evil alluding to the concept of superhuman activities in the world.  
However, the comprehensiveness of such explanations seems incomparable with White’s 
and Boyd’s.39  Several works have been done on the problem of evil, but none has been 
devoted to the most comprehensive warfare models of White and Boyd.  Although White 
was not a theologian in a conventional sense and White’s and Boyd’s warfare models are 
a century apart, the depth of White’s presentation makes her model comparable with 
Boyd’s.  
 
Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
 
Some limits have been set to this study to keep it within reasonable scope.  A 
discussion of three universal theodicies, namely those of Augustine, Hick, and Process 
                                                 
39For instance, C. S. Lewis presupposed that the origin of evil “demands that good 
should be original and evil a mere perversion.” Evil is a parasite, not an original thing.  
An angel abused his free will and influenced humans to abuse their free will.  Evil in the 
human world can sometimes be attributed to the devil.  On the other hand, the freedom of 
humanity really would not be freedom without the choice between evil and good.  Thus, 
evil is necessary. Good and evil work together to provide opportunities for human choice.  
For him, pain and suffering are God’s megaphone.  God uses pain and suffering to arouse 
the bad man to acknowledge that all is not well, but he suggested that animal suffering is 
either an illusion or perhaps caused by the fallen angels. C. S. Lewis, The Problem of 
Pain (New York: Macmillan, 1962); idem, Mere Christianity (New York: Macmillan, 
1979), 46-50, 174; idem, The Great Divorce (New York: Macmillan, 1946), 91; idem, 
God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1970), 23. 
Edwin Lewis affirmed the contradictions in all aspects of creation: “Creation is 
creativity in strife with discreativity.” He indicated that the only meaningful explanation 
for the contradictions is eternal dualism. Edwin Lewis, The Creator and the Adversary 
(New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1948). See the works of William Robinson, The Devil 
and God (London: Lutterworth Press, 1945), 7, 110-111; Terrence Penelhum, Religion 
and Rationality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Random 
House, 1971); and Wallace A. Murphree, “Can Theism Survive without the Devil?” 
Religious Studies 21 (1985): 231-244. 
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theology, serves as a background to this study.     
The problem of evil has aroused the interest of theologians, as well as 
philosophers, and has produced abundant literature.  However, this study focuses on 
warfare theodicy in the writings of White with particular attention directed to her Conflict 
of the Ages Series and the writings of Boyd from 1992-2009 (because he is 
professionally active), especially his 2-volume work on trinitarian warfare.  Secondary 
literature on both authors was also used. 
 
Methodology 
 
The methodology that this dissertation adopted is a descriptive analysis.  The 
process has been instrumental in facilitating the evaluation of the logical coherence and 
probability of the warfare models of White and Boyd.  
To avoid misrepresentation and/or distortion of their views, the authors are 
allowed to speak for themselves.  Their arguments are presented in their own terms, 
however, in a shortened form.  The structure of the descriptive analysis is tailored toward 
the outline of the trinitarian warfare model.  This means the analysis of both warfare 
models begins with free will, divine foreknowledge and sovereignty, and then evil.  Any 
discussion of these elements—free will, divine foreknowledge, and sovereignty—is not 
an attempt to get involved with the ongoing philosophical and theological discussion on 
these issues.  My sole intention is to use these elements to establish the structure of the 
authors’ theological thought.   
A careful comparison of the two models of the warfare theodicy is conducted on 
the basis of the analyses done in chapters 3 and 4.  Next, an evaluation is attempted to 
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focus on the internal consistency and coherence of each model and the contribution each 
has made to theology.    
Applying the method in achieving the purpose of this study demands the 
following course of action.  Chapter 1 gives the historical background of theodicy and 
states the problem that the study addresses.  It also describes the purpose and scope of 
study and the research methodology that the dissertation adopts.   
Assessment of the credibility of the warfare models of theodicy of White and 
Boyd cannot be done in a vacuum.  Consequently, the three main theodicies that have 
influenced theological and philosophical thought for decades serve as the basis of my 
evaluation of the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great Controversy theodicies.  Therefore, 
chapter 2 focuses on Augustinian, Hick, and Process theodicies.   The first step is to focus 
on primary sources to describe the theodicies and then mention the problems that, 
according to scholars, are associated with each of the three theodicies.  
The Great Controversy model of the warfare theodicy precedes the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy.  However, due to the theological categorization of the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy, which aids in forming the analytical structure of the Great 
Controversy Theodicy, the analysis of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy precedes the 
Great Controversy Theodicy.   
As a result, chapter 3 seeks to describe and analyze Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.  The description and analysis of Boyd’s model primarily focuses on his two 
major books devoted to the warfare explanation of the problem of evil.  Also, 
consideration is given to elements of his trinitarian warfare explanation found on his 
website and in other books he has authored from 1992-2009, since he is professionally 
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active.  The systematic analysis of the nature of evil in Boyd’s model is undertaken by 
inquiring into the way he explains free will, divine foreknowledge, the sovereignty of 
God in relation to evil, the origin of sin and evil, natural evil, and eradication of sin and 
evil from the universe.   
Chapter 4 attempts to describe and analyze White’s Great Controversy model of 
the warfare explanation of the problem of evil.  The descriptive analysis is based on her 
Conflict of the Ages Series and elements of her concept scattered elsewhere in her 
writings.  The systematic analysis of her model looks carefully at her explanation of free 
will, divine foreknowledge, the sovereignty of God in relation to evil, origin of sin and 
evil, natural evil, and eradication of sin and evil from the universe.   
Chapter 5 takes up the task of comparing and evaluating warfare theodicy on the 
basis of the result of the preceding chapters.  The chapter investigates whether the 
warfare theodicy avoids the tensions of the three main theodicies as described in chapter 
2.  This evaluation makes it possible to extrapolate the meaning and purpose of the 
warfare concept.  Furthermore, it makes possible the identification of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the warfare theodicy and its contributions to theology.  Finally, chapter 6 
summarizes the findings of the study of the warfare theodicy as presented by Boyd and 
White.  In addition, it states the conclusion to the study and makes some 
recommendations. 
This chapter has identified the problem and purpose of this dissertation: A Study 
of Warfare Theodicy in the Writings of Ellen G. White and Gregory A. Boyd.  It has also 
justified the problem in terms of the amount of work that has been done to establish the 
coherency of the existence of God and evil and the significance of the writings of White 
20 
and Boyd on the problem of evil.  It has also described the scope, delimitation, and the 
methodology of the study.  Having done these, the study proceeds by first surveying the 
three main Christian responses to the problem of evil.
21 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
THREE MAIN THEISTIC THEODICIES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As noted in the historical background to the problem of the study (chapter 1), 
explanation of the problem of evil has been a perennial challenge in Christian theology 
and philosophy.  The increased intensity of natural and moral evils through the centuries 
exacerbated the problem.  It is, therefore, the purpose of this chapter to clarify and 
understand the debate among three main Christian approaches (Augustine, John Hick, 
and Process theology) to the problem of evil that have emerged in Christian theology 
since the time of Augustine.   
I propose to focus on the principles upon which these theodicies are developed.  
Nonetheless, the aim is not only to describe, but also to explore the arguments raised 
against them.  The critical discussion focuses on issues such as the nature of evil, free 
will of human beings, sovereignty and foreknowledge of God in relation to evil, and 
God’s victory over evil.  These issues are of much concern, for they are pertinent to the 
subject of this dissertation, as we shall see later in my discussion on the theodicies of 
Boyd and White.   
 
Augustine’s Theodicy 
 
Augustine, the bishop of Hippo (A.D. 354-430), was the greatest of the Latin 
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fathers.  After espousing Manichaean philosophy for about ten years, Augustine became a 
Christian.  He recognized that the Manichaean solution to the problem of evil, 
specifically the concept of the nature of God, is “shocking and detestable profanity, that 
the wedge of darkness sunders not a region distinct and separate from God but the very 
nature of God.”1  Against Manichaeism, Augustine affirmed the goodness of God and His 
sovereignty over the universe.  In reality, the God who is self-sufficient, infinite in 
goodness and beauty, eternal, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, and a supreme being 
became the core of his explanation to the problem of evil.
2
  Augustine’s theodicy is the 
first fully developed Christian response to the problem of evil.  
On the basis of his understanding of the nature of God, he argued that God created 
the universe out of nothing.
3
  The omnipotent and the only perfect God created all things 
that need to be.  Out of divine love and goodness, He deliberately called into existence 
every conceivable kind of being.
4
  He put all creation in rank according to their utility or 
order of nature.  On the order of nature, Augustine stated that 
those beings which exist, and which are not of God the Creator’s essence, those which 
have life are ranked above those which have none; those that have the power of 
                                                 
1
Augustine Against the Epistle of Manichaeans Called Fundamental 24.26 
(NPNF First Series, 4:140).  
2
Augustine City of God 11:10; 22:1 (NPNF First Series, 2:210-211; 479-410); 
idem, Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans (NPNF First Series, 4:351-
365). See Whitney, What Are They Saying About God and Evil? 29-37; idem, Theodicy, 
282-284; Dietmar Wyrwa, “Augustine and Luther on Evil,” in The Problem of Evil and 
Its Symbols in Jewish and Christian Tradition, ed. Henning Graf Reventlow and Yair 
Hoffman (New York: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 126-130; Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 53, 
76-95. 
3
Augustine Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 1 (NPNF First 
Series, 4: 351). 
4
Augustine City of God 12.5 (NPNF First Series, 2: 228-229). 
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generation, or even of desiring, above those which want this faculty.  And, among things 
that have life, the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation, as animals are 
ranked above trees.  And, among the sentient, the intelligent are above those that have no 
intelligence, . . . above cattle.  And among the intelligent, the immortal, such as angels, 
above the mortal, such as men.
5
 
When it comes to the ranking according to utility, he indicated that there are 
varieties of standards of values so that at a given point individuals prefer some things that 
have no sensation to some sentient beings.  Such preference is so strong that sometimes 
we wish to eradicate some things in the scale of being.
6
  Thus, each form of existence has 
its own place in the hierarchy of being.
7
  There is no level of the scale of being that is 
evil.  All creation, from the highest to the lowest on the scale, is good.  Therefore, he 
stated, “No nature, therefore, as far as it is nature, is evil; but to each nature there is no 
evil except to be diminished in respect of good.”8  While the lower forms of existence, 
perceived in isolation, appear to be evil, they are necessary links in the scale of being.  
The fragments perceived as a whole are harmonious, well-ordered, beautiful, and a 
perfect creation of God.  They adequately and perfectly express the goodness of God’s 
creation.
9
  However, all creatures are capable of being corrupted because they lack the 
immutability of the Creator.
10
 
                                                 
5
Augustine City of God 11.16 (NPNF First Series, 2:214). 
6
Ibid.  
7
This idea of creation, the diversity of creation is ordered in rank, is called the 
principle of plenitude. See Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 76.  
8
Augustine Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 17 (NPNF 
First Series, 4:354). 
9
Augustine City of God 12.2, 4, 11.16-22 (NPNF First Series, 2:227-228; 214-
217); idem, Enchiridion 3:9-11 (LCC 7:341-343); idem, Soliloquies 1.1, 2 (NPNF First 
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Augustine noted that the harmonious and perfect world is infested with pain and 
suffering as a result of sin.  Among all the conceivable creatures of God, he remarked, 
there are living beings endowed with the gift of free will.  The world would not have 
been perfect without free will.  Unfortunately, some of the free creatures went wrong in 
exercising their free will.  The first misuse of the will is turning to the will itself instead 
of God; turning away from the mode of being that is proper to a creature in God’s 
creative intention is sin.  Sin is the origin of evil that began with angels and continued 
afterwards with human beings.
11
  
  The will is one of the good creations of God, but became evil only as it desired 
something inferior, contended Augustine.  That is, evil originated from a good substance, 
the act of turning away from something incorruptible to that which is mutable is the issue 
of sin.
12
 On the other hand, there is a motive which leads the rational being away from 
the Creator, and that is pride—“craving for undue exaltation.”13  This act of rational 
beings affected the entire creation.  In addition, he indicated that “nature could not have 
been depraved by vice had it not been made out of nothing.  Consequently, that it is a 
nature, this is because it is made by God, but that it falls away from Him, this is because 
                                                 
Series, 7:537); idem, Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 3, 8, 16 
(NPNF First Series, 4:352-354).  
10
Augustine Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 10 (NPNF 
First Series, 4:353).  
11
Augustine City of God  11:11, 13, 15, 20, 32-33; 12:1, 9; 14:11; 19:4 (NPNF 
First Series, 2: 211-216, 223-224; 226-231; 271-272; 401-403); idem, On Free Will 1 
(LCC, 1:113-134). 
12
Augustine City of God 12:6 (NPNF First Series, 2: 229).  
13
Ibid., 14.13 (NPNF First Series, 2: 273).  
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it is made out of nothing.”14  Hence, God is not the originator of evil.15  From his analysis 
of the misuse of the free will, Augustine attributed evils to sin and its consequences, both 
moral and natural, to the wrong choice of free rational beings, with the exception of evils 
that are considered as punishment for sin. “Free will is the cause of our doing evil and 
that is why just judgment is the cause of our having to suffer from its consequence.”16   In 
his view, God punishes sin in order to bring moral balance to the universe;
17
 death, which 
was the punishment for the first humans—Adam and Eve who first sinned—is now the 
natural consequence for their progeny.
18
   
Therefore, evil is not a substance.
19
  It “has no positive nature,” but is a defect of 
created good; “the loss of good has received the name ‘evil.’” 20  It is, therefore, a 
privation of good, a parasitic non essential, the absence of good from a thing which can 
and ought naturally to possess it.
21
  “It is an evil, solely because it corrupts the good.  It is 
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Augustine City of God  14.13 (NPNF First Series, 2:273); idem, Concerning 
Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans, 10 (NPNF First Series, 4:353); idem, 
Enchiridion 4:12 (LCC, 7: 343-344).  
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Augustine Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 33 (NPNF 
First Series, 4:358); idem, Against the Epistle of Manichaeus Called Fundamental 38 
(NPNF First Series, 4:148-149).  
16
Augustine Confessions 7.3,4,5 (LCC, 7:134-156); idem, 0n Free Will 3.17.48 
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Augustine Concerning Nature of Good, Against the Manichaeans 9 (NPNF First 
Series, 4: 353).  
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Augustine City of God 13.3 (NPNF First Series, 2: 246).  
19
Augustine Confessions 12.18 (LCC, 7:148).  
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Augustine City of God 11.9 (NPNF First Series, 2: 210).   
21
Augustine Enchiridion 4 (LCC, 7: 343-346); idem, Against the Epistle of 
Manichaeus Called Fundamental 35 (NPNF First Series, 4:147).  
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not nature, therefore, but vice, which is contrary to God.  For that which is evil is 
contrary to the good.”22  Hence, evil and good are antithetic, but they co-exist.  Good can 
exist without evil, but evil cannot exist without good.
23
   Evil is connected with the 
created nature of the subject who has become evil—so that it would annihilate itself if it 
exterminates this nature.  It arises from the fact that it does not derive its existence from 
itself or from the essence of God, but it is nothing.
24
  As a result, argued Augustine, evil 
has no efficient cause but only deficient cause as the will itself is defection from the 
Supreme Being.
25
  
Augustine mentioned that God was not ignorant about what rational beings will 
do with their will.  God foresaw that they will abandon Him for inferior substance, yet He 
did not deny them freedom, for He foreknew the good He can bring out of evil.
26
  “God 
would never have created any, I do not say angel, but even man, whose future wickedness 
He foreknew, unless He had equally known to what uses in behalf of the good He could 
turn him, thus embellishing the course of the ages, as it were an exquisite poem set off 
with antitheses.”27  God allows all these evils in the world to demonstrate how He can 
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Augustine City of God 12.3 (NPNF First Series, 2:227-228).  
23
Ibid. 
24
Augustine Enchiridion 4.12-13 (LCC, 7:343-344). 
25
Augustine City of God 12.7 (NPNF First Series, 2:230).  
26
Ibid., 12.22; 22.1 (NPNF First Series, 2:241; 480).  
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Ibid., 11.18 (NPNF First Series, 2:214-215).  
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make good use of them.  In this context, many good will disappear without evil.
28
  Thus, 
he mentioned, “What is evil, when it is rightly ordered and kept in its place, commends 
the good more eminently, since good things yield greater pleasure and praise when 
compared to the bad things.”29  
Augustine argued that God’s purpose for permitting evil is to bring good out of it 
only by saving the justly condemned race according to His grace. Yet, he remarked that 
God overcomes sin and evil by predestining some to eternal life and condemning others 
to eternal destruction.
30
  “Therefore they were elected before the foundation of the world 
with that predestination in which God foreknew what He Himself would do; but they 
were elected out of the world with that calling whereby God fulfilled that which He 
predestinated. . . . Those whom He predestinated, called and justified, them He also 
glorified; assuredly to that end which has no end.”31 
 
Critical Discussion on Augustine’s Theodicy 
 
Augustine’s theodicy served as the Christian explanation of the problem of evil 
for several centuries and generated impressive theological and philosophical literature. 
Notwithstanding its exceptional influence, scholars from both within and without 
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Augustine Enchiridion 4.11 (LCC, 7: 342-343); idem, City of God 12.22, 14.11, 
22.22 (NPNF First Series, 2:241, 271-272, 499-500). 
29
Augustine Enchiridion 4.11 (LCC, 7:342). This idea, evil complements the good 
of creation, is known as the aesthetic principle. See Hick, Evil and the Love of God, 88.  
30
Augustine City of God 22: 1, 2, 22; 21:12 (NPNF First Series, 2: 480, 499-501; 
463).  
31
Augustine On the Predestination of the Saints 34 (NPNF First Series, 5:515).  
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theological circles have deliberated on its credibility, especially looking at the logical 
consistency, the nature of evil, and free will and its relation to evil. 
 
Logical Consistency in Augustine’s  
Theodicy 
 
Philosophers such as David Hume, John L. Mackie, Anthony Flew, and H. J. 
McCloskey, just to mention a few, have reiterated Epicurus’s formulation32 of the 
problem of evil in many ways, claiming the theist explanation of the problem of evil is 
incongruous.  They maintain that the existence of evil in this world suggests that an 
omnipotent, omniscient, and wholly good God does not exist.
33
  From Mackie’s 
viewpoint, free will theodicy “strongly suggests that there is no valid solution of the 
problem which does not modify at least one of the constituent propositions in a way 
which would seriously affect the essential core of the theistic position.”34  The problem of 
evil arises when God is conceived as all-good and all-powerful.
35
   
Alvin Plantinga replies to the atheological criticisms, specifically the criticism of 
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As stated above in the introductory chapter.  
33
David Hume, Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Hafner, 
1948); John. L Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind 64 (1955): 200-212; Anthony 
Flew, “Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom,” in New Essay in Philosophical 
Theology, ed. Anthony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (London: SCM, 1955), 141-169; H. 
J. McClosky, “God and Evil,” Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1960): 97-114; Curt J. 
Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of Religion (New York: Roland Press, 1953), chap. 
16.   
34
Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 212.  
35Edward H. Madden, “The Riddle of God and Evil,” in Current Philosophical 
Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse, ed. F. C. Dommeyer (Springfield, IL: 
Charles C. Thomas, 1966), 185-200.  
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John L. Mackie and Anthony Flew,
36
 which holds that there is logical inconsistency in 
the free will theodicy propositions that God is omnipotent and wholly good and that evil 
exists.
37
  According to Plantinga, all that is needed in responding to this criticism is a 
proposition that is consistent with an omnipotent, omniscient God who co-exists with 
evil; and the proposition needs not to be true.
38
   
Hence, Plantinga argues that every possible free person contains the property 
“free to perform at least one morally wrong action.”  Therefore, for God to create a world 
containing moral good, He must create significantly free persons, and He can do that only 
by instantiating free possible persons.  Every free possible person performs at least one 
moral wrong action.  Thus, no matter what free possible person God actualizes, the 
resulting persons, if free with respect to morally significant actions, would always 
perform at least some wrong actions.  That is, it is not within God’s power to create a 
world containing moral good without evil.  Consequently, an omnipotent, omniscient, 
and all-good God’s existence is consistent with the reality of evil.39 
Nelson Pike contends that Plantinga’s argument does not do justice to the issue: 
How can an omnipotent, omniscient, and all-good God create possible persons as subsets 
of a set including the property “freely-performs-at least-one morally-wrong-action” rather 
                                                 
36
Alvin C. Plantinga, “Self-Profile,” in Alvin Plantinga, ed. James E. Tomberlin 
and Peter Van Inwagen (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing, 1985), 41.  
37
Alvin C. Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 
165-168; idem, God, Freedom, and Evil (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1975), 16-28. 
38
Alvin C. Plantinga, God and Other Minds (New York: Cornell University Press, 
1967), 151. 
39
Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, 49-53; idem, The Nature of Necessity, 184-
188; idem, God and Other Minds, 131-155.  
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than subsets of the sets including the property “freely-performs-only-right-actions”?  
Plantinga fails, argues Pike, to see the distinction between making someone do something 
and creating someone who God knows in advance will do something.
40
  From William 
Rowe’s point of view, Plantinga’s shift from free will to unfettered will refutes Flew’s 
critique.  But he does so only to weaken his argument because his defense is based on the 
claim that human freedom and some evil are better than no moral evil and no human 
freedom.
41
  Rowe claims, furthermore, that Plantinga’s reply to Mackie’s squabble is 
valid, but the argument raised does not require the premises he used.  In his view, there is 
a need for a clearer definition of the proposition that God is omnipotent before free will 
defense can controvert the criticism of Mackie and others.
42
 
Plantinga, in responding to the criticisms, specifically to Pike, argues that his 
proposition is not necessary but contingent.  It is logically possible that God can 
instantiate free persons who perform only morally right actions, but it is contingent upon 
free choices that these possible persons would make.
43
    
In his article “Compatibilism, Free Will and God,” Flew again analyzes 
Plantinga’s refutation and poses the question: “If [theodicy] is to be developed in 
incompatibilism terms, then the first problem is to show how these are to be squared with 
                                                 
40Nelson Pike, “Plantinga on the Free Will Defense: A Reply,” Journal of 
Philosophy 63 (1966): 93-104; idem, “Plantinga on Free Will and Evil,” Religious 
Studies 15 (1979): 449-473.  
41
William L. Rowe, “God and Other Minds,” Nous 3 (1969): 273-274. 
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Ibid., 276-284.  
43Alvin C. Plantinga, “Pike and Possible Persons,” Journal of Philosophy 63 
(1966): 104-108.  
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what so many classical theologians have taken to be essentials of theism.”44  Plantinga’s 
proposition, argues Stephen T. Davis, successfully rebuts the logical inconsistency 
problem in the free will theodicy.  He confidently affirms that God cannot create a world 
with moral good without possible evil.  However, the cost-effectiveness of the evil 
allowed in the world cannot be met with a philosophical solution.
45
  
 
Nature of Evil in Augustine’s Theodicy 
 
I examined Augustine’s understanding of the nature of evil by investigating 
scholars’ arguments on the privation, aesthetic, and plenitude principles found in 
Augustine’s theodicy. 
 
Privation 
 
The concept of privation in free will theodicy claims that evil is the absence of a 
good or a quality that normally would be present in a thing.  Nonetheless, some leading 
scholars reject the theory on the basis that it is a denial of the reality of evil or an attempt 
to circumvent the problem of evil.
46
  
 Stanley G. Kane, in his analysis of the theory, affirms that the rejection of the 
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1964), 196; McClosky, “God and Evil,” 10; Ducasse, A Philosophical Scrutiny of 
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concept of privation arises from misunderstanding.
47
  The basis of this confusion, Kane 
asserts, is the failure to see the function of the theory in the free will theodicy.  The 
concept is not intended to explain away evil or alleviate pain or deny the assertion that 
evil is caused by some active agent.  A superficial reading of the statements on the theory 
is the cause of the misunderstanding.  On the contrary, the idea of privation advocates a 
vivid sense of sin.  No doubt, he declares, it does not portray any intention of explaining 
away evil.  As defined by Augustine and Aquinas, Kane concedes, the theory recognizes 
evil as negative but not as non-existent.  It is negative in a sense that its existence 
depends on the nature of another thing.  The theory only describes the nature of evil.
48
  
On the other hand, affirms Kane, even with a correct understanding, the theory of 
privation has a deficient elucidation of the problem of evil.  He claims the concept fails to 
answer the problem of evil, for not all evils are privation.  Some evils are positive in 
nature and others are real but are privative.  First, its account for pain is not plausible.  A 
paralyzed leg can be considered a privation, but a leg aching with pain as suffering 
cannot be privation of good health.  It is an experience different from a paralyzed leg.  It 
is not a lack of feeling or function.
49
  Secondly, the concept does not recognize the 
distinction between a sin of omission and a sin of commission.  According to him, “On 
the privation theory we would have to say that both sorts of sin are equally evil, and that 
as evil there is really nothing in the hateful or murderous acts beyond the lack or 
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privation of love and right action.  This . . . is a reduction ad absurdum of the theory.”  
Privation does not explain all the gradations of evil in the world.
50
  
Bill Angling and Stewart Goetz, in their article “Evil is Privation,” argue that 
Kane’s rebuttal does not negate the efficiency of the privation theory.  They assert that 
pain is a privation in the sense that it entails some absence in a normal state of 
consciousness and an indicator of an absence of physical well-being.  In the same 
manner, privation handles a sin of commission adequately.  A Sin of commission 
embraces the lack of executing some duties, just like a sin of omission.  However, a sin of 
commission is a greater evil than a sin of omission inasmuch as it involves greater 
privation, “a greater deviation of the will from the dictates of conscience and thus a 
greater lack of psychic harmony.”51  
 According to John Hick, from the point of view of the modern logical theory,
52
  
“there is no basis for the hypostatization of non-being.  The situation is simply that we 
have the generally useful habit of presuming an entity of some kind corresponding to a  
noun; but sometimes the language generates words that have no denotation—and non-
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being is a case in point.”53  Thus Hick condemns the use of privation of God in 
Augustine’s theodicy.  The crucial issue with the problem of evil, Kane and Hopers 
argue, is not whether evil is positive or negative, but if there is enough reason for God to 
allow the occurrence of evil in the world.  According to them, evil as a positive reality is 
not incompatible with God’s omnipotence; if God, according to free will theodicy, uses 
evil to accomplish His purpose, then the positive or the negative reality of evil does not 
matter; for God has control over evil.  Rendering evil as negative does not give sufficient 
moral reason for the permission of evil in our world.
54
  
 P. M. Farrell argues that the idea of privation is like “the passing of colour from 
the decaying rose,” hence, in free will agents privation becomes a necessary by-product, 
“a very nature of a contingent being.”55  Wallace I. Matson also suggests that the theory 
of privation points to metaphysical evil. “Evil . . . considered in itself, is mere non-being, 
the deprivation of reality, whereas being and perfection are synonymous.  Insofar as 
anything is real, it is perfect and good.  But everything, except God, is and must be finite, 
hence everything, except God must be evil to some extent.”56  Quoting from Augusinus 
Magister, Hick explains that the principle of privation does not only make evil 
metaphysical but also makes grace a metaphysical force.
57
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  By this definition of evil as non-being St. Augustine threw into the process of 
theological reflection a principle which was to lead to a particular conception of 
grace, salvation, the Christian life, and the Church. In effect, if sin is a privation, the 
sinner is un deficient. Consequently the grace which saves him will fill up this 
deficiency, and will be an irresistible grace [un don de force]. The instrument of this 
infusion of supernatural life will be the sacrament. The Church will have the treasury 
of these sanctifying graces at its disposal and will distribute it by means of its 
priests.
58
  
 
Kane proposes that the idea of relating the inevitability of some physical evil to 
the concept of privation is not accurate; it is rather the principle of plenitude that makes 
evil a necessary consequence of contingency.  The privation theory of the nature of evil, 
he contends, is not true experientially and does not safeguard any of the beliefs of theism. 
There are no “extra-theistic” or “intra-theistic” grounds for accepting the theory.59  
 
Plenitude 
 
As mentioned earlier on, the principle of plenitude in the free will theodicy 
assumes a world that includes all forms of life in a hierarchy that descends from the 
highest form of life down to the lowest.  This principle has not gone without being 
challenged.   
According to Mackie, the theory of plenitude as a solution to the problem of evil 
makes good and evil necessary counterparts.  They exist in the same way as “quality and 
its logical opposite.”60  In addition, Hick asserts that the idea of plenitude leads to a 
despairing view.  The understanding that is derived from the principle is that God cannot 
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create good without evil, which is not in accordance with an orthodox understanding of 
God.
61
  
 If the principle of plenitude is accepted, grant Edward H. Madden and Peter H. 
Hare, then any possible universe entails both good and evil; God, as an omnipotent being, 
should be able to impose a just distribution of evil no matter what possible system He 
chose to create.  In addition, any solution to the problem of evil that relies on the 
principle of plenitude has shortcomings.  The principle leads to a paradoxical result, they 
claim.  On the one hand, God’s creation in rank, which includes all kinds of things, is 
good.  On the other hand, the mutual interference of the creatures in rank causes most 
physical evil.
62
  In his article “The Defense from Plenitude against the Problem of Evil,”  
Robert F. Burch argues that the principle solves the problem of evil.  According to him, 
the concept of plenitude is plausible in itself.  For a world with free agents that do go 
wrong is better than a world without free agents.
63
  According to Madden and Hare, the 
absurd result of the principle of plentitude is solved with the aesthetic theory.
64
   
 
Aesthetic 
 
In the free will theodicy, the aesthetic concept maintains that God has created a 
good world.  Individual parts of the world may appear evil to the human mind, but, from 
the standpoint of God, those evils are ugly patches that make the whole picture beautiful.  
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 In Mackie’s opinion, the aesthetic principle in free will theodicy presupposes a 
causal law.  Therefore, if God needs evil as a means to a good end, then He is subject to 
causal laws.  Unfortunately, he stresses, this is incongruent with what theists mean by  
omnipotent.
65
  
Furthermore, the principle implies, explain critics, that as evil contributes to the 
ultimate good, so does good equally augment the ultimate evil, but this is not always the 
case.  Some evil may turn to a good result, but the price is still high, critics explain.  A 
natural catastrophe such as an earthquake, flood, and hurricane may kill thousands of 
people, destroy properties, but also provide opportunities for service.  However, the 
opportunities are not worth the price.  Evil does not always serve as a means to good  
ends. Therefore, it is absurd to assume that the suffering of creatures is a necessary side-
effect of a world which is good as a whole.
66
  
 In the view of John Hospers, if the best universe that the designer, God, could 
bring about is one where pain and suffering lead to good ends, “perhaps he should have 
refrained from universe designing and chosen instead some activity in which he had 
greater competence.”67  He continues:  If evils such as are experienced in the world are 
good in God’s perspective, then such a moral being does not deserve worship.  God is not 
like a physician who introduces pain in order to help a patient.  He is a God who does not 
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need means such as agonizing pain to achieve a purpose.  Such procedure is needed by 
creatures.
68
  
 
Free Will and God in Relation to Evil in  
Augustine’s Theodicy 
 
The free will theodicy contends that evil is to be ascribed to the independent free 
will actions.  On the other hand, contends Mackie, the notion of freedom in free will 
theodicy makes the solution inadequate.
69
  Free will theodicy upholds a compatibilistic 
view of free will.  In this context, compatibility means that free will is coherent with 
causal determinism—everything has a causal antecedent. Hence, theological 
compatibility or determinism holds that an “action is free, whether or not it was causally 
determined, provided only that it was done by an agent whose faculties were operating 
normal, and was done because the agent chose it.”70   
According to Robert F. Brown, the compatibilistic view gives credit to God for 
the good of creation; however, it attributes the fall to inherent weakness which creatures 
possess by virtue of being created out of nothing.  The cause of evil, he claims, is shifted 
to something that fallen humanity cannot ascertain.
71
  In the free will theodicy, state 
critics, decisions are predicted from other factors and actions are predetermined by a God 
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who knew all causes; this makes free will an illusion.
72
  Hartshorne stresses that the 
explanation that “God permits us to make our own decisions but, . . . He so influences us 
that we make exact decisions He decides upon for us, and so He is responsible for our 
acts, even though they are truly ours, . . . is a mere verbiage, and that no one knows what 
it means.”73  David Basinger joins the discussion by arguing that, for the compatibilism 
view to preserve the goodness of God, the free will theodicy must conceive all evil to be 
non-gratuitous.  However, this assumption cannot hold because the proponents of the 
theodicy affirm that moral agents commit some action, sin, that God does not desire; this 
is to say, the theodicy exhibits a dilemma which cannot be escaped.
74
  
Augustine’s affirmation of free will is not compatible with an immutable 
omniscient and omnipotent God, argues David R. Griffin.  Immutable omniscience in 
Augustine means God’s knowledge does not increase or decrease in content and it also 
implies God foreknew the order of causation including the human will being the cause of 
human actions.  But this nature of God, which belongs to His essence, does not make 
humans responsible as free will theodicy requires.
75
  Therefore, an “immutable 
omnipotent God . . . would be unjustified in condemning any one to punishment for 
sinning, for . . . a person’s life could not have been one iota different from its actual 
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cause.”76  According to Hick, even if Augustine’s theodicy is granted, God cannot be 
defended from being responsible for evil, since He chose to create beings whom He 
foreknew would actualize sin and evil, when created.
77
  
The exposition on free will, continues Griffin, allows autonomy, but it is 
illusionary, for omnipotence in Augustine suggests that “the Almighty sets in motion 
even in the innermost hearts of men the movement of their will, so that He does through 
their agency whatsoever He wishes to perform through them.”78  This, Griffin contends, 
negates creatures’ freedom and responsibility, making God’s justice for punishing sinners 
questionable.
79
  Free will theodicy is self-contradictory
80
 and makes all evils 
instrumentally good.  Thus, there is no genuine evil; even evil will which is considered 
intrinsically evil is not genuine evil but apparent, for, according to Augustine, the 
universe is better with sin than without sin.
81
  
The discussion on Augustine’s theodicy explicitly shows the inadequacy of the 
solution.  Critics are not satisfied with Plantinga’s response to the logical challenge, and 
the evidential problems, such as the amount of evil and its cost-effectiveness, involved in 
the problem of evil are inefficiently explained.  These irreconcilable difficulties led 
scholars to search for a more reliable explanation to the problem of evil. We shall now 
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turn our attention to Hick’s theodicy.  
 
Hick’s Theodicy 
 
Hick notes that Fredrick Schleiermacher, in the nineteenth century, was the first to 
depart from Augustine’s theodicy.  But Hick’s theodicy is the first defined alternative to 
Augustine’s theodicy.82 
Hick argues that Augustine’s theodicy is based on a myth.83  The concept of a 
perfect free creature introducing evil into the world by perverse misuse of the free will 
has fulfilled its function as a myth in the minds of countless people, but it is preposterous 
when taken as authentic history and used in solving problems.  The use of this myth has 
created nothing but inadequacies in Augustine’s theodicy.84  Upon this self-awakening 
from Augustine’s theodicy, Hick sets off to develop a theodicy that is internally coherent 
with religious tradition and consistent with scientific enquiry.
85
   
 As he searched for a better explanation to the problem of evil, he was led to the 
themes in Irenaeus’s theology, specifically creation.  Hick develops a hypothesis from 
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Irenaeus’s theology upon which he explains moral and natural evils.86  He proposes that 
God’s purpose for creating the world is “soul-making”87 for rational moral agents. For 
this reason, God could not have created finite beings directly in the divine presence, so 
that in being conscious of that which is other than oneself, the creature is automatically 
conscious of God, the limitless reality and power, goodness and love, knowledge and 
wisdom, towering above oneself.  In such a situation, the disproportion between Creator 
and creatures would be so great that the latter would have no freedom in relation to God; 
they would indeed not exist as independent autonomous persons.
88
 
The soul-making process requires “epistemic distance,” an environment in which 
the soul-making process is an autonomous system and God is not overwhelmingly 
evident.  In this situation, finite beings exercise some measure of genuine freedom.
89
  
“One has space to exist as a finite being, a space created by this epistemic distance from 
God and protected by one’s basic cognitive freedom, one’s freedom to open or close 
oneself to the dawning awareness of God that is experienced naturally by a religious 
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animal.”90  Virtues, according to Hick, attained through an autonomous soul-making 
system are of more value than ready-made virtues created within a moral agent without 
any effort of the agent.
91
  
 Thus, God’s creation is not perfect.  The human being is created as personal being 
in the image of God, and were “only the raw material for a further and more difficult 
stage of God’s creative work.”92  Human beings are spiritually and morally immature, but 
intelligent social beings capable of awareness of the divine, and placed in an imperfect 
environment.
93
  
  With this hypothesis in place, Hick explains divine permission of pain and 
suffering in the world by discussing sin, pain, suffering, and the kingdom of God.  In the 
context of God’s purpose for human agents, the ideal relationship with God implies 
accepting our status as insignificant creatures and yet loved and valued by God in a 
universe that is dependent upon His activity.
94
  Hence, becoming aware of God and being 
obedient servants to His purpose is the duty of humanity.
95
  However, rational agents did 
not follow the ideal relationship, but rather treated self as the center of the world. This is 
sin; it belongs to nature and is the source of many forms of evil.  Following Augustine, he 
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claims sin constitutes the heart of the problem of evil.
96
  God has permitted this because 
He has endowed His creatures with cognitive freedom that proceeds from the nature of 
the agent.
97
  The epistemic distance makes sin unavoidable.  He writes, “Man’s spiritual 
location at an epistemic distance from God makes it virtually inevitable that man will 
organize his life apart from God and in self-centered competitiveness with his fellows.”98  
 Pain gives rise to suffering, but suffering is not the reaction to only physical pain 
but also a reaction to emotional pain.  The ability to cope with pain depends upon the 
inward attitude of the suffering individuals.
99
  According to Hick, pain-receptors are 
sensitive to any kind of stimulus that impinges upon the organism that is violent enough 
to damage it.  As a result, physical pain serves as a warning signal to living creatures, a 
biological function that relates to a normal state of health rather than a state of disease.
100
  
Every mobile mammal has become skilled at basic procedures of self-preservation 
through pain.  Living creatures have gained knowledge of how to guide their movements 
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successfully within their material environment.
101
  He argues that God could have created 
a utopian world, but the goodness God desires for humanity cannot be achieved except 
“through a long process of creaturely experience in response to challenges and disciplines 
of various kind.”102  Therefore, he writes, “Under the existing dispensation, each of life’s 
evils may perhaps be necessary to ward off some greater evil, or attain a good which is 
not” attainable in a painless world.103  Animals are liable to pain because it follows from 
their nature as living creatures.  However, since animal life forms part of the independent 
natural order in which humanity is related and by which humankind is “enabled to exist 
as a free and responsible creature in the presence of his infinite Creator,”104 the animal 
kingdom plays an indirect but significant role in forming rational agents into the likeness 
of God.  Thus, animal pain is subordinate to human sin and suffering.
105
  
  Suffering, “a state of mind in which we wish violently that our situation were 
otherwise,” is a function of sin.106  Human life can be full of suffering because of self-
centeredness; sin causes suffering.  Considering God’s purpose, he argues, sinfulness is 
the price we paid for our cognitive freedom.  Thus, sin and suffering are something that 
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ought to exist for God to achieve His purpose, but to be abolished after He had reached 
His aim.  Their contribution, however, has no intrinsic value in themselves but the  
activities whereby they are overcome: redemption from sin and human beings’ service in 
the midst of suffering.  This means moral qualities would have no value without 
suffering.
107
   
However, the amount of suffering in the world is left to mystery.  According to 
Hick, “The solution to this baffling problem of excessive and undeserved suffering is a 
frank appeal to the positive value of mystery.  Such suffering remains unjust and 
inexplicable, haphazard and cruelly excessive.  The mystery of excessive suffering is a 
real mystery, impenetrable to the rationalizing human mind.”108  On the one hand, the 
excessive undeserved and ethically meaningless suffering challenges Christian faith.  On 
the other hand, theological reflections on the amount of suffering show that it contributes 
to the world as a place in which “true human goodness can occur and in which loving 
sympathy and compassionate self-sacrifice takes place.”109  
  Hick indicates that the present epoch of human history is only at the beginning 
stages of God’s purpose for rational beings.  In most cases, evil events breed strength of 
character, courage, unselfishness, patience, and moral steadfastness.  Nonetheless, he 
recognizes that too often the opposite is true:  Wickedness multiplies, personalities 
disintegrate under suffering and pain, good events turn into evil, kindness into bitterness, 
and hope to despair.  He remarks that, looking back in historical records, we can conclude 
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that not “all sin leads to redemption” and not “all suffering leads to a good end.”110  The 
mingling of good and evil in human experience continues throughout life.  A decisive 
victory over evil must include life after death.
111
  
  He notes that, since God’s soul-making purpose is not realized in the present 
personal life of most beings at the time of death to inherit the Kingdom of God, there is 
an intermediate state, a state where the scenes of soul-making are completed: 
“Progressive sanctification after death.”  Its extent and duration depends on the degree of 
unsanctification remaining to be overcome at the time of death.  “It is quite evident that 
the creating of human beings into children of God is not usually completed by the 
moment of bodily death and that if it is ever to be completed it must continue beyond this 
life.”112  Hick asserted that God reconstitutes an individual who dies in this world without 
reaching the likeness to Him, in the soul-making process, in another world.
113
  In the 
post-mortem world, the reconstituted individual is a replica of him or her as he or she was 
the moment before his or her death in this world.  The “replica”114 is the same person in 
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all respects with the exception of “continuous occupancy of space.”115  He contends that 
operations of divine grace are directed to the replica in order that the inherent need of  
human nature may eventually lead him freely to respond to his or her God.
116
   
  The ultimate justification of evil is rooted in God’s purpose for humans and in the 
final comprehensive fulfillment of that purpose.  It is the infinite good of the end state of 
human persons, pre-envisioned in God’s soul-making purpose for them, that ultimately 
justifies the existence of any and all evil in the world.  “For the justification of evil, 
according to this Irenaean type of theodicy, is that it is a necessary part of a process 
whose end product is to be an infinite good—namely, the perfection and endless joy of all 
finite personal life.”117  In this way, none perish.  God’s purpose for humankind will at 
last be fulfilled in every rational being.
118
  It can be predicted that “sooner or later, in our 
own time and in our own way, we shall all freely come to God; and universal salvation 
can be affirmed, not as a logical necessity but as the contingent, but predictable outcome 
of the process of the universe interpreted theistically.”119  
 
Critical Discussion on Hick’s Theodicy 
 
In the foregoing discussion, I have outlined Hick’s soul-making theodicy. 
Presently, one needs to ask questions regarding the evaluation of this theodicy.  This 
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section summarizes scholars’ assessment of this theodicy.  
  Hick’s theodicy has received a number of acknowledgments from scholars.  In his 
book Why Me? Why Mine? Clear Thinking about Suffering, Paul F. Andrus undoubtedly 
expands on Hick’s soul-making theodicy and provides a defense for the theodicy.  He 
writes, “We have reason to thank Irenaeus for this part of his theology. . . .  It provides us 
a point from which to develop our new concept of the role of suffering.”120  Robert C. 
Mesle also points out the significance of Hick’s theodicy.  In his view, the theodicy 
portrays a God with personal love qualities that classical theodicy lacks.
121
  Hick has 
brought to the history of theodicy, contends Gilbert Fulmer, an “analytic talent, historical 
scholarship and a degree of fair mindedness that is, sadly, not always evident on either 
side of the ongoing controversy over theism.”122  However, the theodicy is not without 
obvious challenges.  
  Opponents and critics have pointed out that the theodicy has not responded to all 
the crucial issues involved with the problem of evil.
123
  We now turn to a brief discussion 
of the issues raised against this theodicy.  These are discussed under excessive suffering  
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and genuine evil and eschatology and free will. 
Excessive Suffering and Genuine Evil 
in Hick’s Theodicy 
 
William Rowe concurs with Hick on the idea that, if the soul-making hypothesis 
is true, it is rational for us to believe that there is excessive evil in the world.  However, 
the cost-benefit analysis shows that excessive evil defaces the image of Christ and 
destroys growth into His likeness, maintains Rowe.  The evil that falls on humans is 
destructive to the soul-making concept.  The excessive evil in the world is more than 
what an omnipotent God would have to permit for soul-making.  If there is such a 
powerful God, He could have prevented a good deal of evil without altering the soul-
making process.
124
  
  Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, in harmony with Hick, replies that Rowe’s criticism 
does not disapprove the soul-making hypothesis.  Both contend that the assertion “it is 
rational to assume excessive amount of evil is needed for soul-making” entails “it is 
rational to assume that the evil in the world exceeds what is needed for soul-making.”125  
Conversely, asserts Zagzebski, Hick’s theodicy has to appeal to divine love rather than 
the goodness of soul-making.  Defending the hypothesis on the grounds of the goodness 
of soul-making attracts a comparison of the soul-making with other alternatives.   In 
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addition, “It seems . . . that soul-making is something a good being would be motivated to 
produce, not for the sake of any good, but simply because a good being is loving and a 
loving being acts in that way.”126  Hick, in response to Zagzebski, claims her proposal 
handles only moral evil but not suffering and pain caused by natural disasters.  On the 
other hand, love and goodness are connected.  God loves us means God cares for us and 
seeks the highest good for us.  In this sense, the theodicy appeals to divine love for 
establishing a world with epistemic distance in order that we may come to the 
actualization of the good He intends for us.
127
  
  Critics insist that souls that progress morally and spiritually in the face of 
excessive evil do not reach perfection.  According to M. B. Ahern, even if granted that 
evil is logically necessary for moral growth, there was a great deal of evil, such as 
physical and psychological evil among animals, before humans inhabited this world; 
those have nothing to do with the moral development of humans.
128
  In response, Fulmer 
contends that Hick does not claim that every individual evil is logically necessary, but 
that the world in this condition, in which goods and evils are created and distributed 
according to natural laws, requires humans to make a moral choice.
129
  Critics assert that, 
if, according to Hick, soul-making continues beyond the grave and better progress is 
made in post-mortem environments, then why did God not place us in such an 
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environment from the beginning?
130
  Hick deals with some of the difficult issues involved 
in the question of the amount of suffering in the world.  He claims God cannot eliminate 
some evils without removing all evils, but excessive undeserved suffering is a mystery.
131
  
Fulmer argues that Hick’s treatment of the issues involved with excessive evil is 
unsuccessful and inconsistent with Hick’s own beliefs.  Hick adopts the Kantian 
deontological ethical framework to deal with excessive evil, claims Fulmer.  However, 
his theodicy does not meet the Kantian ethical requirement that human beings should 
always be treated as valuable ends, never as means to an end.  Even, Fulmer insists, the 
appeal to mystery is not good enough to handle the question: “Why do the innocent suffer 
in order to build the souls of others?”132  Mystery may be a necessary condition for an 
adequate response to God, granted Ahern.  “Worship, for example, supposes inequality of 
a radical kind which excludes the making of demands even for clarity.  It supposes total 
submission and trust. A response of this kind might not be possible without mystery.  
However, as it stands, Hick’s theory cannot be explained in this way.”133  
  Furthermore, Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare maintain that Hick’s “all or 
nothing” and “slippery slope”134  concepts that he uses to explain excessive evil are not 
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sufficient.  The argument is based on a wrong notion that, if God starts eliminating some 
evils, He would not be able to stop at the exact point at which “soul-making” was most 
efficiently achieved.
135
  There are many ways of guiding one’s moral growth without 
undermining freedom.  Puccetti argues that 
there is no need to choose between a completely painless world and the actual world. 
Just as there could be a far more painful scheme of things without changing the stable 
environment of natural laws, so could there be a far less painful one. It is not at all 
clear . . . that God would be obliged to create the organic world as we now know it 
through evolution.
136
  
For there is neither a contradiction in God for starting off a world with no past 
history nor an incongruity in a world in which all creatures live on plants.  It would be 
our world with the exception that nature would not be “red in tooth and claw.”137  
  After analyzing three imaginary worlds with less or no useless suffering, Clement 
Dore concludes that there is no other world better for soul-making than our present 
world. He states that a world with stringent obligations is more enviable than a world 
without any stringent obligations.  For “it is a general rule that the greater the failure 
which would have resulted had one not triumphed, the more splendid is the victory, and 
this rule applies to resisting the temptation to do what is morally wrong.”138  William  
Hasker also claims it is scientifically known that any change to our world might result in 
a universe in which intelligent life is not possible.  Therefore, the argument that God 
                                                 
135
Ibid.  
136Puccetti, “Loving God:  Some Observation on John Hick’s Evil and the God of 
Love,” 261.  
137
Ibid. 
138
Clement Dore, “An Examination of the ‘Soul-Making’ Theodicy,” American 
Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970): 124-126.  
54 
could have created a different world is intelligibly impossible.
139
  
  In his reaction to Puccetti, Hick contends that a world in which suffering occurs 
justly or a world in which suffering works for good of the sufferer, suffering would not 
evoke sympathy for neighbors, hence such worlds are inconsistent with soul-making.  He 
claims that in a world that is to be the scene of compassionate love and self-giving for 
others, suffering must fall upon mankind with something of the haphazardness and equity 
that we now experience.
140
  
  Critics insist that Hick’s theodicy is insufficient and it does not recognize genuine 
evil.  Every evil is considered apparent evil.  It may be true that some virtues are 
developed in the face of evil, but pain and suffering frustrate human endeavor.  Most of 
the time, there is no point in evil; it is not essential as a catalyst in the life of humanity. 
Goodness does not triumph in the face of adversity.
141
  
 
Eschatology and Free Will in 
Hick’s Theodicy 
 
As it is postulated in Hick’s theodicy, the fulfillment of divine purpose, growing 
into the likeness of God, presupposes life after death in some form.  It is said that any 
coherent theodicy cannot do without dependence upon eschatology.
142
  However, the type 
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of eschatology embedded in Hick’s theodicy has not escaped criticism.  
  There seems to be no rational grounds for the final state in this theodicy, 
suggested Stanley G. Kane.  After one has gone through horrendous evils, sometimes 
debilitating, demoralizing, and defeating struggles with situations, to possess values 
which cannot be attained under any other circumstances, according to Hick, the 
individual is accepted into a state where all these values are not needed, nor are there 
opportunities to put them to use.  This is, asserts Kane, a ridicule on humankind.
143
  
  Hasker comes to the defense of Hick’s theodicy by expounding on the importance 
of virtues in Hick’s theodicy.  In his view, virtues cultivated in this life are relevant in 
this life and the next.  He claims Kane’s argument has no force and it is inconsistent with 
Christianity as well as common morality.  Heroes who have gone before us no longer 
need their achievements, but throughout history they are prized, esteemed, and honored.  
Hasker continues, saying that Christianity does not claim to have much knowledge about 
the future life but it is clear that virtues achieved here enable one to respond appropriately 
to dangers and suffering of others, but it is not to be taken that virtue has no effect on 
personality apart from these particular sorts of situations.
144
  Hick defends his theodicy by 
claiming that Kane’s argument focuses on a narrow view of soul-making; however, soul-
making is not about acquiring specific virtues but is about building a relationship with 
God.
145
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 Douglas Geivett declares that the idea of multiple future opportunities to reconcile 
with God is ridiculous.  The prophets’ plea is in the sense of urgency and finality, never 
in multiple after-death opportunities.  Granted that, Geivett claims, life history is divided 
into a number of states, if the first state is completed in this life, no infinite rewards in the 
final state can compensate for the difficulties in this life.
146
  Paul Edwards asserts that 
God cannot be exonerated for permitting evil irrespective of after-death benefits the 
sufferer might accrue.  The infinite future good will not eradicate what, for example, 
“Hitler and Stalin and their predecessors and associates did to countless human 
beings.”147 
Dan R. Stiver in his article, “Hick against Himself,” contends that the 
reconstitution view of the resurrection associated with this after-death state undermines 
the entire theodicy.  For the replica is not the same as the actual person who lived an 
earthly life.  The theodicy, with its reconstitution view, puts forward the likelihood of 
God creating beings who meet the criteria of the Irenaean intuition, but who had never 
experienced actual evils of the world.  If God can do this, then He could hardly be 
justified for permitting the evils in question.
148
  Hick replies that, according to the 
Irenaean principle, it is logically impossible for God to create morally mature beings 
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whose spiritual maturity is the result of exercising genuine free will.
149
  
  Stephen Davis simply indicates that Hick’s universalism150 conflicts with the data 
of Christian tradition to which he subscribes.  Only a personal God would have an 
unlimited time and arguments to win people over, but Hick’s God is not a personal God 
since creation is in epistemic distance.
151
  It places a heavy price tag on Hick’s theodicy. 
The theodicy denies any kind of action by divine fiat.  Therefore, if universalism is 
affirmed, human freedom is ultimately denied and genuine freedom, which the theodicy 
is committed to, is rendered illusive.  God cannot truly love if He compels His creatures 
to love Him in return by manipulating them or making heaven compulsory.
152
  Logically, 
asserts Geivett, it is impossible for God to bring all free creatures to eventual moral and 
spiritual perfection.  It is the contingent state of affairs that will finally determine those 
free creatures that remain morally and spiritually recalcitrant or morally and spiritually 
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matured.  As a result, universalism makes free will shallow and arbitrary.
153
  In addition, 
the act of choosing demands that every conscious being exercising free will must have 
adequate knowledge of the things from which they make their choice.  However, in 
Hick’s theodicy, epistemic distance implies that choosing to have a relationship with God 
is done in ignorance, Geivette argues.  This is inconsistent with genuine free will.
154
  
 In reply to this critique, Hick maintains that critics base their contention on a 
notion that claims God can ensure the salvation of all men only by coercion.  However, 
this is a wrong notion.  The truth, he writes, is that “to be created at all is to be subject to 
an ultimate arbitrariness and determination.”  Human nature has an innate quest that is 
basically oriented towards God. Therefore, there can be no final opposition between 
God’s creative will and human freedom, claims Hick.155  
 According to critics, Hick does not recognize that his usage of free will together 
with epistemic distance makes God ontologically responsible for evil.  God holds people 
responsible when ignorance is one’s own fault.  However, in his system, individuals are 
responsible for their actions even when their original ignorance is God’s doing.  This 
makes his free will and epistemic distance concepts unconvincing and inconsistent.
156
  
 Edwards avers that, in light of Hick’s understanding, eschatological elements are 
inseparable from any conception of God and the universe; therefore, any objections to his 
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concept of immortality inevitably are the objections to his system in its entirety, 
particularly his doctrine of God.
157
    
 The discussion shows that, although Hick’s theodicy is an attempt at a 
breakthrough in the history of theodicy, it not only gives insufficient solutions to some 
theodical problems, but also adds some new problems. We now turn our attention to 
Process theodicy.  
 
Process Theodicy  
 
Process theology is a rethinking of traditional dogmatic structure.
158
  Process 
theists believe the process movement fills a vacuum created as a result of a shift from a 
worldview that affirms determinism, objective knowledge, and materialism, to a world 
view that considers things as dynamic, relative, and relational.
159
  Accordingly, it has 
liberated Christianity from “Greek and Hellenistic notions that have distorted the essence 
of Christianity.”  It has offered an “intellectually and emotionally satisfying 
reinterpretation of Christianity that is compatible with late-twentieth century ways of 
thinking.”160  David Griffin argues that traditional theism has an insoluble problem of evil 
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because of its acceptance of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo.
161
  In his view, process 
theodicy is developed upon the teachings of process philosophy and theology with Alfred 
North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne as its two major originators.  It shares much in 
common with traditional theism, affirming the existence of a God who is both perfect in 
power and goodness, but it is nontraditional in the affirmation of creation out of chaos, as 
well as its interpretation of divine power and many other divine attributes.
162
  
  Process theodicy is rooted in a metaphysic that claims that “to be an actuality is to 
exercise creativity and that there is necessarily a realm of finite actualities with creativity 
of their own.”163  This means, according to Griffin, every actuality has twofold power: 
the power of self-creation on the basis of creative influences received from other 
actualities, and the power to influence the self-determination of subsequent individuals.
164
  
Accordingly, the dual power is a continuous twofold process.  All reality, including God, 
is a process.  Each actuality is a momentary event of a multiplicity of data with the 
potentiality of becoming another object.  However, the multiple data do not determine the 
event, but how the data are synthesized with every other event that has ever contributed 
toward the making of a particular event.  The actual entities become subjects  
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and immediately become objects available to be experienced by subsequent events. 
Everything is necessarily dipolar. God has two natures: the primordial, which includes 
the unchanging, unlimited, unconscious side of God’s nature, and the consequent, which 
is the limited, changing, conscious, and temporal aspect of God.
165
  
  That is, according to process writers, the necessary existence of God implies the 
necessary existence of a world of finite actualities.  Thus, God did not create the world ex 
nihilo, but created the known universe out of some pre-existent actualities, co-eternal 
with God.
166
  He created finite events out of chaos; they were not enduring things, not 
even primitive enduring things such as electrons and quarks.  The chaos from which our 
world began is a final state of another world.
 167
  Before God initiated the creation of our 
world, the two-fold process of actualities’ creativity produces trivial results, which do not 
belong to enduring objects, due to the fact that they constituted chaos.  Their creativity is 
the “most fundamental type of power or energy, having the potential to be transmuted 
into the contingent forms of energy constituting our universe.”168  Creation is God  
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bringing order out of chaos for the purpose of increased intensity, which will result in 
greater intrinsic good.  His creation is rescuing the finite realm from triviality.
169
  
  The power embodied in finite creatures is inherent rather than a gift bestowed by 
God.  It is part of their being, metaphysical, and God can neither control nor evoke it.  
The power of the creatures is independent from God.
170
  Self-creation and causality are 
not exerted only by humans but by all individuals; however, creativity is in degree.  
There is a degree of quality between a living organism and an inorganic environment.  
The creativity of actualities, through long years of incessant oscillation between the one 
and the many, has evolved into freedom and even greater freedom in humans.  It is a 
metaphysical necessity that all creatures have some degree of freedom, depending upon 
their self-determinative response to received data.
171
  However, God possesses the 
greatest power—the power that yields worthwhile results.172  Hypothetically, God cannot 
rule the world by coercion in any form but by persuasion.  He only persuades creatures 
toward the things which, when actualized, will result in the most possible aesthetic value 
in every situation.  He only provides every creature with “initial subjective aim”—ideal 
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and creative possibilities.
173
  Process thinkers claim the process which God initiated for 
the purpose of the greatest aesthetic value is a progressive one.  Each step brings a greater 
actuality of the present and also provides a more complex form of actuality in the future, 
capable of greater intrinsic good.
174
  
  It is on this basis that process theologians respond to the problem of evil.  The 
reality of evil, argue process thinkers, does not contradict the existence of God.  An 
event, in process system, is intrinsically good when there is harmony and intensity.  It is 
good to the degree that it is both harmonious and intense.  Intensity requires complex 
experience, and complexity presupposes order.  In other words, before an experience can 
lead to moral goodness, there must first be complex data and the ability to simplify the 
data in an orderly manner.  Evil is the opposite of intensity and harmony.  An experience 
is intrinsically evil when there is a clash or disharmony between two elements of an 
experience so that there is a feeling of mutual destructiveness.  Triviality is the opposite 
of intensity, but triviality is evil only in comparison to what should have been obtained. 
Intensity, as well as harmony, is essential in order to attain moral goodness and overcome 
unnecessary triviality and discord.  Thus, the response of an actuality to the data received 
                                                 
173
Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 118-120; Lewis S. Ford, “Divine 
Persuasion and the Triumph of the Good,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought: 
The Major Implications of a Major Modern Movement, ed. Delwin Brown et al. 
(Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971), 288-293; Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, 268; 
Hartshorne, The Divine Relativity, 138, 154; Griffin, “Creation out of Chaos and the 
Problem of Evil,” 123-124; Ogden, Faith and Freedom,77. 
174
Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New 
York: Macmillan, 1929), 161, 169, 244, 381; Griffin, God, Power, and Evil, 286-287; 
idem, Evil Revisited, 23; Cobb and Griffin, Process Theology, 73. 
64 
determines the aesthetic value.
175
  
  In light of this, good and evil are two sides of the creativity of finite creatures. 
According to Hartshorne, the “risk of evil and opportunity for good are two aspects of 
just one thing: multiple freedom. . . .  This is the sole, but sufficient, reason for evil as 
such and in general.”176  Griffin explains this by stating that there is correlation among 
metaphysical variables: the power of self-determination, the power to influence others 
either for good or evil, the ability to enjoy positive value, and the ability to suffer 
negative value.  For a positive correlation to exist, there must be a proportional increase 
in all the variables.
177
  Hence, “the possibility of evil is necessary if there was to be the 
possibility of all the good that has occurred and may occur in the future.”178   
 In a discussion on the correlation of the principle of intrinsic goodness with that 
of freedom, Griffin writes:  
Why did God bring forth creatures with high degrees of freedom?  The answer is not 
primarily that freedom is worth all the evils which it can produce simply because it is 
so overwhelmingly valuable in itself, or because only those moral and religious acts 
and/or virtues which are genuinely free are valuable in the sight of God.  Rather, the 
answer is that no significant degree of intrinsic values would be possible without a 
significant degree of freedom.  If there is trivial freedom, there is trivial value.
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Freedom and the correlation are metaphysical, hence God cannot exercise 
unilateral coercive power to compel creatures, even those with minimal freedom, to obey 
the divine will.
180
  God could not have actualized any other world.  Creatures’ refusal to 
heed to God’s purpose to lure them toward the actualization of potentials for the most 
aesthetic value has resulted in moral evil, sin: “the intention to actualize oneself in such a 
way as not to maximize the conditions for intrinsic good in the future.”181   
Therefore, good and evil are the direct result of God initiating chaos into the 
process of order.  In His primordial nature, God constantly provides the world with 
possible ways in which the world can advance or increase in aesthetic value.  On the 
other hand, He incessantly stores up the experiences, both good and evil, of the finite 
actualities in His consequent nature.  In a sense, God experiences the evils and the good 
of creation; He is a fellow sufferer.
182
  
  Process writers hold a popular idea that good will overcome evil in the future.  In 
their opinion, God is the source of novelty in the world; and the fact that His initiation of 
creation has brought our world halfway between chaos and perfection is an assurance that 
He will ultimately achieve aesthetic value and immortality in His eternity.
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Critical Discussion on Process Theodicy  
 
Process theodicy has obviated the insurmountable theodical problems involved in 
maintaining that it is due to divine free choice that there is an actual world with self- 
moving creatures.  Scholars agree with process writers on the idea that there would be no 
significant degree of intrinsic value without a significant degree of freedom.  Human 
activities spin between chaos and order, triviality and intensity of experience.
184
  
However, Ronald Nash claims process theology is a “capitulation to paganism.” Process 
theologians supplant essential Christian beliefs with pagan beliefs.
185
  Specifically, 
process theodicy, argues Hefner, is no “advance in its final outcome over traditional 
theodicies.”186  Upon closer study of process theodicy, critics uncover a number of 
difficulties.  We shall now turn to a brief summary of scholars’ discussions on some 
issues such as divine power and evil and divine goodness in relation to evil.  
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Divine Power and Evil in                                                                                                        
Process Theodicy 
Process theists firmly allege that persuasion is the greatest of all possible powers 
and the only one that is morally capable of a worthwhile result.  Coercion is not 
compatible with metaphysics, hence God cannot use coercion in any form.
187
  Opponents 
of process theodicy indicate that process theists’ arguments in favor of persuasive power 
are inconsistent.
188
  Process thinkers claim, David Basinger argues, that coercion is 
metaphysically inappropriate, yet in criticizing the concept of God in Augustinian 
theodicy, they argue that a being that could coerce should at times do so.  This is, 
contends Basinger, an explicit dilemma in the process theists’ concept of persuasive 
power.  On the one hand, the use of coercive power is morally superior, justifiable, and 
demanded in some human cases. On the other hand, coercion is metaphysically 
impossible.
189
  The question is, Why would God allow human coercion in some matters 
but He would not coerce in any way? There is no reason for assuming that God consents 
to human coercion in some cases and that He would not coerce in this manner even if this 
were possible.  One of the beliefs must be dropped or modified.  After a long rebuttal of 
process explanation of persuasive power, he concludes that the process idea that God 
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cannot coerce in any way is doubtful and their perception on divine omnipotence is not 
more adequate than the view affirmed by classical theism.
190
  
Lewis S. Ford and Griffin respond to Basinger’s critique.  Ford claims the 
criticism disappears when coercion and persuasion are examined in the context of process 
theists’ worldview.  In his view, the Whiteheadian theists’ understanding of freedom is in 
the context of self-creation, not in the traditional worldview in which God unilaterally  
determines everything; hence it is impossible for process exponents to embrace the idea 
of a coercive God.
191
  Griffin, on the other hand, argues that the denunciation of Basinger 
does not stand up to scrutiny because he neglected to see the distinction between the 
human body and soul.  In process metaphysics, he continues, coercion can occur only by 
means of instrumentalities and by things with bodies.  It can be exerted on the body but 
not on anything that initiates activity, such as the soul. God has no divine body which 
could be used to exert coercion.
192
  
  From the critics’ point of view, the process thinkers’ understanding of the 
traditional concept of the doctrine of divine omnipotence and Charles Hartshorne’s 
argument that with respect to power ownership is exclusive, they have an either/or 
dichotomy between coercive and persuasive powers.
193
  Nancy Frankenberry stipulates 
that process theologians ignore a range of power between the two extremes of power, 
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coercion and persuasion.  In addition, their understanding of persuasive power is limited. 
The process rendition of persuasive power puts emphasis only on one side of God’s 
nature.  He is always showing “mercy never wrath,” “loving never judgment,” “freeing 
never confining,” and “blessing never cursing.”194  According to Peterson, their concept 
of persuasion lacks the mutual respect for the individual’s rational dignity that 
accompanies morality of persuasion.
195
  Griffin again points out that the either/or 
dichotomy between two powers is based on the psychological meaning of the terms 
instead of the metaphysical meaning.  Metaphysically, he emphasizes, the distinction 
between the two powers is “none” and “some”; there is an absolute difference between 
the two terms. Coercion in a metaphysical sense occurs only if the efficient cause totally 
determines the effect, but if a causal relation is completed with the effect of making a 
self-determining response, no matter how trivial it may be, it is an example of 
persuasion.
196
  
  Peter Hare and Edward Madden agree with the process writers on the suggestion 
that coercion is morally repugnant and incoherent in the metaphysics of social process; 
however, permission of degrees of freedom in their theological framework makes degrees 
of coercion necessary.  On empirical grounds, they argue, the process theists’ notion of 
persuasive power fails.  In some situations, persuasion alone is morally inappropriate. 
Any reasonable person requests of God whatever mixture of coercion and persuasion is 
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suitable in a situation.
197
  Affirming this critique is Frankenberry, who sees creatures as 
exercising the ontological power of self-determination.  In everyday life, avers 
Frankenberry, individuals pass on their pulsating creative energy without threatening 
another’s autonomy, but rather make achievements possible.  That is, we energize each 
other without impinging on self-determined freedom.  Creative freedom is not transmitted 
without form, yet there is a succinct distinction of the form it takes.  Thus, declares 
Frankenberry, there is a distinction between energizing another and inclining another in a 
certain direction without infringing on genuine exercise of freedom.  However, process 
writers affirm a relational system, but emphasize persuasion at the expense of imparted 
energy.
198
  
 Proponents of process theodicy have argued against this criticism, claiming that 
persuasive power is the only means to resolve theodicy.
199
  Dalton D. Baldwin and J. E. 
Barnhart maintain that the criticism of Hare and Madden is based on a wrong concept of 
persuasion.  Baldwin argues that, in process metaphysics, actual entities possess freedom 
of conceptual innovation.  Therefore, God cannot coerce in a sense of encountering evil, 
and the outcome of persuasion is based on finite entities’ choice rather than the strength 
                                                 
197
Hare and Madden, “Evil and Persuasive Power,” 45-48.  
198
Frankenberry, “Some Problems in Process Theodicy,” 182-183. 
199Dalton D. Baldwin, “Evil and Persuasive Power: A Response to Hare and 
Madden,” Process Studies 3 (1973): 267-270; Joe E. Barnhart, “Persuasive and Coercive 
Power in Process Metaphysics,” Process Studies 3 (1973): 153-157; Lewis S. Ford, “The 
Power of God and the Christ,” in Religious Experience and Process Theology: The 
Pastoral Implications of a Major Modern Movement, ed. Harry James Cargas and 
Bernard Lee (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), 79-92. 
71 
of persuasion.
200
  Although their argument is invalid, attests Barnhart, yet they emphasize 
“quasi-coercive power which would not so much frustrate the desire of finite entities that 
already are in the scheme of things” but process writers pay no attention to it.201  
 Ford expresses that Whitney, a process theologian who bases his writings solely 
on the expositions of Hartshorne, embraces the concept of God exercising both coercive 
and persuasive powers.  But his concept of coercion differs from the critics’ notion of 
coercion, which thwarts our desires.  According to Ford, Whitney speaks of coercive 
power only in the sense of God establishing the laws of nature or providing initial aims. 
This power is coercive because it is beyond our control and consent.
202
  As Griffin 
buttresses his arguments against the mixture of coercion and persuasive powers in 
process theodicy, he makes a distinction between genuine individuals and mere 
aggregates. Genuine individuals are a unity of experience; they exercise only persuasion 
amongst them because they have the ability to respond to received data, but mere 
aggregates exercise coercion because they are unable to respond to their environment.  
However, genuine individuals may coerce by virtue of the body; in this indirect sense, 
some coercion may be regarded as divine activity.
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Divine Goodness and Evil in                                                                                                  
Process Theodicy 
Stephen Lee Ely, in his article “The Religious Availability of Whitehead’s God,” 
argued that the God of Whitehead’s “metaphysical analysis is not the God of religions.  
Whatever religious value Whitehead’s God may have depends upon aspects of God that 
lie beyond reason—aspects that Whitehead either intuits, guesses at or has faith in.”204  
Process theologians have refuted Ely’s arguments, claiming he has not been sufficiently 
just to the richness of Whitehead’s thought.205  However, Frankenberry argues that doubts 
about the process theists’ God have lingered.  Process theodicy assumes divine 
omnipotence as persuasive power for the sake of preserving God’s goodness, but it fails 
to make good on its claim to protect the moral character of deity.
206
  If evil does not cut 
deeply into the life of God as it lacerates human life, then God is not a fellow sufferer.  
On the other hand, if it does, then God is not morally good.
207
  In responding, Griffin 
claims that God suffers sympathetically with His creatures, but the evil He suffers is not 
intended, but undergone.  Therefore, the evil God suffers is aesthetic not moral.
208
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The existence of primordial chaos, critics argue, allows process theologians to 
implicate God in the process of evil without indicting God’s collaboration because the 
metaphysical principles which guard the interaction of beings are beyond divine 
decision.
209
  Furthermore, the idea that God constantly works to overcome evil through 
evolutionary process is absurd.  It is a process based on aesthetic principles rather than 
moral principles.  In addition, the course of history demonstrates that His efforts have 
hardly made any difference.  If God and evil, opponents claim, are part of reality and God 
has no upper hand over evil because of metaphysical principle, then God is neither 
perfect nor good, and nothing short of perfection is worthy of worship.
210
  Carl Henry 
maintains that if a process God cannot create an ideal world in the first place, He could 
do little to overcome evil.  He cannot remove the evils that we suffer in this world.  The 
world will forever remain as it is.  If God is an aspect of all that happens in the world, 
then it is not possible to make an absolute distinction between good and evil.
211
  Hare and 
Madden claim that process theists limit God’s goodness to unselfish sacrifice and make 
Him weak.  He is very weak if He is unable to move the world and Himself toward 
novelty without enormous cost in pain.  Considering God’s affinity with creation from 
eternity, if He could not change or create it as He would like, He should have known the  
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weakness of the mechanism of creation and crush it to prevent it from the situation in  
which we find ourselves.  For, continues Hare and Madden, “it takes a skilled mechanic 
to assemble an automobile engine but only a small child to put it out of order.”212  
  The assumption that God ideally perfects every event in His consequent nature, 
opponents argue, demonstrates that God has devised ways of enjoying what seems evil to 
us.  Evil, in this sense, is apparent rather than genuine.
213
  The salvaging of evil by 
transmuting its discordance into divine enjoyment does not benefit the sufferer; God’s 
feelings alone are considered important.  God conserves and produces values that He 
alone enjoys from the events of actualities, no matter how ugly they are.  Suffering, pain, 
difficulties, and pleasures of finite beings are material for God’s consequent nature.  The 
maximization of intensity and the complexity of experience necessarily include an 
amount of discord and conflict only to obtain novelty.
214
  This aesthetic explanation does 
not solve the problem of evil any more than the theodicies which process theologians 
have criticized.  It is indifference toward human good; therefore, it is another model of 
the conception that evil is an illusion of our shortsightedness:  What seems evil to us is 
really not evil in the sight of God.
215
  Paradoxically, mentions Ronald O. Durham, even 
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the classical God was more ‘available.’216  As a matter of fact, it is another form of the 
classical free-will solution to the problem of evil.
217
  
  Maurice R. Barineau defends process theodicy against criticism on the issue of 
prehension of evil for aesthetic purposes.  He concedes, with the critics, that a process 
God prehends every evil as a means toward the perfection of the world and Godself.  But 
he argues that the fact that God uses every evil for the foundation through which He 
perfects the world and himself does not make evil apparent.
218
  Hence, the issue is 
whether the Whiteheadian God prehends every evil as morally necessary and justified for 
novelty.
219
  Others reply to these issues by asserting that actual entities’ inevitable failure 
to conform to God’s aim creates genuine evils; God prehends these evils negatively.  
Although He extracts all the possible good from such evil, He preserves them as objects 
of immediacy, not as future envisagement.
220
  But Griffin affirms that process theodicy, 
his in particular, rationalizes evil but not in the sense of traditional theodicy, according to 
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which all actual evil is said to be necessary for the greater good.  It only rationalizes evil 
by claiming that some events classified by humans as evil must not be considered as 
genuine evil because they are necessary, and for those that are not necessary, their 
possibility is necessary.
221
  
  Frankenberry claims Griffin’s conclusion in God, Power and Evil points out that 
process theodicy has not “succeeded in salvaging a valid meaning of the goodness of God 
in the face of genuine evil.”222  Process theology is evolutionary, expounds Griffin; it is 
nondualistic and nonanthropocentric.  The divine persuasive purpose promotes 
harmonious intensity of experience in general.  Hence, the designed creation is not for 
human beings in particular and the aesthetic purpose does not mean everything must 
work together for human good.  The indifferent and malevolent characteristics of 
creaturely creativity do not cast doubt on God’s creativity, remarks Griffin.  His 
creativity is always accomplished in responsive love.  More prominently, His consequent 
nature proves He is unambiguously good.
223
  Durham and others mention that people 
suffer and die; there is no evidential power to redeem such loss of values. In the 
Whiteheadian system, they emphasize, all actualities perish; even God, an actual entity, is 
not exempted in the process system.  What hope can suffering humanity gain from God-
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in-process, critics question.
224
  
  According to Griffin, the doctrine of the consequent nature of God by itself is not  
adequate, in the light of manifold and demonic evils, to allow many to accept that the 
process God will ultimately bring good to victory.  Even objective immortality in God 
alone is not sufficient to answer the question of the ultimate meaning of life.  Only with 
life beyond the present is there a morally trustworthy ground for hope in the ultimate 
victory of good over evil.
225
  
  Basinger maintains that the addition of belief in an afterlife allows process 
theodicy to consider potential forms of victory over demonic evils.  However, belief in an 
afterlife does not mean individuals turn their desires to fight evil.  Furthermore, Basinger 
points out, the idea that “every increase in the capacity for good is also an increase in the 
possibility of evil” makes it likely that the amount of good and evil in the afterlife realm 
will be proportionate or evil will be greater than good.  Therefore, there is no hope, 
concludes Basinger, that an afterlife realm would be a realm in which good abounds more 
than evil.
226
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It was already apparent that the problem of evil is not restricted to Christianity. 
However, Christianity is faced with the challenge of reconciling belief in one God with 
                                                 
224
Durham, “Evil and God: Has Process Made Good Its Promise,” 12; Madden 
and Hare, Evil and the Concept of God, 120-122. 
225
Griffin, Evil Revisited, 34-40.  
226David Basinger, “Process Theism, Evil and Life after Death: Response to 
Griffin,” Encounter 53 (1992): 353-363. 
78 
the reality of evil and suffering in the world.  
  This chapter began by offering a summary and scholarly critical analysis of the 
three major Christian attempts to reconcile the belief in one God and the reality of evil 
(theodicy).  The purpose was to provide a necessary context to see whether warfare 
theodicy is necessary and if it is, its feasibility and contribution to theology.   From the 
brief discourse of Augustine’s, Hick’s, and Process theodicies, it seems possible to draw 
the following conclusions:  
  The theodicies may be part of belief systems that serve to maintain religious 
meaning in spite of evil and suffering, yet according to the analysis, each fails to deal 
adequately with all the issues associated with theodicy.  Feinberg seems to write in favor 
of these theodicies when he argues that there is not just one theological/philosophical 
problem of evil.  Each theological system has its views of omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnibenevolence and may seek to address different issues of the problem of evil.  Hence 
“it is wrongheaded at a very fundamental level to think that because a given defense or 
theodicy doesn’t solve every problem of evil, it doesn’t solve any problem of evil. . . . An 
acceptable solution to one problem of evil isn’t nullified because it doesn’t solve any or 
all other problems.”227  However, in Feinberg’s opinion, every given defense or theodicy 
must be internally coherent and espouse plausible views.
228
   
When the theodicies are considered, each of them is internally incoherent. 
First, it becomes apparent that they draw their contents from an integration of science,  
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philosophy, and tradition with biblical truth.  The Augustinian theodicy incorporated 
Neo-Platonic principles of privation, plenitude, and aesthetic.  Hick’s theodicy is based 
on Irenaeus’s tradition, and process theodicy is founded on a metaphysics that draws its  
contents from the discipline of physics.  Theology employs human thought and speech in 
articulating the word of God.  However, the presuppositions of these theodices employed 
have led to irreconcilable difficulties for the theodicies.  
  Second, all three theodicies suggest evil is an inevitable consequence of free will.  
In a way, it is necessary for some teleological purpose of God.  Hick’s theodicy claims 
evil exists because of the moral quality that God wants for His creatures, while 
Augustine’s and Process theodicy affirm future harmony.  However, why a good God 
demands gratuitous evil and so much innocent suffering for the achievement of His 
teleological purpose, whatever that may be, was insufficiently elaborated upon.  Hick’s 
theodicy claims it is a mystery, while process theodicy explains that the aesthetic purpose 
of God does not promise that everything will work out good for human beings, for 
humanity is not the focus of the aesthetic purpose.  
  Third, it is explicit that the three theodicies did not provide the groaning world 
with a clear ground of certainty for the assurance of victory of good over evil.  From the 
scholars’ discussion, it appears that the glimpses of hope that these theodicies provide is 
illusive.  According to process theodicy, the evolution of the world will reach a point 
where the world will be a paradise.  However, this looks unachievable because evil and 
good are two sides of the same coin, and in the language of process theodicy, two sides of 
creativity; therefore, there seems to be an equal amount of good and evil at any point in 
the evolutionary process.  There is an ambiguity on this issue in Hick’s theodicy as well.  
80 
On one hand, God does not know what human choices will be until after the decision has 
been made, and God does nothing in this world by divine fiat.  On the other hand, Hick’s 
theodicy affirms universalism.  If free moral response to God is of supreme value, it is 
difficult to ascertain the salvation of all humans.  Augustine’s theodicy, in addition to 
predestination, affirms that by divine fiat God will bring future harmony; a kingdom of 
God will be realized and all evils will be seen as actually resulting in good.  
  Finally, the theodicies could not reconcile the nature of a good God with the 
reality of evil.  All three theodicies portray a good God who uses evil to serve His 
purposes. Augustine’s theodicy describes an incompetent God whose providential 
purpose is being served by certain horrifying experiences of His creatures.  It finds it 
difficult to reconcile human free will and God’s nature.  It runs into a paradox in 
affirming the concepts of human free will—determinism and the nature of God.  Hick’s 
theodicy portrays an unwise God who makes evil necessary in order to get His peoples’ 
attention and unable to make a decision on what evil to eliminate in the world.  Process 
theodicy pictures a God who initiates a program and has no control over the creatures that 
He set in the process.  He suffers finitude with His creatures and so has a council with 
them on how to straighten out the universe.  
 The three main theodicies, according to scholarly evaluation, were unable to deal 
with the issues: how the actual amount and distribution of evil can be reconciled with a 
God who is good, without making God the cause of evil; how to reconcile human free 
will and the nature of God; and the certainty of the victory of good over evil.  This 
implies that, though Christianity has three main responses to theodicy, none of them 
displays total sufficiency for providing a viable explanation to the problem of evil.  
81 
Hence, one may conclude from the scholarly evaluation of the three main Christian 
responses to the problem of evil that an adequate Christian response to the problem of 
evil must of necessity bear three characteristics: (1) it must not explain evil away; (2) it 
must provide an eschatology that gives the assurance of a complete victory over evil; and 
(3) it must respond to the problem of evil without making God the cause of evil.  These 
three characteristics will become significant in assessing the credibility of the warfare 
theodicy in chapters 5 and 6.  
The foregoing observations, among other things, bring to bear the need to 
examine other theodicies for their feasibility.  The warfare theodicy, which has existed 
for quite a long time, but has not been considered as one of the main Christian responses 
to the problem of evil, will be examined for its feasibility.  The next two chapters analyze 
the warfare theodicy of Gregory A. Boyd and Ellen G. White, which serve as a challenge 
to the three main theodicies.  How has the warfare theodicy reconciled the existence of a 
good God and the reality of evil without the difficulties that the three main theodicies 
have encountered?    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
TRINITARIAN WARFARE THEODICY: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 of this study clarified the views of the three main Christian approaches 
(Augustine, John Hick, and Process theology) to the problem of evil developed in 
Christian theology since the time of Augustine.  It also explored various scholarly 
evaluations of each of them and discovered that numerous scholars consider each of these 
Christian approaches to the question of God and the existence of evil as an unsatisfactory 
Christian response to the problem of evil.  Hence, there is the need to examine the 
warfare approach to the problem of evil for its plausibility.  As already indicated in 
chapter 1, the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great Controversy theodicies are the most 
comprehensive representations of the warfare approach to the problem of evil.  The 
object of this chapter, therefore, is to present a descriptive analysis of the warfare 
approach as expounded by Gregory A. Boyd.  The paramount factor that has brought 
Boyd’s works into the limelight in the twenty-first century is his effort to bring Christian 
doctrines into harmony with a modern scientific viewpoint.  The chapter analyzes Boyd’s 
theodicy and his efforts to deal with the problem of evil.   
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General Background 
 
Gregory A. Boyd 
 
Gregory A. Boyd, a pastor, theologian, and author, earned a Bachelor of Arts in 
philosophy from the University of Minnesota in 1979, a Master of Divinity from Yale 
Divinity School in 1982, and a Doctor of Philosophy from Princeton Theological 
Seminary in 1988.
1
 
Boyd’s religious and professional experiences have made interesting turns.  Born 
in 1957,
2
 he grew up as a Catholic
3
 but became an atheist by the time he was a teenager.  
In 1974, he accepted Christ and joined the United Pentecostal Church.
4
  At the University 
of Minnesota, Boyd went back to atheism after his first semester as a philosophy major 
student.
5
  However, after reading Rom 8 in October 1976, Boyd became convinced that 
salvation is by grace rather than righteous deeds.  This conviction initiated his quest to  
                                                 
1Gregory Boyd, “Welcome,” Christus Victor Ministries, 
www.christusvictorministries.org/main/ (accessed October 30, 2007). 
2Gregory Boyd, “Random Reflections,” Christus Victor Ministries, 
www.gregboyd.blogspot.com/2007_06_01_archive.html (accessed November 11, 2007). 
3Carla Barnhill, “The Cross or the Sword,” Today’s Christian, September/October 
2006, 50; Gregory A. Boyd, Trinity and Process: A Critical Evaluation and 
Reconstruction of Hartshorne's Di-Polar Theism Towards a Trinitarian Metaphysics 
(New York: P. Lang, 1992), preface.  
4
The United Pentecostal church is a community of faith that rejects the Trinity on 
the basis that the concept of Trinity is incompatible with faith in one God. Father, Son 
and Holy Spirit cannot be real, distinct and co-equal persons; they are but different roles 
performed by one divine being. In essence, it is a community of faith that affirms  
modalistic Monarchianism.  For more information on the beliefs of this community of 
faith, see Gregory A. Boyd, Oneness Pentecostals and the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: 
Baker Book House, 1992).  
5Barnhill, “The Cross or the Sword,” 50.  
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examine his religious beliefs.  In his first year at Yale Divinity School, he came under the 
influence of Trinitarian Christians.  This experience led to two major turns in his life.  
First, he ended his relationship with his community of faith, Oneness Pentecostalism,
6
 
and second, he acquired a strong desire to research and develop a clearer understanding 
of the nature of God.   
It was not until he arrived at Bethel University, where he taught theology for 
sixteen years, and at Princeton Theological Seminary that he came to a realization that he 
could salvage what is essentially correct in Charles Hartshorne’s7 process theology to 
resolve the difficulties associated with the classical concept of God.  That is, he 
determined to provide a philosophical and theological concept of God that satisfies the 
scriptural picture of trinity and render this intelligible to the modern generation that sees 
the world as “dynamic, relative and relational.”8  
His worldview has been controversial in evangelical circles, and proponents of the 
traditional view of God unsuccessfully sought to change the rules guiding the Baptist 
General Conference to exclude him from the denomination.
9
  
                                                 
6
Boyd, Oneness Pentecostals and the Trinity, 21-24. 
7Boyd considers Hartshorne’s philosophical and theological concept of God as 
essentially correct. Boyd, Trinity and Process, 1-3.  
8
Ibid., 3. 
9“Greg Boyd (theologian),” Wikipedia, www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Gregory_A._Boyd (accessed October 30, 2007).  See the debate in the following articles: 
Bruce A. Ware, “Defining Evangelicalism’s Boundaries Theologically: Is Open Theism 
Evangelical?” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 193-212; Clark 
H. Pinnock, “There Is Room for Us: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” Journal of the Evangelical 
Theological Society 45 (2002): 213-219; John Sanders, “Be Wary of Ware: A Reply to 
Bruce Ware,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 221-231; 
Gregory A. Boyd, “Christian Love and Academic Dialogue: A Reply to Bruce Ware,” 
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Boyd founded the Christus Victor Ministries, a non-profit organization that 
promotes faith, in 2000.  In 1992 he founded the Woodland Hills Church, an evangelical 
church in St. Paul, Minnesota.  He is presently the senior pastor of the church.
10
 
 
Background to Boyd’s Theodicy  
 
Gregory A. Boyd’s key academic and practical concern was the dialogue between 
the contemporary understanding of reality and theology.  His primary interest has been to 
maintain and vindicate essential Christian beliefs, but at the same time he is convinced 
that beliefs must be brought into harmony with the scientific mind-set of the twenty-first 
century.
11
    
                                                 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 233-43; Bruce A. Ware, 
“Rejoinder to Replies by Clark H. Pinnock, John Sanders, and Gregory A. Boyd,” 
Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 245-256.  
10Gregory A. Boyd, “Vita,” Christus Victor Ministries, www 
.christusvictorministries.org/main/ (accessed October 30, 2007); idem, “Bio,” Christus 
Victor Ministries, www.christusvictorministries.org/main/ (accessed June 26, 2007). 
11“Locating . . . [any] element of truth in the culture and aligning it with theology 
based on the Word can be advantageous to communicating credibly the truth of the Word 
to our culture. It can also help us more effectively think through and apply our theology 
for our culture and for ourselves. This is why our theology should be developed in 
dialogue with every other branch of learning. Whatever truth is to be found in physics, 
cosmology, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, and so on is God’s truth and 
can only help us credibly proclaim the truth of God’s Word to the world.” 
“In this light, it is important to recognize that this century has witnessed a 
revolution in all of these fields of learning in terms of how we see the world. We have 
been shifting from a static to a thoroughly dynamic understanding of reality. . . . The 
most fundamental challenge this shift poses for Christian theology is this: The classical 
view of God and of creation was thoroughly influenced by, and is logically tied to, the 
old understanding of reality. Hence, the more influential the dynamic understanding of 
reality becomes in our culture, the more out of sync classical theology will be with our 
culture. . . . . Therefore, there is no reason for theology to resist the paradigmatic shift 
occurring in our culture. On the contrary, there are actually good grounds for embracing 
and celebrating much of it” (Gregory A. Boyd, God of the Possible: A Biblical 
Introduction to the Open View of God [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2000], 107-109).  
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He develops a metaphysical concept on the basis of insights gained from classical 
and neoclassical traditions.  Boyd believes that the classical and neoclassical concepts of 
God do not exhaust feasible options and is confident that between these concepts of God 
there is an essentially correct alternative.  Therefore, Boyd inquires into both traditions to 
make use of their strengths to construct his metaphysics without, in his own words, 
“paying the price that these traditions pay to maintain their beliefs.”12   
From the classical tradition, he adopts the idea that God is triune and His abstract 
essence is His necessary concrete existence.  That is to say, God does not possess abstract 
features such as love and goodness, but He is love and goodness.  He is self-sufficient 
apart from the world. 
However, for Boyd this definition of God does not imply that God is actus 
purus.
13
  To affirm the classical conception of God without the idea of actus purus and its 
theological implications, he is convinced to rework the neoclassical tradition, specifically 
Hartshorne’s six theistic arguments for the existence of God.14  He acknowledges that the 
six arguments in and of themselves have some theological and philosophical difficulties, 
but that did not deter him from his endeavor. 
Having made this assertion, Boyd sets himself to undertake the task of reworking 
Hartshorne’s theistic arguments.  Pivotal to this task is for him to arrive at a concept of  
                                                 
12
Boyd, Trinity and Process, 208-209.  
13
Relying on Aquinas, Boyd takes actus purus to mean “there is no potentiality in 
God” (ibid., 196n55).  
14
The six arguments are ontological, cosmological, design, epistemic, moral, and 
aesthetic.  
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God which avoids insuperable theological and philosophical difficulties associated with 
classical and neoclassical concepts of God.  His creativity led him to analyze, critique, 
and evaluate Hartshorne’s concept of God as he constructed his own every step of the 
way. 
Before exploring the outcome of Boyd’s task, it is appropriate to give a short 
outline of Hartshorne’s view of God.  For Hartshorne, God’s existence is necessary; He 
co-exists eternally with the world.  He is dipolar, having abstract and concrete poles. The 
abstract pole is the element within God that never varies; it is His ability to experience 
the world, God as actual.  The concrete pole is the ever-changing nature in God.  It 
receives the experiences of the world process into His actuality, the world included in 
divine life.  He acts only by persuasion.  His persuasive power is infinitely superior to the 
power of non-divine beings; however, the difference is one of degree, not kind.  God 
possesses perfect knowledge; He knows everything that is knowable—all that is actual 
and all that is possible.  God is good to the world.  He provides every actual occasion 
with a subjective aim and He supremely considers and responds to others.  God’s 
goodness to the world is His goodness to His concrete self.  And He contains within 
Himself all possible aesthetic value.
15
 
Evaluating the ontological and cosmological arguments,
16
 Boyd points out that 
the arguments run into the difficulty of making the existence of God and the world 
                                                 
15Charles Hartshorne, “The Dipolar Conception of Deity,” The Review of 
Metaphysics 21 (1967): 273-289; idem, Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism.  
16These two arguments “seek to establish on an a priori basis that God necessarily 
exists and that God is in different respects both necessary and contingent” (Boyd, Trinity 
and Process, 235).  
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logically necessary and eternal.
17
  He identifies the difficulty arising from Hartshorne’s 
conception of abstract and concrete poles of God.
18
  Obviously, this leads him to argue 
that no particular contingency is a constituent of God’s necessary essential actuality.19  
He agrees with Hartshorne that God is necessarily eternal and contingent, but Boyd is 
convinced that God’s contingent actuality does not define His essence.20  In his opinion, 
God is defined only by His necessary actuality.  He understands God’s actual 
contingency as the self-expressiveness of God’s essence, antecedent actuality.21   
Following his argument through, Boyd assesses the rest of Hartshorne’s theistic 
arguments.  On the basis of the postulation that God is infinite and necessary while being 
finite and contingent in different respects, independent of the world, he reconstructs the 
design and epistemic arguments
22
 to fill in the development of his theory of God.  Boyd 
suggests that “the supposed asymmetrical view of concrete relationality, the view of 
experience as a creative synthesis, and the atomistic conception of actuality” must be 
                                                 
17
Ibid., 209. 
18
Boyd is of the view that the distinction Hartshorne makes between the abstract 
and concrete characteristics of God renders the abstract characteristics unintelligible in 
themselves. For, in Hartshorne’s system, the abstract characteristics of God are contained 
in the concrete nature, which is the past spontaneity of a nexus of actual occasions (ibid., 
208-224). 
19
Ibid., 216.  
20
Ibid., 225. 
21
Ibid., 224-226.  
22The design argument claims that “there is cosmic order and divine power” and 
“epistemic argument suggests reality is actual content of divine knowledge.” (ibid., 236, 
321).   
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“rejected as a priori truth.”23  He contends that the necessary relationality of God is not 
between God and the world but it is within the Godhead: “the Father and Son in the 
power of the Spirit.”24  God is the only necessary being and eternal self-differentiated 
relationality without any non-divine contingency.  As a result, the object of God’s 
knowledge is God-self and His activity is not dependent upon the world’s creative 
synthesis of antecedent occasion.
25
  He is “free to create or not to create; to determine or 
leave undetermined; to allow creation to freely run its course or to intervene and alter its 
course.” 26  His power toward non-divine subjects, in Boyd’s metaphysics, is free and 
gracious.
27
 
Based on the preceding worked out definitions of the characteristics of God, he 
proceeds to reaffirm the already identified characteristics and further fill out his concept 
of God.  In an attempt to achieve this goal, he examines Hartshorne’s last two theistic 
arguments, moral and aesthetic.
28
  Evaluating these two arguments, Boyd claims they 
necessitate the eternal existence of the world and make God’s goodness and beauty 
dependent on the contingent world.  Consequently, he contends that God has no abstract 
characteristic, but God is goodness itself, He experiences goodness within His God-self.  
                                                 
23
Ibid., 343. 
24
Ibid., 330. 
25
Ibid., 328-330.  
26
Ibid., 332.  
27
Ibid., 331-332. 
28The moral argument is that “there is a supreme aim, which is to enrich the 
divine life (by promoting the good life among creatures)” (ibid., 344) and the aesthetic 
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However, He enjoys the relative goodness of the world not as essential constituent of His 
concrete goodness but as a genuine expression of His perfect goodness.  Thus, according 
to Boyd, God’s benevolence “consists in the fact that God unnecessarily creates a world 
to share in the aesthetic experience of existence.  It consists in the further fact that God is 
unsurpassably good to this One’s creation, and ceaselessly works with the world to bring 
about God’s foreordained Kingdom in the world—the final execution of all evil from the 
earth.”29  He contends that the aesthetic satisfaction of God is the same irrespective of the 
non-divine world.  According to him, the peak of God’s aesthetic intensity is constituted 
in God-self from eternity.  God’s openness to the world is an expression of the eternal 
divine intensity of God’s triune self-experience.30   
Having made use of the positive ideas in classical and neoclassical traditions, 
Boyd arrives at a God whose transcendent essence is His essential existence, eternal, self-
sufficient and self-differential, and does not need a non-divine world with which to co-
exist.  He is infinite, the object of His knowledge is God-self, and He has the power to 
freely create or not to create, determine or leave undetermined.  God created the world 
out of His goodness and free will but not out of necessity.  He is free to respond to His 
                                                 
argument is that “there is a beauty of the world as a whole and God alone adequately 
enjoys it” (ibid., 352). 
29For Boyd, Hartshorne’s system makes a fundamental telos of every actual 
occasional aesthetic satisfaction.  Everything, including God, aims at creating itself as a 
synthesis of past objectified data. According to him, this has an advantage over the 
classical definition of the beauty of God; however, it has its own difficulties. 
Hartshorne’s idea denies grace, God’s final victory, and God’s freedom. Thus, Boyd’s 
objection to Hartshorne’s concept of necessary eternal non-divine beings allowed him to 
successfully conclude that God experiences God’s own triune sociality as unsurpassably 
good (ibid., 376).  
30
Ibid., 376-378. 
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creation in a way that expresses His infinite love, goodness, and aesthetic appreciation.  
Nonetheless, in a different respect He genuinely relates to the contingent non-divine 
world without compromising His self-sufficiency.  God is supremely consistent in His 
character while also supremely changing in His responsiveness to creation
31
 and His 
relationship to Himself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
32
  What God is in any given 
moment, is contingent.
33
  God is “an eternally on-going event, an event which is dynamic 
and open.”  Within Him, there is “eternally ‘room for expansion.’”34  This, remarks 
Boyd, is an “outline for trinitarian dispositional metaphysics, grounded on a priori truths, 
compatible with the dynamic, non-substantial, process categories of modernity as well as 
with scriptural and the Christian tradition.”35 
 
Boyd’s Writings on Theodicy 
 
Boyd has published several books and academic articles, made presentations, 
debated critics of Christianity, and participated in apologetic forums on doctrinal, 
theological, and social issues.
36
  Among other things, theodicy figures prominently in his 
works.   
                                                 
31
Ibid., 230-231. 
32
Ibid., 392. 
33
Ibid., 232.  
34
Ibid., 386. 
35
Ibid., 404. 
36Boyd, “Vita,” www.Christusvictorministries.org/main/ (accessed June 26, 
2007); idem, “Bio,” www.Christusvictorministries.org/main/ (accessed June 26, 2007). 
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Boyd has made a contribution to the Christian explanation of the problem of evil.  
In his opinion the formulation of the problem of evil, on the basis of the classical-
philosophical tradition, renders the problem unsolvable makes every evil serve a divine 
purpose, and fails to express the critically important role of Satan and evil angels in the 
world.  These features of the problem, remarks Boyd, call into question the classical-
philosophical assumptions that give rise to the problem.
37
   
He claims that the Bible evidently shows that its central message is a warfare 
motif, God warring against angelic and human opponents who are capable of thwarting 
His will.  Boyd is convinced that the early church fathers affirmed this teaching and that 
some aspects of it were lost in Augustinian theology.
38
   
Consequently, Boyd’s purpose in constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is 
to make “philosophical sense of the warfare world view of Scripture and to understand 
our own experience of evil.”  It is also to “reconcile the reality of spiritual war with the 
belief in an all-powerful and all-good God.”  His effort is to develop a theodicy that does 
not require “suffering to always serve a divine purpose,” makes morally responsible 
agents the ultimate reason for their free activity, and shows that “the possibility of 
gratuitous suffering is necessarily built into the possibility of love for contingent 
creatures.”39    
He has introduced an alternative to the three main Christian responses to the  
                                                 
37
Boyd, God at War, 43-56.  
38
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 15. 
39
Ibid., 19-20. 
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problem of evil.  Evidence of his contribution is found in a few of his works devoted to 
the problem of evil.  In 1994, a synopsis of his explanation of the problem of evil 
appeared in the first section of the Letters From a Skeptic as he answers questions his 
father, then a skeptic, asked him about God.
40
  
On two different occasions in 1997 he made presentations on the problem of evil: 
one, “Trouble with Angels: The Warfare Theodicy of the Early Church,” at the 
Evangelical Theological Society annual meeting and two, “Engaging in Spiritual 
Warfare,” at a seminar for Christian military personnel at the Pentagon.41  In the same 
year, he published the first volume, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict, of 
what he calls the Satan and Evil Series.  The core issue of this volume is the extent to 
which biblical writers explain aspects of life as the result of good and evil spirits warring 
gainst each other and against us.  Thus, biblical authors interpret all evil in the context of 
spiritual warfare. 
42
  
In 1998, he made another presentation, “Chaos Theory, Evil and the Book of 
Job,” on the problem of evil at the Evangelical Theological Society annual meeting.43  In 
2001, the second volume of the Satan and Evil series, Satan and the Problem of Evil: 
Constructing a Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, was published.  The central theme of this 
volume is “to demonstrate that the warfare worldview is the foundation for a theodicy 
                                                 
40
Boyd, “Vita” (accessed October 30, 2007).  
41
Ibid. 
42
Boyd, God at War, 22.  
43Boyd, “Vita” (accessed October 30, 2007). 
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that is philosophically superior” to all other responses to the problem of evil.44  Two 
years later, he published another book, Is God to Blame? Beyond Pat Answers to the 
Problem of Suffering.  The ideas and arguments found in this volume are developed from 
dialogues with colleagues.  He reiterates his explanation to the problem of evil and also 
looks at practical ways as to how we are to live in the midst of evil.
45
 
Boyd titles his explanation of the problem of evil the “Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.”  According to him, it is warfare because it makes philosophical sense from 
the warfare view in Scripture, and it is also “Trinitarian” in the sense that it is based on 
the assumption that the world was brought into existence by a Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit God who created it out of an “expression of love” existing within them and as “an 
invitation to love.”46   
In order to make a good descriptive analysis of Boyd’s theodicy, I have to depend, 
to a large extent, on his three published books:  God at War, Satan and the Problem of 
Evil, and Is God to Blame?  I shall also note any observations and statements scattered in 
other writings which contribute to a fuller understanding of his theodicy.  The analysis of 
the text follows the procedure that he logically uses to explain the problem of evil in his 
book, Satan and the Problem of Evil.  In the introductory chapter of this book, Boyd 
enunciates six theses upon which he bases his arguments for the Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.  It is, therefore, necessary to list his theses: 
                                                 
44
Boyd, God at War, 23. 
45
Gregory A. Boyd, Is God to Blame? Moving Beyond Pat Answers to the 
Problem of Suffering (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2003). 
46
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 18.  
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1.  Love must be chosen. 
2.  Freedom implies risk. 
3.  Risk entails moral responsibility. 
4.  Moral responsibility is proportional to the potential to influence others. 
5.  Freedom is irrevocable. 
6.  Freedom is finite.
47
 
Boyd considers these theses to be the ground by which the Trinitariain Warfare 
Theodicy deals with various important issues relating to any theodicy.
48
  The meaning 
and implication of each of these theses become evident as we proceed with the analysis.  
For better clarity, the analysis of Boyd’s theodicy begins with establishing his model of 
free will, divine foreknowledge, and sovereignty.   
 
Analysis of Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
Free Will 
Boyd makes contingent free will one of the concepts that underlie his theodicy.  
What follows is a descriptive analysis of Boyd’s concept of free will.49   
The theological and philosophical debate on the problem of evil focuses on many 
issues, such as the concept of free will.  The question of primary importance is whether or 
not humans are morally responsible for their actions.  The answer to this issue has caused 
                                                 
47
Ibid., 23-24.  
48
Ibid., 24.  
49The analysis of Boyd’s concept of free will deals with five of Boyd’s theses.  
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divisions among theologians as well as philosophers.
50
  Boyd desires to articulate a free 
will concept that is viable in explaining the problem of evil without encountering the 
difficulties that the theodicies in the preceding chapter have encountered.   
The questions that Boyd addresses in his free will concept in relation to theodicy 
are whether God determines everything from eternity.  If He does, is free will possible in 
the context of God’s determination?  If He does not, what kind of free will do agents 
possess?  Boyd finds answers to these questions by explaining the relationship between 
love and free will, self-determined freedom, the nature of self-determined freedom, and 
the quality of self-determined freedom.  
 
Love and Free Will 
 
In Boyd’s view, the nature of love is the basic element that provides a 
philosophical raison d'être for a war-zone world.  As noted above, he embraces the 
concept of a God who alone is a necessary being, internally social; is love and enjoys 
love within His God-self; God the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit; and is self-
sufficient.  Nonetheless, He is open to a contingent expression of His divine fullness to a 
contingent non-divine world.
51
   
                                                 
50
See Roger E. Olson, The Story of Christian Theology (Downers Grove, IL: 
InterVarsity Press, 1999); Robert Kane, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Gray Watson, ed., Free Will, 2nd ed., (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003); Sidney Hook, ed., Determinism and Freedom in Modern 
Science (New York: State University Press, 1958); Gerald Dworkin, ed., Determinism, 
Free Will, and Moral Responsibility (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970).  
51
Boyd, Trinity and Process, 330.   
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According to Boyd, the all-self-sufficient God created the world out of love for 
the purpose of acquiring a people who will participate in His triune love.
52
  He stresses 
that “expressing and expanding the unfathomable triune love that God eternally is was 
the chief end for which God created the world.”53  And the primary condition for this 
goal is that “love must be freely chosen.”54  By establishing this kind of metaphysical 
relationship between love and freedom, God’s freedom in terms of whether to determine 
or to leave undetermined His creatures diminishes, a view that Boyd holds dearly.
55
  That 
is to say, God lost His freedom to create a determined or undetermined world to His 
decision to have a world with the potential to love.  
This means, for God to achieve His purpose He has to bring into existence 
creatures with the ability to reject or accept the triune love.  Boyd wants it to be distinctly 
understood that the capability to say no to God’s triune love is metaphysically entailed in 
the possibility to say yes to God.  Thus, no agent possesses the possibility to say yes 
without the possibility to say no.
56
  The question at stake is whether the possibility of 
                                                 
52
Boyd mentions that the love that God intends to share with His creation is none 
other than Agape love—the unconditional love demonstrated in Christ on Calvary. God’s 
goal was to fill humans with this love; and when filled they would “replicate on an 
individual level, and overflow with love back to God, to themselves, and their 
neighbors.” Thus, the world would be a community of love.  For this reason God created 
us with an inner vacuum which can only be filled by God with His unsurpassable love 
(Gregory A. Boyd, Repenting of Religion: Turning from Judgment to the Love of God  
[Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2004], 23-32).  
53
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 51.  
54
Ibid. This is Boyd’s first thesis. 
55
Ibid., 69, 71; Boyd, Trinity and Process, 332.  
56
Boyd refers to these biblical passages for his arguments: Isa 63:10; Acts 7:51; 
Heb 3:8, 15; Eph 4:30; Exod 33:3, 5; 34:9; Deut 9:6, 13; 10:16; 31:27; Judg 2:19; 2 Kgs 
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agents saying no is part of God’s plan.  Relying on scriptural passages, he emphasizes 
that the possibility of contingent beings saying no to God is not part of God’s design.57  
This brings into view Boyd’s attempt to disassociate the possibility of saying no from 
God’s plan, but this is effortless since saying no is metaphysically associated to saying 
yes to His love.  Boyd appears to iron out this difficulty with this remark, “If God could 
have designed the world in such a way that all would say yes to him and no one would be 
lost, he would have done so.  The fact that he did not do so suggests that he could not do 
so.”58  On this note, he disabuses his readers’ minds from perceiving God as one who 
fails to love by turning to church fathers and Scripture to emphasize the unchangeable 
nature of God.
59
  This is an expression of his conviction on the distinction between God 
and contingent beings.  In contingent beings love is a mere potential, but God is love.  
Apparently, free will is a corollary of love.  The question then is: What is free will? It is 
to this query that we now turn our attention.   
 
Self-Determined Freedom 
 
Throughout the history of theology the explanation of free will has followed two 
main paths: compatibilism and incompatibilism.
60
 Classical Christian tradition has 
                                                 
17:14; 2 Chr 30:8; 36:13; Neh 9:16; Isa 46:12; 48:4; Jer 7:26; Hos 4:16 (Boyd, Satan and 
the Problem of Evil, 54).  
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1 Tim 2:4; 4:10; 2 Pet 3:9 (ibid., 53).  
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Ibid. (emphasis his). 
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The problem of free will is a voluminously debated issue in theology and 
philosophy of religion. This has been the case since Augustine’s work, On the Free 
Choice of the Will. Moreover discoveries in the sciences, philosophy, and humanities 
have intensified the debate.  The debate has always been the dilemma of reconciling free 
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will and divine foreknowledge and sovereignty. The compatibilists argue that free will is 
coherent with foreknowledge, and for that matter, determinism.  Incompatibilists believe 
human freedom is not consistent with determinism; and if human actions are determined 
then no one has control over his or her actions and cannot be held responsible. Within 
these two main groups are varying explanations of free will. 
Among the compatibilists there are determinists and self-determinists. 
Determinism is the idea that every event is wholly and unequivocally caused by prior 
causal factors.  That is, given all the causal factors of an action, it could not have 
happened otherwise than it did. Theological determinism is that God has control over all 
the events and circumstances which precede any human choice and actions; thus, God 
determines every human action. Therefore, the compatibilists who are determinists deal 
with the dilemma by arguing that determined individuals are responsible for their actions 
as long as they are not forced to act against their will or desires. In other words, an action 
is free even if causally determined so long as the causes are non-constraining (John S. 
Feinberg, “God Ordains All Things,” in Predestination and Free Will, ed. David 
Basinger and Randall Basinger [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1986],19-43; Paul 
Helm, The Providence of God [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994]; Donald A. 
Carson, Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book, 
1995]; Bruce Ware, God’s Greater Glory: The Exalted God of Scripture and the 
Christian Faith [Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004]). The compatibilists who affirm 
the self-determined view contend that God does not determine human actions or 
decisions but He is omniscient and He has always foreknown what humans will do with 
their free will.  In this way, God has ordered His creation in a way that whatever humans 
do is always within His specific plan. This was first propounded by Boethius (480-524). 
“If human and divine present may be compared, just as you see certain things in this your 
present time, so God sees all things in His eternal present. So that this divine 
foreknowledge does not change the nature and property of things; it simply sees things 
present to it exactly as they will happen at some time as future events. . . . The divine 
gaze looks down on all things without disturbing their nature; to Him they are present 
things, but under the condition of time they are future things. And so it comes about that 
when God knows that something is going to occur . . . no necessity is imposed on it” 
Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, 5.6, trans. V. E. Watts [New York: Penguin, 
1969], 165-166). Some contemporary advocates of this view are Norman L. Geisler, 
“God Knows All Things,” in Predestination and Free Will, ed. David Basinger and 
Randall Basinger (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1986), 63-84; Eleonore Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann, “Eternity, Awareness and Action, ” Faith and Philosophy 9 (1992): 
463-482. Others argue that God knows what any possible free creature would freely do in 
any possible circumstance. By knowing the circumstances in which future creatures will 
be placed, God knows what any possible free agent will do in every situation without 
determining agents’ actions. Jesuit theologian Luis de Molina developed this approach in 
the sixteenth century. This is termed middle knowledge. Some advocates of this view are 
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity; Jonathan Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing 
God (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986); William Lane Craig, The Only Wise God 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker House, 1987). There are those who assert that the Bible 
affirms both divine foreknowledge and sovereignty and genuine free will. That is, God is 
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generally followed the interpretation of compatibilism.
61
  In assessing the traditional view 
of contingent freedom, Boyd finds incompatibilism to be more appropriately called self-
determined freedom.  My major concern is to find out what he means by self-determined 
freedom.   
                                                 
in total control but He does not determine human actions. Therefore, the relationship 
between determinism and free will is a mystery. 
Among scholars who argue for an incompatible view of free will, there are those 
who are determinists.  This group of determinists argues that all events are determined by 
natural causes. Free will that requires responsibility is not compatible with determinism 
and, as a result, free will does not exist in a sense that requires genuine responsibility. 
Paul Edwards, “Hard and Soft Determinism,” in Determinism and Freedom in the Age of 
Modern Science, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New York University Press, 1958), 104-
113; Anthony Kenny, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom,” in Aquinas: A 
Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Anthony Kenny (South Bend, IN: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1969), 63-81. There are others, hard compatibilists, who believe free will is 
necessary for genuine moral responsibility, but such freedom does not exist. Ted 
Honderich, A Theory of Determinism, 2 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1990); idem, How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993); Derk Pereboom, Living without Free Will (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001). A majority of the incompabilists are those who hold 
that the classical Christian view—God knows contingent future decisions—is 
incompatible with human freedom. They claim God knows only past, present, and future 
possibilities. Hence, the future decisions of free agents are not known by God, thus 
humans are genuinely free and responsible for their actions. David Basinger, The Case 
for Freewill Theism: A Philosophical Assessment (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1996); William Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989); Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's 
Openness (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2001); Bruce Reichenbach, “God Limits His 
Power,” in Predestination and Free Will, eds. David Basinger and Randall Basinger 
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 99-124; Richard Rice, God's 
Foreknowledge and Man's Free Will (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 
1980); John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence (Downers Grove, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998). For a detailed elaboration of these views on free will, see 
Robert Kane, The Oxford Handbook of Free Will; Watson, Free Will; Hook, Determinism 
and Freedom in Modern Science; Dworkin, Determinism, Free Will, and Moral 
Responsibility. 
61
Olson, The Story of Christian Theology, 260-261, 237-238, 279-285, 454-455, 
471. 
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Boyd has much to say about determinism; however, much of his argument is 
rather an attempt to answer compatibilist scientific,
62
 philosophical,
63
 and theological  
                                                 
62
The scientific objection to self-determinism is that self-determinism conflicts 
with the findings of modern science concerning the role of genes and environment in 
influencing our personality and behavior.  He answers this objection by focusing on 
angelic freedom, inconclusive evidence, determinism and moral responsibility, self-
refuting nature of physical determinism, the phenomenon of freedom and determinism, 
and the pragmatic criterion for truth. According to him, Scripture clearly points out that 
evil began as a result of misuse of angelic free will.  Angels are neither tied to genes nor 
environment.  In addition, experience proves that the influence of genes and environment 
contributes to the development of characteristics, but there is no evidence that they 
determine our behavior. If they are determinative, then we cannot in any way blame 
people for their actions.  That is, the objection raised undermines moral responsibility. 
“While a great deal of the world in which we live and even a good deal of our own lives 
is determined by forces outside of our control,” within the parameters set by these 
variables self-determination remains. Finally, the process of decision making is an 
evidence for self-determined freedom. For in decision making, choices are made between 
alternatives that are within one’s own power to act upon (Boyd, Satan and the Problem of 
Evil, 62-68). 
63
The philosophical objection to self-determinism is that a person’s decision is 
caused or uncaused.  If it is caused, then it is determined.  If it is uncaused, it is still not 
free but is random or capricious.  Boyd defends the self-determinism concept of free will 
with three major points: the freedom of God, the nature of causation, and indeterminism 
and the principle of sufficient reason. He argues that human self-determination is the only 
analogical ground by which Christianity can affirm God’s self-determination. Therefore, 
if human self-determination is irrational, then God’s self-determination is not coherent 
for “[a] concept devoid of all experiential content is vacuous” (Boyd, Satan and the 
Problem of Evil, 70). The objection is valid if causation is inherently deterministic. 
Relying on Peter Van Inwagen, he argues that equating causality to determination is not 
intelligible. Again he argues that quantum physics proves that the relationship between 
cause and effect does not necessarily include determinism. Our actions have causal 
conditions but they only define parameters within which our freedom functions. As a 
result, free actions are not capricious. In his view a free action always has sufficient 
reason that renders it retroactively intelligible, but it does so without rendering it 
futuristically predictable. Before an event, even an exhaustive knowledge of the 
surrounding circumstances could not have given us a determinate knowledge of what 
shall certainly occur. But once the action happens, one can examine all the factors and at 
least hypothetically discover the sufficient reason behind the act (ibid., 71-72). “Free 
actions are not deterministically caused by the sum total of antecedent conditions, for 
they are free and not determined.  Neither are they uncaused, for they are free and not 
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objections to self-determinism.
64
  Depending on B. Reichenbach and Robert Kane, he 
argues that the self-determinism concept of free will means that “while factors outside the 
agent are influential in every decision an agent makes, such factors are never coercive 
when the decision is in fact free.  Thus, appealing to factors external to the agent can 
never exhaustively explain the free choice of the agent.  In the light of all influences and 
circumstances, agents ultimately determine themselves.”65  For him, it is only in the 
context of self-determinism that moral responsibility is made intelligible.
66
  He 
strengthens the positive implications of self-determinism
67
 over and against determinism.  
Self-determined freedom becomes all the more significant when he remarks that 
such understanding of contingent freedom is coherent with experience, moral 
responsibility, decision making, and personal dignity.  According to Boyd, it is by this 
                                                 
capricious. Rather, insofar as they are free, they are caused by the agent who initiates 
them” (ibid., 77). 
64
The theological objection is that self-determinism makes salvation meritorious 
and not by grace. In responding to this objection, he asserts that the doctrine of 
unconditional election undermines Scripture’s portrayal of God’s love.  According to 
him, choosing to accept a gift does not change the nature of the offer.  Therefore, 
choosing to accept God’s offer of salvation does not change the offer:  it is still a gift of 
salvation.  Scripture affirms the idea of choosing between life and death and does not 
consider choosing the offer of salvation as work, for choosing does not cause salvation 
but it is a condition for salvation (ibid., 78-83). 
65
Ibid., 56 (emphasis his). 
66In Boyd’s opinion, morally responsible beings are those who are the ultimate 
producers and explainers of their actions.  Therefore, determinism which traces causal 
chains beyond an agent’s freedom undermines free will and moral responsibility.  On the 
other hand, self-determination renders moral responsibility feasible by affirming that no 
external factors exhaustively determine an agent’s decision or action (ibid., 56-60). 
67
Although “self-determination,” “libertarianism,” and “indeterminism” are 
synonyms, Boyd refrains from the use of  “indeterministic freedom” because, according 
to him, the term connotes the idea of  an uncaused or random free will choices (ibid., 
52n2). 
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conception of free will that we meaningfully affirm God’s self-determinism and 
intelligibly explain the warfare concept in the Bible and Christ’s sacrificial death for our 
salvation, which is free but only applicable when one chooses to accept Christ.
68
  It must 
be remembered that we do not choose our parents, environment, personality traits, and 
many of our experiences; however, for Boyd, these external factors contribute to who we 
are at present.  Within these parameters set forth we have the upper hand to determine 
what transpires in the next moment.
69
  Those causal factors provide only a realm of 
possibilities, but actualization of the possibilities depends on the individuals.
70
  He further 
mentions that those causal conditions
71
 “do not meticulously determine our particular 
actions.”72  To make such an assumption is to object to the idea of equating self-
determined freedom to self-existence.   
Related to this understanding of freedom is the question of what becomes of 
individuals, such as babies who die or mentally retarded people, who were unable to 
resolve themselves for or against God in this lifetime.  Boyd explains that the answer to 
this issue is based on whether or not one agrees that the first condition of love is that it 
must be freely chosen.  If it is a metaphysical truth, “then people who have not chosen 
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Ibid., 66, 71-72. 
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For Boyd, cause is not equal to determination. According to him, with causal 
conditions we can have possibilities of actions that will take place but cannot 
exhaustively predict actual actions (ibid., 70-73).  
72
Ibid., 72 (emphasis his). 
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must somehow be given the opportunity to do so.”73  It is obvious that this answer 
expresses Boyd’s belief in post-mortem opportunity for those who could not decide for or 
against God in their present lives due to defectiveness or immaturity of their free will.   
In surveying the background of Boyd’s writings, I discovered that he developed 
his metaphysics by drawing ideas from classical and process traditions.  However, at this 
point in the discussion one could remark that John Hick impacted Boyd’s thoughts 
significantly.  Boyd’s self-determined freedom is similar to Hick’s cognitive freedom. 
Like Hick, Boyd’s concept of freedom implies that to be in existence is to be subjected to 
arbitrariness and determination, and within these causal factors that contribute to our 
existence, free will functions in a self-determined manner.  Significant to Hick’s 
influence on Boyd is the doctrine of life after death.  While Hick adopted the doctrine of 
life after death to deal with issues that arose from his concepts of free will and universal 
salvation, Boyd introduces life after death to iron out the tension between self-determined 
freedom and individuals who did not get the opportunity to decide either for or against 
God.  Consequently, Boyd disavows the contemporary assumption that every individual 
who dies goes immediately to heaven or hell.
74
  It is important to note that Boyd’s idea of 
post-mortem does not include the theories of reconstitution and replica found in Hick.   
It is sufficient to point out that Boyd does not take free will in a minimal sense—
the ability to select a desired option.  For him, a free agent is one who possesses 
deliberative and executive capabilities to choose on the basis of desires and values.  
                                                 
73
Boyd contends that there is no explicit Scripture teaching on post-mortem 
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Therefore, by self-determined free will, he means that with all the limitations that our 
genes and environment put on us as individuals, it is within our power to determine our 
actions. That is why Boyd could write that “we experience self-determining freedom in 
every act of deliberation and in every moral judgment we make.”75  
For him, each of us determines his or her fate.  There may be various factors that 
sway our decision-making process, yet those factors are not determinative factors of our 
destiny.  Created agents are ultimately responsible for their actions.  In this way, Boyd 
refutes the classical view of free will and its associated concept of predestination.  On the 
other hand, he refrains from humanism, but appeals to a concept of free will that is akin 
to the Ariminian view of human freedom.
76
 
 
Nature of Self-Determined Freedom 
 
Having defined contingent freedom as self-determination, Boyd attributes some 
qualities to it.  According to him, self-determination involves moral responsibility and   
proportionality of moral responsibility, and it is irrevocable and finite.  
 
Moral responsibility 
 
His definition of self-determined freedom holds individual persons accountable 
for their decisions.
77
  Boyd writes, the “capacity to freely love one another must imply 
that to some extent we have the capacity to freely harm one another.”78  As a result, 
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God’s decision to create self-determined agents entails a risk of moral responsibility to 
each other.  In his view, God put us at risk to each other when He endowed us with the 
potential to freely love one another.  In other words, He made us responsible for each 
other.
79
  Consequently, contingent freedom is not only the potential to love or not to love 
God but it also includes the capacity to help or harm others.   
Relying on the command in Gen 1:26-28, Boyd claims that we are placed in a 
covenant relationship with everyone and everything around us.  The essence of this is that 
our moral responsibility extends further than our close relationships; it encompasses our 
entire environment.  In his opinion, the tapestry of morally responsible interactions 
includes the spiritual realm.  In effect, the spiritual beings who possess the ability to bless 
the human race also have the capacity to hurt it.
80
 
This means, by reason of this interlocking tapestry, moral responsibility is broadly 
shared.  However, according to Boyd, the self-determined free agents directly involved in 
a behavior or an action are more responsible than others.
81
 
 
Proportionality of moral responsibility   
 
Boyd’s view of moral responsibility is closely correlated with the principle of 
proportionality.  He deems it apposite to assume that the scope of the potential to freely 
love one another is proportional to the scope of the potential to freely harm each other.
82
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82Ibid. This is the fourth of Boyd’s six theses. 
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For direct proof of this assumption he identifies the principle of proportionality as an old 
concept found in the teachings of Jesus (Luke 12:48), Paul (1 Tim 3; Titus 1:6-8), 
Aristotle, and Shakespeare.  He claims that the same principle is referred to with the 
phrase “corruptio optimi pessima, ‘the corruption of the best is the worst,’”83 in medieval 
theology.  Accordingly, the greater a contingent’s capacity to do good, the greater his or 
her potential to do evil.  Hence, if individuals with the capacity to freely love fail to love, 
the same capacity and moral responsibility is turned to the capacity to harm.  It is his 
conviction that, in view of the principle of proportionality, the good that God wants to 
attain can be determined by the intensity of the evil that is manifested in the cosmos.  Not 
only does this assertion justify God for taking the risk that He took in creating the 
world,
84
 but it also demonstrates Boyd’s confidence in the idea that God cannot do what 
is logically impossible.  He cannot create a world with the potential to love without a 
proportional potential to cause evil. 
 
Irrevocability of self-determined freedom    
 
Boyd is inclined to believe that “the genuineness of self-determination hinges . . . 
on its irrevocability.”85  Using a gift as an illustration he earmarks, the time period in 
which the receiver of a gift determines what to do with the gift is crucial.
86
  Similarly, in 
his opinion, self-determined free will requires a time period for agents to use their free  
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will either for good or evil.  The duration of self-determined free will, according to Boyd, 
even though it is temporal, makes self-determined free will irrevocable.
87
  This implies 
that the irrevocability of self-determined freedom is ingrained in the meaning of love and 
its corollary, freedom, and its necessitated moral responsibility.
88
  That is to say, a period 
of time is a must for love, freedom, and moral responsibility to be a reality. 
Contingent self-determined freedom seems to have noticeable effects on God’s 
omnipotence, but Boyd rejects this appraisal.  He conceives irrevocability of self-
determined freedom to be an acknowledgment of divine power.  He explains that God’s 
inability to revoke contingent free will is an indispensable consequence of His power to 
create the world.
89
  The irrevocability of self-determined free will is a metaphysical 
consequence of God’s decision to create a contingent world that He must allow to take its 
natural course until a required time, which is known only to God.
90
  He appears to 
demonstrate that the immediate termination of free will implies annihilation of the human 
race, which, from his assessment, does not typify the nature of a God who is love.  
 
Finite self-determined freedom 
 
Self-determined free will of agents, according to Boyd, is irrevocable, yet he 
suggests it is also finite.
91
  Observing from his understanding of the wisdom of God,  
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experience, and the nature of contingent beings, he concludes that self-determined free 
will must be finite before God’s victory over sin as described in the Bible can be 
intelligible.
92
   
Boyd’s discussion on the finitude of self-determined free will is relevant in the 
context of contingent beings.  In his view, contingent being refers to a finite being, a 
being who is inherently restricted.  The significance of this is that it necessarily makes the 
freedom of any contingent being finite, just as the being itself.
93
    
Again from the analogy of a company selling shares, Boyd conceives of God as 
an owner of all power who gave out shares of power.  Nevertheless, in His wisdom, 
according to him, God keeps a greater part of the shares in order that He can see to the 
total “flow of history and the attainment of his ultimate aim in creation would remain 
within his power.”  He continues, “God wisely restricts the extent of the risk he was 
willing to take.”94  While Boyd agrees with process theists that all agents possess power, 
he disavows the process thought that agents possess power from eternity.  He asserts that 
God shares His power with contingent beings; however, God possesses the ultimate 
power.
95
  
Similarly, he observes on an experiential level that our genetic makeup, 
environment, and natural laws limit us.  In addition, the options available to us are also 
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limited by time.  As a result, the irrevocable self-determination is finite.
96
  Referring to 
such authors as Augustine and C. S. Lewis, Boyd explains that the choices we make 
within the options that are available to use become our habits and gradually become our 
character.
97
  Thus, he remarks, self-determined free will is the “probationary means by 
which we acquire compatibilistic freedom either for or against God.”98  Boyd does not 
indicate the point at which one’s choice becomes a solidified character or when self-
determination becomes compatibilistic freedom.  But, in the same context, he notes that 
life gains momentum the further it flows.  This projects an idea that if an individual’s 
decision leans toward one side of the will, it is not possible for that individual to turn to 
the opposite side of the will.  That is why he states that “like every other process we 
observe in nature, the ever-quickening current of life flows in only one direction.”99  If 
my analysis so far is correct, then there comes into view a tension between the 
contingency of human nature and the idea of life’s current flowing in one direction. 
 
Quality of Self-determined Freedom 
 
According to Boyd, different variables define the scope or quality of any moral 
agents’ freedom and at the same time condition God’s interaction with the world.  He 
calls these variables “givens.”100  He defines the “givens” as a “complex constellation of 
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contingent variables that collectively constitute a particular situation.”101  The “givens” 
are the ongoing influence of God, the original constitution of an agent, the agent’s 
previous decision, other agents’ decision, and finally prayer.  We shall now turn our 
attention to a brief discussion of the individual “givens,” however, the last variable, 
prayer, is discussed under divine sovereignty.
102
 
 
Ongoing influence of God 
 
Boyd acknowledges that genuine personal relationship lies on two centers, the 
center of influence and the center of non-coercion.
103
  From this observation, he 
concludes that “God leads personal beings with persuasive call, not a controlling 
force.”104  Based on his understanding of the rudiments of personal relationship and the 
apostolic church fathers, he emphatically stresses that there is no coercion with God.
105
   
Boyd conceives that God influences His creatures and His creatures influence Him.
106
  
However, God does not depend on His creatures for His sufficiency.
107
  But what 
happens to His creatures makes a real difference on Him; God can neither change nor 
undo their actions and decisions for the sake of His fundamental nature, love.  This  
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means, for Boyd, God’s non-coercion covenant stems from a quality of relationships.  He 
deals with His creatures in ways that respect and preserve His and their integrity in the 
relationship.  Therefore, he writes, God honors the non-coercion center of the relationship 
with a covenant of non-coercion.
108
  According to Boyd, this freedom is the “core of what 
it means to be made in the image of God,” and it is “God’s greatest achievement.”109 
 
Original constitution of an agent   
 
Another metaphysical principle that conditions God’s interaction with human 
agents, according to Boyd, is the original constitution of human beings.  By this he means 
the individual’s makeup from birth and the parameters of possible roles designed for an 
individual by the Creator.  In Boyd’s view, these parameters originate from the Creator 
and differ with every individual.  This does not deny the Scripture’s teaching on the 
equality of humans in the sight of God.  However, it causes unequal possibilities, inherent 
potential, and degrees of freedom.
110
  This implies that degrees of freedom result in 
unequal degrees of the scope of freedom.  Accordingly, this is the reason why God’s 
interaction with free agents appears arbitrary from a human perspective.
111
  It appears that 
self-determined will is personalized, therefore, for the sake of God’s integrity, He does 
not interfere with choices made within individuals’ limit of freedom.112   
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In discussing the differences in individuals’ natural endowments of which he cites 
examples,
113
 he writes, “Insofar as these differences flow from the reproductive process 
working in congruity with the design of the Creator, they are natural and beautiful.  
Insofar as they flow from other variables in this war zone that are incongruous with the 
Creator’s design, they are unnatural and hideous.”114  By the examples that Boyd alludes 
to, it becomes evident that God sometimes uses diseases and deformities to individualize 
contingent freedom.
115
  We can infer from this that, for him, inherent in creation are some 
deformities even without the activities of Satan.  However, this design of God which is 
short of perfection contributes to the beauty of creation.  It is obvious that, although Boyd 
disavows Augustine’s theodicy, some aspects of his explanation are indistinguishable 
from Augustine’s.  Considering the fact that his concept of God bears some 
characteristics of the classical traditional theory of God, it is not surprising that he 
reiterates the aesthetic principle in Augustine’s theodicy.  It should be emphasized that 
Boyd’s understanding of the original constitution of an agent does not take into account 
the choices of our parents and their environment and/or the effects of sin on a being.  
 
Previous decision of an agent  
 
I have already noted that every individual possesses some degree of freedom 
conditioned by the nature and parameters of the possible role we receive from God.  This 
initial free will may be the ability to say yes or no to God’s love.  Whatever this freedom 
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is, saying yes or no to God redefines the individual’s scope of freedom and opens new 
opportunities to the extent that it shapes one’s character. 116  Thus Boyd remarks that 
possibilities are open to us now that would have otherwise been irrevocably closed 
had we previously chosen differently, while other possibilities are irrevocably closed 
to us now that would have otherwise been open had we previously chosen differently.  
Like every other process we observe in nature, the ever-quickening current of life 
flows in only one direction.
117
 
For Boyd, free will is unidirectional and dynamic.
118
  One’s quality of freedom is 
defined by variables beyond human control; nonetheless within the initial freedom it is 
still within one’s ability to define their quality of freedom with the choices they make.119   
 
Decisions of other agents    
 
As noted above, self-determined freedom is genuine inasmuch as it influences 
others.
120
  Resulting from this nature of self-determination is that quality of freedom that 
is conditioned by the free will of other agents.   
For Boyd, not only are creatures of the world interconnected, but also the physical 
world is related with the spiritual world.  Thus, the quality of the individual’s freedom is 
defined by both factors and variables that flow from the physical world as well as the 
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spiritual realm.
121
  Hence, he concludes that “every single event in the cosmos is to some 
extent a universally influenced, sociologically determined event.”122 
This means that in every event the decisions of other human beings and angelic 
beings influence it either for good or bad.  The individual free will does not live in a 
vacuum.  It is interconnected with all other free wills.  Therefore, according to Boyd, it 
“is a dynamic reality largely defined by its relationship to everything else.”123 
In sum, Boyd’s model of free will is self-determined or libertarian.  It is a 
metaphysical requirement of divine decision to create the world with the potential to love.  
His free will model entails moral responsibility and proportional potential to influence 
others either for good or bad; it is irrevocable and finite.  Five of the six theses upon 
which Boyd bases his arguments for Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy and the issues relating 
to theodicy are characteristics of his concept of free will.  These theses are arrived at 
based on his re-working of Hartshorne’s process philosophy.  Thus, it could be said that 
his model of free will is the ground by which he establishes his Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.  The next section explores how Boyd establishes his model of divine 
foreknowledge on the basis of his concept of free will. 
                                                 
121
Boyd, God at War, 164-167. 
122
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 213. 
123
Ibid., 201.  
116 
Divine Foreknowledge 
I noted in the previous section that the debate on free will has been a dilemma of 
the relationship between contingent freedom and divine foreknowledge; consequently, in 
seeking to analyze the theodicy of Boyd, it is important to examine his concept of divine 
foreknowledge.  For, in Boyd’s view, the correct understanding of scriptural teaching on 
divine foreknowledge is very critical in formulating an explanation of the problem of 
evil.   
Boyd prefaces his discussion on the concept of divine knowledge of the future by 
pointing out the weakness in the classical view of divine foreknowledge.  For him, all 
forms of exhaustive definite foreknowledge
124—Calvinist view, simple foreknowledge, 
and middle knowledge—are inconsistent with the idea that God took a risk when He 
created a world with agents possessing self-determining free will and the idea that the 
world is a war zone.
125
  Therefore, he objects to those views of divine foreknowledge and 
prefers an open view of the future.  He explains that an open view of the future is “an in-
house Arminian discussion on how to render the free will defense that is most coherent, 
biblical, and credible.”126  Elsewhere he claims that the open view “reconciles . . .  
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seemingly contradictory passages of the Word.”127 
According to Boyd, the open view of the future attributes risk to God and also   
affirms God’s omniscience.  He claims the view affirms that God knows the past, present, 
and the future perfectly.  However, the future decisions of contingent beings are only 
possibilities until free agents actualize them.  Thus, in his view, the future is partly open 
and partly closed, which means the partly closed future is determined and thus foreknown 
by God.  On the other hand, the partly open future is undetermined and not known as 
certainty but as possibilities.
128
  In the ensuing discussion I try to analytically describe his 
concept of divine foreknowledge under openness of the future and the content of divine 
foreknowledge. 
 
Openness of the Future 
 
In Boyd’s opinion, the Bible portrays many aspects of the future as settled.  
However, in his opinion, this portrayal does not, in any way, support the exhaustive 
definite foreknowledge of God.  God’s knowledge is temporally conditioned.  He 
investigates this by considering God who risks, God in time, His resourcefulness, and 
conditional prophecies. 
 
God who risks 
 
In Boyd, as we have seen, love implies choice.  At best, the possibility of love in 
the universe requires that both angelic and human beings possess the power of choice and 
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are the ultimate cause of their actions.  Underlying this understanding of this free will is 
the conception that the choice of contingent beings cannot be known in advance. 
Convinced of the accurateness of his concept of self-determined freedom, Boyd 
argues that in creating morally free beings with the potential to love, God undertook the 
risk that love will not be returned—disobedience.129  In his opinion God willingly 
committed Himself to creating morally free agents in spite of an uncertain and indefinite 
outcome of the use of their freedom.  He writes, God “deemed the risk worthwhile for the 
sake of what it can achieve”130—possibility of love.  Thus for Boyd, “the destiny of 
individuals is open at the time they are created.”131  Consequently, God does not possess 
exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future choices of free moral agents.  God left moral 
agents free to complete the open future with their choices.   
 
God in time 
 
Boyd elaborates on various biblical passages describing God’s relationship with 
contingent beings.  According to him, from eternity God considered probabilities of free 
agents’ decisions and anticipated each situation as the only possibility that could be 
actualized.  Therefore, God is not taken off guard at the decisions contingent beings 
actualize.
132
 
This is, according to Boyd, manifested in the characteristic way in which  
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scriptural passages depict God’s definite response to decisions of contingent beings in 
time.  God gets disappointed by the improbable decisions of free agents,
133
 asks questions 
about the decisions of individuals,
134
 regrets the results of His own decisions,
135
 finds out 
or tests peoples’ hearts to know their loyalty to Him,136 and searches for an intercessor for 
people who have lost their connection with Him because of continuous involvement in 
sinful actions.
137
  In his opinion, the picture that emerges from these passages is not a 
God who knows the future as certain but a God who responds to events as they are 
actualized.  God is open to the world of creaturely experience and He is genuinely 
affected by creaturely experience. 
Another intriguing evidence that God does not possess definite foreknowledge of 
free agents’ future decisions is Christ’s remarks concerning the time of His second 
coming, argues Boyd.
138
  It is his contention that Christ’s statement about the day and the 
hour of His return, when placed in the context of other eschatological statements,
139
 is 
only “an idiomatic way of affirming that the decision about this matter is the Father’s.  
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He alone will know when the time is right.”140  Boyd makes this conclusion because, for 
him, decisions of contingent beings may delay or hasten the return of Christ.  Boyd is 
here proving that contents of divine foreknowledge of matters involving contingent 
beings are only possibilities. 
 
Omni-resourceful God   
 
Boyd is inclined to attribute the extent to which the future is open to Scriptures’ 
use of “conditional and tentative terms about the future.”141  On the basis of several 
scriptural texts that are structured in such terms,
142
 he points out that God does not 
infallibly predict the future, or project Himself as one who knows every detail;
143
 rather 
He demonstrates His knowledge of the only reality about the future, possibilities.
144
  To 
make this assumption is to maintain that God’s uncertainty about the future is a defect of 
His nature.  On the contrary, Boyd rejects this assertion.  He conceives of God’s 
knowledge of future possibilities as an evidence of a partly open future.
145
  Therefore, he 
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writes, “the passages that suggest that God faces a partly open future do not conflict with 
those that depict God as the all-powerful, sovereign, majestic Lord of history.”146 
Using William James’s analogy of God as a chess master, Boyd concludes that 
God, like a wise chess player, knows and anticipates all the possibilities of His moves 
and that of His opponent.  He even places some pieces “at risk,” nonetheless He is certain 
to be victorious.  In other words, what Boyd is affirming here is that the future is not 
definite, therefore God knows only the possibilities of the future.
147
  However, on the 
basis of God’s infinite intelligence, He is able to attend to each and every possibility as 
though there are no other alternatives.  For, according to Boyd, God’s infinite intelligence 
is not divided up among possibilities; consequently, there is no distinction between God 
knowing future events as possibilities and knowing the future as settled.
148
  Boyd argues 
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definite knowledge of the future, Boyd states, “Why are we humans less confident 
considering possibilities than we are with certainties?  It is only because our intelligence 
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say that all of God’s intelligence is focused on each and every possibility, and each series 
of possibilities, as though there were no alternative possibilities. In other words, for a 
God of infinite intelligence, there is virtually no distinction between knowing a certainty 
and knowing a possibility. God gains no providential advantage by knowing future events 
 
122 
that there is no difference between the concepts of God’s knowledge of the future as 
possibilities and God’s knowledge of the future as certain.  But this by itself is no 
sufficient reason to consider Boyd as affirming exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  
Although his explanation is logical, it does not make the two concepts the same. 
 
Conditional prophecies 
 
The nature of prophecies involving free agents, Boyd claims, is conditional.  He 
cites the stories of Jonah and the repentant Ninevites,
149
  Hezekiah’s recovery,150 and the 
flexible potter
151
 as examples of conditional prophecies, but in each case he appears to 
place emphasis on the event as “God’s willingness to be flexible and change according to 
the situation.”152  In his opinion, these and other prophecies of the same nature imply that 
God’s declarations about the future are alterable; therefore, His statements about the 
future are possibilities.  God through Jeremiah reprimanded people who think otherwise, 
he argues.
153
  For Boyd, passages expressing God’s emotions are a scriptural way of 
getting its reader’s attention on the fact that God’s knowledge of the future decisions of 
contingent beings is of possibilities that are neither exhaustively settled in reality nor in 
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the mind of God.
154
  Not only is it obvious that Boyd’s consideration of these passages 
emphasizes his affirmation of God’s activeness in human history, but it also constrains 
him to object to exhaustive definite foreknowledge. 
In effect, he objects to the traditional interpretation of scriptural passages 
expressing God’s emotions as anthropomorphic and phenomenological expressions.155  
He argues that such understanding is based on a philosophical presupposition, God is 
immutable, brought into the scriptural texts.  In his view, the philosophical 
presupposition creates a canon within a canon and denies the integrity of the texts and the 
genuineness of who God really is.
156
  In contrasting the traditional interpretation, he 
makes a distinction between passages with body parts and those with emotional phrases.  
While passages with phrases of body parts are treated as figurative and/or poetic in nature 
to maintain the veracity of the Bible,
157
 those with emotional phrases are taken literally.  
It seems the distinction made between scriptural texts with anthropomorphic and 
phenomenological expressions is significantly related to his acceptance of the 
philosophical assumption that God has no body.
158
   
                                                 
154
Ibid., 61. 
155
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 97, 102; Gregory A. Boyd, “The Open 
Theism View,” in Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. 
Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001), 37. 
156
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 97, 100. 
157
Deut 4:34; Hos 2:2; Ps 17:8 (Boyd, God of the Possible, 54, 60, 71-72, 120). 
158
Millard J. Erickson, What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? The 
Current Controversy over Divine Foreknowledge (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2003), 
68. 
124 
Although Boyd states explicitly that the issue of divine foreknowledge is not 
about the nature of God but rather the nature of creation, yet it can be said categorically 
that Boyd affirms the A-theory of time
159
 and totally rejects God being atemporal.  This is 
culminated in his remarks, “When I speak of texts being ‘literal’ I am not thereby 
denying that there is a metaphorical element in them.  I simply mean they have a similar 
meaning when applied to God as they have when applied to humans.”160  This 
emphasizes the point that, in Boyd, God’s nature is at stake; He is limited by time the 
same way human beings are limited.   
In the process of reconciling contemporary science with theology, he concludes 
that although it is not ideal to use scientific discoveries to establish biblical truth, “we 
cannot ignore the findings of contemporary science on this account [divine 
foreknowledge].”161  As a result, he contends that the development of theology must be in 
dialogue with the truths found in all other disciplines such as physics, cosmology, 
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psychology, sociology, biology, and anthropology.
162
  He also cautioned that “while the 
findings of science cannot be ignored, if a particular interpretation of a theory 
fundamentally conflicts with Scripture, Christians are obliged to stick with Scripture and 
judge that the interpretation of the theory is misguided.”163  With this emphasis, Boyd 
identifies quantum physics as providing evidence of the openness of the future.  
 The most relevant feature of quantum physics for our purposes is the 
indeterminate behavior of quantum particles.  In quantum mechanics we can predict 
on a bell curve an individual particle’s probable behavior under given experimental 
conditions, but we cannot in principle predict it precisely.  The leap from the 
probability wave pocket (the state of being “possibly this or possibly that,” what is 
sometimes called the particle’s “superposition”) to the actual state at the end of the 
experiment (the state of being “definitely this and definitely not that”) cannot be 
exhaustively accounted for.
164
  
Boyd adds that the uncertainty of quantum mechanics is not found in the 
measurement device, but it lies in the metaphysics of things.
165
  Furthermore, he declares 
that the science of deliberation provides stronger evidence that the future is partly 
opened.  In his opinion, “our experience as free, moral agents who deliberate about 
decisions indicates that on a fundamental level we assume that reality is partly 
determined, partly undetermined.”166  
These prove to him that the Bible does not subscribe to exhaustive definite divine 
foreknowledge.  At this point, it is important to recognize that Boyd’s explanation is 
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philosophically driven.  He makes inference from presuppositions of the scientific mind- 
set of this present epoch of human history.   
The point to be made from this analysis of definite open future is that God is not 
cut off from humans and the world.  By virtue of a partly open future, God is able to 
relate with His creatures on a temporal level evident in His flexibility in responding to 
human actions by asking questions, changing His mind in response to situations, 
regretting the outcome of some decisions He makes, and finding out about His peoples’ 
decisions; and for that matter He has not determined and does not possess exhaustive 
definite knowledge of the future decisions and actions of free agents, yet He is sovereign. 
We now turn to the analysis of Boyd’s understanding of the content of divine 
foreknowledge.  
 
Content of Divine Foreknowledge 
 
In the preceding section we have seen, in Boyd’s view, the extent to which the 
future is definitely opened, the aspects of the future that are undetermined and not 
definitely known by God.  My concern in this section is to show, in Boyd’s opinion, how 
much of the future is foreknown by God.  The answer to this question seems to be 
provided by Boyd’s discussion of biblical passages that he classifies as unconditional 
prophecies.   
 
Unconditional prophecies   
 
To present Boyd’s view of the content of divine foreknowledge it is appropriate to 
analyze his understanding of unconditional prophecies under unilateral decisions and 
predictions of individual actions. 
127 
Unilateral decisions.  Boyd agrees that Scripture portrays some things about the 
future as definite.  However, for him, the fact that those aspects have been written in the 
language and style of definiteness does not mean everything about the future is settled.  
They are definite only because God designed them in that manner; that is, they are God’s 
will or His own plan or by inevitable consequence of present actions.
167
  Alluding to 
some specific scriptural texts in Isaiah,
168
 Boyd explains how some aspects are settled by 
saying “Whatever the Lord is going to do he foreknows from the time he decides to do it.  
And so he declares this foreknowledge to prove that he, not some idol, is doing it.”169  
Therefore, it would be correct to infer that the closed aspects of the future are that which 
are determined and thus foreknown. 
His emphasis on the content of God’s foreknowledge is culminated in his analysis 
of Rom 8:29-30 and the prophecies about the Messiah’s death.  In each case he seems to 
place emphasis on the idea that they do not involve free agents and so they are God’s 
self-knowledge of His purpose.
170
   
In his discussion on Rom 8:29-30, a scriptural passage that is considered as 
explicit evidence of divine foreknowledge, Boyd’s view of the openness of some part of 
the future forces him to deny the cognitive use of the Greek word proginōskō.171   
According to him, proginōskō, which is translated foreknowledge, is not used in the 
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cognitive sense but in the “customary Semitic sense of affection,” thus, the word means 
forelove.
172
  Consequently, there is a definite emphasis on God loving a group from the 
foundation of the world.
173
  I have noted under the discussion on free will that for Boyd, 
“God’s goal from the dawn of history has been to have a church, a bride who would say 
yes to his love, who would fully receive this love, embody this love, and beautifully 
reflect this triune love back to himself.”174  Hence, he unambiguously points to the church 
as the object foreloved.  What Boyd means is that the text is not dealing with God’s 
foreknowledge of selected individual free agents but a corporate whole, the church, that 
God loved ahead of time.  However, whatever applies to the group affects the individual 
who accepts God.
175
   
Boyd does not come out to deny that the text does not speak about divine 
foreknowledge; neither does he confirm it.  However, it is clear that he is emphasizing 
the content of what he considers as divine foreknowledge.  Apparently, in this 
explanation he asserts God’s foreknowledge of future behavior of a group of free agents.  
Unlike the social scientists, biologists, and anthropologists who predict the future 
behavior of a group by studying the group, God foreknows the future behavior of a group 
                                                 
171
Ibid., 117-118. 
172
Ibid., 118.  
173
Ibid.  
174
Ibid., 51.  
175
Ibid., 118. 
129 
not because the object caused His knowledge, but because God has willed or determined 
their behavior.
 176
   
Boyd’s insistence on showing the content of divine foreknowledge is further 
disclosed in his discussion on the Messianic prophecies.  He accentuates the prophecies 
about the Messiah’s crucifixion as preordained and foreknown, but that the individuals 
involved were not known.  He asserts that the roles played by individuals such as Peter 
and Judas were not known and, hence, not determined by God;
177
 the individuals, says 
Boyd, “participated in Christ’s death of their own free wills.”178   
Boyd believes in a metaphysics that has a “balance between determinism and 
freedom, stable laws and chance, regularity and spontaneity, general predictability and 
element of unpredictability about specifics,” which makes it possible for an event to be 
“predestined while affirming that the individuals who carry it out are not.”179  Therefore, 
Boyd manages to explain how the individuals are intertwined in God’s determined and 
foreknown plans by resorting to predictions of individual actions. 
 
Predictions of individuals’ actions.  It appears that Boyd believes the 
plausibility of explaining the predictions involving free decisions of individuals without 
compromising any aspect of his view on partly opened future depends on details of what 
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he means by future possibilities.  He therefore modifies middle knowledge,
180
 claiming 
that from all eternity God knows the “might” and “would” counterfactuals of free agents 
in any possible world.
181
  In his view, the might counterfactuals of creaturely freedom 
make the contents of God’s foreknowledge of the free agents’ possibilities.182  On the 
basis of might and would counterfactuals of creaturely free will, God knows the 
characteristics of the agents He chooses to create, and the actions they would take in 
certain situations if they follow a certain life-trajectory.
183
 
In addition, as was described earlier, in Boyd, the choices of an individual define 
the character and thereafter the individual acts in conformity with his or her character.  
Thus, as far as Boyd is concerned, the predictions of Peter’s denial and Judas’s betrayals 
are based on God’s perfect knowledge of Peter’s and Judas’s past and present solidified 
characters and the “might” counterfactuals.184  What Boyd means is that God infers from 
known facts about Peter and Judas and then, as a sovereign Lord, He “decides at some 
point to providentially ensure that just this situation would come about.”185  It could be 
said, inferring from his exposition, that based on the “would” and “might” 
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counterfactuals God creates the kind of people who will fit into his purpose, which 
implies God determines such individuals.  Elaborating on Peter’s denial, he remarks that  
“God knew and perfectly anticipated . . . that if the world proceeded exactly as it did up 
to the point of the Last Supper, Peter’s character would be solidified to the extent that he 
would be the kind of person who would deny Christ in a certain situation.”186  In the 
context of this discussion, it could be mentioned that, in Boyd, the process by which God 
acquires His knowledge is analogous to humans.  The extent of what God knows is the 
same as what humans know except for the fact that God predicts with a sufficient degree 
of certainty because of His possession of “might” and “would” counterfactual knowledge.  
This is why Boyd states that “anyone who knew Peter’s character perfectly could have 
predicted that under certain highly pressured circumstances (that God could easily 
orchestrate), he would act just the way he did.”187   
It should be emphasized that, for Boyd, moral responsibility is in the context of 
self-determined freedom.  Therefore, God drawing individuals into His determined plans 
only after the individuals have solidified their characters does not make God responsible.  
According to Boyd,  
 Moral culpability is not just about people acting certain ways when they could 
have and should have acted differently.  It’s more about people becoming certain 
kinds of people when they could have and should have become different kinds of 
people.  Hence, if God decides that it fits his providential plan to use a person whose 
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choices have solidified his character as wicked, God is not responsible for this 
person’s wickedness.188   
In this brief discussion of Boyd’s understanding of predictions involving choices 
of individuals, we may say with certainty that the future choices of free agents that God 
foreknows as certain are those that flow from solidified character. 
On the other hand, he recognizes that his explanation does not deal adequately 
with predictions found in the book of Daniel about Cyrus, Josiah, and the people of 
Israel.
189
  However, he is not willing to admit that such prophecies establish divine 
foreknowledge of an individual’s future decisions.  Hence, he argues that in such 
prophecies God determines the activities and then sets the parameters within which the 
freedom of the individuals will occur and sets boundaries within which certain nations 
will strive.
190
   
In the framework of Boyd’s self-determinism, freedom is generally restricted.  
This implies that the freedom of the individuals involved in these prophecies is further 
limited; the scope of their free will is narrower than all other individuals.  That is, God 
unilaterally manipulates human freedom.  For God must orchestrate, in addition to 
restricting free will, the activities of individuals involved in order to get them to fulfill 
His predictions.
191
  It seems, then, that God undermines individual freedom and takes 
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advantage of the undermined freedom by making offers in a manner that the only 
reasonable choice for the contingent being is to accept the coercive offer.  There comes 
into sight an in-built tension between affirmation of surety of the fulfillment of divine 
predictions, on one hand, and holding to self-determination, on the other hand.  
As a way of concluding the examination of Boyd’s concept of divine 
foreknowledge, it is necessary to emphasize that Boyd believes his concept of divine 
foreknowledge has theological advantage over other alternative views.  However, he does 
not “wager the entire credibility of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy on . . . the open 
view of the future.”192  He recognizes that individuals with other theories of divine 
foreknowledge may at the same time affirm the warfare explanation of the problem of 
evil.  However, he mentions that such people “do so with a certain inconsistency.”193  He 
therefore writes, “The open perspective on the future, however, is more biblical and 
logically more consistent with the warfare worldview of Scripture and the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy than the EDF doctrine.”194 
Two assertions stand out in Boyd’s statement.  The first assertion is that any 
theological concept must be biblical and logically consistent.  The other affirmation of 
equal importance for Boyd is that among other things his trinitarian warfare view is the 
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most biblical and internally consistent warfare theodicy model.
195
  In sum, we may 
observe that in spite of his caveat, the credibility of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
depends to a great extent on the open view of the future.  However, his claims for the 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy must await evaluation in chapter 5. 
 
Sovereignty of God 
 
In discussing Boyd’s concepts of free will and divine foreknowledge, we have 
discovered that because of contingent free will, the content of God’s foreknowledge is 
what there is to be known: self-purpose and possibilities of moral agents’ future 
decisions.  
On the basis of the relationship between divine foreknowledge and self-
determinism, Boyd is critical of the classical traditional view of divine sovereignty, God 
exercising meticulous sovereignty over His creation.  In his attempt to object to this view 
he points out that the assumption, “sovereignty is synonymous” with unilateral or 
meticulous control,
196
 has devastating effects on God’s sovereignty.  It undermines God’s 
power in a sense that it denies Him the ability to respond and adapt to surprises and to the 
unexpected and the prerogative of being a risk-taker, the very things that human beings 
enjoy having.
197
  He claims that the concept of meticulous divine sovereignty distorts the 
human understanding of God, which is “analogically rooted in our experience.”198 
                                                 
195
See ibid., 88-144, for Boyd’s explanation for the truth of these claims. 
196
Ibid., 147.  
197
Ibid., 148. 
198
Ibid., 149. 
135 
Depending on feminist theologians and analogy from human experience, he 
emphasizes that we appreciate leaders or individuals who influence others more than 
those who coerce.  Thus, Boyd can say that “what is praiseworthy about God’s 
sovereignty is . . . that out of his character he does not exercise all the power he could.”199  
He intends to demonstrate that divine sovereignty is limited to influence not as a result of 
weakness found in God but as a necessary act that accompanies His decision to create 
creatures with self-determined free will.  This is why he is of the conviction that God 
shares His power with His intelligent creatures.  However, as wise as God is, He keeps 
enough power to Himself “so that the overall flow of history and the attainment of his 
ultimate aim in creation would remain within his power.”200  In other words, God took a 
risk in sharing His power, but has enough means to redeem the lost that may occur as a 
result of the risk.
201
  Boyd is persuaded that shared power distinguishes God’s style of 
leadership as persuasion and not coercion. I may correctly remark that Boyd sounds like a 
process theologian.  However, unlike process theists who call attention to a necessary 
God-world relationality, Boyd assumes that relationality belongs to the essence of the 
Godhead.
202
  In his view, God does not need the world to be relational: there is 
relationality among God the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
At this point, Boyd relies on various sources to support the view that divine 
sovereignty is not meticulous.  He refers to Irenaeus, Athenagoras, and Origen to say that 
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there is no coercion in God.
203
  Convinced as he is about his concept of divine 
sovereignty, he is no less certain about the support contemporary science lends to his 
theory.  He observes, with contemporary scientific disciplines, that indeterminism and 
determinism are complementary.  Thus he writes, “From quantum mechanics as well as 
from chaos theory, complexity theory and thermodynamics, ‘we are presented with a 
picture of the world that is neither mechanical nor chaotic, but at once both open and 
orderly in its character.’”204  In his experience, contemporary science proves that the 
behavior of a group can be predicted, but in each and every individual there is 
unpredictability, which stems from the nature of things.
205
  Consequently, in Boyd, once 
predictability is not exhaustive, God does not control everything.
206
  From this, one can 
infer that the relationship that exists between human freedom and divine determinism and 
foreknowledge exists between self-determined free will and divine sovereignty.  
Therefore, divine determinism, foreknowledge, and sovereignty are inextricably linked 
together.   
The apparent relationship between divine determinism, foreknowledge, and 
sovereignty raises a question about the possibility of God achieving His purpose for His 
creation.  Boyd addresses this issue by expounding on God’s “own character and 
ability.”207  On one hand, God’s ability to know all counterfactuals and predict the 
                                                 
203
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 151.  
204
Ibid., 152.  
205
Ibid., 151-155.  
206
Ibid., 155.  
207
Ibid., 156 (emphasis his). 
137 
behavior of a group made it possible for God to foreknow from the beginning the 
probability of the fall, and also to foreknow that, if the fall should occur, some of the 
creatures would accept His offer of salvation and others would not.
208
  We should be 
reminded that, in Boyd, the possibility of the fall is rooted in self-determined free will.
209
  
That is, God knows the probability of achieving His purpose on the basis of His 
knowledge of the future possibilities of agents’ choices.     
Similarly, he argues that God’s essence is love, therefore He will not give up on 
His determined purpose for His creatures.  Citing the stories of the flood
210
 and Israel’s 
obstinacy and God’s ability to provide alternative plans to save the Israelites,211 Boyd 
concludes that God will do anything to bring His purpose for creation to a realization.
212
 
Based on the previous discussions, one could confidently say that in Boyd God’s effort to 
actualize His goal includes limiting one’s scope of freedom, orchestrating some 
circumstances, and pulling individuals into His self-purposed plan.   
Having described God’s sovereignty as general, Boyd recognizes that his 
explanation seems to make God’s governing activities in history arbitrary.  However, he 
points out that the seeming arbitrariness arises from the nature of human freedom
213
 and 
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the variables that condition the quality of freedom.
214
  This means contingent free will 
dictates when and how God intervenes in human history, free to intervene after an 
individual’s character is solidified or does not act within his or her scope of freedom.  In 
other words, God’s decision to create creatures with self-determined will not only limits 
His power but also His freedom.  Thus, Boyd observes that “God is not free to ‘unlimit 
himself’ anytime he chooses.”215  This understanding of divine intervention in human 
history requires a corresponding understanding of prayer.  The following section 
discusses the issue of prayer in terms of its role in divine sovereignty. 
 
Prayer 
 
Boyd conceives of prayer as a part of the package that comes along with God’s 
decision to create a world in which “love is possible.”216  In Boyd’s view, prayer is a 
necessary corollary of God’s decision.  According to him, prayer is the say-so in the 
spiritual realm
217
  as free will is the say-so in the physical realm.  Since the nature of self-
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determined freedom places constraints on what God can do unilaterally, petitionary and 
intercessory prayers are that which allows God to “steer a situation toward his desired 
end” without revoking contingent freedom.218  Therefore, he remarks, “prayer [is] a 
central aspect of moral responsibility.  By God’s own design, it functions as a crucial 
constituent in the ‘givens’ of any particular situation that makes it possible for God more 
intensely to steer a situation toward his desired end.”219  He continues, “We may 
understand that, by his own choice, God genuinely needs us to pray for certain things if 
they are to be accomplished, just as we may understand that God needs us to cooperate 
with him on a physical level for certain things to be accomplished.”220  
Again, relying on the essentials of friendship or personal relationships, Boyd sees 
prayer as empowerment given to free agents to influence God.  Through prayers, free 
agents participate in the center of influence in their relationship with God.
221
  For him, 
prayer is a human activity that God has ordained to establish a free agent’s personhood, 
participation in God’s triune loving Lordship, and maintain constant communication in 
the Creator-creature relationship on a temporal level.
222
  We can infer that prayer is the 
medium through which humans influence God in the God-human relationship.  In this 
sense, petitioners and intercessors influence God to do their bidding and, as a result, 
prayer does not necessarily permit God to direct a particular situation to His desired end, 
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as Boyd indicates.  Unequivocally, Boyd’s emphasis is that God shares His sovereignty 
with humanity; however, he has not shown how God influences His people in any 
particular situation in order to bring them to do what He desires. Thus, all the elements 
that condition the scope of self-determined freedom limit God in terms of His activity in 
human life, and prayer also specifies what He can do.  Thus, the certainty of God 
achieving His desired end in a war zone world by exercising providential sovereignty is 
still questionable.     
Unlike process theologians who believe God cannot respond to petitionary 
prayers because He works in accordance with metaphysical principles that govern Him 
and creation
223
 and classical theology that teaches that prayer has no effect on God,
224
 
Boyd insists on the effectiveness of prayer.  He turns to scriptural passages
225
 and some 
contemporary scholars, such as Walter Wink and Keith Ward, to emphasize that 
petitionary prayer influences God in an extraordinary manner, which makes an 
“incredible difference in the world.”226  Pointing to the war between the Amalekites and 
the Israelites and Moses’ significant participation, he concludes that intercessory prayer 
also conditions the amount of influence an agent has over others.
227
  According to him, 
the importance and urgency of prayer is evident in Christ’s teaching.  Therefore, he 
writes, “This teaching only makes sense if prayer actually accomplishes things: the more 
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we pray, the more good is accomplished.  Indeed, there are more conditional promises 
attached to prayer in Scripture than to any other human activity.”228  As a result, he 
asserts that a feasible theology must “render coherent the effectiveness and urgency of     
. . . prayer in the scripture.”229    
Although Boyd believes prayer plays an important role in God’s sovereignty, he 
recognizes that many prayers go unanswered.  He is certain that the arbitrary way in 
which prayers seem to be answered does not result only from God’s will and the faith of 
the petitioners, but also other variables such as angelic free will and the presence of 
sin.
230
  This does not mean he believes we are left to chance;
231
 rather he is convinced 
that “God sovereignly influences the whole process, working to bring about as much 
good and to prevent as much evil as possible.”232 
As important and as powerful as prayer is, it does not always bring the desired 
results, he contends.  However, he stresses an urgent trust in the sovereign leadership of 
the Lord.
233
  Based on scriptural texts, he mentions that God never indicated that the 
suffering and pain in the world be part of His plan, neither did He promise that we will 
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escape from all the emotions and physical pains of the world, nor did He promise 
absolute protection from all the evils of the world.  However, He did assure us that He 
bears with us our pains and sufferings, He is working to bring good out of evil; He uses 
the pains and the sufferings we go through “to build our character and strengthen our 
reliance on Him,” and that eternal fellowship with God in His kingdom is our reward for 
the sufferings in this world.
234
  
In sum, prayer and contingent freedom, its nature and scope, play a significant 
role in a particular event.  Therefore, to understand God’s specific interaction with a free 
agent it is necessary to understand the agent’s relationship with all the free agents who 
are associated with the event in question.  Citing the communication between God and 
Job, Boyd indicates that it is beyond our knowledge to coordinate all the variables 
associated to a particular episode.
235
  Hence, God’s interaction with creation will always 
seem, from the outside, arbitrary to us.   
Boyd’s notion of human freedom and the part it plays in God’s interaction with 
the world makes the reason for a particular evil a mystery.  This is why he emphasizes 
that the mystery of evil is not “about God’s character” but, rather, it is the result of the 
“complexity of creation.”236  Boyd explains that all evil results from the agents’ will; 
however, by virtue of our lack of exhaustive knowledge of the variables of the condition 
or a particular state of affairs, we cannot know why some events are preventable and 
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others are not.
237
  So far, I have analyzed three main concepts: free will, divine 
foreknowledge, and God’s sovereignty, that underlie Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.  In discussing these concepts, we have discovered that contingent freedom is 
self-determined, divine foreknowledge is limited; the content of divine foreknowledge is 
that which God has purposed or determined, and sovereignty is general.  Consequently, in 
seeking to analyze Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, it is important to examine how Boyd 
employs his understanding of these concepts to explain the problem of evil.  
The Fall and Evil 
So far, I have analyzed the underlying theological elements of the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy.  However, the task of examining the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
will not be complete without an analysis of the fall and evil in Boyd.  I wish to 
accomplish this exercise by focusing on his understanding of the origin of the fall and 
evil, and victory over evil. 
 
Prehistoric Fall and Evil 
 
In his book God at War, Boyd examines passages of Scripture and concludes that 
the Bible is written from a warfare perspective.
238
  As a result, he carefully demonstrates 
that Gen 1 is in a warfare context.  This makes Gen 1 a conflict-creation account.
239
  
He also mentions that the Western cultural mind-set of secularism and 
materialism does not give much credit to cosmic warfare,
240
 but he indicates that the turn 
                                                 
237
Ibid., 216-220. 
238
Boyd, God at War, 99.  
239
Ibid., 102-113.  
144 
of modernism to postmodernism makes cosmic warfare all important because of 
postmodern awareness of “nonordinary reality” in the spiritual realm.241  This boosts his 
confidence in the viability of his cosmic warfare explanation to the problem of evil.  
While Boyd is not prepared to accept the obsessiveness of evil spirits in the surrounding 
cultures of the Old Testament authors, he maintains that the biblical authors were 
influenced by their surrounding cultures, specifically the Canaanite culture.  Again, he 
comments that the biblical motif of cosmic warfare is polemicizing against the Near 
Eastern cultural view of imperfect gods fighting against each other.  In his view, although 
the Bible affirms cosmic conflict, yet the sovereignty of God is unparalleled.
242
  It is 
therefore not surprising when he interprets most of the Old Testament passages in the 
light of a warfare motif in Ancient Near Eastern literature or culture.
243
  In this context, 
Boyd identifies prehistoric
244
 fall and warfare.  
It should be emphasized that the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy “is predicated on 
the assumption that divine goodness does not completely control or in any sense will evil; 
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rather, good and evil are at war with one another.  This assumption obviously entails that 
God is not exercising exhaustive, meticulous control over the world.”245 
Referring to some Old Testament passages, Boyd comes to the conclusion that, 
although God is portrayed as the only God, there are other spiritual beings.  He admits 
that these beings are sometimes called angels or gods.  However, Boyd, considering the 
difficulties such as unbiblical cultural baggage that comes with the use of angels, prefers 
the term gods.
246
  Boyd by no means suggests polytheism.  He believes the usage of the 
term in Scriptures is an emphasis on the existence of such beings and a sarcastic way of 
making them “puny in comparison with Yahweh that they do not even warrant the title 
‘god.’”247  Consequently, he gives a definite prominence to the concept of 
monotheism.
248
  
The stress put on monotheism stems from a belief that the gods are creatures that 
God created billions of years before our present universe.
249
  Therefore, according to 
Boyd, these gods are contingent beings endowed with self-determined freedom.  They are 
personal and intellectual beings, powerful and self-determined, which implies they have 
the capacity to influence other creatures for better or for worse and the ability to obey or 
disobey God.
250
  Boyd does not give God’s purpose for creating the gods.  But one can 
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infer from Boyd’s understanding of the relationship between love and self-determined 
will that God created them for the same reason He created humankind.  This means that 
not only is God’s sovereignty on earth general, but it is general also in heaven.  As a 
result, he maintains that these gods form a heavenly council, which God consults before 
taking an action.
251
   
In this way, Boyd proves that these heavenly beings co-rule with God as 
intermediaries between God and other creatures.  In association with this, he mentions 
that some of these gods are warriors of God,
252
 and others are assigned to oversee the 
welfare of the nations.
253
  Hence, the decisions of these gods genuinely affect God “to the 
point where He may even alter previous plans in response.”254  This proves to Boyd that 
the angels are in a personal relationship with God; and the two centers, influence and 
non-coercion, on which relationships are built upon are genuinely respected.  God abides 
by a non-coercion covenant with these lesser gods.
255
  In his view, while God is 
sovereign over these gods, He treats them as personal beings and counsels with them.  
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Citing biblical references
256
 for support, Boyd uses this as an opportunity to reemphasize 
God’s temporality, His ability to change His mind, interact with and respond to His 
creatures, disavowing the Greek philosophical concept of a timeless God.
257
  
The notion of a primordial fall is inherent in this understanding of the relationship 
between God and these gods.  This is evidenced in Boyd’s discussion of the relationship 
between love and free will.  Consequently, reading the creation account in the light of 
Near Eastern literature, Boyd identifies a pre-creational fall of the gods.
258
  He establishes 
that Gen 1:1 is a description of prehistoric creation.
259
  He speculates that the gods 
perverted their God-given duties by copulating with the inhabitants of the earth, 
apparently animals,
260
 in procreating monsters such as Leviathan.  This tentative 
statement is reached due to the fact that Boyd relies on watcher tradition
261
 for the 
interpretation of Gen 6, from which he states that  
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perhaps [the incident that resulted in the fall is] in a manner remotely analogous to the 
way deformed hybrid creatures were produced by the mixture of demonic and human 
natures prior to the flood. . . . The mingling of demonic influences with the good 
creative ‘life-force’ . . . of God produced hybrid creatures in this world that no longer 
perfectly reflected the glory of their original Creator.  Nature became hostile, 
creatures become vicious, and the whole planet became subject to God’s enemy and 
was no longer fit for the purpose for which it was originally created.
262
 
Apparently, Boyd’s understanding of self-determined free will is an integral part 
of the issue of a prehistoric fall.  The gods’ decision to exercise their will against the 
purpose of God is the beginning of the fall and evil.  God’s response to His rebellious 
creatures is discovered in Boyd’s concept of divine victory over evil, which is analyzed 
in the next section. 
 
Victory over the Fall and Evil 
 
We have noted that Boyd’s concept of divine sovereignty describes God as one 
who constantly relates with His creation.  This section focuses on his concept of God’s 
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reaction towards His fallen creation.  This discussion is classified under historic fall and 
evil, natural evil, and the ministry of Christ. 
 
Historic fall and evil   
 
According to Boyd, God engaged in a primeval warfare with the evil monsters to 
preserve His creation.
263
  However, God did not annihilate the evil forces, but subjugated 
and domesticated the evil creatures.
264
  It could be said that the fallen animals and the 
hybrid creatures involved were the ones that were subjugated and the rest of the animals 
were domesticated.  This, in Boyd’s view, is evidence of God’s masterful sovereignty and 
victory over formidable forces.
265
  
In contrast to the traditional belief in a pristine creation, he opts for the concept, 
the earth was “birthed . . . in an infected incubator.”266  This understanding is greatly 
impacted by Boyd’s view of a prehistoric fall.  His concept of a self-determined free will 
forces him to assume that God did not destroy the monsters He waged war with, but 
subdued them.  Therefore, he sees evil “at the very foundation of creation and in the 
cosmic environment of the earth, something has rebelled against God and is therefore 
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both hostile toward God and threatening toward the world.”267  Boyd then identifies that 
the word translated “subdue” in Gen 1:26 is referring to “the suppression, the conquering 
or the enslavement of hostile forces.”268  He argues that Gen 1 is an “account of God’s 
creation of this world after his battle with his cosmic foes, and out of the remains of the 
battle.”269  This clearly shows that Boyd reads the Genesis account of creation from a 
“restoration theory.”  This reading offers him a plausible answer to the scientific issues of 
radiometric dating of the earth, fossilized sequence, and prehumanoid animal suffering.
270
  
But he writes, “While the case for the restoration view is defensible and compelling, the 
evidence is nevertheless admittedly tentative and controversial and should not be raised 
to the level of a doctrine.”271  Again he indicates that he does not want the viability of the 
warfare theodicy to depend on “restoration theory” and that the biblical view of warfare 
is feasible without the restoration theory.
272
  Hence, he writes that 
the creational monotheism of the Bible and of the church seems to logically require 
something like a prehistoric fall, regardless of how we interpret the Chaoskampf 
material of the Old Testament.  Assuming that there is one eternal Creator God who is 
all-good and all-powerful, it is illogical to posit a foundational structural evil within 
the cosmos . . . without postulating a significant rebellion at some previous point that 
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has corrupted the cosmos. . . . In short, if the all-powerful Creator is perfectly good 
but creation is largely evil, something must have interfered with the creation.
273
 
Consequently, one could remark that the restoration theory is employed only to 
meet the requirement of his scientific hermeneutic principles, but then the question is: 
Can Boyd’s model of warfare theodicy be feasible without the restoration theory of 
creation?  This question will be addressed later.  
Accordingly, God’s purpose for refashioning the earth was to collaborate with His 
human creatures in subduing His enemies and restoring His lordship over the earth.
274
  
This may appear incongruent with his idea that God’s purpose for creation is to acquire a 
people to share His triune love, but a thorough analysis of these two expressions makes 
clear that the two phrases are certainly in harmony, given that, in Boyd, humans co-rule 
with God.  That is, when Boyd remarks that humans were given the power or key to 
subdue or unlock the evil forces,
275
 he believes the key or the power is self-determined 
freedom, the ability to either join with God to conquer His enemies or support the 
enemies.  However, humans did not use the key as God intended, but unleashed the 
enemies of God.
276
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Boyd explains the occasion that led to the unleashing of the evil monsters by first 
identifying one particular malicious god as the “the adversary of God.”277  In the context 
of the traditional understanding of Isa 14:1-23 and Ezek 28,
278
 Boyd sees that the 
adversary  
was the pinnacle of God’s creation, the one who possessed the greatest potential for 
good.  For this same reason, however, Satan possessed the greatest potential for evil, 
for though he was the greatest of God’s creation, he was nevertheless a contingent 
creature, which means that he possessed the capacity to choose one way or the other.   
. . .  Lucifer tragically chose to exalt himself rather than offering himself as a gift of 
love to his Maker, and now Satan has fallen.
279
   
Boyd’s concept of self-determined free will allows him to argue that God did not 
destroy Lucifer or revoke his free will.  He was allowed to use all the potentials and 
influential abilities he was endowed with when he was created, which he has decided to 
use for evil.
280
  Boyd indicates that   
over billions of years the original creation came under bondage to destructive spirits, 
some of whom perhaps had been agents originally entrusted by the Creator with 
caring for it.  These guardians joined Satan’s rebellion, however, and began 
exercising their domain of influence in an anticreational manner. . . . They perverted 
earth’s animal inhabitants, perhaps infiltrating the environmental process. . . . Perhaps 
in a manner remotely analogous to the way deformed hybrid creatures were produced 
by the mixture of demonic and human natures prior to the flood . . . the minging of 
demonic and influences with the good creative ‘life-force . . . of God produced hybrid 
creatures in this world that no longer perfectly reflected the glory of their original 
Creator.
281
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The impression one gets is that Lucifer penetrated the heavenly council with his 
rebellion, which led to the prehistoric fall and warfare.  However, some conclusive 
remarks of Boyd militate against this impression.  He makes a clear distinction between 
the destructive forces such as Yamm, Leviathan, Rahab, and Behemoth, which God 
battled with at the foundation of the earth, and the rebellious gods with Lucifer/Satan as 
their prince.
282
  In association with this, he writes, “The figure of Satan comes to absorb 
within himself the chaotic cosmic characteristics previously attributable to Leviathan and 
other anticreational beasts.”283  This conclusive statement lends credence to the 
assumption that Satan’s diabolic activities began after the prehistoric warfare.  In other 
words, it is difficult to ascertain from these remarks whether or not Satan was involved in 
the prehistoric fall and warfare.  Despite this difficulty in deciphering Satan’s 
involvement in the prehistoric fall and warfare, it is certain that Boyd portrays Satan as 
the brain behind the act that led to resetting the demons loose once again after God had 
restrained them in the prehistoric battle.  An indication that God did not bring them under 
a forcible control, the nature of Boyd’s concept of self-determined freedom does not give 
room for compulsion; the only way God subdued them was to lessen the intensity of their 
actions.   
In any case, Boyd does not mention the cause of Satan’s rebellion.  Discussing the 
prologue to the Book of Job, Boyd appears to make God’s authority the issue of Satan’s 
rebellion.  But in the same context, he points out that, since the passage is an epic poem, 
it is not sufficient to cite divine authority as the issue of Satan’s rebellion.  In his view, 
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the introduction only “sets up a specific episode that will vindicate God’s wisdom and 
integrity.”284  Consequently, the cause of Satan’s rebellion is not mentioned.  
Having identified Satan as an enemy of God, he describes the snake in Gen 3 as 
possessed by the old adversary of God.  His deceptive act in the Garden of Eden brought 
about the fall of humanity.
285
  He believes this traditional idea is an incontestable fact.    
The central idea underlining the human fall is that misuse of self-determined 
freedom unleashed evil spirits and brought the world once again under the dominion of 
the enemies of God
286
 with Satan as their prince,
287
 the one who has “illegitimately seized 
the world and thus now exercises a controlling influence over it.”288  Elsewhere he writes, 
the adversary who later assumes the name Satan is “undiluted evil.  He is Hitler on a 
cosmic scale!  And his power to influence, as well as that of the other ‘demons,’ is 
vast.”289  
For Boyd, “the possibility of warfare seems to be a necessary concomitant to 
Yahweh’s plan to rule the cosmos through intermediary beings, human and divine, who 
are free to some extent.”290  This means God wars with formidable enemies and genuine 
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resistance.
291
  This is the reason Boyd emphasizes that God does not always have His 
own way, but “God always does the most God can do.”292  With this emphasis, it seems  
Boyd makes absurd the idea that there is a divine purpose behind every evil.  In this 
sense, Boyd successfully makes Christ’s ministry a battle against the kingdom of Satan 
and building the Kingdom of God.
293
  
It appears an agent’s free will is significantly related to this understanding of the 
origin and perpetuating of evil.
294
  This concept stands close to Augustine’s concept of 
the origin of evil.  While they both agree that evil began with the misuse of the free will 
of a created being, they disagree on many issues.  Whereas Augustine clearly accepts 
creation ex-nihilo and free will in the compatibility sense, Boyd affirms creation out of 
the debris of prehistoric warfare and self-determined freedom, which makes it difficult 
for God to prevent creatures from doing evil and arousing warfare.  For Boyd, since 
freedom is a metaphysical result of love, God cannot stop evil without destroying 
freedom and the capacity to love.  Thus, evil is a risk God took and has to endure.  In 
addition, Boyd seems to assume some sort of dualism but not metaphysical dualism as 
found in later Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism.  It is “ethical and provisional 
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dualism.”295  That is to say, Satan and his forces are not from eternity, but were created 
beings to whom God has given the ability to oppose Him. 
Boyd does not depersonalize demons as powerful social forces and structures; he 
perceives demons as personal moral beings with freedom who have power to influence 
other moral beings with their evil activities.  Therefore, he sees evil as a reality, not as an 
illusion.  Boyd argues that evil is not a substance created by God; it is a possible reality 
resulting from God’s willingness to create agents with free will.  While prehistoric 
misuse of free will brought evil beings into existence, humankind’s misuse of the will 
released all that God negated when He refashioned the earth.
296
  In the context of Boyd, 
that which God negated is self-love.  For this reason, evil is a “tragic intrusion into God’s 
otherwise good creation.”297  
 
Natural evil  
 
Discussion on the origin of the fall and evil earmarked an adverse use of 
contingent freedom from God’s purpose as the root cause of evil.  Consequently, like 
Augustine and process theists, Boyd does not distinguish natural from moral evil.  For 
him, there is nothing natural about natural evil.
298
  All evils are the result of actions of 
agents who contribute to how things transpire over and against God.  However, he does 
not overlook the scholars’ perspective on natural evil. 
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Boyd approvingly cites several authors such as W. E. Stuermann, Edwin Lewis, 
and Robert J. Russell to affirm the magnitude of natural evil and animal suffering.
299
  He 
writes, “Nature in its present state . . . is not as the Creator created it to be, any more than 
humanity in its present state is as the Creator created it to be.  When nature exhibits 
diabolical features that are not the result of human wills, it is the direct or indirect result 
of the influence of diabolic forces.”300 
He identifies the strengths and weaknesses of seven approaches to natural evil,
301
 
but his insistence that the diabolic features of nature are the result of demonic activities 
led him to conclude that all the seven explanations to the problem of natural evil are 
insufficient.  On the other hand, he notes that a viable explanation of natural evil must 
incorporate insights
302
 from all the seven approaches; “but none of these approaches 
alone constitutes such an explanation.”303  Hence on the basis of his explanation of the 
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The seven approaches are: natural evil fulfills higher harmony of creation, 
nature suffers because of human sin, nature is an inevitable by-product of God’s aim of 
developing souls with moral character, natural evil is nature’s way of participating in the 
self-sacrificial life of God, natural evil exists because God is inherently limited, natural 
evil exists because there is necessary limitation in creation, and the menacing nature of 
das nichtige (ibid., 248-290).
 
302
The insights that Boyd claims are unavoidable in any feasible explanation to 
natural evils are: some natural evils are punishment for sin, objective medium of 
relationality that allows free agents to interact with each other, epistemic distance 
between God and free agents, self-giving love of God, natural and moral evils have the 
same cause, and creatures possess potential for both good and evil (ibid., 290-291).  
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origin of evil and insights from the above view on natural evil, Boyd came up with three 
explanations of pain and suffering in the world. 
First, he agrees with Augustine that human sin contributes to the natural disasters 
we experience in the world.
304
  Arguing from the context of his principle of 
proportionality—the potential of moral agents to bless entails equal potential to harm—
he concludes that when humanity succumbed to the influence of Satan, we actualized our 
potential to harm each other and our environment.  Consequently, according to Boyd, we 
harm nature and we are harmed by nature.
305
  He concedes to the biblical teaching that 
suffering happens as punishment for sin or as a form of discipline, but he argues that 
generalizing this idea is absurd and askew.
306
  This does not imply that Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy incorporates suffering as punishment as an explanation to evil.  In 
Boyd’s judgment, such method of rulership was meant only for the people of Israel who 
were “to be the yeast God mixed with the whole world until all of it was leavened.”307  
Thus God no longer uses such method in His sovereignty.  This becomes more evident 
when in discussing God’s love and justice he remarks, “We certainly have no reason to 
assume that God is punishing people because of sin—he took care of that on Calvary—or 
that he’s disciplining them to refine their character, though God will always use suffering 
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to bring about whatever good he can.”308  Thus, some time ago before Christ’s death, 
suffering as punishment for sin or as a form of discipline was a feasible explanation of 
the problem of evil, but after His death it no longer serves as a plausible explanation for 
pain and suffering.  However, he creates tension in his theory when in a sermon he 
bluntly states that the process of character purification, which is sometimes excruciating, 
begins as soon as an individual accepts Christ.
309
  
Secondly, siding with advocates of nature as inherently limited, Boyd argues that 
some things labeled natural evil are due to limitations in nature.  God’s creation is 
something other than Himself, which implies there are limitations and imperfections in 
creation.
310
  He remarks that “any created thing must, for example, possess a limited set 
of characteristics which rules out the possibility of possessing other characteristics 
incompatible with these.  But this can lead to unfortunate consequences.”311   
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can’t breathe in it, and so on. The dependability of the world which makes it possible for 
rational, morally responsible creatures to live works against us in certain circumstances.  
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certain circumstances” (Boyd and Boyd, Letters from a Skeptic, 35).  
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On the other hand, he agrees with Hick on the concept of epistemic distance and 
objective reality.  Boyd contends on the grounds of agents’ morality and responsibility 
that some unpleasant qualities of nature are consequences of metaphysical requirements 
of “neutral medium of relationality.”312  He argues that 
freedom of choice . . . requires that the alternatives under consideration be viable 
alternatives. If the choice is to be a matter of morality, not survival, it must be 
possible genuinely to project a future for oneself living out one’s choices.  If God in 
all his glory, power and splendor were perfectly obvious to us from the start, it is 
doubtful our choice to love him could have a distinctly moral quality to it.
313
   
He continues, “Objective reality has to be impersonal and somewhat unbending if 
creatures are to live morally responsible lives within it.  For us to be morally responsible 
in relation to the world, we must be able to influence the world, but the world must also 
be able to influence us.  That is, it must be somewhat pliable but not immediately 
accommodating to our every whim.”314  It is not clear whether Boyd implies two sets of 
limitation: one set is because creation is something other than God and the other set is for 
the purpose of forming epistemic distance between God and man, or one set serves the 
two purposes.  Whichever way one looks at these limitations, in Boyd’s opinion they are 
not inherently evil.
315
  However, a couple of Boyd’s ideas make this assertion beg the 
question:  First is the theory that our present earth was created upon an evil-infested 
incubator.  Second is the idea that some of the animals God warred with were 
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subordinated to domestic animals.  Finally, the fact that the human race is not able to 
distinguish between these inherent limitations and imperfections in nature means they 
manifest evil effects in the same manner as human sin.  On the other hand, if we grant the 
relationship Boyd creates between love and self-determined freedom it can be said that 
the limitations and imperfections in nature are inherent possible evil.  The definiteness of 
this assumption must await the assessment of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.  
In his third explanation of natural evil, Boyd acknowledges that there are ominous 
aspects of nature that cannot be attributed to sin or corrective measures.  In his view, 
nature exists alongside invisible agents, Satan and his cohorts, who influence it for the 
worst.
316
  He cites early Church Fathers such as Origen, Athenagoras, and Tertullian, and 
some contemporary theologians to demonstrate that the idea that natural evil is the result 
of demonic influence has been the understanding of natural evil throughout the history of 
the church, only to be distorted by Augustine’s concept of meticulous divine providence 
and the rise of “Enlightenment naturalism, rationalism and biblical criticism.”317  We 
could infer that the event in the Garden of Eden gave Satan the opportunity to revitalize 
the subdued evil and put him in charge of creation.  For this reason evil is the “byproduct 
of creation which is gone berserk through the evil influence of this Satanic army.”318  
Boyd’s attempt to attribute recklessness in nature to the misuse of the freedom319 is a 
feasible explanation for the existence of evil before the prehistoric battle.   
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The significant points arrived at in this discussion are Boyd’s claims that God 
does not cause evil, and even though He brings good out of evil He does not have any 
purpose for evil.  Natural and moral evils are the result of the wrong use of the freedom 
of contingent— angelic and human—beings.  It then becomes obvious that if the human 
race had directed their will in championing God’s purpose for this refashioned earth, the 
limitations and imperfections in nature may not have been conspicuous.
320
  Satan, asserts 
Boyd, uses the neutral environment as a weapon against humanity.   
 
Ministry of Christ   
 
Having briefly discussed Boyd’s understanding of a refashioned earth, human fall 
and evil, the next step seeks to clarify his concept of the function of the ministry of Christ 
in the divine process of gaining victory over His rebellious creatures.  As mentioned 
above, the fall of the human race unleashed the evil beings and made Lucifer the king of 
the world.  When Satan became the ruler of the earth, humans and nature turned against 
each other; nature became a weapon in the hands of the enemy of God.  As a result, in 
Boyd’s opinion the centrality of Jesus’ ministry is to bind Lucifer and his followers and 
establish His Kingdom.
321
  His discussion of Jesus’ work in regard to eliminating sin and 
evil may be organized in terms of Christ’s life, death and resurrection, the church, and 
eradication of fall and evil. 
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Christ’s life, death, and resurrection.  Thus, he sees every activity of Christ as a 
conflict with the archenemy of God.  Hence, according to Boyd, Christ saw the victims of 
diseases and pain—demoniac, epileptics, and paralytics—as casualties of war.  Therefore, 
every healing and exorcism that Christ performed was a step toward the vanquishing of 
the rule of Satan and setting people free from demonic inflicted pain and suffering.  All 
the miracles over nature that Christ performed were a demonstration of God restoring 
creation to its proper order.
322
  Furthermore, in Boyd’s opinion, Christ’s teachings were 
all demonstrations of warfare motive.  However, for Boyd, the most significant aspect of  
Christ’s ministry is His death and resurrection; Christ’s death and resurrection were acts 
of war that demonstrated and accomplished His victory over evil, and “spell Satan’s 
ultimate demise.”323   
According to Boyd, for Christ’s substitutionary death to be meaningful, it must be 
recognized that the primary significance of His death is cosmic.  In other words, while 
Boyd believes Christ died to deliver the fallen human race, his emphasis on Gen 3:15 
requires that God’s first aim is to subjugate His enemy, Satan,324 and enthrone Christ 
where He rightfully belongs, at the right hand of God.
325
  In this cosmic context, Boyd  
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comments that Christ’s death and resurrection paid the ransom, which set human beings 
totally and unconditionally free from the bondage of the evil one and reconciles them to 
God.  Whoever accepts it is thereby reinstated to the original position and responsibility 
of stewards of the creation that God had always intended for humans.
326
  While not 
discounting the value of Christ’s victory, he observes that Christ’s victory is not yet fully 
realized.  Satan is still the god of the world and the ruler of the power of the air.  In his 
opinion, the church, the earthly benefactors of Christ’s victory, is responsible to manifest 
Christ’s mission of building a kingdom for the rest of the world.327    
 
The Church.  Boyd describes the church as “God’s eternal ‘trophy case’ of 
grace.”  It evidences “God’s brilliance and power in bringing about the destruction of his 
foes, and thus the liberation of his people.”328  He agrees that “the church has always 
been a very human and a very fallen institution, exhibiting all the carnality, pettiness, 
narrowness, self-centeredness and abusive power tendencies that characterize all other 
fallen institutions,” yet he insists that it is the very institution that proclaims the glory of 
God by lacking any glory of its own.
329
  The church is called upon to declare to 
authorities in heavenly places and on earth, principalities, and powers Christ’s victory 
over Satan.  The church’s proclamation of Christ’s victory over his cosmic foes includes 
saving humans from Satan’s den, freeing the earth from all spiritual and physical  
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destructive oppression and social injustices.  For Boyd, when the church is engaged in 
overthrowing the devil and the salvation of humans and the restoration of the earth, it is 
Jesus accomplishing His kingdom.  The enthroned Christ manifests His redemptive and 
restorative work through His church.
330
 
Boyd does not take for granted the activities of the enemies of God from the cross 
to the eschaton.  In his opinion, Satan directs his activities to hinder the mission of the 
church.  On the basis of several scriptural texts, Boyd identifies Satan as the one behind 
every sin, causing hardships, famine, physical pain in the world, and instigating 
persecution, falsehood among believers, false teachings about the Kingdom of God, and 
tempting and deceiving God’s people in an attempt to oppose the mission of the 
church.
331
  He asserts that, in the last day, Satan “is permitted to head up a vicious attack 
of demonic forces upon the earth.”332   
Thus, for Boyd, Christian life is a warfare, exorcising the enemy, consequently, 
there is the need for every Christian to put on the spiritual armor.
333
  We should be 
reminded that due to the nature of contingent freedom God has to endure the atrocities of 
His enemies until the scope of their freedom elapses.  Thus, “there shall come a time, 
Scripture declares, when God shall conclude this cosmic epoch by fully manifesting 
throughout his cosmos the victory that he has already won through his Son.”334  
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Eradication of sin and evil.  Boyd addresses the full realization of God’s victory 
over sin and its accompanying evil by first examining the biblical support for already- 
existing concepts of God’s victory over evil: annihilation, eternal torment of the wicked, 
and universalism.  Without hesitation he asserts that there is no biblical or philosophical 
support for the position of universalism.
335
  After his examination of the other two 
concepts— annihilation and eternal torment of the wicked—he concludes that the Bible 
affirms both theories; therefore he does not discount the value of both.  Rather, with his 
firm belief that the Bible does not contradict itself, he insists that the biblical description 
of hell is not literal.  He contends that the use of metaphorical language in 
communicating the idea of hell is intended only to impress upon humanity the 
dreadfulness of hell.
336
 
Thus, his explanation of how God wins the battle against evil is an attempt to 
integrate the two prominent concepts of hell,
337
 annihilation and eternal torment of the 
wicked, by introducing into his system das nichtige.
338
  Boyd defines das nichtige as 
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Barth’s das nichtige.  However, in an editor’s note, Bromiley and Torrance point out that 
“it is not used in its more common and abstract way, but in the secondary sense, to be 
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having the potential to become actualized. Possibilities that God has negated become 
actualized if wills overturn the divine negation and “impute” reality to these negated 
possibilities by choosing them.  Now “the nothingness” acquires authority, for now a 
free agent with authority has invested itself into it. Nothing has become something.  
What was negated by God is affirmed by a creature, and thus the possibility of 
something opposing God—the possibility of evil—becomes actualized.339 
It is obvious that Boyd’s concept of love and its metaphysical corollary, freedom, 
is the force behind this definition of das nichtige.  From this perspective of das nichtige, 
he takes sin to mean overriding God’s definition of reality with what He has negated.340  
Evidently, sin is the act of choosing the possibilities that God has negated and evil is the 
content of the choice of yes to God’s no. 
The idea that self-determined freedom is finite sets the stage for Boyd’s concept 
of hell and allows him to come close to expressing the idea of annihilation when he 
comments that during the eschaton, the wills that say yes to the realm of negated 
possibilities and the content of their choices will be rendered as nothing.
341
  But he 
                                                 
filled out from Barth’s own definitions and delimitations of ‘that which is not.’” It is 
neither God nor His creature.  It is all the possibilities that God said no to when He said 
yes to creation. It is the object of God’s non-willingness. It exists in a third order of its 
own at the limit of the left side of God’s creation, as God is the limit of the right side of 
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nothingness to invade creation. It takes many forms: sin (concrete form of nothingness), 
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argues, on the basis of the immortality of the soul and God’s love for any agent’s original 
potential to choose for or against God, that annihilating the wicked means destroying 
something God has created to be “intrinsically and essentially immortal and 
indestructible.”342  Therefore, he makes a distinction between the will and the content of 
the choices of the will as follows: the “entire content of what is willed against God is 
exposed as nothingness” but the will that makes the negated possibilities real will exist 
eternally.
343
  That is, “the potential for eternally saying yes to reality as defined by the 
loving Creator metaphysically requires the potential eternally to say no to this reality,  
just as the creation of two adjacent mountains logically requires the creation of an 
intervening valley.”344  Consequently, the eternal existence of the wicked wills is 
congruent with the love of God.  For, in his opinion, God allowing the wicked wills to 
become “eternalized in their self-creation” is His judgment upon the wicked.345  
Boyd expounds on the intensity of God’s judgment by describing the eternal 
existence of the wicked as contentless and without objective shared medium.  Since 
God’s love defines all reality at the eschaton and the soul is immortal, the wicked will 
continue to choose negated possibilities, but this time the negated possibilities cannot be 
actualized.  Thus, for Boyd, the wicked will does not participate in reality during the 
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eschaton; the only reality is God’s love and those who participate in it.346  This means to 
enjoy eternity with God is conditional but the souls of both the wicked and righteous are 
immortal.   
Boyd’s use of the phrase “objective shared medium,” as I noted earlier, points to a 
middle ground that allows free agents to relate to each other.  It is on this middle ground 
that freedom becomes a reality; agents exist parallel to each other and share common 
time.
347
  Consequently, Boyd affirms firmly that existence without objective shared 
medium comes with dreadful consequences.  In his opinion, without objective shared 
medium the will that says yes to God’s no is self-enclosed, separated from the only 
reality—“love, joy and peace which humanity has.”348  This reality, according to Boyd, is 
real only to itself, “a wholly separate and wholly isolated reality . . . an unreal reality.”349  
It does not share time with the will that says yes to God’s love; it has nothing in common 
with humanity, for it lacks “every semblance of a shared humanity.”350  Yet from the 
perspective of the wicked, “their reality is all there is.”351  Relying on C. S. Lewis and  
several other scholars, he suggests that hell is real only to the agent that wills it.  Hence, 
he concludes that scriptural texts on annihilation and eternal suffering might be 
considered as “the domain of negatively defined wills as constituting a sort of 
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infinitesimally narrow parameter outside of the kingdom of God that separates reality 
from unreality, love from war and what once was and could have been from what now is 
and always will be.”352 
On the other hand, in his recent articles and sermons on hell, he shows that the 
traditional view of eternal conscious burning in hell is inconsistent with other biblical 
passages.
353
  Arguing in favor of annihilationism, he writes, “When all the biblical 
evidence is assessed apart from the Hellenistic philosophical assumption that the soul is 
innately immortal, it becomes clear that the fate of the wicked is eventual annihilation, 
not unending torment.”354  In his opinion the fire that annihilates the wicked, sin, and evil 
not only purifies the earth but also the righteous.  It completes all the work that was not 
completed in the sanctification process.  Thus, the afterlife process of purification and 
annihilation comes to an end, but the consequences are forever.
355
 
Although, he contends that annihilationism is consistent biblical teaching, he is 
not “completely convinced” of it.356  In another essay, he indicates that he is “strongly 
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inclined toward” annihilationism.357 However, he insists that the proposed rapprochement 
between theories of eternal suffering and annihilationism is “coherent and possible.”358  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
Due to the unresolved difficulties associated with the three main theodicies, as 
described in chapter 2, it became essential to analyze warfare theodicy for its feasibility.  
This chapter is an inquiry into Gregory A. Boyd’s model of the warfare theodicy.  
The chapter began by giving a brief biography of Boyd and a survey of his 
writings on theodicy.  It became evident that at the heart of his theological inquiry lies the 
desire to make Christian beliefs reasonable to the scientific mind.  This mind-set resulted 
into the construction of a theological framework which is a breed of classical and process 
theisms.  On the basis of his strain of theism, he has written several books on a variety of 
subjects; among them is theodicy, which is developed extensively in three books. 
The tenor of his theodicy was not only to reconcile belief in God with the reality 
of evil but also to make the warfare motif of Scripture more scientific, to reconcile the 
essentials of biblical warfare with the changed outlook of the contemporary mind.  
Convinced that the biblical warfare theme could no longer be presented to the 
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contemporary mind, in view of the results of scientific discoveries, it was his aim to 
formulate a warfare explication that could preserve the essentials of the belief in God and 
biblical warfare motif and at the same time satisfy the scientific demands.  To Boyd, this 
means the biblical phenomena must be in harmony with basic scientific developments, 
such as quantum physics. 
To achieve his aim, Boyd establishes, on the basis of Christ’s life, ministry, death, 
and resurrection, that God’s goal is for human beings to receive love and replicate and 
reflect back His triune love.  This purpose entails a metaphysical risk of endowing 
humans with freedom, freedom to either accept or reject God’s love.  Having established 
this fact, Boyd describes contingent freedom as self-determined, and it is genuine when it 
is irrevocable, finite, and holds individuals responsible for their moral acts and makes 
moral responsibility proportional.  Free will of human agents is self-determined not in a 
sense of self-existence but because within the factors that determined a person’s 
existence, the individual makes decisions with these elements acting as influential 
factors, not determinants. 
By showing that contingent freedom is self-determined, he makes contingent free 
will the basis on which he explains divine foreknowledge and sovereignty.  The emphasis 
that Boyd places on contingent freedom finds its strongest support in his concept of 
divine foreknowledge, which, in his estimation, future decisions of free agents are “not-
yet”; therefore, God does not know them exhaustively but as possibilities.  In essence, by 
knowing His own decision to act in the future, His perfect knowledge of past and present 
realities allows Him to predict possible outcomes of agents’ free decisions in the future.  
That is, in Boyd’s opinion, an act cannot be free and at the same time foreknown.  This 
173 
means God has to manipulate events in order to achieve His purpose.  Consequently, any 
view on the relationship between human and divine foreknowledge that is contrary to this 
view makes human free will illusory.    
Boyd’s argument against the classical traditional concept of divine foreknowledge 
is specifically over the issue of God foreknowing individual future free decisions before 
they are actualized.  It seems, superficially, that Boyd’s persistent affirmation of self-
determinism is making it difficult for him to affirm divine foreknowledge of future 
actions of free agents.  However, we may extrapolate from the analysis that the difficulty 
lies in his conception of the relationship between divine foreknowledge and determinism.   
He avows the classical traditional understanding of the relationship between the two 
concepts.  That is, in his view, divine foreknowledge is identified and grounded in 
determinism.  As a result, Boyd’s concept depicts not only the influence of Hartshorne’s 
process philosophy, but also the influence of Greek philosophy.  Critics of openness-of-
God theology argue that incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and libertarian human 
free will is an argument held by Aristotle even though he did not apply it to divine 
foreknowledge.
359
   
Boyd’s model of self-determined freedom enables him to present divine 
sovereignty in a way that demonstrates God working in partnership with humans.  By 
virtue of His non-coercive covenant, He limits His power and empowers humanity to be 
co-rulers over the earth.  Thus, divine sovereignty is influential.  Like process theists, he 
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establishes that God only leads the world through persuasive power.  However, for Boyd, 
God sometimes intervenes in human history on the basis of what contingent freedom 
allows.  The nature of divine sovereignty means God does not always get what He wants 
to happen on the account of contingent free will and the various variables that condition 
it.  For Boyd, this does not mean God cannot achieve His purpose.  
However, the relationship that he creates among his concepts—self-determined 
freedom, divine foreknowledge and determinism, and divine sovereignty—makes God’s 
intervention seems arbitrary and some individuals’ freedom illusive.  Thus the factors 
which he claims condition human freedom and God’s freedom to intervene in human 
history are his attempt to explain away the difficulties that this relationship raises.   
With these three concepts—freedom, divine foreknowledge, and sovereignty—
defined, Boyd manages to explain the problem of evil, using each concept to address 
specific issues involved in the problem of evil.  From Boyd’s belief in the existence of 
spiritual personal beings eons ago and reading Gen 1 from a warfare context, he 
ascertains that evil first began by the misuse of free will by some of the spiritual beings.  
He does not hesitate to point out that these rebels, with their leader Satan, orchestrate all 
evil in the cosmos. 
Boyd’s insistence on contingent beings as responsible for all evil seems to relieve 
God of the responsibility for evil.  He establishes that God foreknew only the possibility 
of evil but did not know for certain what contingent beings would do with their freedom.  
Therefore, God does not have a specific divine purpose that somehow justifies the 
suffering.  However, Boyd puts emphasis on God’s victory over evil by stating that as an 
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omni-resourceful God, He responds and adapts to surprises and the unexpected.  He will 
realize His purpose for creation ad hoc in history by subjecting the wills that rebel against 
Him and rendering the content of their decision to nothingness.  
Although Boyd explains the problem of evil with the help of these three concepts, 
it is clear that his concept of free will becomes, for him, the stronghold of his theodicy to 
accommodate the contemporary mind-set.  This assessment draws attention to Boyd’s 
aim to offer a more feasible theodicy.  On one hand, he wants to bring his concept of 
theodicy in harmony with what he esteems to be the just demands of science.  On the 
other hand, he desires to preserve the essential elements in the traditional understanding 
of the problem of evil. 
Despite Boyd’s effort to formulate a contemporary theodicy, his attempt to do so 
raises an imperative question.  Is this Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy capable of handling 
the problem of evil?  Though the question raised as a result of my analysis brings to the 
fore the need to evaluate Boyd’s theodicy, however, the next chapter will analyze 
White’s warfare model, the Great Controversy.  I intend to evaluate the two models of 
warfare theodicy in chapter 5 in terms of their feasibility, inner consistency, and 
coherence with respect to the stated goals of this study.  The next chapter is a descriptive 
analysis of a warfare approach to the question of the co-existence of an omnipotent, 
omniscient, and omnibenevolent God and evil as presented in the writings of Ellen G. 
White.
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
THE GREAT CONTROVERSY THEODICY: 
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In concluding chapter 2, it was shown that the three main Christian approaches to 
the problem of evil are not viable and that there is a need to examine the warfare 
approach as expounded in the writings of Boyd and White.  In chapter 3, the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy of Boyd was examined.  The present chapter deals with a descriptive 
analysis of White’s model of warfare approach to understand her concept of cosmic 
conflict and the theological concepts embedded in it.  To reach the goal of this chapter, 
first a general background of Ellen G. White and the corpus of her writings on theodicy 
will be presented.  Then an analytical discussion of the Great Controversy Theodicy will 
follow.  
 
General Background 
 
Ellen G. White 
 
Ellen G. White was born to Robert F. Harmon and Eunice Gould Harmon, a 
Methodist family, on November 26, 1827, in Gorham, Maine, and grew up in Portland, 
Maine, a city with a harsh environment that “toughened the character of those it did not 
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break.”1  She lived in an era when the United States was going through enormous 
political, social, and religious changes.
2
 
In 1836, she had an accident that brought her formal education to an abrupt end, 
and the knowledge acquired from that time onward was by reading and learning practical 
skills from her mother.
3
  In 1840, White accepted the teachings of Jesus’ return to the 
earth in 1843 after attending lectures by William Miller, a Baptist preacher.  In the same 
year, two dreams and pastoral counseling with Levi Stockman
4
  led her to establish a 
deep relationship with Christ that prepared her for a lifelong ministry.
5
   
However, it was not until December 1844, after the great disappointment of the 
Millerites,
6
 that her work began.  The bitterness of the disappointment and doctrinal 
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Christ did not come, the people were disappointed but not discouraged.  Renewed study 
of the prophecies led the Millerites to appoint October 22, 1844, as the exact day for 
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differences divided the Millerites into groups, each going their separate way.
7
  The 
smaller group felt obligated to study biblical prophecies more closely to understand the 
events that took place in October 1844.
8
  It was under these circumstances that White’s 
work began with a vision, which did not explain the reason for the disappointment but 
gave this company of believers the assurance of God’s leadership.  Her subsequent 
visions confirmed the results of Bible study by this group of believers, which led to 
conclusive statements on doctrinal issues.   
Although her ministry began in 1844, it was not until 1858 that she began writing 
and publishing on the great controversy theme.
9
  Her writings cover many biblical 
themes.  White wrote in the historical, social, and religious context of the nineteenth 
century.   Maintaining a constant practice of writing diaries, letters, sermons, periodical 
articles, and books, her personal experience enriched her writings.  With the help of 
literary assistants, whose duties were to edit, gather, and bring together all her writings 
relating to various subjects in preparation of books,
10
 she wrote and published 5,000  
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periodical articles, twenty-six books, and 100,000 pages of manuscript by the end of her 
life in 1915.  In her will, she made provision for the steady publication of her writings.  
Consequently, there are about 128 titles in English; many are compilations from her 
manuscripts.  Her volume Steps to Christ is translated into about 144 languages.
11
  She 
was also a preacher who traveled all over the United States, Europe, Australia, and New 
Zealand, as well as a mother and home-maker.
12
                                                                                                                           
 
Theological Context of White’s Theodicy 
 
As already indicated in the introductory chapter of this study, the Enlightenment  
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elevated the problem of evil “into a challenge to the credibility and coherence of 
Christian faith itself.”13  The Enlightenment culture assumed the world is a self-contained 
mechanical system, governed by mathematical laws without the need of divine 
intervention.  Thus, the world is comprehensible through human reason by means of 
science and technology.  The theological and philosophical implication of this cultural 
mind-set was that traditional Christian beliefs were contested.  Theologians and 
philosophers of religion developed theodicies that are reasonable to the cultural mind-set 
of the era.  They limited God’s involvement in human history, and elevated human 
abilities to solve the problem of evil.
14
  Even Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who in 1791 
argued against philosophical theodicies, could not refrain from limiting the role of God in 
the problem of evil.
15
  
In 1793, Kant argued that ascribing human tendencies to evil to natural or 
hereditary defects removes responsibility of evil from us to our progenitors.  According 
to him, “an evil disposition is found in self-love, and recovery from it is reached through 
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supernatural help when an individual proved himself or herself worthy to receive it.”16  
Thus, the divine activity in the world is significantly reduced.  While the eighteenth 
century rejected the classical concept of divine providence, the nineteenth century sought 
to affirm it.  Consequently, nineteenth-century thinkers like George Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel (1770-1831), Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and Friedrich Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834) claimed that the Creator of the world is responsible for evil, but Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844-1900) contended that evil is an illusion.  
Hegel, a German idealist, attempted to resolve the problem of evil and its 
challenges to Christianity by focusing on the fall of humanity.   In discussing the 
narrative story of Gen 3, he asserted that the state of humanity before the fall was 
innocence, lack of responsibility for the world, and a separation from the Divine Spirit.  
The fall is a movement from innocence to knowledge.  Knowledge is evil because it is an 
alienation from natural innocence, but necessary for reconciliation with the Divine Spirit.  
The knowledge of the separation from God creates a yearning for spiritual growth, a 
process that closes the gap between God and man.  Thus, for Hegel, human misery and 
suffering are necessary for spiritual growth.
17
   Like Leibniz, Hegel argued that the world 
is as it ought to be and nothing can thwart God’s purposes.18    
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Schopenhauer, a contemporary of Hegel and an atheist, rejected the concept of 
divine providence, but did not abandon the notion of cosmic justice.  In his opinion pain 
and suffering in the world arise from the needs and necessities of life.  Moral and natural 
evils are perfectly balanced, and any minute change to the world would render it entirely 
impossible; humankind would die of boredom or inflict more suffering than what human 
beings face from the hands of nature.  He maintained that natural evils are punishment for 
moral evil.  For him, “the world itself is a tribunal of the world.”19   
Schleiermacher, who is considered the father of liberal Protestantism, envisaged   
sin and evil as inherent when he contended that humanity was created with a sinful 
propensity and potentiality to develop a full God consciousness.  He argued that natural 
evils are imperfections in nature which were supposed to be an incentive to the 
development of the spirit, but turned evil because of human sin.  The methodology of 
liberal Protestantism avoided the discussion on the origin of sin.
20
  Consequently, the 
problem of evil was generally absent in liberal theology.   
Nietzsche argued that evil is an illusion.  In his view, evil is the creation of 
resentful and frustrated people of the lower class in society.  They spiritualize their revolt 
against the aristocratic society by inverting the cultural values of the upper class, 
condemning them as evil.  In his opinion, humans brought evil upon themselves and 
                                                 
19Arthur Schopenhauer, “On the Sufferings of the World,” in Complete Essays of 
Schopenhauer, trans. Bailey Saunders (New York: Willey Book Company, 1942), 5:1-18. 
20
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. Hugh Ross Mackintosh and 
James Stuart Stewart (New York: T & T Clark, 1948), 291-324.  
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should resolve it by reevaluating contemporary values.
21
 
White’s great controversy theodicy seems to be an alternative approach to 
theodicies that make God responsible for the cause of evil and those that consider evil as 
an illusion.  She gives several indicators that her explanation is not just a pastiche of the 
theodicies that preceded her explanation, but a biblical explanation of the problem of evil.  
She remarks as follows:  
 There are those who, in their inquiries concerning the existence of sin, endeavor 
to search into that which God has never revealed; hence they find no solution of their 
difficulties; and such as are actuated by a disposition to doubt and cavil seize upon 
this as an excuse for rejecting the words of Holy Writ. Others, however, fail of a 
satisfactory understanding of the great problem of evil, from the fact that tradition and 
misinterpretation have obscured the teaching of the Bible concerning the character of 
God, the nature of His government, and the principles of His dealing with sin.. It is 
impossible to explain the origin of sin so as to give a reason for its existence.  Yet 
enough may be understood concerning both the origin and the final disposition of sin 
to make fully manifest the justice and benevolence of God in all his dealings with 
evil.
22
      
 
White’s Writings on Theodicy 
 
In several of her remarks, White identifies the great controversy between Christ 
and Satan as the key to understanding the central theme of the Bible, the plan of 
redemption.  Scholars who have investigated her writings have affirmed that White 
makes the great controversy the organizing principle of her writings.  It is the principle by 
which she approached, interpreted, and drew lessons from biblical passages.
23
  Her 
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writings on philosophy, religion, education, science, health, and history are informed by 
her understanding of the great controversy.  In addition, it is the same principle that 
became her principal explanation of the problem of evil.
24
  Concluding the introduction to 
her book The Great Controversy, she states her purpose as follows: 
 To unfold the scenes of the great controversy between truth and error; to reveal 
the wiles of Satan, and the means by which he may be successfully resisted; to 
present a satisfactory solution of the great problem of evil, shedding such a light upon 
the origin and the final disposition of sin as to fully make manifest the justice and 
benevolence of God in all his dealings with his creatures; and to show the holy, 
unchanging nature of his law, is the object of this book.
25
  
In 1858, Ellen White began to pen her explanation of the problem of evil, a 
project that was developed gradually in three stages.  The first phase of the development 
was in the form of a four-volume work entitled Spiritual Gifts.
26
  With the exception of 
the second volume and the last half of the fourth volume, Spiritual Gifts is a broad outline 
of her views on theodicy.  It is a brief sketch of the entire scope of the great controversy.  
In volume 1, White describes the origin and nature of sin and how it affects the universe, 
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including planet Earth.  She explains that the divine plan to redeem and restore planet 
Earth and eradicate sin and evil is through Christ’s ministry, suffering and death, and 
resurrection.
27
  The third volume and the first half of the fourth volume describe the 
devastating effects of sin in the lives of the people of Old Testament history and divine 
activities to protect and save the human race from evil.   
The second stage of the development was an expansion of the material found in 
Spiritual Gifts.  As with any expansion of a work, this stage of the development brought 
out a new and more complete treatment of her great controversy theodicy.  This stage 
includes an exact reproduction of some content from Spiritual Gifts, along with 
additions.
28
  The four-volume work, The Spirit of Prophecy, covers the controversy from 
the beginning to the end in a more detailed and chronological manner.
29
  
The first volume of the The Spirit of Prophecy series discusses the fall of Satan 
and goes on to describe the creation of planet Earth and the relationship that existed 
between the Creator and humankind, the condition of the relationship after the 
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disobedience of humans, and the divine plan to restore the relationship between God and 
humanity.  She also gives a detailed account of divine activities in the patriarchal epoch 
to restore the broken relationship between God and the human race and Satan’s craftiness 
to stop the restoration process.  The second volume is a comprehensive work on the 
divine plan to redeem and restore humanity.  She puts emphasis on Christ’s life and 
mission as manifested in His teachings and miracles in connection with human 
redemption from sin and evil.  The first half of volume 3 describes Christ’s suffering and 
death, stressing its meaning and importance, the importance of the law, and the universal 
implication of sin and evil.  The second half of this volume describes the manifestation of 
the Holy Spirit to destroy the activities of the evil one in the lives of the apostles from 
Pentecost to the martyrdom of Paul.
30
  The last volume deals with the history of the 
church—its trials and triumph, the destruction of Satan and all his followers, and the 
renewing of the earth, revealing the schemes of the adversary and the justice and 
benevolence of God.  It describes how the conflict between Christ and Satan manifests 
itself in the history of the church from the destruction of Jerusalem till the restoration of 
the earth.  The fourth volume specifically answers the question of how long the 
controversy will last and how the issue that initiated the controversy will be settled.   
Both the Spiritual Gifts and the Spirit of Prophecy series were written primarily 
                                                 
30
Separate from the The Spirit of Prophecy set, White published a volume entitled 
Sketches From the Life of Paul in 1883, which also developed the great controversy 
theme as manifested in Paul’s conversion, ministry, and martyrdom.  
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with Seventh-day Adventist readers in mind.
31
  But the final stage of the development of 
her theodicy under the general title Conflict of the Ages was designed for a wider public.  
The Conflict of the Ages is an enlarged version of the Spirit of Prophecy adapted for the 
general reading public.
32
   
With the exception of Prophets and Kings, all the volumes of the Conflict of the 
Ages series are revised and expanded versions of the Spirit of Prophecy series and the 
final stage of the development of her theodicy.  These developmental stages show a 
systematic growth in the understanding of her visions and concepts, a process evident in 
other theologians and writers.  Hence, in the remainder of this chapter, the Conflict of the 
Ages series is the primary material for the analysis of her great controversy theodicy.   
However, some attention is also given to the first two series and statements found in other 
writings that may have a significant impact in achieving a full understanding of her 
theodicy. 
Analysis of the Great Controversy Theodicy 
 
We now turn our attention to the descriptive analysis of White’s Great 
Controversy Theodicy.  As evident in chapter 2, the problem of evil is a theological issue 
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of which the underlying theological concepts, free will, divine foreknowledge, and divine 
sovereignty appear to be incompatible.  Thus this analysis of the great controversy 
theodicy examines White’s understanding of free will, divine foreknowledge, and divine 
sovereignty, how she relates these theological elements to each other, and how they 
influence her theodicy or vice versa.   
 
Free Will 
 
White’s affirmation of human free will is evident in her remarks on the original 
qualities of humanity in relation to God’s law of liberty.  She comments: 
 God placed man under law, as an indispensable condition of his very existence. 
He was a subject of the divine government, and there can be no government without 
law. God might have created man without the power to transgress His law; He might 
have withheld the hand of Adam from touching the forbidden fruit; but in that case 
man would have been, not a free moral agent, but a mere automaton. Without 
freedom of choice, his obedience would not have been voluntary, but forced. There 
could have been no development of character.  Such a course would have been 
contrary to God’s plan in dealing with the inhabitants of other worlds.  It would have 
been unworthy of man as an intelligent being, and would have sustained Satan's 
charge of God's arbitrary rule.
33
   
It is quite clear that White believes that humans were created with free will, and 
she gives three reasons why God endowed them with free will: (1) God provided humans 
with free will because He prefers service done to God and humankind to be voluntary; (2) 
God awarded humans with free will because He wants them to develop into a complete 
reflection of their  Creator;
34
 and (3) God bestowed the human race with free will because 
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He wants to disabuse Satan’s charge against divine government35 that free will and God’s 
law of love are incoherent and incongruent.
36
  Elsewhere, she points out that God’s 
character is the grounds for providing created beings with freedom.
37
  However, it 
remains to be seen how she understands the nature of free will. 
Nature of Free Will   
In this section, the main concern is to examine whether White proposes a 
libertarian or deterministic free will.
38
  With respect to the nature of human free will she 
writes, “God made man upright; He gave him noble traits of character, with no bias 
toward evil.  He endowed him with high intellectual powers, and presented before him 
the strongest possible inducements to be true to his allegiance.”39  White’s notion of the 
nature of free will shows up in her view of the fall.  In her opinion, in spite of the 
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qualities to make the human race true to its allegiance and its environment, the race chose 
the other alternative.
40
  Thus, humans were created with the ability to act self-consciously 
irrespective of external and internal influences.  Individuals have the power to decide 
between alternatives, and they are responsible and the ultimate explanation of their 
behaviors.  Free will is, therefore, understood in a libertarian sense.   
But, describing the progeny of Adam she mentions that “man after the fall, ‘begat 
a son in his own likeness, after his image.’ While Adam was created sinless, in the 
likeness of God, Seth, like Cain, inherited the fallen nature of his parents.”41  The original  
flawless free will is now tainted with sin.  The descendants of Adam and Eve, which 
includes all humans, are born with evil dispositions.    
Upon further reflection on White’s understanding of the effects of sin, one may 
conclude that sin annuls her libertarian model of free will.  But, the way she correlates 
free will with sin makes it possible to define her concept of free will as including the 
ability to know and understand divine laws and the power to fulfill moral obligations.
42
  
Consequently, free will makes character development possible.  In other words, our 
choices make us responsible for what we become.  Thus, for White, sin does not annul 
libertarian free will but corrupts it.   
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There seems to be a tension in White between corrupt libertarian free will and 
character development.  If the first humans could not develop their characters through the 
use of their flawless libertarian free will, it is difficult to hold their progeny with corrupt 
libertarian free will responsible for what they become.
43
  White deals with this tension 
with what is theologically termed prevenient grace.
44
  In her observation, God restores to 
every human being some measure of the will lost to sin.  This act of God awakens the 
will to a state of being conscious of the existence of a Supreme Being, human depravity, 
right and wrong, and the desire for character development.
45
  Thus prevenient grace  
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restores the discerning properties of free will.  It is God’s initiative to help humanity to 
engage its God-given free will.
46
  For White, after the discerning properties of free will 
are restored through prevenient grace, neither God
47
 nor Satan
48
 infringes on an agent’s 
free will.  But, God grants spiritual aid to those who make the decision to live in harmony 
with the will of God.
49
  
While her concept of libertarian free will rejects divine coercion, it does not 
eliminate God.
50
  In spite of sin the “power of choice is ours, and it rests with us to 
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determine what we will become.”51  This is a strong evidence of her objection to any 
form of theological determinism with its associated concept of deterministic 
predestination.
52
  She writes, “No walls are built to keep any living soul from salvation.  
The predestination, or election, of which God speaks, includes all who will accept Christ 
as a personal Saviour. . . .  This is the effectual salvation of a peculiar people, chosen by 
God from among men.  All who are willing to be saved by Christ are the elect of God.  It 
is the obedient who are predestinated from the foundation of the world.”53   
The foregoing discussion is a demonstration of White’s emphasis on free will in a 
libertarian sense.  However, human free will interpreted in this sense is seen by some 
scholars as incompatible with divine foreknowledge and divine sovereignty.  It is argued 
that since God foreknows everything, He foreknows future free choices before they are 
realized.  If God foreknows all future free choices before they happen, He must be the 
cause of free choices and meticulously sovereign over His creation, and humans are not 
free.  This ambiguity has been the source of bitter theological contention.  This explains 
the need to understand White’s model of divine foreknowledge and divine sovereignty 
and their relationship with her understanding of agents’ free will.  Hence the following 
two sections undertake this task by first considering her concept of divine foreknowledge, 
and its relation to libertarian free will.  
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Divine Foreknowledge 
 
This section continues to investigate White’s understanding of the theological 
concepts underlying the problem of evil by describing her concept of divine 
foreknowledge.  Her discussions on this subject are brief and, in most cases, are in the 
context of Christ and His ministry.
54
  In the ensuing discussion an attempt is made to 
identify her model of divine foreknowledge by considering her understanding of eternity, 
the content of divine foreknowledge, and divine risk.  
 
Eternity 
 
By eternity White intends a very long period of time.  She writes, “I Am means an 
eternal presence; the past, present, and future are alike to God.  He sees the most remote 
events of past history, and the far distant future with as clear a vision as we do those 
things that are transpiring daily.”55  White’s definition is reminiscent of the traditional 
claim that God exists outside of time, and His “now” simultaneously encompasses all 
                                                 
53Ellen G. White, “The Abiding Trust,” Gospel Herald, June 11, 1902. 
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time.
56
  However, since she does not compare God’s seeing to human beings observing 
an expanse from an elevated point, but from historical events transpiring daily, it would 
be correct to infer that, for White, eternity encompasses all time—past, present, and 
future in a temporal sequence.  
This does not suggest eternity is the same as our time.  The distinction she makes 
between eternity and our time becomes clear when we consider her understanding of the 
origin of our time.  White believes our time came into existence with our universe,
57
 but 
God is the “Eternal One.”58  That is to say, God created our time, but eternity is not 
created; eternity exists because God exists.  While created time is a creation of God, 
eternity is an attribute of God.  Her frequent use of the expression “before the foundation 
of the world”59 implies that our time exists in God’s time, eternity.  Thus, eternity and 
created time share temporality, yet they differ from each other.  While eternity is infinite 
and immeasurable, created time is finite and measurable.  She writes, “Planted firmly 
upon the earth, and reaching heavenward to the throne of God, is a ladder of shining 
brightness.  God is above the ladder, and his light is shining along its whole length. This 
ladder is Christ. . . . The angels of God are constantly ascending and descending this 
glorious ladder.  They will not let you fall, if you keep your eye fixed upon the glory of 
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God that is at the top of the ladder.” 60  What she implies is that God transcends created 
time and yet He acts and responds to what happens in it without breaking its continuum.   
Hence, eternity, in White, is not timelessness—absence of duration, but  endless time. 
 
Content of Divine Foreknowledge   
 
On the question of the content of divine exhaustive foreknowledge, White states:    
 It was an unfolding of the principles that from eternal ages have been the 
foundation of God's throne.  From the beginning, God and Christ knew of the 
apostasy of Satan, and of the fall of man through the deceptive power of the apostate. 
God did not ordain that sin should exist, but He foresaw its existence, and made 
provision to meet the terrible emergency.
61
                         
Furthermore, in her article “The Plan of Salvation,” White is careful to point out 
that divine purpose, the plan to create, and the plan of salvation existed from eternity.
62
  
She notes that “God sees beyond the woe and darkness and ruin that sin has wrought, the 
outworking of his purpose of love and blessing. . . . Through creation and redemption, 
through nature and through Christ, the glories of the divine character are revealed.”63  She 
also contends that Christ is the provision through whom humanity will be saved from sin 
and evil.  
In her opinion, before God began creating, He foreknew the problem of evil and 
predestined a solution for it.  For God to predestine a detailed, definite, and achievable 
solution—a response to free will actions—to the problem of evil, which is also the 
consequence of free actions, He must foreknow all actual and possible free choices.  This 
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means the content of God’s foreknowledge is exhaustive and definite; it includes future 
free choices and the result of His provision for sin.
 64
  Thus, White reflects a classical 
view of divine foreknowledge.   
On the other hand, there seems to be a sense in which White’s understanding of 
divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge differs from the classical view.  When her 
statements on divine foreknowledge are taken in totality, the difference between White’s 
theory and the classical view of divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge is evident on 
two levels.  First, unlike the classical view, White’s concept proves that the content of 
divine foreknowledge does not shape human history.
 65
  In addition, for White, God 
responds appropriately to His foreknowledge of free choices when actualized in created 
time.  Second, unlike proponents of the classical view of divine exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge who consider predestination to mean all things are causally determined, 
White considers predestination as a divine plan.  This is because she believes Christ is the 
only provision predestined in eternity as the solution to the problem of evil.
66
  This 
implies that God does not cause free choices and humans are free in a libertarian sense.  
Thus, for White maintaining divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge and libertarian 
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In an article discussing the struggle between the tempter and the tempted, she 
writes, “Christ quoted a prophecy which more than a thousand years before had predicted 
what God's foreknowledge had seen would be. The prophecies do not shape the 
characters of the men who fulfill them.  Men act out their own free will, either in 
accordance with a character placed under the molding of God or a character placed under 
the harsh rule of Satan” (Ellen G. White, “Walk in the Light,” Review and Herald, 
November 13, 1900, 2).  
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free will simultaneously does not create tension.  Therefore, in her view, foreknowledge 
is neither grounded in predestination nor vice versa.  She also does not make 
foreknowledge and predestination one and the same.  
A tenable question that arises from White’s concept of divine foreknowledge is: 
How does God foreknow free will choices definitely in His eternity without causing 
them?  However, she does not consider this to be a problem.  In her opinion, though we 
know the reality of divine foreknowledge, its ontological structure is beyond the reach of 
human reasoning.   She remarks, “There are many mysteries which I do not seek to 
understand or to explain; they are too high for me, and too high for you.  On some of 
these points, silence is golden.”67 
Thus far the discussion proves White’s affirmation of exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge.  However, she made a statement that appears to undermine my analysis 
of her concept of divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  In 1897, White wrote, “In 
the councils of heaven, before the world was created, the Father and the Son covenanted 
together that if man proved disloyal to God, Christ, one with the Father, would take the 
place of the transgressor, and suffer the penalty of justice that must fall upon him.”68  The 
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statement appeared again in an 1898 article entitled, “Christ’s Attitude Toward the 
Law.”69  This conditional statement seems to compromise her understanding of divine 
exhaustive definite foreknowledge.
70
  But given the contexts of the two occurrences of 
this conditional statement, White appears to underline the importance of the law of God.  
She does that by referring to divine decision, made in eternity, to suffer the penalty of 
justice that must fall upon the human race to vindicate every precept of the law instead of 
abrogating it to meet humankind’s condition.  While the statement is conditional, it is not 
expressing the uncertainty of divine foreknowledge of what human free will choices 
would be.  It is rather expressing that the significance of the law of God is from eternity. 
Furthermore, White’s historicist approach to the prophecies of the books of 
Daniel and Revelation is evidence of her affirmation that God knows the future in every 
detail.
71
  For she believes prophecies are predictions of what God’s foreknowledge had 
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seen would be.
72
  In addition, there are passages in her writings that imply divine 
exhaustive definite foreknowledge of the future.
73
  As a result, one cannot conclude 
otherwise than to affirm her strong affirmation of exhaustive definite foreknowledge.   
 
God Who Risks  
 
Some contemporary theologians claim that the affirmations of divine exhaustive 
definite foreknowledge and divine risk are incompatible.
74
  In this section an attempt will 
be made to understand White’s notion of divine risk and how she relates it to her concept 
of divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge. 
White discusses divine risk in relation to Jesus’ ministry on earth.  Underlining 
the value Christ places on the fallen human race in her discourse on the parable of the lost 
sheep, she remarks: 
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 Who can estimate the value of a soul? Go to Gethsemane, and there watch with 
Jesus through those long hours of anguish when he sweat as it were great drops of 
blood; look upon the Saviour uplifted on the cross; hear that despairing cry, “My 
God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?” Look upon that wounded head, the 
pierced side, the marred feet. Remember that Christ risked all; "tempted like as we 
are," he staked even his own eternal existence upon the issue of the conflict. Heaven 
itself was imperiled for our redemption.  At the foot of the cross, remembering that 
for one sinner Jesus would have yielded up his life, we may estimate the value of a 
soul.
75
 
Again, discussing the human nature of Christ she writes: 
 Satan in heaven had hated Christ for His position in the courts of God. He hated 
Him the more when he himself was dethroned. He hated Him who pledged Himself to 
redeem a race of sinners. Yet into the world where Satan claimed dominion God 
permitted His Son to come, a helpless babe, subject to the weakness of humanity. He 
permitted Him to meet life's peril in common with every human soul, to fight the 
battle as every child of humanity must fight it, at the risk of failure and eternal loss.
76
  
In addition, writing about the temptation of Christ, she recognizes that “if man has 
in any sense a more trying conflict to endure than had Christ, then Christ is not able to 
succor him when tempted.  Christ took humanity with all its liabilities.  He took the 
nature of man with the possibility of yielding to temptation, and he relied upon divine 
power to keep him.”77 
Two assertions arise from White’s comments on divine risk.78  First, divine risk is 
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associated with divine activity performed in human history.  This implies that, although 
foreknowledge and risk are divine activities, they are distinct activities.  While divine 
foreknowledge is an activity performed in eternity, divine risk was taken in human 
history.  Consequently, in her opinion, divine risk does not increase or decrease the 
content of divine foreknowledge, but it is evident that the content of divine 
foreknowledge involves not only future choices of free moral agents but also the outcome 
of His plan to redeem His creation from the problem of evil.   
The second assertion, which flows from the first, is that it was divine confidence 
in what God foreknew about the future that led Him to decide on endangering His most 
treasured asset in heaven, His Son, in human history.  These two assertions are also 
manifested in White’s claim that Christ paid the price and only He is a sufficient ransom 
for the fallen race.
79
  Experientially, management takes risks frequently, but management  
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never puts its most treasured assets in harm’s way without knowing the certainty of the 
outcome.  As a result, risks do not entail lack of certainty of the end results.  We may 
assume that, for White, divine risk is Christ vacating the heavenly realm and exposing 
Himself to the sinful world and the cruelty of its intelligent creatures rather than the 
uncertainty of the outcome.
80
     
The discussion on White’s concepts of eternity, content of divine foreknowledge, 
and divine risk has established her model of divine foreknowledge as exhaustive definite 
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terrible emergency” (E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 22). This remark suggests that 
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foreknowledge.  How she deals with the alleged theological contradiction between 
libertarian free will and divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge has also been 
identified.  For her, divine predestination is a planned provision for the problem of evil, 
not predestined free will choices.  Therefore, there is no contradiction in affirming 
libertarian free will and exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  The next section explores 
how her model of free will and divine foreknowledge impacts her model of divine 
sovereignty.  
 
Sovereignty of God 
 
Like most theologians, White holds that God is the creator of the universe.  He 
has authority and power over all His creation.  He continually upholds His creation.  He 
directly or indirectly acts in human history to restore humankind in the image of God.
81
   
These acts in human history are revealed through special revelations, such as visions, 
dreams and incarnation,
 
Scripture,
 82
 the convicting and illuminating work of the Holy 
Spirit,
 83
 and the mission of the church.
84
  If, according to White, humans possess 
libertarian free will, how can God be said to be in control of all things?  If He does not 
cause free will choices, how can He be sovereign in bringing humanity back to the 
perfection in which the race was created?  White’s solution to this ambiguity between 
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libertarian free will and divine sovereignty may be identified by considering the wills of 
God:  permissive, limitative, directive, preventive, and controlling wills.  
 
Permissive Will 
 
In White’s opinion divine permissive will is evident in two ways.   First, 
discussing the origin of sin and evil, she insists that “God permitted him [Satan] to 
demonstrate the nature of his claims, to show the working out of his proposed changes in 
the divine law. . . .  The whole universe must see the deceiver unmasked.”85  For her, 
divine permission of sin not only allows Satan to identify himself as an enemy of God, 
but also the permission to work on the wicked as well as the righteous.
86
   
Second, she sees divine permissive will manifested in every occurrence.  Even 
about Christ’s suffering she remarks that “the Father's presence encircled Christ, and 
nothing befell Him but that which infinite love permitted for the blessing of the world.” 87  
By making human wickedness against Christ evidence of divine permissive will, she 
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necessarily identifies the human race as permitted to exercise individuality in making 
choices.
88
   
Thus every action that libertarian free will effectuates is possible because of 
divine permissive will.  In other words libertarian free will is allowed to function under 
the permissive will of God.   For White, though God has permitted free will to function, 
He is not directly responsible for the events that libertarian free will effectuates.   
 
Limitative Will 
 
While White affirms divine permissive will, she seems to point out that God 
limits the things He permits.  Once again, depending on her understanding of the origin 
of sin and evil, she notes that the casting of Satan and his cohorts out of heaven puts a 
limit on sin and evil from spreading to the entire angelic population.
89
  Furthermore, 
based on Gen 3 she writes:  
 In order to possess an endless existence, man must continue to partake of the tree of 
life. Deprived of this, his vitality would gradually diminish until life should become 
extinct. It was Satan's plan that Adam and Eve should by disobedience incur God's 
displeasure; and then, if they failed to obtain forgiveness, he hoped that they would 
eat of the tree of life, and thus perpetuate an existence of sin and misery. But after 
man's fall, holy angels were immediately commissioned to guard the tree of life. 
Around these angels flashed beams of light having the appearance of a glittering 
sword. None of the family of Adam were permitted to pass the barrier to partake of 
the life-giving fruit; hence there is not an immortal sinner.
90
 
   
This implies, for White, that God has put a limit on the length of the existence of 
sin and evil.  The definite limit on sin and evil is death.  In her view, this limit involves a 
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promise to put an end to sin and evil, to redeem and restore His creation through Christ in 
spite of Satan’s desperate campaign to exterminate God’s people and His creation.91  She 
refers to biblical stories to describe how divine limitative will manifests itself universally 
and in particular events.
92
  These stories include Jesus’ victory over Satan’s 
temptations,
93
 the story of Job, Peter’s fall,94 disobedience of the first human parents,95 
and Rev 7:2, 3.
96
  In each of these cases, she emphasizes the effects of limitative will on 
the advancement of sin and evil.   
Thus, the Prince of sin and evil is limited to planet Earth, and he is limited as to 
the extent of influence he can exert and does not have all eternity to prove his principles 
to intelligent creatures.  In the same manner, humans are limited in the extent of influence 
they can exert on each other.  
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Directive Will 
 
White’s perception of divine directive will is illustrated in her discussion on 
Joseph’s story.97  She observes that God did not approve the evils worked against Joseph 
and yet He did not prevent it.  However, the “divine hand had directed” the disastrous 
outcome of Joseph’s brothers’ sinful act to good results.98   
It appears that, for White, God redirects evil acts that the perpetrators intended to 
hinder the manifestations of God’s glory and His blessings to humankind.  This is 
because in comparing Joseph’s experience with Christ’s, she notes that God overruled 
evil doers’ course of events to “bring about the event that they designed to hinder.”99  In 
her view, divine directive will does not imply that God manipulates in such a way that 
evils that are permitted to occur are necessary for the production of greater good.  For she 
emphasizes that “God gives opportunities; success depends upon the use made of 
them.”100  This implies that not all heinous evils are redirected and these are evidence of 
warfare between the Creator and His rebellious creatures.  It also indicates that White’s 
concept of directive will does not override libertarian free will. 
 
Preventive Will  
 
Another will that is already implicit in White’s concept of divine sovereignty is 
preventive will.  The biblical passage about Abraham and Abimelech is frequently used 
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as a proof of divine preventive will.
 101
  Ironically, White does not make any comment on 
the most prominent biblical evidence of divine preventive will.  However, she alludes to 
divine preventive will when she uses the story of Balaam as an illustration in her 
exposition on the snares of Satan.
 
 “The Spirit of God forbade the evil which he [Balaam] 
longed to pronounce”102 on the people of God.  
It seems to White that God has generally permitted evil, but He sometimes 
prevents some concrete evil occurrences.  On the one hand, she recognizes that, while 
God’s children remain faithful to Him, “no power in earth or hell could prevail against 
them.” 103  On the other hand, she acknowledges that preventive will does not coerce 
libertarian free will.  According to White, “the curse which Balaam had not been 
permitted to pronounce against God's people, he finally succeeded in bringing upon them 
by seducing them into sin.”104  In other words when God’s people choose to follow the 
perpetrators of evil against them, they remove themselves from under the protection of 
God and deny themselves the benefit of divine preventive will.  They are then “left to feel 
the power of the destroyer.”  But when they remain faithful to God, irrespective of how 
perpetrators of evil present themselves, God prevents some concrete evil occurrences 
from befalling them.
105
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Controlling Will 
 
In addition to permissive, limitative, directive, and preventive wills, White asserts 
that it is “the word of God” that “controls” nature, not “inherent power that year by year 
the earth continues her motion round the sun and produces her bounties.”106  She 
observes that divine controlling will is manifested upon nature in two ways:  nourishment 
and punishment.  From her point of view, in spite of the effects of Satan’s and humans’ 
rebellion on the natural world, God, through controlling will, nourishes nature, which 
enables nature to remain a lesson book to humankind.
107
  On the other hand, her 
discussion on the flood emphasizes that nature has been a weapon storehouse for God 
where, through divine controlling will, He drew weapons for the destruction of the 
wicked during the flood, and He will draw weapons from there again against the wicked 
at the second coming of Christ.
108
  
White’s view of permissive, limitative, directive, preventive, and controlling 
wills, as described above, reflects her disavowal of the idea that creation is left to 
chance.
109
  It also displays her objection to meticulous divine sovereignty.
 110
  Her 
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approach shows that she believes that God rules and works to achieve His purpose for 
His creation.  However, He works in a manner that does not interfere with agents’ 
libertarian free will.  Thus, the consistency between White’s view of sovereign activities 
and agents’ libertarian free will requires a corresponding understanding of prayer.   
In the history of Christian theology, discussion on divine sovereignty raises the 
question of the efficaciousness of prayer. The following section discusses White’s view 
of prayer in the context of her understanding of divine sovereign activities. 
 
Prayer 
 
White discusses prayer in relation to divine sovereignty.  She identifies prayer as 
human activity, which God has assigned as an essential factor in His sovereignty over His 
creatures.  According to her, through general and special revelations God speaks to us; 
and prayer is a necessary privilege through which human agents express their thoughts 
and feelings in the divine and human relationship.
111
  This means for White, “prayer is 
the opening of the heart to God as to a friend.” 112  It is a channel through which 
libertarian free will communicates with God.  
Relying on biblical evidence, White identifies the benefit of prayer as spiritual  
and material things necessary to help petitioners’ to be faithful to God in spite of the 
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production of a greater good” (William Hasker, “Must God Do His Best?” International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 [1984]: 216). It is often affirmed by scholars who 
believe in theological determinism, free will, and exhaustive definite divine 
foreknowledge. See Feinberg, “God Ordains All Things,” 19-43. 
111Ellen G. White, “Prayer,” Signs of the Times, June 18, 1902. 
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hideous nature of sin and evil.
 113
  This means prayer can “move the arm of God.”114  In 
this context, prayer is efficacious.  Nevertheless, she is critical of the idea that prayer 
enriches God’s knowledge about us or informs Him about our needs115 and commands 
Him to do what we desire.
116
  She is equally critical of the idea that “there can be no real 
answer to prayer.”117  For White, God has made it “plain that our asking must be 
according to God's will; we must ask for the things that He has promised, and whatever 
we receive must be used in doing His will.”118  This is why she affirms that prayer 
“enables us to receive God.”119  This implies prayer demonstrates human agents’ 
willingness to let God work His purpose in them.  Through prayer the divine sovereign 
wills work in cooperation with libertarian free will.  “The natural cooperates with the 
supernatural.  It is a part of God's plan to grant us, in answer to the prayer of faith, that 
which He would not bestow did we not thus ask.”120  
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E. G. White, Steps to Christ, 93. 
113Ellen G. White, “The Power of Prayer,” Signs of the Times, January 29, 1902. 
114Ellen G. White, “The Work for This Time,” Signs of the Times, September 4, 
1879, CD-ROM (Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White Estate, 2008). 
115“The ear of the Lord is open to the cry of every suppliant. Even before the 
prayer is offered or the yearning desire of the soul made known, the Spirit of God goes 
forth to meet it. Never has there been a genuine desire, never a tear shed in contrition of 
soul, but grace from Christ has gone forth to meet the grace working upon the human 
heart” (E. G. White, “Prayer,” 2). 
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E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 2:149.  
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E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 525.  
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E. G. White, Education, 257. 
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E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 525.  
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While not discounting the importance of prayer, White indicates that prayers must 
meet certain conditions before they are answered.
 
  By conditions to answered prayer, she 
means petitioners must feel the need for help, be humble, persistent, and pray in faith 
with intensity.
121
  Prayers that do not meet the stipulated conditions are our insult to 
God.
122
   However, “to every sincere prayer He answers, ‘Here am I.’ He uplifts the 
distressed and downtrodden.”123  But, sometimes “it may not come just as you desire, or 
at the time you look for it; but it will come in the way and at the time that will best meet 
your need.”124   
As I bring this discussion on White’s concept of divine sovereignty to an end, her 
understanding can be summarized in the statement “God is a moral governor as well as a 
Father.”125  In other words, divine sovereign activities in human history are governed by 
moral obligations and the love of the Creator.  Thus, by creating agents with libertarian 
free will, God chose to abide by moral obligations in ruling over them.  In this sense, 
divine sovereign activities do not threaten or obstruct or manipulate creaturely freedom.  
To be precise, White recognizes that God has sufficient moral reasons for acting the way 
                                                 
121
Ibid., 530; idem, Testimonies for the Church, 4:538, 539; idem, Christ’s Object 
Lessons, 145, 146; idem, Steps to Christ, 95-97.  
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with the world. See ibid., 823; idem, Education, 263. 
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Ellen G. White, Gospel Workers (Battle Creek, MI: Review and Herald, 1892; 
reprint, 1901), 258. 
125Ellen G. White, “As It Was in the Days of Noah,” in Manuscript Releases, 21 
vols. (Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White Estate, 1990), 12:208; idem, Testimonies for the 
Church, 4:520.  
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He does in history.  This idea becomes apparent in her insistence on God’s decision not 
to destroy evil at the moment of its intrusion, but permit it and then provide other means, 
which are morally consonant with His character, to save creation.  Thus, all the sovereign 
devices mentioned are dynamic realities vital to redeeming the fallen race, restoring 
creation, and eradicating sin and evil which means that, although special concerns are 
directed toward the children of God, divine sovereignty is universal; He rules over all His 
creation.  
The descriptive analysis thus far has focused on the concepts of free will, divine 
foreknowledge, and sovereignty that are implied in White’s model of warfare theodicy.  
It is evident that free will is libertarian, divine foreknowledge is exhaustive and definite, 
and divine sovereignty is general.  The following sections seek to explore White’s 
understanding of sin and evil. 
 
Sin and Evil 
 
So far, White’s views on the theological elements (free will, divine 
foreknowledge, and divine sovereignty) embedded in her model of warfare theodicy have 
been examined.  This section analyzes her understanding of sin and evil; it is done by 
exploring her concept of the origin of sin and evil and the divine victory over sin and evil. 
 
Origin of Sin and Evil 
 
Convinced that through the Scripture enough may be understood about God and 
His dealings with evil,
 126
 White relies on the Scripture to deal with the perplexing issue 
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E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 492-493. 
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of the origin of sin and evil.
127
  She observes that before the appearance of sin the 
universe existed in harmony with the will of God; all creatures were at peace and shared 
impartial love with each other and showed supreme love towards their Creator.
128
  For the 
law of love is the foundation of God’s government, and the “happiness of all created 
beings” depended upon their perfect obedience to the law.129   
With regard to the obedience to the law, White argues that God by virtue of His 
nature desires that obedience to the law must be voluntary.  Therefore, He endowed 
intelligent creatures with freedom of the will.
130
  However, the misuse of the freedom of 
the will originated sin and distorted the harmony that existed between God and His 
creation.  This is why White defines sin as “‘the transgression of the law;’ it is the 
outworking of a principle at war with the great law of love which is the foundation of the 
divine government.”131  She distinguishes Lucifer, the first of the covering cherubs, as the 
first created being to misuse the freedom of the will that his Creator endowed him with.  
He deliberately coveted the honor and allegiance that is exclusively the privilege of 
                                                 
127
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 33-43. 
128
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Christ, the Son of God.
132
  Thus for White, sin began with Lucifer’s choice to disobey 
God’s law.  
For White, the exact cause of Lucifer’s disobedience is inexplicable.  She writes, 
“Sin is an intruder, for whose presence no reason can be given.  It is mysterious, 
unaccountable; to excuse it is to defend it.  Could excuse for it be found, or cause be 
shown for its existence, it would cease to be sin.”133  White’s insistence that there is no  
cause for Lucifer’s rebellion is based on her model of free will.  As is evident in the 
discussion on her model of free will, external and internal elements may influence agents’ 
free choices but those factors do not determine agents’ free choices.  Therefore, by stating 
that there is no cause or reason for Lucifer’s disobedience, she means no external factors 
or decay or deficiency in Lucifer determined his choice to rebel.  Lucifer’s disposition to 
serve himself was neither determined by his environment nor by divine purpose.
134
  For 
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University, 1985). 
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White, God neither created sin as part of His creation nor caused sin by creating deficient 
beings. 
Relating the origin of sin to evil, White argues that “the consequence . . . of sin is 
. . . evil.”135  In other words evil is inevitable once sin originated.  This implies that for 
White, sin and its consequence are not privation of good that a thing ought to have—a 
necessary condition from which degeneration departs, in this case imperfect will
136—but 
                                                 
Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, 169). Aquinas argued on the one hand that evil 
has material cause where evil flows accidentally. On the other hand, based on his 
definition of privation (“A privation is that from which generation departs. It can, 
however, be called an accidental cause, inasmuch as it coincides with matter” [Aquinas, 
De Principiis Naturae, III.21]), “the effect of the deficient secondary cause [imperfect 
being] is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and 
perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect. . . . And, likewise, whatever there is of 
being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect 
is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause” (Aquinas, Summa 
Theologiae, 8. Ia. 49.2).  
White’s argument implies that sin has no material cause, formal cause, and final 
cause, but it has a primary efficient cause: Lucifer, the source of disorder in God’s 
creation.  
135In a discourse on the fourth commandment, she indicates that “the fall of Adam 
was a terrible thing, and the consequence of his sin so fraught with evil that language 
cannot portray it” (Ellen G. White, “The Sabbath of the Fourth Commandment 
Unchanged,” Signs of the Times, January 8, 1894, 3). This is not a direct reference to the 
consequence of Lucifer’s disobedience, but depending on her discussion of the events 
that took place after Lucifer’s sin, the war in heaven and the deception of the first 
humans, the same statement can be made about the effects of Lucifer’s sin.  
136“Evil has a deficient cause in voluntary things otherwise than in natural things. 
For the natural agent produces the same kind of effect as it is itself, unless it is impeded 
by some exterior thing; and this amounts to some defect belonging to it. Hence evil never 
follows in the effect, unless some other evil pre-exists in the agent or in the matter, as 
was said above. But in voluntary things the defect of the action comes from the will 
actually deficient, inasmuch as it does not actually subject itself to its proper rule. This 
defect, however, is not a fault, but fault follows upon it from the fact that the will acts 
with this defect” (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a. 49.1). Thus, privation of good is a 
potential evil in God’s creation.  Once an agent misuses the imperfect free will, the agent 
becomes the cause of the defect action of the imperfect free will.   
218 
divergence from good.   There is no necessary imperfection in God’s creation to warrant 
sin and evil.    
From the foregoing discussion, we may ponder the difficult question, Why did 
God permit sin and its evil consequences?  It seems to White that God could have easily 
eradicated Lucifer at the initial stages of his insidious behavior.  She sees the eviction of 
Lucifer and his cohorts, a third of the angelic host, from heaven as evidence of divine 
ability to destroy Lucifer instantly.
137
  However, for the benefit of all intelligent creatures 
in the cosmos, to acknowledge the repulsive nature of sin and evil, He let Lucifer live.  
She writes: 
 The inhabitants of heaven and of the worlds, being unprepared to comprehend the 
nature or consequences of sin, could not then have seen the justice of God in the 
destruction of Satan.  Had he been immediately blotted out of existence, some would 
have served God from fear rather than from love.  The influence of the deceiver 
would not have been fully destroyed, nor would the spirit of rebellion have been 
utterly eradicated. . . . Satan's rebellion was to be a lesson to the universe through all 
coming ages—a perpetual testimony to the nature of sin and its terrible results.  The 
working out of Satan's rule, its effects upon both men and angels, would show what 
must be the fruit of setting aside the divine authority.
138
  
While Lucifer’s rebellion was not necessary, God has allowed it and its effects to 
be a lesson to His creatures.  This permission began a controversy between Christ and 
rebellious creatures over the issue of allegiance of created beings to God.
139
  White’s 
understanding of the origin and divine permission of sin and evil raises concerns about 
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how God plans to overcome it.  Thus, my next inquiry is on her understanding of divine 
victory over sin and evil. 
 
Victory over Sin and Evil 
 
As certain as White is about the mystery of the origin of sin and evil and divine 
authority over it, she is no less convinced about the divine plan to eradicate the intruder 
from His creation.  From her point of view, based on divine foreknowledge, God had in 
place a plan to deal with sin and evil.
140
  She insists that “the creation of the worlds, the 
mystery of the gospel, are for one purpose, to make manifest to all created intelligences, 
through nature and through Christ, the glories of the divine character.  By the marvelous 
display of his love in giving ‘his only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him 
should not perish, but have everlasting life,’ the glory of God is revealed to lost humanity 
and to the intelligences of other worlds.”141  At this point, a more detailed and careful 
presentation of her view on the creation of planet Earth and the ministry of Christ are 
needed.  The rest of this chapter analyzes White’s model of creation and her 
understanding of the ministry of Christ and their relation to divine victory over sin and 
evil.  
 
Creation 
 
Convinced of the role planet Earth plays in the battle between good and evil,  
                                                 
140E. G. White’s theory of divine foreknowledge of sin and evil before it 
happened will be discussed in later analysis. 
141Ellen G. White, “The Purpose and Plan of Grace,” Signs of the Times, April 25, 
1892, 6. See also E. G. White, “The Mystery of God,” Signs of the Times, March 25, 
1897. 
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White does not hesitate to depend on the Bible for an accurate “early history of our world 
. . . the creation of man, and of his fall.”  She concludes that studying the history of the 
human race without consulting the Bible generates false and unreliable theories.
142
   
Relying on the biblical account of creation, White asserts that creation (“the 
heavens and all the host of them, the earth and all things that are therein”)143 is by a 
personal God;
144
 it is done in six literal, consecutive days of evening and morning,
145
 and 
not from eternally pre-existent matter.
146
  From her perspective all of God’s creation is 
good; human beings were created with characteristics such as “noble traits of character, 
with no bias toward evil,” “high intellectual powers,” and “the strongest possible 
inducements to be true to [their] allegiance.”147  They serve as the culmination and 
completeness of the creation of the earth.    
Thus creation is not from preexisting material; it derives its existence from God, 
and nothing in it is intrinsically evil.
148
  Evidently, White also believes that creatures are 
                                                 
142Ellen G. White, “The Power of the Word of God,” Review and Herald, 
November 10, 1904, 7. 
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White, Manuscript Releases, 3:208. 
144
White, Patriarch and Prophets, 44.   
145“The Bible recognizes no long ages in which the earth was slowly evolved 
from chaos. Of each successive day of creation, the sacred record declares that it 
consisted of the evening and the morning, like all other days that have followed. At the 
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221 
placed in orders,
149
 yet her explanation does not support the theory of inherent limitations 
and imperfections.  It seems that White’s emphasis on humans as the climax of creation is 
only to accentuate the human place in creation, representative of God as rulers over 
God’s works on earth.150  Thus, it suffices to say that, from her point of view, the original 
creation of planet Earth cannot be anything short of perfect, lacking nothing essential and 
without flaws.
151
   
White’s emphasis on the biblical account of creation is also evidence of her views 
on scientific theories about the origin of the earth.  In reacting to the nineteenth-century 
geological theories, she wrote, 
 Infidel geologists claim that the world is very much older than the Bible record 
makes it. They reject the Bible record, because of those things which are to them 
evidences from the earth itself, that the world has existed tens of thousands of years. 
And many who profess to believe the Bible record are at a loss to account for 
wonderful things which are found in the earth, with the view that creation week was 
only seven literal days, and that the world is now only about six thousand years old. 
These, to free themselves of difficulties thrown in their way by infidel geologists, 
adopt the view that the six days of creation were six vast, indefinite periods.
152
 
The point to be made here is as follows.  On the one hand, she rejects the claims 
of evolutionists, geologists, and paleontologists that are contradictory to the biblical 
accounts of creation, and any harmonization of these theories with the biblical accounts 
of creation that seems to compromise the biblical account.
153
  On the other hand, she does 
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not create a dichotomy between theology and science.  Like a few of her 
contemporaries,
154
 she believes that communication between theology and science is 
necessary.  She writes, “All true science is but an interpretation of the handwriting of 
God in the material world.  Science brings from her research only fresh evidences of the 
wisdom and power of God.  Rightly understood, both the book of nature and the written 
word make us acquainted with God by teaching us something of the wise and beneficent 
laws through which He works.”155  Consequently, for White, any conflict between the 
Bible and science is a result of erroneous inferences drawn from observation of nature or 
from a biased interpretation of the Bible.
156
   
                                                 
Fernando Canale writes, “The difference between Theistic Evolution and Progressive 
Creationism consists in the way they see God’s involvement in the process of evolution.  
Both, however, share the conviction that evolutionary science tells the true story of what 
actually took place in historical reality. Moreover, following the dictates of timeless 
Greek metaphysics, both views assume that God does not work historically within the 
spatiotemporal sequence of historical events. Divine causality does not operate 
historically (sequentially), but spiritually (instantaneously). Thus, Christian 
harmonization of creation to evolution stands on the prior harmonization of reality to 
Greek metaphysical and anthropological dualisms that guided Augustine’s and Aquinas’ 
theological constructions. They systematized the dehistorization and spiritualization of 
Christian doctrine on which Theistic Evolutionism and Progressive Creationism build 
their theological syntheses” (Fernando Canale, “Adventist Theology and Deep 
Time/Evolutionary Theory: Are They Compatible?” Journal of the Adventist Theological 
Society 15 [2004]: 98). 
154According to Livingston, Charles Hodge, “would not separate science and 
theology into two distinct spheres of fact and value. For Hodge, science and the Bible 
were reconcilable. Conflicts could only be apparent and would be shown to be so when 
either the facts were better known or the truth of the Bible more clearly discerned” 
(Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 260). Hodge rejected Darwinism on the basis 
that it is a false scientific theory. See Charles Hodge, What Is Darwinism? (New York: 
Scribner, 1874). 
155
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 599.  
156
She cites geology as a case in point. E. G. White, Education, 128. For a 
detailed discussion of White’s view on Creation, the Bible, and science and evolution, see 
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White’s rejection of evolution and geological theories of the nineteenth century, 
which seem to give reasonable explanation for pain and suffering in nature, does not 
mean she denies the reality of the problem of evil.  Rather, due to her emphasis on the 
primacy of Scripture, she is able to affirm the perfection of creation while at the same 
time maintaining that planet Earth is infested with evil.  She proposes that everything is 
under “fixed laws.”  In addition to the fixed laws, human beings are “amenable to moral 
law,” and are endowed with free will—“power to understand His [God’s] requirements, 
to comprehend the justice and beneficence of His law, and its sacred claims”  upon 
humankind.
157
  Thus she recognizes that the human race is granted the power of choice 
just like the angels, and that in spite of the noble character of the first humans, they were 
not beyond the possibility of disobeying God.
158
   For this reason, she insists that the first 
humans were not left ignorant about Satan’s rebellion.159  Affirming the literal 
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interpretation of Gen 1-3, she concludes that they succumbed to Satan’s deception and 
temptation “to distrust God’s love, to doubt his wisdom, and to transgress His law.”160  
Consequently, for White, by Adam’s “disobedience of the divine law, the world was 
thrown into disorder and rebellion.  Because of his disobedience, man was under the 
penalty of breaking the law, doomed to death.”161  The conclusion appears inescapable 
that White believes in the reality of the problem of evil. 
This reflection shows that the perfect earth now experiences sin and its 
consequence, evil.  However, scholars have argued that such an explanation of the reality 
of evil is applicable to moral evil, but does not deal adequately with natural evil such as 
the Lisbon Earthquake that set the Enlightenment thinkers searching for an explanation 
for such evils.  It is to this issue of natural evil that we now turn our attention. 
 
Natural evil   
Natural evil became an issue needing the immediate attention of academicians 
after the Lisbon Earthquake in 1755.  Voltaire, in reacting to the Lisbon disaster, wrote a 
poem against the providence of God.
 162
  Jean Jacques Rousseau, responding to the poem, 
                                                 
was demonstrated in the objects of nature that surrounded them. Every tree of the garden 
spoke to them. The invisible things of God were clearly seen, being understood by the 
things which were made, even his eternal power and Godhead” (Ellen G. White, “The 
Revelation of God,” Review and Herald, November 8, 1898, 1).   
160
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 57.  
161Ellen G. White, “The Sabbath of the Fourth Commandment Unchanged,” 3. 
See also idem, Patriarchs and Prophets, 52-57. She sees the tree of good and evil in 
Eden to be a test of faith. Thus, eternal happiness lies in human obedience to God’s law 
of love. E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 48-49. 
162Voltaire was against hopes for any kind of wholeness as suggested by Leibniz’s 
and Pope’s explanations of evil. However, he believed in the future betterment of 
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reminded Voltaire about the fact that humans and their organizational structures 
contribute a great deal to physical ills and disasters.
163
  White’s views on moral and 
natural evils to some degree reiterate Rousseau’s opinion.  She remarks, “Even the child, 
as he comes in contact with nature, will see cause for perplexity.  He cannot but 
recognize the working of antagonistic forces”;164 such evil forces are neither natural nor 
inherent in nature.
 165
   
In the ensuing discussion I examine how this explains natural evil and its 
excessiveness.  I intend to do this by considering how White counteracts two main 
approaches to natural evil:  Natural evil as a consequence of the laws of nature and as 
punishment for sin.   
 
Natural evil as a consequence of laws of nature.  White does not develop a 
complete theory on natural evil, although she makes remarks that express her opinion on 
the issue.  We may deduce from White’s concept of creation that natural evil is the 
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consequence of the disobedience to God’s law, human actions, and lack of it and not the 
consequence of the laws of nature themselves.   
The accuracy of the above deduction is based on the assertion she makes about 
the effects of the disobedience of our first parents.  She observes that the disobedience of 
Adam and Eve deprived them of their relationship with God and subjugated them under 
Satan’s rule; thereby they forfeited their privilege to gain immortality from eating the 
fruit of the tree of life and became slaves to sin.
166
    
Similarly, White maintains that the effects of human disobedience are also 
manifested in nature.  Human nature began to degenerate; they decreased in physical 
strength, mental power, and moral worth.  The natural world also began to deteriorate 
under Satan’s rule.167  She relies on Christ’s remarks, “An enemy hath done this,”168 to 
explain the antagonistic forces in nature.   From the foregoing discussion we may 
conclude that White’s understanding of what some perceive as inherent or natural evil, 
“capricious outbreaks of disorganized, unregulated forces of nature,”169 are calamities 
resulting from human disobedience to God’s law.  She writes, God “never made a thorn, 
a thistle, or a tare.  These are Satan’s work, the result of degeneration, introduced by him 
                                                 
idem, “Words to the Young,” The Youth’s Instructor, November 23, 1893; idem, “Words 
to the Young,” The Youth’s Instructor, June 7, 1894).  
166Ellen G. White, “Christ’s Sacrifice for Man,” Signs of the Times, June 13, 
1900; idem, Patriarchs and Prophets, 62.  
167
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 59.  
168
Matt 13:28. E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 3:113; idem, Education, 
101. 
169
E. G. White, Prophets and Kings, 277; idem, “Calamities and the Great 
Controversy,” in Manuscript Releases, 21 vols. (Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White 
Estate, 1990), 19:279.  
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among the precious things.”170  This implies, it seems, that the curse upon the human race 
is an announcement of the kind of government to which the original disobedience 
subjected the race and its environment.
171
   
While, for White, moral and natural evils in this world originated from Satan’s 
deception and the first parents’ disobedience, human persistence in sinful actions and 
disregard of the laws of nature contribute to the continually downward degeneration of 
the human race and deterioration of the natural world.  This results in chronic and 
terminal conditions of individual humans
172
 and natural disasters such as tornadoes, death 
                                                 
170
E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 6:186.   
171This inference from White’s position agrees with the meaning of the curse 
formula in the Old Testament.  According to Old Testament scholars, the curse formula 
expels the object of the curse from a community relationship, status, or a position that the 
object of the curse enjoyed before. Josef Scharbert, “ררא,” Theological Dictionary of the 
Old Testament (1974), 1:408-409. See also F. Rachel Magdalene, “Curse,” Eerdmans 
Dictionary of the Bible (2000), 301-302. 
172Discussing the deplorable state of the human race she writes, “Since the fall the 
tendency of the race has been continually downward, the effects of sin becoming more 
marked with every successive generation. But so great was the vitality with which man 
was endowed that the patriarchs from Adam to Noah, with a few exceptions, lived nearly 
a thousand years. Moses, the first historian, gives an account of social and individual life 
in the early days of the world's history; but we find no record that an infant was born 
blind, deaf, crippled, or imbecile. Not an instance is recorded of a death in infancy, 
childhood, or early manhood. . . . It was so rare for a son to die before his father that such 
an occurrence was thought worthy of record: ‘Haran died before his father Terah.’”     
“Since the flood, the average length of life has been decreasing. Had Adam 
possessed no greater physical force than men now have, the race would before this have 
become extinct. . . .”   
“Still more deplorable is the condition of the human family at the present time. 
Diseases of every type have been developed. Thousands of poor mortals with deformed, 
sickly bodies and shattered nerves are dragging out a miserable existence. The infirmities 
of the body affect the mind, and lead to gloom, doubt, and despair. Even infants in the 
cradle suffer from diseases resulting from the sins of their parents.”    
“Disease and premature death have so long prevailed, with an ever-increasing 
weight of suffering, that they have come to be regarded as the appointed lot of humanity. 
 
228 
of living things, earthquakes, and hurricanes.
173
  Humans in collaboration with evil forces 
cause such damage to God’s creation.    
                                                 
But this is not the case. God is not the author of the many woes to which mortals are 
subject; it is not because He desires to see His creatures suffer that there is so much 
misery in this world. Neither is it all due to Adam’s transgression. We may mourn over 
the fall in Eden, and think that our first parents showed great weakness in yielding to 
temptation, thus opening the door for sin to enter our world, with all its attendant evils. 
But the first transgression is not the only cause of our unhappy lot. A succession of falls 
has occurred since Adam's day” (Ellen G. White, “Health Principles,” Pacific Health 
Journal, February 1, 1902, CD-ROM [Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White Estate, 2008]). 
See also idem, Testimonies for the Church, 4:30. 
Encouraging health reform she states, “Since the laws of nature are the laws of 
God, it is plainly our duty to give these laws careful study. We should study their 
requirements in regard to our own bodies and conform to them. Ignorance in these things 
is sin. He [human] has treated its body as if its laws had no penalty. Through perverted 
appetite its organs and powers have become enfeebled, diseased, and crippled. . . . We 
ourselves must suffer the ills of violated law” (E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 
6:369). 
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In her discussion of calamities on land and sea, she mentions that 
“intemperance is the cause of most of the frequent accidents. . . . Men on whom devolve 
grave responsibilities in safeguarding their fellow men from accident and harm, are often 
untrue to their trust” (E. G. White, “Calamities and the Great Controversy,” 19:280). As 
already indicated, White does not believe in biological evolution and its related 
fundamental laws of physics, which indicates that natural disasters occurred billions of 
years before the evolution of humans. Even so, she does not deny the fact that violations 
accompany the operations of the laws of nature.  In her opinion, the manifestations of 
irregularities with the operations of the laws of nature are the results of human action or 
lack of it and not the laws themselves. This view of White can be illustrated with tectonic 
shifts. Tectonic shifts build up the land masses that we call home, but these are 
sometimes accompanied with earthquakes and tsunamis due to human actions or lack of 
it. Even human modification of its physical environment to meet its survival, changing 
needs, such as food, clothing, water, shelter and energy, has brought transformation and 
economic prosperity. On the other hand, it also has by-products like hazardous chemicals, 
such as chlorofluorocarbons, and disturbance of earth motions which place enormous 
demands on the physical environment to absorb and accommodate. This has resulted in 
depletion of the ozone layer as well as the earth; the repercussions are global warming, 
climate change, earthquakes, etc., which in turn cause intense pain and suffering and 
unprecedented destruction to the biological realm of creation. Some contemporary 
scholars believe much of natural evil and disasters are the result of human actions. See 
Robert John Russell, “Physics, Cosmology, and the Challenge to Consequentialist 
Natural Theodicy,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of 
Natural Evil, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, S. J. 
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Thus the exacerbation and excessiveness of evil in the world are the effects of 
humans’ continuous collaboration with Satan and his cohorts.174  This explains why 
White makes a distinction between moral and natural evil, but does not treat them as 
separate subjects.  She argues that there is a misuse of free will behind every evil 
occurrence.   
 
                                                 
(Vatican City State and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology 
and the Natural Sciences, 2007), 1:109n3; Don Howard, “Physics as Theodicy,” in 
Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural Evil, ed. 
Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger, S. J. (Vatican City State 
and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the Natural 
Sciences, 2007), 1:323-332. 
William R. Stoeger, S. J., defines laws of nature as “the regularities, processes, 
structures and interrelationships which characterize the reality and make it what it is.” 
Having defined laws of nature he makes two clarifications: 1. “The laws of nature as they 
actually are in themselves, whether we understand them or not, and whether we have 
actually adverted to them or not; 2. “‘Our laws of nature’—the imperfect, incomplete 
models or descriptions of the regularities, process, relationships we have developed.”  He 
then indicates that “the actual processes and relationships which constitute the full range 
of the laws of nature are much more than those we actually understand and have 
modelled. . . . There are aspects of our experience of reality which really cannot be 
accounted for by ‘our laws of nature,’ but which we strongly suspect are due to 
relationships . . . which cannot be probed by the methods of the natural sciences. From 
the point of view of the natural sciences—from the point of view of the laws of nature we 
know and understand—they appear to be ‘violations.’ But are they really?” (William R. 
Stoeger, “Evolution, God and Natural Evil,” in Can Nature Be Evil or Evil Natural? A 
Science-and-Religion View on Suffering and Evil, ed. Cornel W. Toit [Pretoria, South 
Africa: University of South Africa, 2006], 27-28). To a large extent, Stoeger’s 
understanding of laws of nature supports White’s view on the limitations of human 
knowledge of the laws of nature. We cannot conclude from limited knowledge of the 
laws of nature that irregularities in nature are the consequence or by-product of the laws 
themselves. Such conclusion, according to her understanding, cannot be substantiated. In 
other words, evidences from nature are not a complete representation of creation as 
originated from God (E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 52, 113, 114).  
174White insists that “Satan is the great originator of sin; yet this does not excuse 
any man for sinning for he cannot force men to do evil.  He tempts them to it, and makes 
sin look enticing and pleasant; but he has to leave it to their own wills whether they will 
do it or not. . . .  Man is a free moral agent to accept or refuse” (E. G. White, Testimonies 
for the Church, 2:294). 
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Natural evil as punishment for sin.  We now turn our attention to White’s 
comments on the concept of natural evil as punishment for sin.  What follow is an 
examination of how her remarks elaborate her understanding of natural evil.  
Concerning the concept that natural evil is punishment for sin,
175
 she writes: “It is 
true that all suffering results from the transgression of God’s law, but this truth had 
become perverted.  Satan, the author of sin and all its results, had led men to look upon 
disease and death as proceeding from God,—as punishment arbitrarily inflicted on 
account of sin.”176  Notice that she neither denies the fact that evil is the consequence of 
disobeying God’s laws nor rejects the idea that evil is God’s punishment for sin.  In her 
opinion, while humans bring evil upon themselves by their sinful actions, some victims 
of specific evil occurrences are innocent and others contribute or provoke the evil action.  
Thus, her argument is on the wrong use of the concept to justify either all human pain and 
suffering or every natural disaster.  Having pointed out the contrived concept of God’s 
nature and sovereignty that generate from generalizing the idea, she discusses some 
reasons for affliction.  Once again, this has not been done in one complete work, but her 
remarks on the topic are scattered throughout her writings and can be organized into three 
categories for clarity: character development, proving loyalty, and punishing and curbing 
sin. 
1.  Character development.  It must be emphasized that, for White, character is 
important in the controversy between God and Satan.  More so, it becomes very crucial 
                                                 
175
The idea that evil is a punishment for sin has been a response to theodicy for 
centuries. See Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 18-31. 
176
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 471 (emphasis added). 
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when she mentions that “trials of life are God's workmen, to remove the impurities and 
roughness from our character.”177  Based on the trial of Abraham, White affirms that by 
“testing trials” God shows His children “their own weakness, and teaches them to lean 
upon Him” and they become “educated, trained, and disciplined.”178  Indeed she claims 
that the central premise of Christian development into the likeness of Christ comes under 
the “pruning knife of trials.”  It is obvious that the pruning away of the dross from 
Christian character is accompanied with afflictions and difficulties.
 179
 
To emphasize the difficulties and afflictions that come with the pruning knife of 
trials, she refers to the Israelites’ journey through the wilderness to say that God leads His 
children through paths where they encounter difficulties and afflictions that they may 
learn to depend on Him.
180
  Again from Jesus’ temptation she notes that the divine 
pruning of dross away from the Christian character sometimes involves being exposed to 
Satan’s temptation “upon appetite, upon the love of the world, and upon the love of 
display which leads to presumption.”181  While she admits that God leads His children to 
                                                 
177
E. G. White, Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing (Mountain View, CA: 
Pacific Press, 1896; reprint, 1955), 10. The trials’ “hewing, squaring, and chiseling, their 
burnishing and polishing, is a painful process; it is hard to be pressed down to the 
grinding wheel. But the stone is brought forth prepared to fill its place in the heavenly 
temple. Upon no useless material does the Master bestow such careful, thorough work. 
Only His precious stones are polished after the similitude of a palace” (ibid.).  
178
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 129, 130. 
179
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 677.  
180E. G. White, “Rephidim,” Review and Herald, April 7, 1903. 
181
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 116. “Many look on this conflict between 
Christ and Satan as having no special bearing on their own life; and for them it has little 
interest. But within the domain of every human heart this controversy is repeated. Never 
does one leave the ranks of evil for the service of God without encountering the assaults 
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paths where they encounter evil, she points out that God “never gives a trial to his 
children but he will be there to help; he knows just what they can bear, and he does not 
give them any more than they can bear.”182   
Given White’s understanding of the connection between divine sovereignty and 
human free will, God does not cause the pain and evil that may come with Christian 
character development.  He also does not impose the benefits of the trials He permits 
upon His children.  His children enjoy the benefits of the trials He permits when they 
remain faithful in spite of the pain and suffering.  This is why she writes, “If received in 
faith, the trial that seems so bitter and hard to bear will prove a blessing. The cruel blow 
that blights the joys of earth will be the means of turning our eyes to heaven.”183  
2.  Proving loyalty.  The second classification we find in White is that God 
permits evil to disprove Satan’s accusations.  White is decidedly against the use of the 
experience of Job to authenticate the view that “great calamities are a sure index of great 
crimes and enormous sins.”  Rather, she dwells on Job’s experience to substantiate the 
fact that “good and evil are mingled, and calamities come upon all.”184  She cites Joseph, 
Daniel, John, Job, and Paul as examples of godly men who suffered the afflictions of 
                                                 
of Satan. The enticements which Christ resisted were those that we find it so difficult to 
withstand” (ibid.).  
182Ellen G. White, “I Will Keep Thee from the Hour of Temptation,” Review and 
Herald, April 29, 1890, 1. 
183
E. G. White, Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing, 10. 
184E. G. White, “Job,” SDA Bible Commentary, ed. F. D. Nichol (Washington, 
DC: Review and Herald, 1953-57), 3:1140; According to her, every follower of Christ is 
a sharer in the sufferings of Christ. It is the self-sacrifice of Christ’s followers that Satan 
and his cohorts seek to destroy.  However, based on Col 3:3 she argues that God permits 
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Satan.  In all these cases she places emphasis on the fact that the individuals suffered 
because of their faith and loyalty to heaven.
185
  
White is insistent that the steadfastness of these courageous men in the midst of 
their afflictions proves their faith and loyalty and the truthfulness of God.  This is why 
she emphasizes the history of these godly men.  The history of these men shows that 
Satan persecutes the people of God.  He attacks their weak points, works through the 
defects in their character to gain control, and tortures them and puts them to death.  But in 
their steadfastness Satan’s accusations are disproven and God is revealed in His chosen 
ones.  The believers “learn the guilt and woe of sin, and they look upon it with 
abhorrence.”186  For White the records of these faithful men disprove any rationalization 
that seeks to make all calamities divine punishment for sin.  The problem she finds with 
such rationalization is that it seeks to accuse every sufferer of sinful acts.  For this reason 
she writes: “When calamity comes, unless the Lord indicates plainly that this calamity is 
sent as a punishment of those who are departing from the word of his counsel; unless he 
reveals that it has come as a retribution for the sins of the workers, let every man refrain 
from criticism.  Let us be careful not to reproach any one.”187  
3.  Punishing and Curbing Sin.  The third reason White identifies for pain and  
                                                 
Satan’s assaults on His followers, but the life which is “hid with Christ in God,” the 
enemy cannot destroy. E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 223, 224. 
185
E. G. White, The Acts of the Apostles, 575.  
186
Ibid., 575-577; idem, Patriarchs and Prophets, 155. 
187E. G. White, “Words of Counsel and Encouragement from Sister White,” 
Review and Herald, August 16, 1906. 
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suffering is that some disasters are God’s punishment for sin and limiting the spread of 
sin.
188
  We have already noted that she is against the use of punishment for sin to explain 
every evil occurrence, but it also seems true that she observes some evils to be 
punishment for sin and putting a check on sin.  Her understanding of divine punishment 
is distinct from the general view that every evil occurrence is divine punishment for sin.  
In this distinction, divine punishment for sin during the period of human probation is to 
arouse humanity to the sense of danger and the need to seek for that which is honorable 
and eternal, “to prevent the necessity of visiting judgments upon millions.”189  Referring 
to the Israelites’ apostasy at Sinai, she maintained that had their transgression gone 
unpunished, “the earth would have become as corrupt as in the days of Noah.  Had these 
transgressors been spared, evils would have followed, greater than resulted from sparing 
the life of Cain.  It was the mercy of God that thousands should suffer, to prevent the 
necessity of visiting judgments upon millions.”190  Therefore, the goal of divine 
punishment during this period of human probation is “to save many” from the ultimate 
penalty of sin, eternal death.
191
   
This conception of divine punishment for sin is maintained in her discussion of 
the sins of Miriam, Korah, and Nadab and Abihu.
192
  While White is not prepared to 
                                                 
188E. G. White, “Nature, Lessons from, Contrast of Nature and Man in Obedience 
to God,” Manuscript Releases, 21 vols. (Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White Estate, 
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accept the argument that sin is part of God’s plan to serve divine eternal purposes, she 
maintains that sins such as idolatry and rebellion against God’s authority need to be 
punished and curbed for they are Satan’s schemes aimed at the total destruction of God’s 
creation.
193
  She remarks:  
 It was no less a mercy to the sinners themselves that they should be cut short in 
their evil course. . . . The same spirit that led them to rebel against God would have 
been manifested in hatred and strife among themselves, and they would eventually 
have destroyed one another.  It was in love to the world, in love to Israel, and even to 
the transgressors, that crime was punished with swift and terrible severity.
194
 
Again God punishes and curbs sin and evil because they are destructive.   She 
determinedly affirms that the wrath and love of God are coherent.  In her view, 
lawlessness and insubordination, hatred and strife, and any demoralization that 
jeopardizes the mission to restore creation and to justify the character of God must be 
punished.
195
  God’s wrath is caused by sin, and sinners bring it upon themselves, and it 
can be averted only by repentance.  Thus, for White, God’s dealings with sin and evil are 
a demonstration of divine love and justice.  In other words, God cannot allow evil 
                                                 
193In relation to idolatry she writes: “The moral and intellectual powers are 
benumbed and paralyzed by the gratification of the animal propensities; and it is 
impossible for the slave of passion to realize the sacred obligation of the law of God, to 
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soul becomes a blackened and desolate waste, the habitation of the evil spirits, and the 
‘cage of every unclean and hateful bird.’ Beings formed in the image of God are dragged 
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without just punishment; allowing evil to go unpunished would be a contradiction in 
God’s character.196 
Some significant implications emerge from the discussion on natural evils.  First, 
flowing from the above considerations is the idea that many suffer afflictions for various 
reasons unknown to the observer; hence, pain and suffering seem to be arbitrarily 
inflicted upon people; however, the ultimate goal of evils that God permits to befall 
people is to redeem and restore humanity and the earth, and to justify His character 
before the entire cosmos.  Consequently, she warns about the tendency of evaluating 
divine permission of evil from a human viewpoint.  She seems to suggest that self-
centered assessment leads to disbelief in God.
197
  That is to say, going through pain and 
suffering with a sense of indignation, of outrage, offense, or self-pity does not help in the 
restoration process.  
Second, White held that some evils serve teleological purposes.
198
  But it is 
relevant at this point to comment on the context in which she regards that some evils 
function in that manner.  In her judgment, nature is a divine revelation intended to be 
beneficial to the human race in its growth into the full image of God.
199
  She claims that, 
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Ibid., 617-621. 
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Ibid., 294.  
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Richard Rice argues that White, like Hick, makes evils in nature “beneficial to 
moral growth” (Richard Rice, “The Great Controversy and the Problem of Evil,” 
Spectrum 32 [2004]: 50).  
199From her point of view, “Nature was their lessonbook. In the Garden of Eden 
the existence of God was demonstrated, His attributes were revealed, in the objects of 
nature that surrounded them. Everything upon which their eyes rested spoke to them.  
The invisible things of God, ‘even His everlasting power and divinity,’ were clearly seen, 
being understood by the things that were made” (E. G. White, Testimonies for the 
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although sin has marred creation, nature in its rebellious state bears testimony to the 
Creator God.
200
  In other words, nature is still humankind’s teacher.  Thus, due to its 
present condition resulting from human sin, its lessons are taught with manifestations of 
the harshness found in it.   God does not create or invent evil in order to achieve His 
purpose of redemption and restoration.  In her estimation, God sometimes uses this 
marred creation to punish humanity’s continuous disobedience201 and/or permits Satan to 
unleash his “deadly work of vitiating nature.”202 
Thus, White believes in shared responsibility.  God is responsible for evil because  
                                                 
Church, 8:255). As already pointed out under the discussion on free will, character 
development before sin is not from imperfections to perfections, but advancing already-
existing good faculties. Thus, she makes sure her exposition does not assume the idea of 
imperfection in creation.  According to her, “All his faculties were capable of 
development; their capacity and vigor were continually to increase. Vast was the scope 
offered for their exercise, glorious the field opened to their research. The mysteries of the 
visible universe—the ‘wondrous works of Him which is perfect in knowledge’ (Job 
37:16)—invited man’s study. Face-to-face, heart-to-heart communion with his Maker 
was his high privilege. Had he remained loyal to God, all this would have been his 
forever. Throughout eternal ages he would have continued to gain new treasures of 
knowledge, to discover fresh springs of happiness, and to obtain clearer and yet clearer 
conceptions of the wisdom, the power, and the love of God. More and more fully would 
he have fulfilled the object of his creation, more and more fully have reflected the 
Creator's glory.”     
“But by disobedience this was forfeited. Through sin the divine likeness was 
marred, and well-nigh obliterated. Man’s physical powers were weakened, his mental 
capacity was lessened, his spiritual vision dimmed. He had become subject to death” (E. 
G. White, Education, 15). 
200
E. G. White, Christ's Object Lessons, 24; idem, “Nature Speaks of God,” Signs 
of the Times, December 6, 1905; reprint, The Watchman, November 3, 1908. In these 
passages she indicates that the creation as a lesson book in conjunction with the Bible is 
to bring humanity from darkness unto Him, the Creator of the universe.   
201E. G. White, “Nature, Lessons from, Contrast of Nature and Man in Obedience 
to God,” 3:346.  
202
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He sustains the perpetrators and has given them the opportunity to challenge His 
sovereignty.
 203
  However, moral creatures are responsible for their evil actions.  Satan is 
responsible for the entrance of sin and evil and his cohorts and humanity are responsible 
for their actions as they play their roles in the controversy between good and evil.  
This discussion has shown that through the disobedience of humanity planet Earth 
failed to fulfill the purpose for its creation.  It has become a field for the spiritual and 
physical manifestation of the nature of evil.  Creation has become “red in tooth and claw” 
and human nature degenerated.   This is why, in White, evil is not inherent in creation; all 
evils are the consequences of moral agents’ actions.  It is also for this reason that all other 
intelligent creatures look to planet Earth for the full understanding of the nature of evil.  
In this way, White makes divine dealings with His archenemy twofold: to redeem and 
restore planet Earth and to eradicate sin and evil.  It is this twofold task that we seek to 
understand by making inquiries into White’s perspective of the ministry of Christ.     
 
Ministry of Christ 
 
The discussion in the previous section identified planet Earth as infested with sin 
and evil.  She also points out that God in His eternity foreknew of this unfortunate 
predicament of planet Earth.  Therefore, He conceived a plan, the ministry of Christ, “to 
be wrought out for the blessing not only of this atom of a world but for the good of all the 
                                                 
203
Discussing the final events before the seconding coming of Christ, she writes, 
“God has not restrained the powers of darkness from carrying forward their deadly work 
of vitiating the air, one of the sources of life and nutrition, with a deadly miasma.  Not 
only is vegetable life affected, but man suffers from pestilence. . . . These things are the 
result of drops from the vials of God’s wrath being sprinkled on the earth” (ibid., 391).  
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worlds which God has created.”204  Consequently, in seeking to analyze White’s concept 
of the ministry of Christ, it is important to examine how she employs the ministry of 
Christ to explain the redemption and restoration of planet Earth from sin and evil and the 
eradication of sin and evil.   
Depending on Gen 3, White reveals that Satan immediately recognized his doom 
and need to contend for his assumed sovereignty over the earth as soon as the curse upon 
the serpent was announced, for the curse undoubtedly revealed the redemptive plan and 
the “ultimate defeat and destruction” of sin and evil.205  What this means, for White, is 
that planet Earth had become the designated “battlefield . . . between good and evil.”206  
Therefore, she precedes her discussion of the ministry of Christ with the history of the 
patriarchal eras of the Old Testament, placing emphasis on the role God’s people played 
in preparing the world for Christ’s ministry on earth and Satan’s craftiness in redirecting 
their mission.
207
  She remarks, “Satan had been working to make the gulf deep and 
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In this regard, White identifies the work of God in the lives of individuals such 
as Abel, Seth, Enoch, and Noah.  From White’s perspective, crucial to the unveiling of 
the plan of redemption is the history of Abraham and his descendants, the Israelites.  
Particularly relevant to her discussion of Israel’s history is God’s plan to bring evil to a 
definite end to justify His character.  In her view, the different stages in the history of 
Israel parallel the different stages in the manifestation and fulfillment of the plan of 
redemption.  She makes the calling of Abraham the beginning of setting apart a people 
who will practically make God’s plan known to the world. Thus, the wilderness events 
become preparatory experiences for the Israelites for the task for which they were 
chosen—building faith in God, establishing noble character, becoming acquainted with 
the will of God and knowledgeable custodians of the plan of redemption.  In her desire to 
identify the activities that gradually led to the fulfillment of the redemptive plan, she did 
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impassable between earth and heaven. . . . He had emboldened” the human race in its sin 
in order “to wear out the forbearance of God, and to extinguish His love for man, so that 
He would abandon the world to satanic jurisdiction.”208  Notwithstanding Satan’s cunning 
ways to turn his defeat into victory, in her opinion, God always kept a remnant who 
constantly expected the Messiah, even though their concept of the ministry of Christ was 
distorted.
209
   
For White, the ministry of Christ is more than Christ shedding His blood on the 
cross.  Relying upon the Old Testament tabernacle and its services and other biblical 
passages such as Heb 9:11-28, she observes that there are parallels between two phases of 
Christ’s ministry in the heavenly sanctuary and the priest’s daily ministry and yearly 
ritual in the earthly sanctuary.  Each of these phases of Christ’s ministry occupies a 
period of time.
210
  However, the shedding of innocent blood is necessary for these two 
                                                 
not trivialize the painstaking efforts of Satan to ruin the plan of redemption. She called 
Israel’s rebellion against God’s authority and their idolatry the most successful plan of 
Satan to distract the Israelites from focusing on the prophecies about the mystery of the 
gospel. 
Hence, while not discounting the part that post-exilic Judaism played in the 
fulfillment of the redemption plan, White points out that Satan, through Judaism, caused 
the world to be ignorant about God’s character by turning their worship to legalism. See 
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 125, 290, 293, 368-370; idem, Prophets and 
Kings; idem, The Desire of Ages, 28-29, 35, 115. Her understanding of God’s relationship 
with the people of Israel gives a clear picture of her concept of divine sovereignty, which 
will be analyzed as this discussion proceeds. 
208
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 35. 
209
Ibid., 29-30. 
210
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 357. White’s study of the sanctuary 
service in the Old Testament helps her to establish the reality of the heavenly sanctuary.  
She identified parallels between the services with the ministry of Christ. Particularly she 
recognizes that what happens in the heavenly sanctuary is realized in the church’s 
mission. Thus, Christ’s ministry in heaven affects the mission of the church and His 
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phases of Christ’s ministry.  This seems to be the case when she writes, “As anciently the 
sins of the people were by faith placed upon the sin offering and through its blood 
transferred, in figure, to the earthly sanctuary, so in the new covenant the sins of the 
repentant are by faith placed upon Christ and transferred, in fact, to the heavenly 
sanctuary.”211  Hence, the following section surveys her understanding of Christ’s life, 
death and resurrection, and His ministry in the heavenly sanctuary. 
 
Christ’s life, death, and resurrection.  While many Christologies of the 
nineteenth century focused on the historical Jesus, White emphasized theological 
Christology.
212
  This understanding of White’s position shows up in her discussion on all 
the aspects of Christ’s personal ministry on earth, and His death and resurrection.   
White’s discussion on Christ’s life and ministry is a conscientious effort to 
portray the character of God and its bearing on sin and evil and human life.   
Accordingly, she sees Christ’s life as “an example to us in childhood, youth, and 
manhood”213 and His parables, sermons, and deeds such as healing and casting out 
                                                 
people. For a thorough discussion on White’s view of the parallels between the heavenly 
sanctuary and its ministration and the earthly tabernacle and its services, see Denis 
Fortin, “Ellen G. White’s Conceptual Understanding of the Sanctuary and 
Hermeneutics,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 9 (1998): 160-66.  
211
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 421.  
212
Historical Jesus Christology or sometimes classified as Christology “from 
below,” refers to Christologies that deny the divinity of Christ, see Christ as a religious 
moralist and a reformer who existed in the past. See David Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, 
2nd ed. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1879); Ernest Renan, Life of Jesus, trans. and 
rev. from the 23rd French ed. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1856). Theological 
Christology or Christology “from above” emphasizes two-nature Christology; Christ is 
the pre-existent Word of God, who came down from heaven to save sinners.   
213
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 71. 
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demons as exposure of Satan’s lies about the law and the character of God and an 
illustration of restoring the human race.
214
  This means that Christ was “an offense and a 
perplexity to the prince of darkness.”215   
Reflecting on Christ’s encounter with the devil in the wilderness, White identifies 
Satan’s temptation of Christ on appetite as very important.  She writes, “Just where the 
ruin began, the work of our redemption must begin.”216  It appears that, for White, 
Christ’s victory over this temptation cannot be theologically isolated from Adam’s 
failure.  This means that the plan of redemption would have come to an abrupt end had 
Christ yielded to that temptation.
217
  It also points to the fact that Christ came to “share 
our sorrows and temptations, and to give us the example of a sinless life.”218  Referring to 
scriptural passages, she observes that Christ’s life is in perfect conformity to the law of 
God, which Satan claims cannot be obeyed, “to fill up the measure of the law's 
requirement, to give an example of perfect conformity to the will of God,”  “to magnify 
                                                 
214
See the healing at Bethesda (ibid., 206-207), the cleansing of the leper (ibid., 
266), and restoring the sight of a blind man (ibid., 474-475). 
215
Ibid., 71. 
216
Ibid., 117. 
217While White believes Christ’s victory over the three temptations is important 
and related to the redemption of the human race, the victory of Christ over temptation of 
appetite is pivotal. Appetite was the ground of the temptation of the first human agents.  
She writes, “From the time of Adam to that of Christ, self-indulgence had increased the 
power of the appetites and passions, until they had almost unlimited control. Thus men 
had become debased and diseased, and of themselves it was impossible for them to 
overcome. In man’s behalf, Christ conquered by enduring the severest test. For our sake 
He exercised a self-control stronger than hunger or death. And in this first victory were 
involved other issues that enter into all our conflicts with the powers of darkness” (ibid.) 
See also ibid., 118-131.  
218Ibid., 49. See E. G. White, “A Crucified and Risen Saviour.”  
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the law, and make it honorable,” and “to show the spiritual nature of the law, to present 
its far-reaching principles, and to make plain its eternal obligation.”219     
On the death and resurrection of Christ, White stresses its importance in the 
divine plan of winning the battle between good and evil.  She contends that Christ’s 
suffering and death is not only a cosmic revelatory model—an expression of God’s love 
for the human race, justice and truth,
 220
 but also reconciliatory,
221
 substitutionary,
222
 
propitiatory,
223
 and a vindication of the character of God and His government.
224
  Hence, 
the two natures of Christ, truly human and divine, and His bodily resurrection are 
emphasized.
225
  Christ’s life and death226 reveal the plan of redemption, the true character 
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Matt 3:15 and Isa 42:21. E. G. White, Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing, 
48-49. See Ellen G. White, “The Perfect Law,” Review and Herald, April 5, 1898; idem, 
“Christ’s Attitude Toward the Law”; idem, Education, 76-77. White’s understanding of 
Jesus as our example is different from the socinian, examplarist, and moral-influence 
theories of atonement. Socinian theory was introduced by Faustus and Laelius Socinus in 
their rejection of vicarious satisfaction, arguing that Christ’s death was an example.  The 
moral-influence theory was developed from Peter Abelard’s reaction to Anselm’s 
satisfaction theory by Horace Bushel and Hastings Rashdall.  For details of these 
theories, see Erickson, Christian Theology, 800-806. What makes White’s understanding 
distinctive from these theories is that, in her opinion, it is not Christ’s death that is an 
example, but the life He lived on earth.  
220
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 761-762. 
221
E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 2:201.  
222
E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 753. 
223
E. G. White, Steps to Christ, 13; idem, Selected Messages, 1:237. 
224
The execution of the plan restores the human race into the image of God, based 
on the race’s reception of Christ as their Savior (E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 568, 
762; idem, Christ's Object Lessons 74; idem, Education, 125), reveals the insidious 
claims of Satan to all intelligent beings (idem, That I May Know Him, 361, 367). 
225
For White, the two natures of Christ were combined, yet both maintained their 
distinctive-character. Thus, her concept of the nature of Christ is distinctive from the 
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of God, and the nature of sin to all created intelligences; and His resurrection forever 
establishes the fate of Satan and the fulfillment of the plan for the redemption of the 
human race.
227
   
The points to be derived from White’s concept of the purpose of Christ’s life, 
death, and resurrection are as follows.  First, it is an affirmation that the law of God is 
unchangeable.  She notes, by virtue of the incarnation of Christ and His earthly ministry, 
death, and resurrection, that the law of God cannot be rescinded or changed to yield to 
Satan’s insinuations.228  Second, the immutable nature of the law, which is the expression 
of God’s character, implies that His character is unchangeable.  As a result, she argues 
strongly against the theological idea that the moral law has been nailed to the cross
229
 and 
                                                 
nineteenth-century theories of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Albecht Ritschl that rejected 
the divinity of Christ and the kenoticism of Gottfried Thomasius. For a detailed 
discussion on Ellen White’s concept of the nature of Christ, see Gil Gutierrez Fernandez, 
“Ellen G. White: The Doctrine of the Person of Christ” (Ph.D. diss., Drew University, 
1978); Woodrow W. Whidden, Ellen White on the Humanity of Christ: A Chronological 
Study (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1997).  
226For detailed accounts on Ellen White’s understanding of Christ’s life and death, 
see Denis Fortin, “The Cross of Christ: Theological Differences between Joseph H. 
Waggoner and Ellen G. White,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 14 (2003): 
134-140; David B. Burke, “The Views of E. G. White on Substitutionary Sacrifice of 
Jesus Christ” (Term Paper, Andrews University, 1973); Chandradass Ephraim, “A 
Concept of Atonement in the Light of E. G. Whites [sic] Writings” (M.A. thesis, 
Andrews University, 1979). 
227
E. G. White, Prophets and Kings, 701-702; idem, The Desire of Ages 758-764, 
782. 
228
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 66-67, 70; idem, Mind, Character, and 
Personality, 2 vols., comp. Ellen G. White Estate (Nashville, TN: Southern Publishing, 
1977), 1:248. 
229
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 365; idem, The Desire of Ages, 308, 
762-763; idem, Thoughts from the Mount of Blessing, 49-50; idem, “Christ and the Law,” 
Signs of the Times, July 29, 1886.  
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places emphasis on the possibility of lifelong obedience in the midst of conflict between 
good and evil.
230
   
Christ’s ministry in heaven.  We now turn to White’s consideration on Christ’s 
ministry in the heavenly sanctuary.  It must be kept in mind that she regards the priest’s 
daily ministry and the yearly ritual in the Old Testament sanctuary service as a type of 
Christ’s two-phase ministry in the heavenly sanctuary; the shedding of His blood is 
pivotal for this ministry in bringing the warfare between good and evil to an end.
 231
  In 
other words, we are interested in Christ’s two- phase ministry and its relation to the 
problem of evil.
232
 
The first phase of this ministry of Christ is subtitled the church.  The section seeks 
to understand how this ministry manifests itself in the Christian church in the context of 
                                                 
230“Our duty to obey this law is to be the burden of the last message of mercy to 
the world. God's law is not a new thing. It is not holiness created, but holiness made 
known. It is a code of principles expressing mercy, goodness, and love. It presents to 
fallen humanity the character of God, and states plainly the whole duty of man. ‘Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy 
mind, and with all thy strength.’ This command contains the principles of the first four 
precepts” (E. G. White, “As It Was in the Days of Noah,” 19:182). 
231
While not discounting the value of the cross in the controversy between good 
and evil, White points out that the issues of the controversy must become fully 
manifested to both the human race and angels; the distinction between the two 
governments must be plain before all creatures. She reveals the importance of the event 
of Christ’s death and resurrection in the conflict between God and Satan when she writes, 
“Not until the death of Christ was the character of Satan clearly revealed to the angels or 
to the unfallen worlds.  The archapostate had so clothed himself with deception that even 
holy beings had not understood his principles. They had not clearly seen the nature of his 
rebellion” (E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 758). She also believes the cross broke “the 
last link of sympathy between Satan and the heavenly world,” but the human race needs 
the opportunity to determine their destiny (ibid., 761). 
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the problem of evil.  The second phase is also discussed under the expression eradication 
of sin and evil.  It investigates the effects of the second phase of Christ’s ministry in 
heaven on the problem of evil. 
1.  The church.  According to White, the first phase of Christ ministry, daily 
pleading “His blood in behalf of penitent believers,” is inextricably linked to the mission 
of the church.  In other words, the benefits of Christ’s daily intercession are manifested in 
the mission of the church and the lives of penitent believers.
233
  Therefore, it should not 
come as a surprise that White considers the function of the church to be very important 
for theodicy.   
Explaining the function of the church, White writes, “The church is the repository 
of the riches of the grace of Christ; and through the church will eventually be made 
manifest, even to ‘the principalities and powers in heavenly places,’ the final and full 
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It should be kept in mind that the vocabulary White uses for the structure of the 
heavenly sanctuary and its services is drawn from Leviticus (Old Testament sanctuary 
services) and Heb 8 and 9.   
233
According to White, in every age God has had a people through whom He 
communicates His purpose.  She identifies the people of Israel as a people through whom 
God made Himself known to the world. In her attempt to show the transition between the 
people of Israel and the church, she indicates in her book, The Acts of the Apostles, a 
book devoted to the discussion on the beginnings and mission of the church, that “the 
Jewish leaders [in the time of Jesus] thought themselves too wise to need instruction, too 
righteous to need salvation, too highly honored to need the honor that comes from Christ. 
The Saviour turned from them to entrust to others the privileges they had abused and the 
work they had slighted. God's glory must be revealed, His word established. Christ's 
kingdom must be set up in the world. The salvation of God must be made known in the 
cities of the wilderness; and the disciples were called to do the work that the Jewish 
leaders had failed to do.” Logically, White does not hesitate to point out that the calling 
initiated a new group of people, the church, that God intends to work with to make His 
will known. E. G. White, The Acts of the Apostles, 16.  
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display of the love of God.”234  She implies that the progression of God’s plan of 
redemption and restoration is manifested in the mission of the church.  Hence, emphasis 
is placed on the successes of the church in spreading the gospel of salvation to the world, 
people coming to recognize the reality of the problem of evil and being saved from the 
condemnation of sin and evil.
 235
  However, she sees the church as militant.  She writes, 
“Now the church is militant”; it is “confronted with a world in midnight darkness, almost 
wholly given over to idolatry.”236  “While Christ is sowing the good seed, Satan is 
sowing the tares.  There are two opposing influences continually exerted on the members 
of the church.  One influence is working for the purification of the church, and the other 
for the corrupting of the people of God.”237  It seems to her that the militant condition of 
the church demonstrates the intensity and the reality of the problem of evil.   
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Ibid., 9. See also ibid., 122, 163, 600.  
235
She believes the successes of the church are reached with the help of the Holy 
Spirit and angels.  In her view, the Holy Spirit is the third Person in the Trinity who took 
the place of Christ on earth. Ibid., 36-56. He is the one who witnesses to sinners and 
convicts and converts them if they willingly accept His witness. He makes “effectual the 
salvation wrought by the death of our Redeemer” (ibid. 52) and dwells in the hearts of the 
regenerated individuals, granting them enabling power to overcome the cunning schemes 
of the devil and “all hereditary and cultivated tendencies to evil and to impress His own 
character” (E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 670-671, 805).  The holy angels serve as 
messengers, sending messages to heaven and bringing blessings upon the children of 
God, and as ministers, tending to the needs of God’s chosen people. Idem, Christ’s 
Object Lessons,  331-332; idem, The Acts of the Apostles, 79-80, 133-135, 145-148, 434-
435, 527. 
236
E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 8:42. White’s understanding of the 
church as militant is distinct from that of other nineteenth-century figures such as 
Friedrich Schleiermacher who suggested that within the church, there is the visible and 
invisible church. This concept is related to the doctrine of election. Albrecht Ritschl also 
argued that the church is the kingdom of God.  
237Ellen G. White, “The Remnant Church Not Babylon,” Review and Herald, 
September 5, 1893, 2.  
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White relies on the history of the church to support her view of Christ’s work of 
commanding the mission of the church and Satan’s work against and from within the 
church to intercept the mission of the church.  She refers to the early history of the church 
until the time of Constantine to point out how Satan and his followers insinuated bigotry, 
prejudice, hatred, and persecution to destroy Christianity at its early stages.
238
  Similarly 
she observes that the union between Christian and pagan teachings, during the dark ages, 
is the work of Satan.  “That gigantic system of false religion is a master piece of Satan’s 
power—a monument of his efforts to seat himself upon the throne to rule the earth 
according to his will.”239  However, God raised up people groups and individuals (the 
Waldeness, pre-reformers, Reformers, and Protestants) to advance the mission of the 
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E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 39-42.   
239
Ibid., 50. A historian, relying on the apostolic fathers, mentions that “on the one 
hand [Satan and his demons] inspire Roman Officialdom to persecute Christians, and on 
the other hand they seduce Christians to abandon the true faith, to fall into schism and 
heresy.” Norman Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons (New York: Basic Books Publishers, 
1975), 66. According to White, paganism became the controlling spirit in the church; and 
Satan, working through unconsecrated leaders of the apostate church, made the bishop of 
Rome the head of the church.  He was declared infallible and given the title the “Lord 
God the Pope.” White explains that, for the leaders of the church to conceal the papal 
usurper’s authority, they conspired to prohibit the circulation of the Bible for centuries in 
order to establish the authority of the papal usurper. Only priests and prelates interpreted 
the Bible to sustain their pretensions. They sought to make changes to the Ten 
Commandments; the Sabbath worship was changed from Saturday to Sunday. The second 
commandment was disregarded by introducing the adoration of images and relics, long 
pilgrimages, acts of penance as works of atoning for sins. The idea of the immortality of 
the soul was introduced into church doctrines, which gave way for the development of 
several others, such as the invocation of saints, the Virgin Mary adoration, purgatory, and 
the doctrine of indulgences. The leaders also supplanted the Lord’s Supper with the 
idolatrous sacrifice of mass (ibid., 49-60). See Raoul Dederen, “The Church,” in 
Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: 
Review and Herald, 2000), 568, for a further discussion on the monarchical episcopacy.  
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church and to emancipate the church from her apostasy.
 240
 The massacre and 
excruciating treatment of these men and women of faith were Satan’s activities through 
the church to hinder the divine plan to overcome evil.
241
  Again she notes that the French 
Revolution, which incapacitated the authority behind the church’s persecuting activities, 
had Satan’s force behind it; it waged “war against God and His holy word as the world 
had never witnessed.”242  Through the Revolution Satan massacred Protestants, burned 
Bibles, abolished institutions of the Bible, and renounced the worship of God by 
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Her discussion of the Reformation includes the forerunners, John Wycliffe, 
John Huss, and Jerome, who prepared the way for the Protestant Reformation. Martin 
Luther in Germany, Huldreich Zwingli in Switzerland, Jacques LeFevre, Guillaume 
Farel, Louis de Berquin and John Calvin in France, and later reformers such as John 
Tyndale, John Knox, and John Wesley in England and Scotland (E. G.White, The Great 
Controversy, 79-288). White is very selective in writing about the Reformation. She 
writes, “I have endeavored to select and group together events in the history of the church 
in such a manner as to trace the unfolding of the great testing truths that at different 
periods have been given to the world, that have excited the wrath of Satan, and the 
enmity of a world-loving church, and that have been maintained by the witness of those 
who ‘loved not their lives unto the death’” (ibid., xi). See Denis Fortin, “The French 
Reformation and John Calvin in Ellen White’s Book Great Controversy,” in Ellen White 
and Current Issues Symposium, vol. 5, ed. Merlin Burt (Berrien Springs, MI: Center for 
Adventist Research Center, 2009), 79-94. 
241White’s discussion is a reference to various activities that church historians 
have sometimes classified as the Inquisition, Crusades, and the Thirty Years War. See E. 
G. White, The Great Controversy, for a detailed discussion on such activities. In his book 
Europe’s Inner Demons, Cohn discovered that the persons whom the church allegedly 
considered as heretics, persons who persistently denied monarchial Episcopal doctrines, 
were deemed to be in Satan’s service and were condemned to death. Inquisitorial 
procedure was instituted to combat heretics (Cohn, Europe’s Inner Demons, 16-74). For a 
detailed discussion on all the historical events mentioned in relation to the church, see 
Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, 8 vols. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 
1949-1957). 
242
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 273.  
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introducing the worship of the goddess of reason.
243
  This means that Satan’s attacks on 
God’s people were meant to cause disillusionment about God and cause the last spark of 
divine love for humanity to die.
 244
  However, God overruled the activities of Satan to 
prove to the world He will not forsake His church and her mission.  Those who fled from 
persecution spread the message of Protestantism wherever they found refuge.  The 
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Ibid., 273-277. Some scholars of the nineteenth-century came to a similar 
conclusion with White on the revolution.  See François-René de Chateaubriand, Essai sur 
les Révolutions; Génie du Christianisme, annotated by Maurice Regard (Paris: Gallimard, 
1978); James Bicheno, The Signs of the Times (London: J. Adlard, 1808); James 
Winthrop, A Systematic Arrangement of Several Scripture Prophecies Relating to 
Antichrist: With Their Application to the Course of History (Boston: Thomas Hall, 1795). 
For sources on the revolution and its relation with the church, see E. G.White, The Great 
Controversy, 688-689. William S. Peterson contends against White’s exposition on the 
Bible and the French Revolution. He argues that the sources White depended on for her 
discussion are unreliable and she mishandled the sources. William S. Peterson, “A 
Textual and Historical Study of Ellen G. White’s Concepts,” Spectrum 2 (1970): 57-69. 
After a critical analysis of the sources in question, John W. Wood, in response to 
Peterson’s criticism of White’s discourse on the Bible and the French Revolution, 
concludes that the “sources were not poor ones nor were they mishandled.” He continues, 
“Not only is the study of the sources valid if, and only if, it proceeds along the stated 
criteria which Mrs. White used, but that a study of this one particular chapter should 
assume that it does not purport to be a history of the French Revolution. . . . Viewed in 
this light the author’s intended exposition of Revelation eleven . . . examines the 
relationship between France’s rejection of the Reformation, the resultant and long 
continued social ills, and the consequent Revolution. Repeatedly and in many different 
ways the author showed that this was her only purpose” (John W. Wood, “The Bible and 
the French Revolution,” Spectrum 3 [1971]: 55-72).   
244
Rice is of the opinion that White’s explanation of the problem of evil must be 
classified as a “luciferous theodicy.” Richard Rice, “The Great Controversy and the 
Problem of Evil,” 49.  Battistone also acknowledges the stress White puts on the presence 
and purpose of Satan in the world. However, according to him, White is “not . . . a grim 
pessimist.” Battistone, The Great Controversy Theme in E. G. White’s Writings, 113. We 
may observe that she emphasizes Satan’s work alongside God’s work because it 
conspicuously discloses the theme of the great controversy and its nature; she does so to 
distinctively emphasize her conviction that good will ultimately conquer evil.  It also 
exposes the issue of the controversy.  Furthermore, it puts emphasis on the nature of evil 
and its originator.  Finally, it arouses people’s minds to the importance of being 
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separation of the English Puritans from the Church of England opened the way to 
religious freedom.  The establishment of Bible societies on the European and American 
continents led to printing and a wide circulation of the Bible, and the work of foreign 
missions increased in an attempt to spread Christianity.
245
  In brief, the first phase of 
Christ’s ministry in heaven unveiled the nature of the problem of evil.  On the one hand, 
those who accept Christ as the solution to the problem of evil have constant access to 
heaven.  They obtain forgiveness of sins, they are reconciled to God, Christ imputes His 
righteousness on them, and their names are written in the book of life; and God’s 
character emerges unassailable to intelligent creatures.  On the other hand, Satan’s 
insidious principles of sin and evil are discerned by intelligent creatures.  Given this 
understanding of the first phase of Christ’s ministry in heaven and its effects on the 
problem of evil, it remains to be seen what the second phase of Christ’s ministry in 
heaven accomplishes in relation to the problem of evil in the next section on the 
eradication of sin and evil.    
2.  Eradication of sin and evil.  According to White, in 1844 the first phase of 
Christ’s ministry in heaven ended and the second phase began.246  She classifies this 
second phase of Christ’s ministry in heaven as an atonement.  White writes, “In the 
service of the earthly sanctuary . . . when the high priest on the Day of Atonement entered  
the most holy place, the ministration in the first apartment ceased. . . . So when Christ 
entered the holy of holies to perform the closing work of the atonement, He ceased His 
                                                 
acquainted with a knowledge of God and to alert them about the schemes Satan uses in 
distracting their attention from the truth.  
245
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 287-288; 289-293. 
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ministration in the first apartment.  But when the ministration in the first apartment 
ended, the ministration in the second apartment began.”247  Thus it is not Christ’s work of 
intercession that has ended, but His ministration in the first apartment of the heavenly 
sanctuary.  He moved into the second apartment to add on another duty to His 
intercession in behalf of sinners.  Hence, in her view, sinners who are willing to be 
redeemed from the problem of evil have access to heaven through Christ in the second 
apartment of the heavenly sanctuary. 
In the light of her understanding of the typical sanctuary service, she notes: 
 By virtue of the atoning blood of Christ, the sins of all the truly penitent will be 
blotted from the books of heaven.  Thus the sanctuary will be freed, or cleansed, from 
the record of sin. . . . Christ's work for the redemption of men and the purification of 
the universe from sin will be closed by the removal of sin from the heavenly 
sanctuary and the placing of these sins upon Satan, who will bear the final penalty.
 248
 
Thus, for White, the atonement is a process that cleanses the sanctuary, 
accomplishes the full reconciliation of the universe to God, and extermination of sin and 
evil.  According to her the process consists of two steps.
249
   
The first step, which White categorizes as investigative judgment,
250
 focuses on 
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See ibid., 410-422, for her detailed discussion on the establishment of the year.  
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Ibid., 428-429.  
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249
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 480. 
250“He [Christ] comes to the Ancient of Days in heaven to receive dominion and 
glory and a kingdom, which will be given Him at the close of His work as a mediator. It 
is this coming, and not His second advent to the earth, that was foretold in prophecy to 
take place at the termination of the 2300 days in 1844. Attended by heavenly angels, our 
great High Priest enters the holy of holies and there appears in the presence of God to 
engage in the last acts of His ministration in behalf of man—to perform the work of 
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all the professed people of God.  In her opinion, in this step the deeds of all professed 
people of God, beginning from the dead and continuing to the living, are examined in the 
heavenly books against the standard of God’s law.  On the one hand, the sins of the truly 
penitent are blotted out and their union with Christ is reaffirmed and their names remain 
in the book of life.  On the other hand, false believers and those who gave up their 
relationship with God are sifted and blotted out from the book of life.
251
  “While the 
investigative judgment is going forward in heaven . . . there is to be a special work of 
purification, of putting away of sin, among God’s people upon earth.”252  In her view, by 
the end of this step, “the destiny of all will have been decided for life or death.  Probation 
is ended . . . Christ declares: ‘He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is 
filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous let him be righteous still: and he that 
is holy, let him be holy still.’”253  
On the other hand, Satan resorts to compromise to work against the professed 
people of God.  He induces “Christians to ally themselves . . . with those who, by their 
devotion to the things of this world, had proved themselves to be as truly idolaters as 
were the worshipers of graven images.”254  In this context, she perceives that the 
aftermath of this plan of Satan will be a replica of the condition of the church during the 
dark ages.  The union, therefore, will bring Protestant churches and secular institutions 
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under the leadership of papal supremacy at the end of time.
 255
  According to White, the 
united body in its attempt to solve problems which arise because of the neglect of God’s 
commandments
256
 will accuse the few who will not join the union of “disaffection toward 
the government,”257 reinforce the Sunday Sabbath law, and then persecute those who 
recognize God as supreme and worship on the Saturday Sabbath.
258
  Here, she makes 
Sabbath worship a major issue at the close of the controversy.   
                                                 
255Relying on scriptural passages, Rev 12:17; Rev 13, White observes that Satan’s 
last scheme will be to use the church as a medium to unite the world under one umbrella. 
She believes that Satan makes it easy for papal supremacy to unite the Protestant 
churches under her leadership by causing its members to be indifferent through 
indulgence of appetite and self-gratification, weakening individuals’ mental, physical, 
and moral powers, introducing heretical teachings to their taste and capacities, enticing 
them with spiritualism, and undermining the integrity of the Bible through human 
theories and scientific facts. See ibid., 445, 520-521; 531-550, 563, 566, 573, 588. “The 
fallen angels who do his bidding appear as messengers from the spirit world. While 
professing to bring the living into communication with the dead, the prince of evil 
exercises his bewitching influence upon their minds” (ibid., 552, 556). For more details 
on the union between Evangelicals and Catholics, see Charles W. Colson, “Evangelicals 
and Catholics Together: The Christian Mission in the Third Millennium,” First Things 43 
(1994): 15-22; Editorial, “The Gift of Salvation,” First Things 79 (1998): 20-23. 
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The fact that Sabbath worship is an issue is evident in that White argues that at the 
close of Christ’s intercessory ministry in heaven a clear distinction would be made 
between Sunday and Saturday Sabbath keepers.  Inferring from the story of Jacob, she 
asserts that Satan will accuse Saturday Sabbath keepers “on account of their sins,” and 
“the Lord permits him to try them to the uttermost.”  Yet, without Christ’s intercession, 
they will prevail for their characters have been sanctified.
259
  She also mentions that 
God’s wrath will descend upon the wicked for uniting in seeking to oppress and destroy 
His people.
260
  In the midst of warfare between good and evil, Christ’s Second Coming 
takes place.  
White makes Christ’s Second Coming an important part of the second phase of 
His ministry in heaven.  She regards the second advent as an event that will be visible and 
audible, sudden and cataclysmic, glorious and triumphant, and also personal and 
literal.
261
  On the basis of several scriptural passages, she affirms that at the Second 
Coming of Christ many will be raised from the dead.
262
  On the one hand, those dead in 
                                                 
259
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 618, 621.  
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She bases her argument on these biblical passages, Rev 14:9, 10; 16:2-6. Ibid., 
627-628.  
261“Between the first and the second advent of Christ a wonderful contrast will be 
seen. No human language can portray the scenes of the second coming of the Son of Man 
in the clouds of heaven. He is to come with his own glory, and with the glory of the 
Father and of the holy angels. He will come clad in the robe of light, which he has worn 
from the days of eternity. Angels will accompany him. Ten thousand times ten thousand 
will escort him on his way. The sound of the trumpet will be heard, calling the sleeping 
dead from the grave. The voice of Christ will penetrate the tomb, and pierce the ears of 
the dead, ‘and all that are in the graves . . . shall come forth’” (Ellen G. White, “The 
First and the Second Advent,” Review and Herald, September 5, 1899, 1, emphasis 
added). 
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Christ will be resurrected with perfect and incorruptible bodies; the faithful living at His 
return will also be changed and together they will be endowed with immortality.
263
  She 
also argues that they will be taken to heaven to spend the millennium there.
264
  On the 
other hand, the wicked, including the few who were resurrected at Christ’s second 
coming,
265
 are put to death for a thousand years and the earth left desolate.  She contends 
that at this point Christ will place the sins of all the redeemed on Satan in the presence of 
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Throughout church history, there have been various views on millennialism. 
There are three main views of millennialism: amillennialism, postmillennialism, and 
premillennial. Amillennialism takes different forms, but common to all the forms is the 
belief that the thousand years are symbolic and it represents a perspective upon the 
history of the church. Others believe the millennium is a period between Christ’s first and 
second coming, a period when Satan cannot stop the spreading of the gospel. 
Postmillennialism holds that the millennium is a period in which the gospel power will be 
influential on every nation and kindred, resulting in the establishment of a millennial 
reign on earth as evidence of Christ’s victory over evil. After this, Christ returns to 
establish His eternal Kingdom.  Premillennialism implies that Christ returns to earth 
before the millennial reign.  However, there are two categories of those who believe in 
premillennialism, dispensational and nondispensational premillennialism. Dispensational 
premillennialism is a belief that the millennial reign is a period when Christ will 
personally rule the earth from Israel; all the Old Testament prophecies and promises 
concerning Israel will be fulfilled within the millennium. Nondispensational 
premillennialism is the belief that the millennial reign follows the second coming of 
Christ. Adventists understand it to refer to a thousand-year reign of saints in heaven while 
the earth is left desolate. For a thorough discussion on the millennium see Peter M. van 
Bemmelen, “The Millennium and the Judgment,” Journal of the Adventist Theological 
Society 8 (1997): 150-160; Eric Claude Webster, “The Millennium,” in Handbook of 
Seventh-day Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and 
Herald, 2000), 927-946; Erickson, Christian Theology, 1211-1224. White is among those 
who believe in nondispensational premillennialism.  
265White believes that at the second advent of Christ “‘they also which pierced 
Him’ . . . those that mocked and derided Christ’s dying agonies, and the most violent 
opposers of His truth and His people, are raised to behold Him in His glory and to see the 
honor placed upon the loyal and obedient” (E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 637). 
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God and the entire host of heaven; “he will be declared guilty of all the evil which he has 
caused them to commit” and confined to the desolate earth.266  
The second step in the atonement process, according to White, begins after Christ 
takes the redeemed to heaven.  The redeemed “in union with Christ” will investigate the 
deeds of the wicked, including Satan and the fallen angels, “comparing their acts with the 
. . . Bible, deciding every case according to the deeds done in the body.”267  This step also 
determines the punishment of the wicked.  This judgment ends after the millennium when 
Christ returns the second time to earth to execute the judgment set off against the 
wicked.
268
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Ibid., 657-658. It is quite obvious that, for White, before the controversy comes 
to an end all issues of the conflict between Christ and Satan would have become clear and 
a line of demarcation will have been drawn between true and false religions, in spite of 
Satan’s effort to deceive every intelligent creature about God and his government. She 
argues that Satan has perverted true religion into witchcraft and sorcery, the cornerstone 
of ancient idolatry.  She observes that these practices, which are based on necromancy, 
are Satan’s effort to affirm his deception in Eden. Satan cannot accrue followers through 
centuries without modifying his scheme; therefore, she concludes witchcraft and all 
forms of ancient idol worship in the Dark Ages are embraced under the term spiritualism. 
She remarks, “It is true that spiritualism is now changing its form and, veiling some of its 
more objectionable features, is assuming a Christian guise. But its utterances from the 
platform and the press have been before the public for many years, and in these its real 
character stands revealed. These teachings cannot be denied or hidden.”    
“Even in its present form, so far from being more worthy of toleration than 
formerly, it is really a more dangerous, because a more subtle, deception. While it 
formerly denounced Christ and the Bible, it now professes to accept both. But the Bible is 
interpreted in a manner that is pleasing to the unrenewed heart, while its solemn and vital 
truths are made of no effect” (E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 558, emphasis hers). 
While she recognizes that Satan adulterates religion in every historical era, she observes 
that true religion has always existed.  It is also clear that no one can survive Satan’s 
schemes without the ministry of Christ.  
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Thus, White recognizes a third advent of Christ to earth and a resurrection of all 
the wicked.  According to her, at the end of the millennium Christ returns with the 
redeemed, angels, and the New Jerusalem.  “As He descends . . . He bids the wicked dead 
arise to receive” their punishment.  Then Satan and his cohorts, beholding Christ and His 
entourage, prepare to attack them.
269
  At the same time, before all who ever lived on 
earth, Christ is crowned.
270
  He then executes the judgment written against the wicked.  
They will be destroyed “not by water but by fire.” 271  “Some are destroyed as in a 
moment, while others suffer many days. . . . In the cleansing flames the wicked are at last 
destroyed, root and branch—Satan the root, his followers the branches.”272   
Hence, her model of how God will eradicate sin and evil is annihilation.  This is 
because she believes that at the end of the controversy between good and evil, the 
righteous will be rewarded with immortality and the wicked with second death.  Based on 
Gen 3, White asserts that humanity’s endless existence depended on the continuous 
partaking of the tree of life, but the disobedience of the first humans deprived them and 
their posterity of the access to the tree of life.
273
  While, the “consequence of Adam’s sin 
passed upon the whole human race,” through Christ “life is the inheritance” of all who 
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will repent from their perversity in spite of the problem of evil.
 274
  This means 
immortality is conditional.
275
  This is an express disavowal of the Platonic concept of 
immortality of the soul,
276
 which is propagated by paganism and much of Christendom.
277
  
She sees conditional immortality as the central biblical principle that corrects the delusion 
introduced into the world by Satan in Eden.
278
   In this sense, she describes death as a 
sleeplike condition, with no consciousness, that is interrupted only by the resurrection.
279
 
Given that her understanding of annihilation is by fire, it would be correct to infer that 
she also rejects the notions of her day relating to annihilation, self-destruction as a natural 
consequence of sin.
280
   
However, there seems to be a tension between White’s understanding of 
annihilation and biblical passages that describe the punishment of the wicked as 
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endless.
281
  But, upon further reflection on her concept of conditional immortality, it 
becomes clear that, for White, everlasting punishment of the wicked is not endless 
suffering in a burning fire.   Rather it is a total destruction in a consuming fire that burns 
until there is nothing left; it is an exclusion from the universe and the presence of God.  
“The fire that consumes the wicked purifies the earth.  Every trace of the curse is swept 
away.  No eternally burning hell will keep before the ransomed the fearful consequences 
of sin.”282  The punishment of the wicked is not eternal but the consequence of their 
complete destruction remains eternal.
283
  This is why she remarks, “One reminder alone 
remains: our Redeemer will ever bear the marks of his crucifixion. Upon his wounded 
head, upon his side, his hands and feet are the only traces of the cruel work that sin has 
wrought. . . . God's original purpose in the creation of the earth is fulfilled as it is made 
the eternal abode of the redeemed.”284 It is, therefore, evident that she makes the ministry 
of Christ pivotal in the restoration of planet Earth and the vindication of God’s character, 
in the conflict between good and evil.
285
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Summary and Conclusion 
 
The chapter has analyzed White’s model of warfare theodicy.  It began with a 
brief biography of White and a survey of her writings on her great controversy model of 
warfare theodicy.  Her intention in proposing her model was to “present a satisfactory 
solution of the great problem of evil.”286  
To understand her model, the analysis focused first on her theories of free will, 
divine foreknowledge, and divine sovereignty.  The relevance of these theological 
concepts in any theodicy is how well the author coordinates them in explaining the 
problem of evil.  In White, free will is libertarian and a gift bestowed on intelligent 
creatures.  It is not just the ability to choose from alternatives, but also the potential to 
know and understand moral laws and fulfill moral obligations.  Free will does not possess 
its full potential as a result of sin.  Consequently, God provides initial grace to every 
individual.  Agents’ free choices determine their destiny, but “there is no true excellence 
of character apart from Him [Christ].”287  
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Enlightenment friends, with our animist, Buddhist, and Moslem friends. Indeed, the Bible 
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White describes divine foreknowledge as exhaustive and definite.  The content of 
divine foreknowledge includes actual and possible free choices and the results of His plan 
of salvation.  Typically, this affirmation of the classical traditional view of divine 
foreknowledge and libertarian free will is incoherent.  But such tension is averted by 
defining predestination, which is divine eternal activity, as a plan of redemption and 
makes Christ the only provision for the solution to the problem of evil.  Foreknowledge is 
neither grounded in predestination nor vice versa.   
We may observe that she adopts a view of divine sovereignty whose structure and 
use fits her overall understanding of libertarian free will and divine exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge.   God is a moral being and a Father who rules over His creatures through 
permissive, limitative, preventive, directive, and controlling wills expressing His 
goodness to individual persons and His creation as a whole.  Prayer is also described as a 
human activity, but God has made it necessary in His sovereignty over His creatures.   
Prayer is a channel through which humans communicate their thoughts, feelings, and 
wants to God.  It is efficacious, but it does not inform God about human needs in order 
for Him to provide.  Rather, prayer is a demonstration of human willingness to receive 
the purpose of God.  
These observations have significant implications for understanding White’s model 
of warfare theodicy.  Since created intelligent beings possess libertarian free will, sin is 
the misuse of libertarian free will and evil is its consequence.   Lucifer, now Satan, is 
identified as the first intelligent creature who misused his free will; however, the cause of 
Lucifer’s misuse of his free will, according White, is a mystery.  He later deceived the 
human race to follow suit.  Thus, the problem of evil may not be understood apart from a 
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correct understanding of agents’ free will.  The misuse of libertarian free will has the 
effect of making sin and evil intruders into God’s good creation.  As a result, evil did not 
co-exist eternally with God and it was not inherent in nature.   Every evil occurrence is 
rooted in the moral agents’ rebellion.  Consequently White recognizes that there are two 
kinds of evil, moral and natural evils, but does not treat them separately.  On the one 
hand, White describes the antagonistic forces in nature as acquired characteristics 
resulting from human disobedience to divine law.  The continuous human disobedience 
to God’s laws and Satan’s activities exacerbate the degeneration of the human race and 
deterioration found in creation.  On the other hand, some evil occurrences are permitted 
for teleological purposes such as punishing and curbing sin, shaping character, and 
proving some individuals’ loyalty to God.  This is because she considers nature as a 
lesson book.  
Similarly, by virtue of the divine ability to foreknow the future exhaustively and 
definitely, God had a plan to deal with sin and evil.  White argues that planet Earth and 
Christ serve the purpose of demonstrating God’s response to Satan’s accusations.  The 
importance of planet Earth in the divine purpose explains why White rejects evolution 
and geological theories of her time for the biblical perspective of creation ex-nihilo in six 
literal, consecutive days.   However, she recognizes planet Earth’s failure to reach the 
purpose for which it was brought into existence.  This means God foreknew Satan’s 
deception and the human fall and made provision to ultimately redeem and restore planet 
Earth and eradicate sin and evil.  It is in this context that Christ, His life and ministry on 
earth, death and resurrection, and heavenly ministry are considered as crucial in human 
history.  
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Through her model of divine sovereignty, she shows how Christ steadily moves 
toward the achievement of His purpose of redeeming and restoring planet Earth and 
exterminating sin and evil, in spite of human free will rejection and Satan’s opposition to 
Christ’s ministry.  
In general terms the analysis has revealed in some detail what was only apparent 
at the surface of White’s model of warfare theodicy.  Sin is disobedience to God’s law 
and its consequence is evil.  It originated in heaven with the misuse of the free will of an 
angelic being.  Though it is not part of God’s purpose, God permitted Satan to advance 
his principles for the benefit of all intelligent beings who do not yet comprehend the true 
nature of sin and evil.  This cosmological nature of her understanding supports her 
coordination of all the theological elements in her model of theodicy.  Thus she presents a 
coherent theodicy.  First, she holds that God’s foreknowledge of what sin will do to His 
creation did not prevent Him from achieving His purpose of creating intelligent beings, 
but He devised a plan to solve the problem of sin and evil.  Second, the formulation of the 
plan did not predestine any intelligent being, but God knows the extent of what the plan 
can accomplish; its fulfillment does not coerce the free choices of moral agents.  Third, 
individual intelligent beings benefit from the divine plan of redemption from sin and evil 
when they respond to divine sovereign providence.  Thus the divine solution to the 
problem of evil respects libertarian free will. 
However, the question of this study remains.  Is this model of warfare theodicy 
plausible?  How has it dealt with the difficulties that the three traditional theodicies 
encountered?  To answer this question, chapter 5 compares and evaluates the two models 
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of the warfare approach to the question of an omnipotent, omniscient, and all good God 
and the existence of evil analyzed in chapters 3 and 4 of this study. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
EVALUATION OF THE TRINITARIAN WARFARE AND THE 
 
GREAT CONTROVERSY THEODICIES 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The discussions in chapters 3 and 4 have sought to bring clarity to the warfare 
models of Boyd and White.  In this chapter, the feasibility of the warfare theodicy is 
ascertained.  To attain this purpose of the chapter, it is crucial to compare the two models 
of the warfare theodicy to discover elements that are similar and those that differ, and to 
establish the relationship between them.  In addition to the comparison of the two models 
of the warfare theodicy, this chapter explores whether the warfare model escapes the 
difficulties regarding the three main Christian responses to the problem of evil as 
discussed in chapter 2.  Hence, this section is divided into two main parts: comparison 
and evaluation. 
 
Trinitarian Warfare and Great Controversy 
Theodicies: A Comparison 
 
This section of the chapter focuses on the comparison between the Trinitarian 
Warfare and Great Controversy Theodicies.   The descriptive analyses of these theodicies 
in chapters 3 and 4 show some similarities and differences.  However, these noticeable 
parallels and discrepancies may be only apparent rather than real, due to differences in 
context, approach, and use of terminology.  Therefore, it is necessary to undertake the 
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task of an appropriate analytical comparison.  
 
Similarities  
 
Origin of Sin and Evil 
 
There are similarities in the discussion of Boyd’s and White’s concept of the 
origin of sin and evil.  First, both are convinced that any feasible explanation of the 
problem of evil must assume warfare between good and evil.  They attribute the origin of 
sin and evil to the misuse of libertarian free will by angelic beings, which happened some 
time before the creation of this present Earth.  In other words, they propose models of a 
free will theodicy in the context of warfare.  Both regard the disobedience of created 
beings as that which led to the prehistoric warfare between good and evil.
1
  Second, both 
rely on Gen 1-3 to explain the origin of sin and evil on planet Earth.  Boyd describes a 
restored earth as part of God’s response to His rebellious creatures, while White describes 
the creation of planet Earth as part of God’s dealings with sin and evil.  They maintain 
that sin and evil entered planet Earth through the misuse of the libertarian free will of  
human beings.
2
  Both theologians regard sin and evil as an intrusion into God’s 
established order and Satan as the prince of the rebellion.
3
 
                                                 
1
The use of the word prehistoric does not mean the event is mythological or not 
concerned with history. It is rather used in the sense of Boyd’s usage of prehistoric. 
Prehistoric means an event that “lies outside what we can by ordinary means know about 
history, and thus outside our ordinary definition of ‘history.’” Yet “it does not lie outside 
the sequence of events that bracket our history” (Boyd, God at War, 326n32).  
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Boyd, God at War, 165, see pp 144-154 for Boyd’s argument against “demonic-
in-Yahweh” theory, a theory that claims God is the author of evil; E. G. White, “The 
Words and Works of Satan Repeated in the World,” Signs of the Times, April 28, 1890.  
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Natural Evil 
 
One of the difficult issues of the problem of evil is natural evil.  Some Christian 
responses to the problem of evil either excuse it or deny its existence.
4
  Boyd and White 
perceive a detailed treatment of natural evil as crucial to any acceptable Christian 
response to the problem of evil.  Therefore, their models of warfare theodicy explain the 
reality of natural evil.  For Boyd, the misuse of the neutral medium of relationality by the 
human family and Satan produce some natural evils.  Similarly, White argues that natural 
evil originated as the result of the disobedience of the first humans and its excessiveness 
is caused by humans’ continuous disobedience to God and Satan’s activities.  Neither 
Boyd nor White considers natural evil as an issue unrelated to moral evil.  All evil, 
according to them, results from the misuse of free will.  They also reject the 
generalization of natural evil as divine punishment for moral evil. 
 
Victory over Sin and Evil   
 
Boyd’s and White’s concepts of victory over sin and evil are comparable in that 
they discuss Christ as the ultimate resolution to the problem of sin and evil.  Boyd 
describes the refashioned earth as God’s attempt to barricade sin and evil, but due to 
human disobedience Christ was made the solution to restore creation and exterminate sin 
and evil.  White similarly mentions that God, in His eternity, foreknew the failure of 
planet Earth, then planned, with Christ, a ransom for sin and evil.  Both authors agree on 
the accomplishments of Christ’s earthly ministry, His death, and resurrection.  In addition 
to their emphasis on Christ’s personal ministry on Earth, they acknowledge the church as 
                                                 
4See chapter 2, the section “Three Main Theodicies.”  
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an institution that participates in Christ’s mission of saving people by manifesting 
Christ’s ministry to the rest of the world.   
Boyd and White also recognize the work of Satan to intercept Christ’s mission to 
redeem the fallen world.  White, more than Boyd, traces the history of the church from its 
beginnings, identifying the enemy’s insidious activities against the redemption and 
restoration of the fallen world.  But both emphasize that, in spite of the enemy’s 
relentless effort, he will be crushed and destroyed.
5
 
 
Differences  
 
Free Will 
 
Boyd and White acknowledge that moral agents possess a libertarian free will.  
However, they understand this free will differently.  Boyd ascribes self-determined 
freedom to God.  He asserts that God had a choice to create agents either with or without 
the ability to love.  God chose to create agents with the ability to participate in His love.  
Since love must be chosen, libertarian free will is a metaphysical corollary of God’s 
decision to create agents with the ability to love.
6
  He suggests that the inevitable effect 
of God’s decision manifests itself in humans on two levels:  The first phase, which is 
self-determined will, is finite, irrevocable, metaphysically probational, and its duration 
and extent differ from person to person.  This is because self-determined free will is 
conditioned individually by our original constitutional design by the Creator, divine 
influence, the agents’ previous decisions, and decisions of other agents.  He also makes 
                                                 
5
Boyd, God at War, 222-227; E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 61-78.   
6
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 53. 
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this level of moral agents’ free will assume a presuppositional status to which all his 
theological elements of his theodicy must be made consistent.  It seems then that, in 
Boyd, libertarian free will is the framework of his theodicy.  For example, having 
established the nature of free will on the basis of divine love, Boyd defines divine 
foreknowledge based on his concept of free will.
7
  The second phase is when our self-
determined actions have determined our being.
8
  For Boyd, the will is generally 
“intrinsically and essentially immortal and indestructible.”9     
Contrary to Boyd, White suggests that free will is neither immortal nor 
indestructible.  There is a time limit for exercising free will in choosing between God and 
Satan, but she does not indicate the time limit for the free will to change from one phase 
to another.  For her, any deformity of the will is the result of sin.
10
  While God’s salvation 
will restore human free will from its sinful conditions to God’s intended purpose, free 
will may remain a self-determined will as long as any created intelligent beings lives.  
Free will is one of the non-negotiable themes in her theodicy, but she does not seek 
consistency of biblical concepts with free will.
11
  White understands that free will is an 
endowment from God, in that she correlates free will with the divine preference for 
                                                 
7
Ibid., 91.  
8
Ibid., 53-55, 189.  
9
Ibid., 343.  
10
E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 80.  
11
See chapter 4, the section “Free Will.”  
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voluntary service,
12
 which emphasizes divine freedom to choose whether or not to endow 
His creatures with free will.   
 
Divine Foreknowledge 
 
Boyd and White agree that divine omniscience includes foreknowledge of the 
future.  However, their models propose different understandings of divine 
foreknowledge.  This is evident in their differing ways of solving the theological tension 
between libertarian free will and divine foreknowledge.
13
  Boyd solves the theological 
tension by denying divine foreknowledge of actual free will future actions.
14
  When 
explaining biblical predictions of individual future actions, he takes a Calvinist approach; 
God foreknows what He has predetermined and He orchestrates events to see to the 
fulfillment of what He has predetermined.  Furthermore, God took a risk in creating, 
given that He lacked foreknowledge of actual future decisions of intelligent creatures.
15
  
Hence, the content of God’s foreknowledge is what He has predetermined and the 
possibilities of future free will actions.  As a result, according to Boyd, divine 
foreknowledge is exhaustive because God foreknows all possibilities, but His 
foreknowledge is not definite. 
On the other hand, White proposes divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  For 
her, foreknowledge is a divine activity performed in eternity.  Its contents may have 
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E. G. White, Patriarchs and Prophets, 49.  
13See chapter 3, the section “Divine Foreknowledge,” and chapter 4, the section 
“Divine Foreknowledge.”  
14
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 59-60.  
15
Ibid., 91.  
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influenced God to predestine Christ as a ransom for the human race.  Thus, divine 
foreknowledge and divine predestination are two related but different divine activities 
performed in eternity.  In her view, the contents of divine foreknowledge include 
foreknowledge of all the possibilities, actual future choices of created intelligent beings, 
and the actual results of His own plans.  Based on this understanding of divine 
foreknowledge and the divine decision to create in spite of his foreknowledge of future 
free will choices and the rebellion, war, suffering, horror, and pain it will cause, it is clear 
that White would agree with Boyd that God took a risk when He created.  But she 
believes that, in spite of divine foreknowledge of the cruelties that the human race would 
inflict upon His Son, He sent Christ to redeem His creation.  Thus, contrary to Boyd, 
White affirms that God took the risk based on the certainty of His foreknowledge of the 
outcome of His decision.
16
   
 
Divine Sovereignty 
 
Both Boyd and White reject the traditional understanding of divine sovereignty
17
 
and opt for a concept of divine sovereignty which in their opinion is compatible with 
their model of human free will and divine foreknowledge.  They affirm that God’s 
rulership over His creation does not coerce, but rather persuades His human and angelic 
creatures’ free will.  Nevertheless, they differ on how God achieves His purpose and the 
role of prayer in divine sovereignty.    
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See chapter 4, the section “Divine Foreknowledge.”  
17
The traditional concept of divine sovereignty is the belief that God meticulously 
controls every occurrence in human history. See Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 
146-148. 
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According to Boyd, the nature of free will and prayers condition divine 
providence over His creation.  For him, God achieves His plan by limiting the scope of 
some individuals’ freedom, orchestrating some circumstances, and pulling individuals 
into His self-purposed plan.
18
  According to Boyd, since God’s foreknowledge of future 
free will decisions is not certain, prayer informs God about agents’ needs and future free 
will choices.
 19
   
White acknowledges that certain things would not have happened without prayer, 
but prayer does not inform God.  It brings individuals and/or groups of people closer to 
God in a manner that gives God a free hand to lead them.  It is a means by which God 
accomplishes some of His will.  She also proposes that God rules over human history 
through direct and indirect activities.  
Sin and Evil  
 
The origin of sin and evil    
 
While Boyd argues that love must be freely chosen, White asserts that service to 
God and fellow creatures must be done voluntarily.  In other words, both concepts of free 
will assume the possibility of saying no to God’s ideal.  That means that sin and evil 
existed as a possibility before it was actualized in God’s creation.  Hence, they argue that 
sin and evil originated as a result of misuse of free will.  On the one hand, Boyd argues 
that sin and evil began on prehistoric earth.
 
 He integrates ancient Near Eastern literature 
and biblical passages to establish his explanation of the origin of sin and evil.  As a result, 
angels, in collaboration with their subjects, prehistoric earthly creatures, misused their 
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Boyd, God of the Possible, 33-48. 
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free will by disobeying God.
20
  On the other hand, White argues that sin and evil 
originated in heaven.  For her, it was an angel who sought his selfish interests by 
claiming the prerogatives of Christ and influenced a third of the angelic population to 
follow his lead.
21
  It seems to Boyd that the divine response to the rebellious creatures 
took the form of battling the evil forces, refashioned the present earth from the remains of 
the battle, and subjugated and domesticated monstrous creatures who survived the war.    
White, by contrast, makes it clear that God could have destroyed Lucifer at the 
beginning of His rebellious accusations.  However, since the rest of the angels did not 
understand Satan’s principles, the destruction of Lucifer at the early stages of his 
rebellion would have introduced fear and other intelligent creatures would have served 
God out of fear.  According to her, such service would have been contrary to God’s 
nature.  Rather than destroying His rebellious creature, God permitted Lucifer to develop 
his principles,
22
 and created an idyllic paradise without death, disease, sin, and evil as 
part of His response to Lucifer. 
 
Natural evil    
 
Boyd’s model and White’s model of sin and evil are contrasted further in that they 
differ in their understanding of natural evil.  Concerning the origin of natural evil, Boyd’s 
assertions make some natural evils inherent in nature.  For example, the assertions that 
(1) the present earth “is birthed as it were, in an infected incubator”; (2) God subjugated 
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Ibid., 211-220, 226-240. 
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Boyd, God at War, 177; E. G. White, The Truth about Angels, 49.  
21See chapter 4, the section “The Origin of Sin and Evil.”  
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and domesticated the surviving potent forces of a prehistoric battle at creation;
23
 and (3) 
the genuineness of free will intelligent creatures requires an objective environment which 
stands over and against them.  In other words, the environment “stands over and against” 
the desires of free will agents.
24
   
White, on the other hand, sees all natural evils as originating with the sin of moral 
agents.
25
  She regards the imperfections in nature as acquired characteristics, as the result 
of human disobedience.  The degeneration in the human race and deterioration in nature 
are due to the work of Satan and humankind’s choice to follow him. 
While both see the sweeping statement that natural evil is punishment for sin as 
ridiculous and skewed, Boyd believes Christ’s death cancelled the use of natural evil as 
punishment, but White believes natural evil is used to occasionally punish and put a 
check on the spread of sin and evil.  God permits Satan to inflict pain and suffering in an 
attempt to call the attention of the human race to the horrific nature of sin and its 
consequences and to stress their need to seek the Redeemer.  In other words, God allows 
evil to befall His people for character development and to prove the loyalty of His 
followers.  
                                                 
22E. G. White, “The Mystery of God.”  
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Boyd, God at War, 107, 98.  
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Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 425.  
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Ellen G. White, Conflict and Courage, comp. Ellen G. White Estate 
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Victory over Sin and Evil  
 
Another disparity between Boyd’s and White’s concepts of sin and evil is their 
discussion on divine victory over sin and evil.  First, Boyd and White see the creation of 
planet Earth and the provision of Christ as a Savior as God’s responses to evil forces.  
However, Boyd’s discussion is set in the context of creation from the debris of warfare 
between God and evil creatures; in other words, the beginning of this present earth is 
itself altogether good, but not a pristine creation.
26
  On the contrary, White’s discussion is 
set in the context of a good creation without sin and evil.
27
   
Second, with regard to Christ as the ultimate solution to sin and evil, both Boyd 
and White emphasize that Christ’s earthly ministry, death, and resurrection demonstrate 
Christ’s victory over cosmic evil forces.  However, they note that sin and evil still reign 
on earth and argued that, through the church, Christ is militant against the powers of 
darkness.  For Boyd, the main purpose of Christ’s death and resurrection is to exorcise 
Satan and establish the Kingdom of God.  Having accomplished this He is enthroned on 
the right hand of God upon His ascension to heaven until His enemies are made His 
footstool.
28
  This seems to show that Christ’s redemptive and restorative work of His 
creation was completed with His resurrection.
29
  By contrast, for White, Christ’s 
ascension bridges the gap between His work on the cross and His ministry as a high 
                                                 
26
Boyd, God at War, 106, 107.  
27E. G. White, “The Purpose and Plan of Grace.” 
28
Boyd, God at War, 243.  
29Apart from Boyd’s emphasis on Christ’s exalted position, nothing more is said 
about what Christ does or what His enthronement encompasses. This may be the 
consequence of understanding the centrality of the atonement as the conquest of Satan.   
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priest.  His enthronement at the right hand of the Father signifies that there is no need for 
another sacrifice; Christ’s sacrifice is enough for the redemption of the sinful race.  
However, the work of salvation is not complete until the blood shed on the cross is 
brought into the Most Holy Place before the altar of God.  Hence, according to White, 
Christ is not only a King, but also a High Priest in the heavenly sanctuary.  She describes 
Christ’s heavenly ministry as being in two phases.  During the first phase of Christ’s 
function as the high priest in the heavenly sanctuary, He ministers on behalf of all who 
accept His atoning sacrifice.  This phase is inextricably related to the mission of the 
militant church.  In her opinion, the period between Christ’s victorious resurrection and 
the extermination of sin and evil is an opportunity for human beings to reconsider their 
choices while the issues of the warfare become fully manifested.
30
   
According to White, in 1844 Christ began His ministration of the second phase of 
His heavenly ministry in addition to His activities in the first phase.  In the first part of 
this second phase of His ministry in the heavenly sanctuary Christ investigates the deeds 
of all His professed followers and performs a special work of purification of the faithful.  
This phase ends with Christ coming for His faithful followers.  In the second part of the 
second phase of His ministry in the heavenly sanctuary, Christ, together with the 
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According to White, “by shedding the blood of the Son of God, he [Satan] had 
uprooted himself from the sympathies of the heavenly beings. Henceforth his work was 
restricted. Whatever attitude he might assume, he could no longer await the angels as 
they came from the heavenly courts, and before them accuse Christ's brethren of being 
clothed with the garments of blackness and the defilement of sin. The last link of 
sympathy between Satan and the heavenly world was broken.”   
“Yet Satan was not then destroyed. The angels did not even then understand all 
that was involved in the great controversy. The principles at stake were to be more fully 
revealed. And for the sake of man, Satan's existence must be continued. Man as well as 
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redeemed, investigates the deeds of the wicked and ends with their execution of the 
punishment on the wicked.        
The third and most conspicuous difference in their concept of victory over sin and 
evil is how God will eradicate or isolate evil from or within the cosmos.  Based on his 
conviction of the immortality of the free will, Boyd resorts to a theory that resulted from 
a rapprochement of eternal suffering and annihilationism.  In his view, since the soul is 
innately immortal, free will endures eternally and both the wicked and the righteous will 
live eternally in separate realities.
31
  The righteous live eternally with all the qualities of 
free will, but the wicked free will endures outside the reality of the righteous eternally; 
the content of their free will choices will be nothingness and they will be denied a neutral 
medium of relationality.
32
  Thus, God leaves the wicked to their choice to separate 
themselves from Him.  Since exercising free will is possible in the context of a neutral 
medium of relationality, lack of it means that the wicked will not have influence among 
themselves in their reality.  In contrast, White regards immortality as a gift to those who 
are loyal to God.  Therefore, she objects to universalism and eternal suffering in hell.  
                                                 
angels must see the contrast between the Prince of light and the prince of darkness. He 
must choose whom he will serve” (E. G. White, The Desire of Ages, 761).   
31
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 326, 343.  
32“When reality becomes exhaustively defined by the triune love, the fact that 
certain wills choose to curve in on themselves will remain, but the content of what they 
choose will be nothing to all outside themselves. Only the fact of their choice has reality, 
for only this is consistent with God’s love.  They endure, to be sure, but as infinitely 
small points that do not interact with those who are real. Indeed, since the only real thing 
about these wills who say no to God’s yes is their negatively defined choice, they could 
be real to people in the eschatological kingdom only in a way similar to the way 
antimatter is real to people today.  They theoretically exist but are never experienced. 
They are beings whose entire existence is swallowed up by a hypothetical reality that 
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She is convinced that all biblical passages concerning the future of the wicked suggest 
annihilation.  Hence, she argues that the wicked will be annihilated and the earth will be 
purified, but the righteous will be exempted from the consuming fire.
33
  
The degree of contrast between these two models of warfare theodicy requires a 
brief investigation into the cause of the disparity.  Hence, the following discussion 
examines the reason for the differences between the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great 
Controversy theodicies. 
 
Reason for the Differences 
 
The above comparison of the two models of warfare theodicy shows similarities 
but also a substantial variety of distinctive differences between them.  For an explanation 
for the similarities between the two theodicies, one may suggest that both models of 
warfare theodicy deal with the same biblical theme.  Another rationale may be argued, on 
the basis of Boyd’s comments on White and her Conflict of the Ages Series34 and the eras 
in which they present their theodicies, that White’s works on warfare might have 
                                                 
used to be possible but is no longer so” (Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 346, 
emphasis his); see pp. 347-357.  
33See chapter 4, the section “Eradication of Sin and Evil.”  
34“Though her thinking lies somewhat outside the parameters of traditional 
orthodox Christianity, and though her method is highly subjectivistic and unscholarly, it 
should be noted that Ellen White, the founder of the Seventh-day Adventist movement, 
integrated a warfare perspective into the problem of evil and the doctrine of God perhaps 
more thoroughly than anyone else in church history” (Boyd, God at War, 307, endnote 
44). 
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influenced Boyd.  However, the extent to which the Conflict of the Ages Series affected 
Boyd could not be ascertained.
35
    
Regarding the differences, one can suggest a variety of possible reasons.  
However, this study has identified their differing outlooks toward the place of scientific 
and philosophical knowledge as a fundamental cause of the differences between 
Trinitarian Warfare and the Great Controversy theodicies.  Boyd and White affirm the 
ontological and epistemological status of Scripture as a revelation of God and the final 
arbiter of truth.  However, in formulating their theodicies, they differ on how other 
sources influence the interpretation of Scripture.   
Boyd finds that Christian beliefs are full of paradoxes; therefore he sought to 
harmonize them while making them appealing to the modern mind.  In his opinion, 
theology must come to grips with the modern advances of science if it is to have an 
intelligible witness to the contemporary world.  As a result, he proposes a dialogue 
between theology and science to protect Christian faith by making it intelligible to the 
contemporary culture.  He also acknowledges that scientific knowledge is always 
changing, and interpreting Scripture in the light of scientific findings implies that biblical 
truth changes with time.  He then opens theology to the contributions of the 
contemporary scientific mind-set, using the distinctions between theology and science to 
help free theology from false biblical interpretations.
36
  However, in the process, he 
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In my e-mail correspondence with Boyd, an effort was made to ascertain the 
extent to which the Conflict of Ages Series may have influenced him, but he avoided the 
issue. 
36
Boyd clearly states that his method for his warfare theodicy is “Wesley’s 
methodological quadrangle of scripture, reason, experience and tradition as the criteria 
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compromises the indispensable normativeness of Scripture by making philosophical and 
scientific ideas the framework that inevitably controls the interpretation of Scripture.  In 
other words, he allows contemporary science to superimpose its conclusion upon 
Scripture.    
Similarly, White calls for a dialogue between theology and science.  In her 
opinion, God is revealed in His word, in Christ, and in His works of creation.  She also 
believes that the distinctions between theology and science help free both theology from 
biblical misinterpretations and science from false scientific principles and ideologies.  
Thus, theology influences science and science influences theology, which provides a 
common ground of controlling beliefs and concepts.  Contrary to Boyd, she makes 
Scripture the framework of her warfare theodicy.  It is the norm for interpreting both the 
special and general revelations of God, and science serves as a resource.
37
  This is evident 
                                                 
for theological truth. . . . Because this is a work in philosophical theology, reason will 
play a more dominant role than it would if this were a work in biblical theology” (Boyd, 
Satan and the Problem of Evil, 20). Therefore, he, Boyd, melds classical theism 
(influenced by Newtonian scientific philosophical principles) and neo-theism (influenced 
by contemporary scientific philosophical ideologies). 
37“God is the author of science. Scientific research opens to the mind vast fields 
of thought and information, enabling us to see God in His created works. Ignorance may 
try to support skepticism by appealing to science; but instead of upholding skepticism, 
true science contributes fresh evidences of the wisdom and power of God. Rightly 
understood, science and the written word agree, and each sheds light on the other. 
Together they lead us to God by teaching us something of the wise and beneficent laws 
through which He works” (E. G. White, Counsels to Parents, Teachers, and Students, 
426). She believes literary sources play a role in theology. She writes, “As the moon and 
the stars of our solar system shine by the reflected light of the sun, so, as far as their 
teaching is true, do the world’s great thinkers reflect the rays of the Sun of 
Righteousness. Every gleam of thought, every flash of the intellect, is from the Light of 
the world” (idem, Education, 14). However, she is of the opinion that literary sources are 
not to be brought to test the Bible, rather they are to be tested by the Bible (idem, 
Selected Messages, 3:307-308; idem, “Be Separated,” Review and Herald, November 20, 
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in her constancy in affirming the Scripture interpretation where scientific and 
philosophical ideas conflict with Scripture.  Thus, under no circumstance does she 
superimpose the conclusions of science upon Scripture.  
The effects of the foregoing differing approach to their theology are manifested in 
their models of warfare theodicy on several theological elements.  Having established the 
nature of free will on the basis of philosophy, Boyd redefines other theological elements 
in light of his theory of the nature of free will.  In other words, in formulating his 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, all other elements are understood in light of his concept of 
libertarian free will.  For White, all theological elements must be understood in light of 
the nature of God revealed in Christ.  Certainly, Boyd’s concept of free will is based on 
divine love; therefore, it could be said that his theological elements are understood in the 
light of the nature of God.  However, he does not thoroughly follow biblical thinking in 
the interpretation of theological elements of his Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.  His 
concept of God is influenced by both classical theism and by process philosophy.
38
  He 
                                                 
1894). See Pfandl, “Ellen G White and Earth Science,” 176-194; Hasel, “Ellen G. White 
and Creationism,” 229-244. 
38
Boyd states the role that process philosophy plays in his theological thinking 
when he writes: “Exponents of a process world view have by and large seen it necessary 
to reject the Church’s understand [sic] of God as antecedently actual and social within 
Godself and hence ontologically independent of the world. They have thus rejected the 
traditional doctrine of the Trinity. Defenders of the Church’s faith, on the other hand, 
have seen it necessary to simply reject the process world view, believing, quite rightly, 
that the understanding of God as triune, and hence as being independent of the world, is 
central to everything Christianity is about. When this doctrine is rejected, or radically 
redefined, everything that is distinctly Christian about the Church’s faith is 
compromised.”  
“This work is, in essence, an attempt to work out a trinitarian-process metaphysic 
which overcomes this impasse. It is our conviction that the fundamental vision of the 
process world view, especially as espoused by Charles Hartshorne, is correct. But it is our 
conviction as well that the scriptural and traditional understanding of God as triune and 
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uses his concept of God as justification for redefining theological elements, which 
according to him have the influence of the Greek philosophical concept of timelessness 
reality.  Boyd is right to argue that classical theology is based on the Greek philosophical 
concept of timeless.  But for him to base his theology on process philosophy makes his 
theology a servant of process philosophy and leaves him with some of the flaws found in 
process philosophy.   
This major difference is reflected in their models of divine foreknowledge, divine 
sovereignty, divine predestination, origin of evil, natural evil, and eradication of sin and 
                                                 
antecedently actual within Godself is true, and is, in fact, a foundational doctrine of the 
Christian faith. But, we contend, these two views, when understood within a proper 
framework, do not conflict.” 
“Indeed, it shall be our contention that Hartshorne’s a priori process metaphysics, 
when corrected of certain misconstrued elements, actually requires something like a 
trinitarian understanding of God to make it consistent and complete! What results, we 
trust, is the outline of a metaphysical system which establishes, on an a priori basis, a 
process review of the world which requires a trinitarian God for its completion” (Boyd, 
Trinity and Process, preface, emphasis his). However, Boyd later denies this influence by 
arguing that “some evangelical authors have wrongly accused open theists of being close 
to process thought, but in truth the two views have little in common.” Among other 
things, process theology holds that God needs the world. He could not have existed 
without it. It also denies the omnipotence of God” (Boyd, God of the Possible, 31, 170). 
Discussing open theists’ denial of the influence of process philosophy on open 
theism, Fernando Canale remarks, “Open view theologians seem to forget that 
theologians usually modify the philosophical thought on which they build. For instance, 
classical theologians adjusted the general ontological patterns suggested by Plato and 
Aristotle for their theological purposes. In other words, they took Greek ontology as their 
basis and adjusted it to fit Christian revelation. . . . Theologians engage, then, in creative 
philosophical reflection, which produces the macro hermeneutical principles they will 
explicitly or implicitly assume when interpreting Scripture and formulating the doctrines 
of the church” (Fernando Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a 
Biblical Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?” Journal of 
the Adventist Theological Society 12 [2001]: 30). Thus, Boyd’s basis for denying the 
influence of process philosophy on his theology cannot be substantiated. The difference 
between Boyd’s and Hartshorne’s metaphysics does not cancel out the influence 
Hartshorne has on Boyd’s theological thinking pattern. 
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evil.  Thus, one can account for their major differences on the basis of their differing 
outlook toward the place of science in theology. 
 
Trinitarian Warfare and Great Controversy  
Theodicies:  An Evaluation 
 
The disparity revealed from the preceding comparison demands a careful 
evaluation of the theodicies of Gregory A. Boyd and Ellen G. White.  Such an 
examination focuses on the contributions that each model makes to theodicy and on 
internal coherency and consistency of each of the two models of warfare theodicy.  In 
addition to the internal criticism, the procedure employed to define the models, 
implications, and assumptions on which their respective positions seem to rest is taken 
into consideration.  Although this section is not an exercise in biblical exegesis, exegesis 
is incorporated when necessary. 
 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
 
Boyd’s contribution to theology lies in his intent to articulate Christianity to the 
contemporary culture in an intelligible language.  He depends on comments made by 
Kent Knutson and Marjorie Suchocki to identify the challenges of Christian faith in a 
culture in which reality is understood through categories of relationship and process.
39
  
Relying on David Tracy, Boyd also presupposes that the change in the understanding of 
reality requires Christianity to “find new vehicles of expression to articulate, in a manner 
intelligible to its contemporary world, the revelatory truth of the Word which it has heard 
and continues to hear anew.  The church must correlate the revelatory content which 
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grounds it with the new categories . . . which are increasingly conditioning contemporary 
thought.”40  Throughout his writings, Boyd displays this intent of making theological 
concepts understandable and acceptable to the contemporary cultural demands.  He has 
constantly managed to be faithful to his intentions in a creative and profound way. 
In his book, The Hermeneutical Spiral, Grant R. Osborne argues that, in 
formulating Christian doctrine, in addition to the Scriptures, tradition, community stance, 
experience, and philosophy play an important role.
41
  Thus, Boyd needs to be 
commended for incorporating all these principles in the process of formulating his model 
of warfare theodicy. 
He emphatically renders the biblical warfare view philosophically coherent with 
the present war zone of our world, and maintains constancy in addressing issues relating 
to the problem of evil.  With great communication skills and ingenuity, he creates an 
awareness of warfare between God and Satan among the people of his readership.  It is 
not startling when Donald A. Carson remarks that “a great deal of his exposition of the 
warfare theme is insightful, helpful and interesting.  Moreover, some Christians do 
tumble into static fatalism that they mistake for active faith, and in so far as Boyd helps 
them escape from such a morass, I am grateful.”42 
In a similar vein, Christopher A. Hall, in his review of Satan and the Problem of 
Evil, demonstrates his appreciation of Boyd’s work by stating that  
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 one does not need to accept the openness model to be thankful to Boyd for 
deepening our awareness of the broader supernatural context of life lived between the 
times.  The contemporary church lives in a war zone, and much of the suffering and 
evil that human beings experience becomes more coherent when viewed against the 
backdrop of Satan’s continuing attempt to disrupt God’s redemptive purpose.43 
But the general positive assessment of Boyd’s theodicy, in terms of its ingenuity 
and tenaciousness in his presentation, does not necessarily imply the correctness and 
soundness of every element of his theodicy.  Such an evaluation calls for the task of 
critical examination of the coherency and the consistency of his Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy.  The remainder of this section focuses on the assessment of the origin of the 
fall and evil, natural evil, and eradication of sin and evil as formulated by Boyd. 
 
Origin of Sin and Evil   
 
In discussing the difficulty in finding solutions to the problem of evil, James L. 
Crenshaw remarks, “Mystery certainly abounds, but it should not stifle intellectual 
curiosity, especially in the face of existential doubt.”44  Consequently, Boyd’s effort to 
explain the general fact of evil, as well as particular evil occurrences, is a move in the 
right direction.  Notwithstanding his significant contribution to iterate the early church 
fathers’ teaching on evil angels into contemporary theology, there are several problematic 
aspects with his theory of the origin of the fall and evil.   
Boyd coherently describes the origin of evil both in prehistoric creation and  
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Donald A. Carson, “Review of God, the Bible and Spiritual Warfare, by 
Gregory A. Boyd,” Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society 42 (June 1999): 258.  
43Christopher A. Hall, “Openness Season,” Christianity Today, February 2003, 
90-91. 
44
James L. Crenshaw, Defending God: Biblical Responses to the Problem of Evil 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 195.  
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historic earth, featuring a warfare motif.  We have seen that his conception of the origin 
of evil assumes a theory, restoration theory, which is different from the traditional 
understanding of an originally perfect creation.
45
  However, he contends that the 
authenticity of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy does not depend on the restoration 
theory.  He acknowledges that the traditional reading of the creation narrative is possible 
to accommodate cosmic warfare,
46
 but, according to him, the traditional reading of Gen 1 
contradicts the findings of geologists and paleontologists about the duration and violent 
nature of the earth before humans arrived on the scene.  Thus, without the restoration 
theory of creation, Boyd’s purpose of making the Christian concept of cosmic warfare 
between good and evil understandable and acceptable to the contemporary cultural 
demands would be defeated.  Bruce Kenneth Waltke has mentioned that the restoration 
theory of creation makes sense of the role of Satan, which otherwise is a mystery.
47
  As a 
result, the restoration theory is of great advantage to Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.  
However, it is argued by some scholars that the biblical narrative of creation gives no 
evidence of God forming planet Earth through conflict combat with sinister creatures.
48
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Boyd, God at War, 100-113.  
46“I am by no means claiming that this handling of the creation-conflict stories in 
Scripture is the only way to handle them. Nor would I want to invest too much weight in 
such a speculative matter. . . . The Bible’s warfare understanding of evil remains intact 
even if the restoration understanding of Genesis 1 is rejected and the creation-conflict 
passages of Scripture are taken to be completely mythological (viz., lacking a temporal 
reference to an actual primordial battle)” (ibid., 113).   
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Bruce K. Waltke, Creation and Chaos: An Exegetical and Theological Study of 
Biblical Cosmogony (Portland, OR: Western Conservative Baptist Seminary, 1974), 20-
21.  
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David Toshio Tsumura, Creation and Destruction: A Reappraisal of the 
Chaoskampf Theory in the Old Testament (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2005); John 
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Erickson argues that the restoration theory creates a lot of exegetical difficulties.
49
   
David Toshio Tsumura’s investigation of the etymology and usages of various key terms 
and expressions in the biblical narrative of the creation story shows no evidence of a 
primordial battle between God and evil forces.
50
  Furthermore, Frederick F. Bruce, in a 
                                                 
H. Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 
2009); John H. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative: A Biblical-Theological 
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1992).  
Scholars like Sjoerd Lieuwe Bonting argue that creation from chaos was affirmed 
by the Christian community until the end of the second century, when Christians turned 
to the concept of creatio ex-nihilo to combat Marcion’s and the Gnostics’ conception of 
creation from pre-existing evil (Sjoerd Lieuwe Bonting, Chaos Theology: A Revised 
Creation Theology [Ottawa, Canada: Novalis, 2002], 14-15). Others, such as Tsumura 
and John R. Rice, contend that Hermann Gunkel was the first to advocate a creation 
narrative in the Bible as creation through combat chaotic matter (Tsumura, Creation and 
Destruction, 2; John R. Rice, In the Beginning . . . : A Verse-by-Verse Commentary on the 
Book of Genesis, with Detailed Studies on Creation vs. Evolution, the Flood 
[Murfreesboro, TN: Sword of the Lord Publishers, 1975], 39-40). In his article, 
“Influence of Babylonian Mythology upon the Biblical Creation Story,” Herman Gunkel 
argued that the biblical story of creation is a moderated version of the Babylonian myth, 
the Enuma Elish. Consequently, Gen 1-2:4a describes creation through combat with 
already-existing matter (Herman Gunkel, “Influence of Babylonian Mythology Upon the 
Biblical Creation Story,” in Creation in the Old Testament, ed. Bernhard W. Anderson 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 28-51.  
49
Erickson, Christian Theology, 407.  
50
Tsumura, Creation and Destruction, 196.  Like other proponents who support 
the restoration theory of creation, Boyd’s support for the theory is based on the 
expression tōhû wābōhû, and the words thôm bārā and ʿāśâh, hāy thāh, and kābāš found 
in Gen 1. But, with the exception of kābāš, Tsumura’s study of the etymology and usages 
of these words and their associated terms in other related languages shows  no evidence 
of evil forces, but desert and uninhabited matter in Gen 1: 1-2 which is made productive 
and habitable with inanimate and animate objects in Gen 1:3ff.  However, Boyd may be 
right when he argues that the word kābāš connotes suppression. See Hebrew and English 
Lexicon of the Old Testament with an Appendix Containing the Biblical Aramaic (BDB) 
based on the lexicon of William Gesenius (1952), s.v. “שׁבכ”; John N. Oswalt, “ןַחָבּ,” 
Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 1:430, A Concise Hebrew and 
Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (1988), s.v. “שׁבכ.” On the other hand, the biblical 
usage presupposes a stronger party as the subject and a weaker party as the object of 
kābāš. Therefore, the use of kābāš in Gen 1: 28 does not necessarily imply sinister forces 
as the object of kābāš. See S. Wagner, “שׁבכ,” Theological Dictionary of the Old 
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debate with P. W. Heward, points out that the appeal to Jer 4:23-26, Isa 34:11, 45:18 in 
support of a chaotic state in Gen 1:1-2 is “impossible on both philosophical and 
theological grounds.”51   
Crucial to this discussion is John Walton’s analysis of Gen 1:1-2.  Walton 
contends that the word translated beginning in Genesis is used to introduce a period of 
time.  Thus, he suggests that Gen 1:1 is an introduction to the seven-day period of 
creation rather than a point in time before creation.  This understanding of Gen 1:1 is 
supported with the statement that the heaven and the earth were finished in Gen 2:1.  
Rather than being a description of formless and empty chaos of a previously ravaged 
creation, Gen 1:1-2 is a description of an uninhabited condition—unnamed, not yet 
separated, unproductive matter.  In his view, the treatment of the words tōhû and bōhû in 
technical literature indicates that Gen 1:1-2 conveys the idea of nonexistence—not yet 
functioning in an ordered system.  It is true that Boyd also describes the precondition of 
creation as unnamed matter, but in Boyd the uninhabited matter is by virtue of divine 
combat with sinister creatures.  Walton’s view on Gen 1:1-2 contradicts Boyd’s 
                                                 
Testament (1984), 7:52-57. Thus, the language and literary style of Gen 1 can hardly be 
seen as evidence for creation from initial chaos. Sailhamer, The Pentateuch as Narrative, 
82-96. 
51
Frederick F. Bruce, “And the Earth Was Without Form and Void: An Enquiry 
into the Exact Meaning of Genesis 1, 2,” Journal of the Transactions of the Victoria 
Institute 78 (1946): 13-37, quoted in Waltke, Creation and Chaos, 24. The use of Jer 
4:23-26 and Isa 34: 11 in support of the restoration theory is based on an incorrect 
assumption that the earlier authors borrowed from the later authors, therefore transposing 
the context of these passages to Gen 1.  See Tsumura, Creation and Destruction, 22-35. 
Logically, it is the later writers who borrow expressions from former writers, not vice 
versa. 
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understanding of the passage.
 52
  In Boyd, Gen 1:1 is a description of pre-historic earth, 
Gen 1:2 is an indication of a battle between God and His creatures of Gen 1:1, and Gen 
1:3 ff. is refashioned from the remnant matter of the combat.   
Another exegetical difficulty that arises from the use of the restoration theory of 
creation is the use of chaoskampf passages as evidence of warfare in Gen 1:2. Tsumura 
emphasizes that “the biblical poetic texts that are claimed to have been influenced by the 
chaoskampf–motif of the ancient Near East . . . in fact use the language of storms and 
floods metaphorically and have nothing to do with primordial combat.”53  Walton asserts 
that the principal element of the pre-creation condition, primordial sea, is personified and 
can be “perceived in an adversarial role.” Yet, these same ancient Near Eastern literatures 
describe the before picture of creation as the absence of productivity of the gods.  Thus, 
an absence of function implies that the precondition of creation is not a chaotic battle.
54
  
Randall W. Younker also points out that, while the biblical chaoskampf passages are 
evidence of cosmic conflict, there is no indication of such a battle in Gen 1.
55
  Boyd 
himself acknowledges these limitations of restoration theory and suggests that it should 
not be raised to the level of a doctrine.  His use of it in constructing warfare theodicy, in 
spite of his acknowledgment of the flaws, creates some inconsistency in his theodicy.   
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First, Boyd’s use of restoration theory with libertarian free will in establishing the 
origin of evil creates inconsistency.  His view of libertarian free will allows that evil is a 
possibility.  Specifically, God’s purpose for creating is to have agents participate in His 
love.  Based on logic and Scripture, Boyd shows that libertarian free will is a necessary 
condition for true love.  Therefore, God had given agents the libertarian freedom to say 
yes or no to His love.  Thus, free will implies potential good and evil; at the beginning of 
present earth’s history, evil was a possibility.  On the contrary, the restoration theory, 
according to Boyd, means that some time before this present earth, God created out of 
nothing.  But this pristine creation became evil.  God battled this evil creation and then 
refashioned our present earth from the remains of the battle by subjugating and 
domesticating the evil forces that survived the battle.  Thus, evil is inherent in this present 
earth.
56
  Sjoerd Lieuwe Bonting observes that one striking factor of reordering from a 
conflict chaos condition is that evil is an inherent characteristic of creation.
57
  Is Boyd 
being consistent here when, on the one hand, he argues that evil is a potentiality and, then 
on the other hand, that creation is birthed in an infested incubator?  Boyd may ward off 
this ambiguity if he should argue that the origin of evil in the prehistoric earth is the 
result of agents’ misuse of free will.  And evil existed in this present earth because it is 
“birthed in an infested incubator,” evil matter.  But as his concept of the origin of sin and 
evil stands now, it is inconsistent.   
Second, the difficulty with his concept of the origin of evil is a twin problem that  
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arises when Boyd’s restoration theory is analyzed in light of his concept of neo-molinism. 
Neo-molinism, argues Boyd, means God knows from eternity the would-counterfactuals 
and might-counterfactuals.  Would-counterfactuals apply to free will agents on two 
levels: (1)  habitus infusu—free will agents’ actions flowing from a character given by 
God, and (2)  habitus acquirus—character acquired by free will agents by following 
certain life patterns. On the former level, agents are not responsible for their actions, but 
they are responsible for their actions on the latter level.  The essence of his argument lies 
in the fact that agents are responsible for the would-counterfactuals that flow from might-
counterfactuals.
 58
  Thus, on the basis of would-counterfactuals that flow from the might-
counterfactuals God could predict what an agent’s action would be in a certain situation 
and orchestrate circumstances to make what He foreknew to happen.  The impetus in 
Boyd’s introduction of neo-molinism into his system is to avoid causal determinism.  
However, this approach raises a twin problem for his concept of the origin of sin and evil.    
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According to neo-molinism, “God knows what agents might do insofar as agents 
possess libertarian freedom. And God knows what agents would do insofar as they have 
received from God and through circumstances or acquired for themselves determinate 
characters. God knows both categories of counterfactuals as they pertain to every 
possible subject in every possible world throughout eternity” (Boyd, Satan and the 
Problem of Evil, 425). “In so far as might might-counterfactuals are true—agents possess 
libertarian freedom—there is no eternal facticity. There are only possibilities of what they 
might or might not do. To the extent that would-counterfactuals apply to future free 
agents, they do so because the actions of these agents flow either from the character God 
has given them (habitus infusus), in which case they are not morally responsible for them, 
or from the character they will freely acquire (habitus acquirus) if they pursue a certain 
possible course of action, in which case they are responsible for them. In either case the 
would-counterfactuals are not ungrounded, as in classical Molinism. From all eternity 
God knows that if he chooses to create free agent x, she will have the basic characteristics 
of a, b and c (habitus infusus). And from all eternity God knows that if agent x freely 
follows a certain possible life-trajectory, he will become the kind of person who would 
do y in situation z (habitus acquires). The would-counterfactuals for which agent x is 
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The first part of the twin problem has to do with divine sovereignty.  Given God’s 
ability to predict as outlined above, God could have averted evil from occurring on this 
present earth.  To put the question succinctly: Is divine sovereignty effective?  Why 
didn’t God create the kind of agents who He knew from all eternity will choose to do 
good in an evil environment?  Why didn’t God create Adam and Eve with a different set 
of habitus infusu other than He did?  Why did God set agents created from evil matter to 
subdue evil forces?  In a world in which God can retain providential control over the flow 
of history based on (1) His ability to know what moral agents will do in a particular 
circumstance if contingents of history flow a certain way; and (2) His ability to 
orchestrate contingent circumstances involving free moral agents, God could have 
refashioned a world in which His loving purposes would be always fulfilled.  On the 
basis of the first rebellion and the result of His battle with the evil forces, God could have 
averted sin and evil by endowing human beings with sets of yet-to-be established 
character (habitus infusu), which when combined with might-counterfactuals human 
beings would be the kind of persons who will always fulfill God’s purpose for His 
creation.  
Boyd may argue that God could not have averted sin and evil from actualizing in 
His refashioned earth because God providentially orchestrates events in the flow of 
history when moral agents “irreversibly become the decision they make”59 (habitus 
acquires).  But, if it could be established on the basis of the biblical record of creation  
                                                 
morally responsible are contingent on the might-counterfactuals for which she is morally 
responsible” (ibid., 128).  
59
Ibid., 189.  
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and the fall that Adam and Eve may have acquired character before their interaction with 
the serpent, which is possible,
60
 then God, rather than averting, orchestrated the 
actualization of sin and evil.  God knew and perfectly anticipated that if the world 
proceeded exactly as it did up to the point of the serpent’s interaction with Adam and 
Eve, Adam and Eve would be the kind of persons who would say no to God’s yes.  On 
the basis of this knowledge and His providential control, God decided at some point to 
providentially ensure that the just situation would come about by orchestrating highly 
pressured circumstances to squeeze Adam and Eve to actualize sin and evil.  If neo-
molinism is true and it excludes causal determinism as Boyd projects it to be, then either  
God through providential control of the flow of history could have averted sin and evil, or 
His providential control over the flow of history by orchestrating events actualized sin 
and evil.   
The second part of the twin problem that Boyd’s concept of origin raises in the 
light of neo-molinism has to do with divine foreknowledge.  Neo-molinism grants that 
God can predict the future free will choices based on the would-counterfactuals that flow 
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While the biblical narrative does not stipulate any specific time Satan waited 
after God had finished with His creation to tempt Adam and Eve, one is not far from 
wrong to assume that Adam and Eve may have interacted with each other and made some 
choices before their temptation. When one considers Adam’s expression to God when 
Eve was brought to him, the time that elapsed between the creation of Adam and Eve and 
the beginning of seventh day when God rested from creating—if the seventh day is a 
commemoration, as it has been suggested—then it is obvious Adam and Eve had some 
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appearance in the Garden of Eden.  If this assumption is true, then to some extent Adam 
and Eve, in the context of Boyd’s theory of self-determined free will, irresistibly became 
the decisions they made before their interaction with the serpent.  
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from might-counterfactuals.
61
  The restoration theory also demonstrates that God battled 
with evil forces and refashioned the remains of the battle.  Thus, based on God’s 
knowledge of evil forces, the result of the battle, what He had done with the debris of the 
war, and the set of habitus infusu He endowed Adam and Eve, He foreknew that sin and 
evil will be actualized in His refashioned earth.  Yet, Boyd insists that, until Adam and 
Eve sinned, God’s foreknowledge of evil in this world was a possibility on the basis of 
his understanding of Rom 8:29.  As already indicated in the analysis of Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy in chapter 3, Boyd considers the Greek word translated foreknowledge 
in Rom 8:29 in the customary Semitic sense of affection.  Thus, he takes the passage to 
mean God loved His church as a corporate whole ahead of time.  Therefore, all that is 
predestined and foreknown about the church applies to everyone who freely accepts 
Christ.  In other words, what God predestines He also foreknows exhaustively and 
definitely, and it is settled.  What He foreknows about future free will choices are 
possibilities.
62
   
While this assertion may support his claims, he must not be judged only on the 
coherence of his claim, but also by the concurrence of his view with scholarship and 
Paul’s usage of foreknowledge.  First, scholars contend that the reduction of divine 
foreknowledge to possibilities stems from a wrong notion derived from Aristotle’s 
philosophical proposition, “that which was truly predicted at the moment in the past will 
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See footnote 61 of this chapter. 
62Boyd’s concept of divine foreknowledge has not gone unchallenged by scholars 
such as Bruce Ware, D. A. Carson, and John Piper. Boyd argues strongly against the 
making of causation synonymous with determinism. See Boyd, Satan and the Problem of 
Evil, 68-78.      
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of necessity take place.”63  According to Robert E. Picirilli, the “certainty of future events 
does not lie in their necessity but in their simple factness.  They will be the way they will 
be . . . and God knows what they will be because he has perfect awareness, in advance, of 
all facts.  But that knowledge per se, even though it is foreknowledge, has no more causal 
effect on the facts than our knowledge of certain past facts has on them.”64  In the same 
vein, Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski argues that the truth or falsity and necessity or 
contingency of a proposition are two distinct properties of the proposition.  Truth or 
falsity is a semantic property of a proposition; “truth is not an event . . . does not enter 
causally into the world, and does not thereby prevent the contingency of events.  
                                                 
63Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, “Divine Foreknowledge and Human Free Will,” 
Religious Studies 21 (1985): 283-285; Ronald H. Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions: An 
Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1999), 319. Ronald Nash 
argued, “The relevance of Aristotle’s position for resolving the omniscience-human 
freedom problem should be obvious. If propositions about future, free human actions 
have no truth value, then they cannot be known by anyone, including an omniscient God. 
God’s inability to know the future should not count against his omniscience, since the 
power to know is constrained only in cases where there is something to know. But if no 
propositions about future, free actions can be true, they cannot be the object of 
knowledge for anyone, including God. God cannot know the future because there is 
nothing for him to know” (Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions, 319). The following is 
Aristotle’s philosophical proposition: “There would be no need to deliberate or to take 
trouble, on the supposition that if we should adopt a certain course, a certain result would 
follow, while, if we did not, the result would not follow. For a man may predict an event 
ten thousand years beforehand, and another may predict the reverse, in the fullness of 
time. . . . Wherefore, if through all time the nature of things was so constituted that a 
prediction about an event was true, then through all time it was necessary that that 
prediction should find fulfillment; and with regard to all events, circumstances have 
always been such that their occurrence is a matter of necessity. For that of which 
someone has said truly that it will be, cannot fail to take place; and of that which takes 
place, it was always true to say that it would be” (Aristotle, Aristotle’s Categories and 
Propositions, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle [Grinnell, IA: Peripatetic Press, 1980], 113-
117).  
64Robert E. Picirilli, “Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Future,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 43 (2000): 263.  
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Necessity, therefore, should not be confused with truth.  Furthermore, it should not be 
confused with certainty.  Certainty is a psychological state of the knower, whereas 
necessity is a property of a proposition.”65  If this is correct, then Boyd’s argument for 
divine foreknowledge of agents’ future choices is invalidated. 
Second, one may agree with Boyd that Paul uses foreknowledge in the customary 
Semitic sense of affection, if the following question could be answered:  Since agape is 
usually used in the New Testament to denote God’s love for sinners,66 would it not be 
appropriate to assume that Paul would have used agape, especially when the passage is 
about the salvation of the human race, if he meant to say God loved ahead of time?
67
  
When the customary Semitic sense of affection is considered, Boyd cannot substantiate 
the effectiveness of his interpretation of the passage, for such understanding of the 
passage demands existence of the subject and the objects of the word foreloved.
68
  Roger 
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W. Günther and H. G. Link, “άγɑπάω,” The New International Dictionary of 
New Testament Theology (1971), 2:542. See William Lillie, Studies in New Testament 
Ethics (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1961), 163-181. 
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For Paul agapē is electing love as indicated by “his use of agapētos ‘the chosen 
one. He uses agape as the motive of election and this love comes to be predicated of Jesus 
Christ Himself (Gal 2:20; 2 Thess 2:13; Eph 5:2)” (Günther and Link, “άγɑπάω,” 544).  
“It is worth noting how regularly the term to elect (eklegesthai) serves as a synonym for 
God’s gracious love (agapan) both in Paul and elsewhere in the New Testament. Luke 
substitutes ‘elect’ for ‘beloved’ in God’s baptismal designation for his Son in the formula 
of the other Synoptics. And Paul, as he does in Ephesians 1:4-5 and 2:4-6, also directly 
associates the two terms in Romans 11:28 and 1 Thessalonians 1:4” (Donald J. 
Westblade, “Divine Election in the Pauline Literature,” in The Grace of God, the 
Bondage of the Will: Biblical and Practical Perspectives on Calvinism, vol. 1, ed. 
Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1995], 72n19).  
68
The Hebrew word translated know sometimes denotes sexual intimacy; scholars 
often cite Gen 4:1, 19:8 and Judg 19:25, which is a rape case. It also means personal 
relationship without sexual connotations, Deut 34:10 and Exod 33:17. Thus, the Semitic 
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T. Forster and V. Paul Marston have pointed out that, explaining foreknowledge in a 
Semitic sense of affection implies that humans knew and reacted to God before they 
existed, which is not possible.
69
  
Furthermore, Paul’s use of divine foreknowledge and predestination in Rom 8:29 
is in relation to divine activities performed before the creation of planet Earth.
70
  The 
Greek word translated predestination relates to a plan made prior to the fallen race.
71
  
Paul’s discussion demonstrates an earthly order of realization of the divine plan through 
calling to faith in Christ, justification by faith, and glorification.  In addition, he points 
out that the earthly realization of the plan of salvation applies to all who love God.
72
  
                                                 
sense of affection of the Hebrew word translated know does not always require a two-way 
relationship, as suggested by Roger T. Forster and V. Paul Marston, such as in the rape 
case. However, in all the instances the existence of the subject and object of the word 
know is a must. See E. D. Schmitz, “ώ,” The New International Dictionary of 
New Testament Theology (1971), 2:395; Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans, The Anchor Bible, 
vol. 33 (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 525. 
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Roger T. Forster and V. Paul Marston, God’s Strategy in Human History 
(Wheaton, IL: Tyndale House, 1974), 198.  
70
Eph 1:4.  
71
In the context of Rom 8:29, Paul coordinates divine activities in favor of human 
agents.  In these divine activities, foreknowledge appears to be first and then 
predestination.  The Greek word prohorizō (predestination) in all its occurrences in the 
New Testament is used exclusively for a divine plan or decision (Acts 4:28; Rom 8:29, 
30; 1 Cor 2:7; Eph 1:5, 11) (Paul Jacobs and Hartmut Krienke, “πρооρίζω,” The New 
International Dictionary of New Testament Theology [1971], 1:695-696). The apostle 
makes all the occurrences of prohorizō point to activity performed in eternity—divine 
plan to give Christ as a ransom for the fallen race (Acts 4:28; 1 Cor 2:7), and the process 
through which the fallen race will be adopted as sons and daughters of God through 
Christ (Rom 8:29; Eph 1:4, 5). Erickson, Christian Theology, 937; Canale, “Doctrine of 
God,” 15.     
72Paul’s discussion in Eph 1:9-10 demonstrates that while the plan for the 
salvation of the human race was conceived in eternity, before the foundation of the world, 
it was not implemented until creation was actualized. This implies that the process—
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Thus, the decision in Rom 8:29 is God’s proposed destiny73 for the human race, rather 
than a prior, unalterable selection of some people unto salvation.
74
  Logically, divine 
foreknowledge, which precedes divine predestination in the passage, is also eternal 
activity.  The Greek word proginōskō means to perceive or recognize something or a 
person in advance.
75
  The meaning carries the notion of the object providing the content 
of what is to be known.
 76 
 Taking into account the influence of the Old Testament word, 
yāda‘, on the New Testament usage of proginōskō, divine foreknowledge is not 
                                                 
called, justified, and glorified (Rom 8:30), through which those foreknown become 
conformed to the image of Christ—takes place in human history.   
73
William W. Klein, The New Chosen People: A Corporate View of Election 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1990), 185. Some of the biblical authors refer to the divinely 
conceived and determined plan as the divine plan of salvation; purpose (Rom 8:28), 
mystery (Eph 3:9); and hidden wisdom of God (1 Cor 2:7). 
74
See Forster and Marston, God’s Strategy in Human History, 203-205; Andrzej 
Gieniusz, Romans 8:18-30: Suffering Does Not Thwart the Future Glory (Atlanta, GA: 
Scholars Press, 1999), 266-267.   
75
The Greek words pronoeō and proginōskō are translated foreknowledge.  The 
former word means knowledge obtained by reasoning, thus, the subject always 
determines the content of the knowledge and imposes it on reality, and the latter word 
means knowledge obtained by perceiving or recognizing, which means the object is 
active and the subject passive.  Thus, Paul’s choice of proginōskō in discussing divine 
foreknowledge is purposeful. Proginōskō occurs five times, two times referring to human 
knowledge acquired on the basis of information given or revelation received (Acts 26:5; 
2 Pet 3:17); two times (Rom 8:29, 11:2) God is the subject and humans are the object; 
and in 1 Pet 1:20 Christ is the object. The noun proginōsis occurs two times (Acts 2:23, 1 
Pet 1:2). In the first text, Christ is the object and in the second passage humans are the 
object.  See Paul Jacobs and Hartmut Krienke, “ώ,” The New International 
Dictionary of New Testament Theology (1971), 1:693-694.  
76
The persons who are foreknown in Rom 8:29 are the “object of the verb 
‘foreknew’ and they are the object without any qualification or further characterization” 
(John Murray, “Foreknew, Foreknowledge,” The Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of 
the Bible [1975], 2:591; Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans [Grand Rapids, MI: 
Eerdmans, 1996]; Fitzmyer, Romans, 533).  
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speculative knowledge, which may be inadequate, half correct, or false.
77
  It is “grasping 
the full reality and nature of the object under consideration”;78 it is exhaustive and 
definite knowledge of His creation.  Also helpful in elucidating the reality that God 
foreknows future free will choices is James’s remark at the Jerusalem Council.  “Known 
to God from eternity are all His works.”79  If God’s works, in this context the works of 
salvation, are a divine response to human sinfulness, He must of necessity foreknow the 
free will choices of sinners.  In other words, from eternity God foreknows all 
possibilities, libertarian free will choices, and the results of His works of salvation.  In 
summary, the Greek words translated predestination and foreknowledge suggests that: (1) 
though foreknowledge and predestination are divine activities performed in eternity, their  
                                                 
77
yāda‘ is used to connote a variety of meanings: to discern, to recognize, learning 
to distinguish, to know good and evil, for sexual intimacy (as mentioned in footnote 68), 
acquaintance with a person. Thus, the Hebrew word yāda‘ is fundamentally relational 
knowing. In such a relational knowing, factual knowledge of the other person is crucial, 
otherwise it is not a relational knowing. Thus, when God is the subject of yāda‘, His 
factual knowledge of the object known is implied. Boyd may be right to understand 
foreknowledge in Rom 8:29 in the customary Semitic sense of affection. yāda‘ 
sometimes denotes sexual intimacy. Scholars often cite Gen 4:1, 19:8, and Judg 19:25, 
which are rape cases. It also means personal relationship without sexual connotations 
(Deut 34:10 and Exod 33:17). Thus, the Semitic sense of affection of the Hebrew word 
translated “know” does not always require a two-way relationship, as suggested by some 
scholars, such as in the rape case. However, in all the instances where the yāda‘ connotes 
affection, the existence of the subject and object of the word yāda‘ is a must. Thus, 
Boyd’s characterization of foreknowledge as a customary Semitic sense of affection does 
not support his interpretation. See Schmitz, “ώ,” 2:395; Fitzmyer, Romans, 525; 
Forster and Marston, God’s Strategy in Human History, 198. According to Jack P. Lewis, 
when God is the subject of yāda‘, it refers to God’s knowledge of the life of a particular 
human being before the conception of that individual. See Jack P. Lewis, “עַָךי,” 
Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 1:366.   
78
Schmitz, “ώ,” 393. See Fitzmyer, Romans, 525.  
79
Acts 15:18.  
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contents are not the same; (2) the content of divine foreknowledge cannot be predictions 
from deductions from past and presents events; and (3) the content of divine 
foreknowledge cannot be only possibilities of future free will choices, but rather 
exhaustive and definite. 
Based on the above discussion of Paul’s use of divine foreknowledge and 
predestination in Rom 8:29, Boyd’s assertion has far-reaching theological implications.  
On the one hand, a tenable question that arises from Boyd’s assertion, as posed by 
Roland Nash, is, “How can God know what He is going to do in the future, when God’s 
own future acts are a response to future human free actions that He cannot know?”80  
Obviously, Boyd’s position is in difficulty.  For God to predetermine and foreknow His 
own plan or unilaterally intervene in human events, He must, of necessity, first know 
exactly what He is responding to.  Since Boyd’s position makes no distinction between 
the contents of the two divine activities, we cannot avoid concluding that his position, as 
it stands now, is inconsistent and collapses into the traditional view of a prior unalterable 
divine predetermination of events.  Thus, God not only foreknew evil before it was 
actualized, but He also knew it was inevitable because He determined it.  On the other 
hand, Boyd can neither affirm divine foreknowledge on the basis of God’s own plan or as 
predictions from deduction from past and present events nor make the content 
possibilities.  Such arguments are a denial of the biblical concept of foreknowledge and 
predestination.
81
   
                                                 
80
Nash, Life’s Ultimate Questions, 320. 
81The effect of Boyd’s concept of divine foreknowledge is discussed later in the 
evaluation under the subsection “Natural Evil.” 
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While Boyd’s concept of the origin of evil is designed to absolve God from the 
responsibility for evil in the world, the difficulties mentioned make the absolution 
impossible.  This is the case because Boyd intends to present openness theodicy, yet for 
the most part of his explanation he is trapped in classical theism—his concept of divine 
foreknowledge is grounded in predestination,
82 
 leaving his theory of the origin of sin and 
evil in a paradoxical situation.   
Certainly, the use of restoration theory with other theological elements of the 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy creates some difficulties.  Boyd seems to recognize this by 
his shift from a refashioned earth to a local creation, based on John Sailhamer’s 
exposition of  
the Genesis account of creation.  In his book, Genesis Unbound, Sailhamer argues that 
the creation narrative is a local creation.  According to him, Gen 1:1 refers to the creation 
of the entire functioning universe, including the sun, moon, and stars in the heavens and 
the plants and animals on earth.  He asserts that Gen 1:2ff. is a description of God 
preparing the land as a place where human kind can dwell—the land promised to 
                                                 
82
Boyd, like the Calvinists, argues that divine foreknowledge is grounded in 
predestination or foreordination (John M. Frame, No Other God: A Response to the Open 
Theism [Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2001], 77; Roy, How Much Does God 
Foreknow?, 82-83). Some go so far to equate divine foreknowledge with election. See 
Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, 533; John Murray, The Epistle to the Romans, New 
International Commentary on the New Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1968), 
1:317-318; Frederick F. Bruce, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans: An Introduction and 
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1963), 177; Rudolf Bultmann,  
“ώóu” Theological Dictionary of the New Testament (1964), 
1:715. In other words, divine foreknowledge is equivalent to divine predetermination.  
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Abraham and his descendants.
 83
  Boyd concedes precedence to Sailhamer’s idea as “an 
intriguing interpretation of Genesis 1 as historical narrative that avoids conflict with the 
scientific account of the world.”84  Boyd correctly understands Sailhamer’s exposition of  
Gen 1:1-2.  However, his submission to Sailhamer’s idea of a local creation is not 
satisfactory.  If Boyd acknowledges that, in Sailhamer, tōhû wabōhû means non-violent 
chaos,
85
 and if he agrees that “man was put into the garden ‘to worship and obey,’”86 then 
there is a sense in which Boyd defers to Sailhamer’s exposition of Gen 1:1-2.  But for 
Boyd to avow a local creation in the “midst of a planet seized and corrupted by hostile 
cosmic forces”87 does not ease the tension between his concept of creation and other  
theological elements of his Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.  On the contrary, the 
application of Sailhamer’s exposition of Gen 1:1-2 to his warfare motif reinforces the 
tension, because in this local creation Adam and Eve awoke to evil forces that were not 
domesticated or subjected. 
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Sailhamer claims that Gen 1:1 refers to the creation of the entire functioning 
universe, including the sun, moon, and stars in the heavens, and the plants and animals on 
earth. He goes on to argue that Gen 1:2 onwards describes God preparing a land for man 
and woman to inhabit—the same land promised to Abraham and his descendants and the 
same land given to the Israelites after their wandering in the desert. John Sailhamer, 
Genesis Unbound (Sisters, OR: Multnomah Books, 1996), 14, 47-58. 
84Gregory A. Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare: A Biblical Perspective on 
Satan and ‘Natural Evil’,” in Creation Made Free: Open Theology Engaging Science, ed. 
Thomas Jay Oord (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2009), 141.  
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Sailhamer, Genesis Unbound, 63-66.  
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Ibid., 76. 
87Boyd, “Evolution as Cosmic Warfare,” 144.  
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Natural Evil  
 
The evaluation of Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy was begun by examining 
his concept of the origin of evil and sin.  It was noted that there are inconsistencies in 
Boyd’s explanation of the origin of sin and evil.  In this section, the assessment 
continuous by including his theory of natural evil.  The subject of concern is whether his 
concept of natural evil is consistent with other aspects of his theodicy.   
The analysis of natural evil in Boyd’s theodicy revealed that his concept of 
natural evil makes no distinction between moral and natural evils and assumes 
imperfections in nature.
88
  However, the source of evil does not lie in the imperfections in 
nature, but the misuse of an agent’s free will.  Boyd’s strategy is to establish, on the one 
hand, that God did not create historical planet Earth as perfect, as the classical tradition 
claims, and, on the other hand, to exonerate Him.  But his effort creates inconsistency in 
his theory.   
He asserts that nature has no will to oppose God,
89
 and yet he claims that nature’s 
initial response to Adam, its caretaker, was not to immediately be subject to Adam’s 
wishes.
90
  He also insists that humans were created to subdue the sinister characteristics 
of creation.
91
  Hence, it is difficult for one to understand how Boyd can argue for 
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Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 279, 282-83.  
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Ibid., 283.  
90
Ibid., 258.  
91According to Boyd, “the term kābaš usually suggests the suppression, the 
conquering or enslavement of hostile forces.” He continues, “If, however, what we have 
in Genesis 1 is a creation that is good, but that is following Enuma Elish and other 
primitive accounts, fashioned out of a battle-torn chaotic abyss and that, as such, must  
continually be controlled . . . then this command [to subdue the earth] begins to make 
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imperfections and limitations in nature, and yet assume that the impersonal and 
unbending characteristics of nature are not actualized evil.  
Furthermore, the combination of Boyd’s views on free will and natural evil turns 
his arguments against him and creates a problem for his theodicy, metaphysical evil.  
First, he argues that freedom of choice “requires that the alternatives under consideration 
be viable alternatives,”92 which means the alternatives must be of the same status in 
nature.  Consequently, both the perfect and imperfect characteristics of creation must be 
either actualized or potentialized.  Second, he maintains that, with the exception of their 
excessiveness, catastrophic and horrifying features of nature are necessary requirements 
of the neutral medium of relationality.
93
  It is readily apparent that his stand is 
contradictory, and makes God the efficient cause of metaphysical evils.  
Boyd’s view on natural evil simultaneously collapses into Augustine’s and Hick’s 
concepts of natural evil.  His theory assumes Augustine’s aesthetic principle with his 
admission that birth deformities that flow from the design of God are natural and 
beautiful.
94
  Like Hick, Boyd’s concept of neutral medium of relationality makes what he 
claims to be imperfections in nature the sine qua non for moral responsibility.
95
  Based on 
these assertions, some evils, including animal suffering, are necessary for God to achieve 
His teleological and aesthetic purposes.  Hence, these imperfections (which God created 
                                                 
sense. Humans in this case are charged with carrying on God’s creational work of 
bringing order to chaos” (Boyd, God at War, 106). 
92
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 258.  
93
Ibid., 306.  
94
Ibid., 194. 
95
Ibid.  
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purposefully), although experienced as evil, fit perfectly in God’s design, making 
metaphysical evil necessary but not genuine, lacking the qualities of moral and/or natural 
evils.
96
  
Philosophically, one basic difficulty rising from metaphysical evil serving 
aesthetical and teleological purposes is the dysteleological nature and/or gratuitousness of 
evil.
97
  Boyd’s appraisal of Augustine’s aesthetical principle and Hick’s soul-making 
theodicy shows his awareness of the inadequacy of both theodicies in explaining the 
excessiveness and dysteleological nature of evil.  Therefore, he appears to respond to 
gratuitous evil with his concept of the irrevocable free will of demonic forces.  He writes, 
“But if we accept that there are spiritual agents who can influence the objective world 
just as humans can, then we can begin to understand how nature could become hostile to 
God’s purposes, even though it has no will of its own.  In the hands of free agents, human 
or angelic, our neutral medium of relationality can become either a gift of love or a 
weapon of war.”98  It is agreeable that, for the most part, evils in the world are influenced 
by demonic forces.  As a result, Boyd’s assertion absolves him from the issue of 
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Arguing against making evil illusive, Stephen J. Vicchio points out that it goes 
against the biblical view of evil, for the Bible presents evil as real. Stephen J. Vicchio, 
The Voice from the Whirlwind: The Problem of Evil and the Modern World 
(Westminster, MD: Christian Classics, 1989), 117-119. See also Hywel D. Lewis, 
Philosophy of Religion (London: The English Universities Press, 1965), 309.    
97
For some decades, excessive evil has been an issue against the divine existence. 
This philosophical argument is technically termed the evidential problem of evil. That is, 
the amount and kinds of evil we observe are evidence against the existence of God.  
98
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 283-284, see also 291. 
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gratuitous evil.
99
  But such a claim does not dissolve the inconsistency in his argument.  
The way out of this paradox is for Boyd to argue that the imperfections in nature are 
actualized inherent evil and the misuse of moral agents’ free will, and demonic forces are 
responsible for its excessiveness.   
Another difficulty that demands attention has to do with Boyd’s understanding of 
how God deals with particular evil occurrences.  Boyd contends that God exhaustively 
knows all the possibilities of future free will decisions, hence, He does all He can to stop 
particular evils from occurring.  If one looks at the heinous state of the world and the 
proposition that God does all He can to stop evil occurrences, then God is not doing well 
enough in this aspect—an issue which Boyd himself recognizes; he claims that it is 
because of the nature of agents’ free will.  Among other things, if the possibility of saying 
no to God’s yes necessarily correlates with the possibility of saying yes to God’s love100 
means that each increase in the possibility of saying yes to God’s love entails an 
increased possibility of saying no to God’s love.  Then, with the current situation of the    
world, God is overmatched by human rebellion.  Boyd appears to argue that the nature of 
free will is the cause of the difficulties with God and the occurrence of particular evil.  
                                                 
99Boyd’s introduction of demonic forces into his system helps him refrain from 
making inscrutable and excessive evils teleologically worthy.  The criticism against 
theodicies that make excessive evil necessary for divine teleological benefits is that God 
does not need such evils in order to achieve His purpose. See Hospers, An Introduction to 
Philosophical Analysis, 464-465; Vicchio, The Voice from the Whirlwind, 102-143. 
100
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 54.  
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However, it is his theory of God’s foreknowledge of future free will decisions that seems 
to cause the greater part of the problem.
101
 
For the most part, the biblical passages that Boyd uses in defense of his 
understanding of God’s foreknowledge of future free will decisions are passages 
describing divine works and ways in human history.
102
  An explanation of two divine 
activities, divine testing
103
 and repenting,
104
 may be helpful in substantiating this point.   
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Boyd bases his argument of divine knowledge of future free will choices on 
biblical passages dealing with divine interaction in human history. I agree with Boyd that 
exegesis on a text-by-text basis is helpful in evaluating his use of Scripture; although 
such an attempt is beyond this study, divine testing and repentance will be taken into 
consideration, for the sake of objectivity. See Steven C. Roy’s How Much Does God 
Know?   
102
See, for example, God expresses frustration (Ezek 22:30-31; Exod 4:10-15; 
Num 11:1-2); God tests (Gen 3; Gen 22:12; Deut 8:2; Ps 95:10-11); God speaks in 
conditional terms (Matt 20:25-28; Exod 13:17); God confronts the unexpected (Isa 5; Jer 
3:19-20); God regrets (Gen 6:6; 1 Sam 13:13; 15:10, 35); God changes His mind (Jer 18; 
1 Chr 21:15; 2 Kgs 20:1); Hastening the Lord’s return (2 Pet 3:9-12; Mark 13:32). Boyd, 
God of the Possible, 53-87; idem, “The Open-Theism View,” 23-36. These passages are 
demonstrations of how God relates to the fallen race in an attempt to win them back to 
Himself. Consequently, they are evidence that God has not predetermined human free 
will and that the future is partly opened. However, they do not deal with divine 
foreknowledge.  
103
The Hebrew words ןַחָבּ (bāchan), ַַקָחר  (chāqar), ףַרָצ (āraph), and הָָסּנ (nāsāh) 
are synonymous and are usually translated “prove,” “examine,” “test,” and “try.”  ַ
Bāchan connotes examining to determine essential qualities or attaining knowledge 
intuitively or intellectually.  Twenty-two of its occurrences refer to God trying the hearts 
of His people (Jer 17:10; 11:20; 12:3; 1 Chr 29:17). The qal form of chāqar, with God as 
the subject and humans as the object, is translated “search,” such as God searches the 
heart and thoughts of a person (Jer 17:10; Pss 139:1, 23; 44:21; Job 13:9; 28:27). Its 
niphal form expresses the notion of immeasurable, unfathomable (Job 5:9; 9:10; 11:7; 
36:26; Ps 145:3; Isa 40:28). āraph and nāsāh emphasize the practical aspects of testing. 
āraph connotes the  refining process; 11 occurrences are references to God’s judgment 
on and purification from sin (Isa 1:25; Jer 6:27-30; Ezek 22:18-22) and removal of sin 
and wickedness from His people (Jer 9:7; Isa 48:10). Nāsāh is the word used in most of 
Boyd’s and White’s references to God’s testing and finding out. Unlike bāchan, which 
connotes trying for the purpose of attaining intellectual knowledge, nāsāh focuses on the 
 
309 
Having analyzed two main passages (Gen 18:21; Gen 22:1, 12) that describe God 
as one who tests,
105
  Robert B. Chisholm contends that the contexts of the passages 
establish that God veils His omniscience and reveals Himself as one who lacks full 
knowledge in order to create a dynamic relationship between Him and His servants and 
allows human response to play a role in how the future unfolds.  Commenting on Gen 22, 
John Piper, Bruce Ware, and Norman Geisler cogently argue that the passage 
demonstrates that God experiences what He foreknew eternally in human history.
106
 
                                                 
practical aspect of testing, either human or divine testing. The purpose of divine nāsāh is 
more of a demonstration of a possessed knowledge rather than God learning to know the 
hearts and behavior of His people. Thus, Gen 22:1 is a testing to demonstrate how a 
faithful servant of God relates to God; Deut 8:2,16 testing the Israelites to acknowledge 
divine discipline; Exod 20:18-20 testing to direct Israel to experience God, Deut 13:3,4; 
Judg 2:22, 3:4; 2 Chr 32:31. F. J. Helfmeyer, “הָָסּנ,” Theological Dictionary of the Old 
Testament (1998), 9:443-445; M. Tsevat, “ןַחָבּ,” Theological Dictionary of the Old 
Testament (1975), 2:69-71; idem, “רַקָח,” Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament 
(1986), 5:148-150; John N. Oswalt, “ןַחָבּ,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament 
(1980),  1:100; Herbert Wolf, “רַקָח,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 
1:318; Marvin R. Wilson, “הָָסּנ,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 
2:581; John E. Hartley, “ףַרָצ,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980),  
2:777-778.   
104The Hebrew word “םַָחנ” has different shades of meaning, but common to all 
meanings is an attempt to influence a situation. Its occurrence is mostly in the niphal and 
hithpael forms.  These forms are usually translated “regret,” “to be comforted,” “relent 
from a course underway,” and “changing of mind.” When God is the subject of these 
forms, He does or does not respond to human actions. See H. Simian-Yofre, “םַָחנ,” 
Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament (1998), 9:340-355; Marvin R. Wilson, 
“םַָחנ,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 2:570-571; Robert B. 
Chisholm Jr., “Does God ‘Change His Mind’?” Bibliotheca Sacra 152 (1995): 388-389. 
105
According to Chisholm, in Gen 18 God presents Himself as a judge, and a fair 
and just judge examines the evidence and then rewards accordingly. In Gen 22 “God 
contextualized his self-revelation to Abraham . . . within the relation, metaphorical 
framework of a covenant Lord” (Robert B. Chisholm Jr., “Anatomy of an 
Anthropomorphism: Does God Discover Facts?” Bibliotheca Sacra 164 [2007]: 8, 9, 13). 
106According to John Piper, “If God knows what will come to pass, does that 
mean that all testings in history are pointless? I don’t think so. God has not created the 
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Discussing divine repentance, Chisholm points out that God deals with His 
creatures in terms of decrees and announcements.  He explains that each decree has 
“clear contextual indicators that the declaration is unconditional.  The statement that God 
will not change His mind, made in tandem with a synonymous expression, formally 
marks the divine proclamation as a decree.”107  Furthermore, concerning divine 
announcements, he asserts that “God can and often does retract announcements.”  In 
every case where God retracts His announcement, He had not decreed a course of action. 
                                                 
world just to be known in terms of what would be if tests were given. He created the 
world to be actualized in history. That is, he wills not just to foreknow, but to know by 
observation and experience. That is the point of creating a real world, rather than just 
knowing one that might be.  Therefore may not God truly know what Abraham is going 
to do, and yet want to externalize that in a test that enables him to it by observation, not 
just prognostication?” (John Piper, “Answering Greg Boyd’s Openness of God Texts,” 
Ondoctrine.com, www.ondoctrine.com/2pip1201.htm [accessed October 20, 2009]). 
From Norman Geisler’s perspective, “there is nothing here [in the passage] about God’s 
desire to learn anything. Rather, God wanted to prove something. . . . What God knew by 
cognition, he desired to show by demonstration. By passing the test, Abraham 
demonstrated what God already knew: namely that he feared God” (Norman L. Geisler, 
Creating God in the Image of Man? [Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1997], 88). For 
Bruce Ware, “Scripture does not lead us to think of God as unchangeable in every 
respect. . . . Importantly, God is changeable in relationship with his creation, particularly 
with human and angelic moral creatures he has made to live in relationship with him. In 
this relational mutability, God does not change in his essential nature, purposes, will 
knowledge or wisdom; but he does interact with his people in the experiences of their 
lives as these unfold in time. God actually enters into relationship with his people, while 
knowing from eternity all that they will face. Therefore, when God observes Abraham 
bind his son to the altar he has crafted and raise his knife to plunge it into his body, God 
literally sees and experiences in this moment what he has known from eternity. When the 
angel of the LORD utters the statement, ‘for now I know that you fear God,’ this 
expresses the idea that ‘in the experience of this action, I (God) am witnessing Abraham 
demonstrate dramatically and afresh that he fears me, and I find this both pleasing and 
acceptable in my sight’” (Bruce Ware, God’s Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open 
Theism [Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2000], 73-74), his emphasis. 
107Chisholm, “Does God ‘Change His Mind’?” 395-396. 
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Rather, “He chose to wait patiently hoping His warnings might bring people to their 
senses and make judgment unnecessary.”108  Roy goes a step further when concluding his  
discussion on divine repentance; he points out that divine repentance is God responding 
to human actions.  “God’s repentance does not necessarily imply a lack of foreknowledge 
on his part.  Nor does it imply any admission of mistake on the part of God. . . . 
Admittedly, it is difficult from our human perspective to conceive of genuine repentance 
coexisting with exhaustive foreknowledge. . . . We must not understand the repentance of 
God in any way that diminishes or minimizes his foreknowledge of free human 
decisions.”109  
Each of these comments on divine testing and repenting openly or covertly points 
to divine activity in human history; thus both those who hold to divine atemporality 
(classical theists) and divine temporality (open theists, specifically Boyd) agree that 
testing and repenting demonstrate divine relation with His creatures.
110
  Divine testing 
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Ibid., 399.  
109
Roy, How Much Does God Foreknow? 144, 176.  
110
Although both camps of evangelical theologians (classical and open theists) 
agree that the passages concerning divine testing and repenting are dealing with divine 
activities in human history, yet they differ on their concept of divine foreknowledge. 
Discussing the controversy between the open view of God and classical theism Canale 
writes: “Would a more complete analysis of the biblical evidence help evangelical 
theologians overcome this controversy? I personally do not think so. Our brief reference 
to the way each party deals with the biblical evidence suggests that the cause for 
disagreement lies somewhere else. Both parties use the same biblical evidence . . . to 
provide different views of the same theological issues. . . . My conviction is that more 
biblical evidence will not move the parties to accept each other’s point of view or lead to 
a new theological position that is grounded on the hermeneutical nature of the process 
through which the evidence is handled. Our analysis of biblical evidence is never a 
‘neutral’ process of discovery yielding the ‘objective meaning that everyone will 
understand in the same way. On the contrary, the interpretive process is always 
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and repenting are God’s works, and His ways in human history are for the purpose of 
creating an environment that fosters a dynamic relationship between an Infinite Creator 
and His finite creatures and allows intellectual beings to relate to Him on a personal 
basis, thus allowing humans to function intelligently in relating to Him.
111
   
Hence, Boyd’s definition of the content of divine foreknowledge on the basis of 
passages that describe God’s works and ways in human history is due to his failure to 
make a distinction between divine activities performed before creation and in human 
history.  At the background of Boyd’s failure to establish a distinction between divine 
activities performed in eternity and in human history is his concept of divine temporality.  
In his opinion, God expresses His immutable necessary actuality in a contingent mode.
112
  
                                                 
conditioned by hermeneutical presuppositions that may be defined in various ways. Thus, 
the micro and meso hermeneutical levels where the controversy between classical and 
open theisms takes place is [sic] conditioned by the deeper and foundational macro 
hermeneutical level” (Canale, “Evangelical Theology and Open Theism,” 23-24). 
111Köhler comes to the same conclusion when he states that “to describe God in 
terms of human characteristics is not to humanize Him. . . . Rather the purpose of 
anthropomorphisms is to make God accessible to man. They hold open the door for 
encounter and controversy between God’s will and man’s will. They represent God as 
person. They avoid the error of presenting God as a careless and soulless abstract Idea or 
fixed Principle standing over against man like a strong silent battlement. God is personal. 
 . . . Through the anthropomorphisms God stands before man as the personal and living 
God” (Ludwig Köhler, Old Testament Theology, trans. A. S. Todd [Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1957], 24-25).  
112
Boyd states that God is above this created time, but he is not clear on the nature 
of eternity.  However, one can easily infer that Boyd assumes eternity is temporal not 
timeless.  He writes, God is temporal—“an eternally on-going event, an event which is 
dynamic and open” (Boyd, Trinity and Process, 224-253, 386). For certain, he believes 
God is “immanent within the flow of the temporal process, and who thus faces the future 
largely as an unsettled matter.  It is not, in other words, only the creatures of God who 
change with the flow of time.  God too (within limits) changes as this One adapts Godself 
to new situations.” Ibid., 314. Contrariwise, he insists that God’s “‘now’ encompasses the 
‘now’ of every point in space, but he is not bound to measure the successive ‘nows’ the 
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However, he failed to acknowledge the differences between eternity and created time.
113
  
The implication is that God’s temporality is identical to human temporality.  This 
conclusion arises from the nature of Boyd’s perception of how God experiences His 
creation.  Consequently, His knowledge of the future free will choices consists of 
possibilities only.
114
  The effect of this understanding of God’s foreknowledge of the 
future choices of intelligent beings in relation to the problem of evil is that God is unable 
                                                 
way any finite creature would”; and He does not measure time against “any physical 
constant” (Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 142).  
113
See for example, Oscar Cullmann, Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian 
Conception of Time and History, trans. Floyd V. Filson (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 
1964), 37-68.  
114The Psalmist’s (Ps 139) declaration of divine foreknowledge of future free 
choices of intelligent beings is denied by Boyd. He argues that Ps 139 is poetry and 
cannot be used as proof of divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge of future free will 
choices. While I agree with Boyd that the passage does not imply God has predetermined 
everything about the Psalmist, I disagree with him on the issue that the passage cannot  
be used to resolve metaphysical disputes regarding the nature of the future.  According to 
Osborne, “modern critics . . . argue against theological content and prefer to think of the 
‘world’ portrayed in the Psalm. Yet it is also true that biblical poetry expressed the 
deepest dimensions of the faith of ancient Israel, especially the view of God. In fact, 
theology is central to biblical poetry” (Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral, 186). 
Consequently, considering Ps 139 in light of poetical hermeneutical principles, the 
passage is highly theological. First, vv. 1-6 reveal divine omniscience, vv. 7-12 
demonstrate divine omnipresence, vv. 13-18 divine omnipotence and, finally, vv. 19-24 
declare the holiness of God. Second, v. 16 points to the fact that God knew David before 
he was formed, thus the omniscience includes divine foreknowledge.  Third, the use of 
chāqar, yāda‘ and da‘ at in vv. 1-6 indicates that divine foreknowledge is a relational 
knowing; future free will choices are future facts not knowledge of possibilities about 
David. “The language of the Psalm does not mean that God, being ignorant, must remove 
His ignorance by investigation. It means, rather, that God possesses full knowledge of 
David” (Edward J. Young, Psalm 139: Devotional and Expository Study [London: 
Banner of Truth of Trust, 1965], 15-16).  
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to stop any particular evil from occurring because such evils are “known only when 
incarnated and experienced concretely.”115  This means God does nothing of importance  
to stop particular evils,
116
 and “only after the event . . . can God begin to bring good out  
of evil acts.”117 
There may be answers to the above-mentioned issue in Boyd’s understanding of 
divine sovereignty.  First, by appealing to divine ability to accurately predict, he may 
                                                 
115
Boyd, God at War, 34. 
116Clearly, for Boyd, God knows “each series of possibilities, as though there 
were no alternative possibilities” (Boyd, “Christian Love and Academic Dialogue,” 235, 
emphasis his), which means God actually does something to stop radical evil. But this 
emphasis has its own weakness. Paul Kjoss Helseth’s evaluation of open theism, in 
general, and Boyd, in particular, on particular evils is worth mentioning. According to 
him, affirmation of divine foreknowledge of future free decisions as possibilities and 
willingness to act unilaterally in human affairs when it serves his purposes “raises 
questions about the love of God that are far more serious than any of the questions that 
can be directed against compatibilists. Why? Because when push comes to shove people 
suffer in the openness view neither because the free will of wicked agents is 
‘irrevocable,’ nor because their suffering was ordained for a greater good, but rather 
because God simply was not inclined to intervene at a particular point in the historical 
past or present. . . . It follows that the God of Open Theism . . . is an arbitrary being. 
Because particular evils cannot be accounted for solely by appealing to the free will of 
wicked moral agents, for the genuine freedom that is presumed to be the ultimate source 
of evil is precisely what is overridden by the unilateral activity of God when he so 
desires.  . . .without an exhaustive plan that determines which particular evils will be 
tolerated and which ones will not God’s toleration of one particular evil and not another 
becomes arbitrary. To put it differently, without an ‘overarching divine purpose’ and plan 
that established when his intervening mercies will be extended and when they will be 
withheld, his extension of those mercies becomes subject to the vicissitudes of the 
moment, and suffering . . . becomes truly pointless” (Paul Kjoss Helseth, “On Divine 
Ambivalence: Open Theism and the Problem of Particular Evils,” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 44 [2001]: 509-510). 
117Ron Highfield, “The Problem with the ‘Problem of Evil’: A Response to 
Gregory Boyd’s Open Theist Solution,” Restoration Quarterly 45 (2003): 173. 
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argue that, based on the past and present characters of the agents that may be involved in 
particular evil occurrence, God can predict and prevent some evil occurrences.
118
 
Second, by appealing to the variables that condition the quality of free will, he may argue  
that God may intervene as He sees fit.  According to him, God created agents with 
libertarian free will and then binds Himself with a noncoercive covenant to honor the gift 
of libertarian free will.  The extent and the duration of each libertarian free will may vary 
from agent to agent but God commits himself to His noncoercive covenant.  However, 
when an agent goes beyond the parameters of the given libertarian free will, God is under 
no obligation to refrain from intervening on an agent’s libertarian free will.  His 
intervention may appear arbitrary; however, the apparent arbitrariness of God’s 
interaction with the world is not due to lack of power; it is because the quality of 
freedom, the scope and duration of God’s covenant of noncoercion toward a given agent, 
is unknowable.  In other words, because God chose to create agents with the potential to 
love, He could not guarantee that all particular evil occurrences would be prevented.  
Thus, God’s intervention in any particular evil or lack of it is out of His own integrity and 
the complexity of the kind of world God has created.
119
  While it is correct to insist on 
divine ability to predict future choices and divine intervention, in Boyd’s system both 
points create difficulties that need to be pointed out.  
                                                 
118See chapter 3, the section “Unconditional Prophecies.” 
119
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 191-206, 210-219.  
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Boyd’s neo-molinism120 approach to divine sovereignty over His intelligent 
creatures is what Paul Kjoss Helseth describes as “Divine Coercion.”121  We may recall 
that, in explaining how God predicts the future of individuals, Boyd employs Josiah (1 
Kgs 13:1-2) and Cyrus (Isa 45:1) to explain divine foreknowledge of individuals before 
they were born, and Peter’s denial (Matt 26:34) and Judas’s betrayal (John 6:64) to 
explain how God foreknows an individual’s character.  For Boyd, God foreknows 
individuals by setting “strict parameters around the parents’ freedom in naming these 
individuals” and restricts “the scope of freedom these individuals could exercise as it 
pertained to particular foreordained activities.”122  If we grant this understanding of 
divine foreknowledge, some questions emerge.  How did God put strict parameters 
around parents’ free will centuries before the parents were born?  If, within the 
parameters, the parents have the freedom to choose among alternatives, how did God 
foreknow the exact names that these parents would choose for their babies?  Should Boyd  
agree with other scholars that the prophecy about Cyrus is a vaticinium post eventum, 
why did God give a sign of the truthfulness of the prophet’s message to the king?  I agree 
with Boyd that the prophecy about Cyrus falls under a portion of the book of Isaiah that 
deals with God’s declaration of His sovereign activities to redeem His people.  Thus, it is 
                                                 
120
See footnote 61 of this chapter.  
121
Helseth argues that openness theologians’ emphasis on divine influence 
accomplishes divine purposes “only because they are willing to sanction a form of 
compatibilism that, ironically, regards compatibilistically free acts as coerced or 
determined acts for which the acting agent is morally responsible” (Paul Kjoss Helseth, 
“Neo-Molinism: A Traditional Openness Rapprochement,” Southern Baptist Journal of 
Theology 7 [2003]: 61).  
122
Boyd, God of the Possible, 34, emphasis his.   
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clear that Cyrus is appointed by God (Isa 45:1).  It is also a biblical truth that those who 
are appointed by God for some specific purpose have the choice to reject the call (Acts 
26:19; Luke 7:30; 2 Pet 3:9).  Consequently, in the context of Boyd’s system, for God to 
name Cyrus and his actions requires what Boyd classifies as a divine orchestration of 
circumstances. 
The idea of God orchestrating events leads into Boyd’s second explanation of 
how God foreknows and predicts the future of individuals.  Boyd is right to assert that it 
is God who determines His plans and not individuals.  However, to argue that God 
foreknew and predicted Peter’s denial and Judas’s betrayal, based on their character and 
divine knowledge of all future variables, creates inconsistency in his system. As Steven 
C. Roy observes, “If . . . Peter’s decision to deny Christ was ‘certain,’ given his character 
and the circumstances he was in, then his was not a free decision in the libertarian sense.  
And if the presence of libertarian freedom is the necessary prerequisite for genuine moral 
responsibility, Peter’s ‘non-free’ decision was one he was not morally responsible for.”123  
This is a significant difficulty for Boyd, because for God to orchestrate circumstances 
surrounding Peter’s denial, which includes human free will, He must restrict and/or 
overturn free will decisions on many occasions.  This implies that divine predictions 
about individuals centuries before they were born require many restrictions and/or 
overturning of both good and evil events, including free will choices.  Divine 
orchestration, according to Boyd, requires past and present events to know individuals’ 
character and then the future variables to lead to the fulfillment of prediction.  This  
                                                 
123
Roy, How Much Does God Foreknow? 100. 
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process has to continue backward into history probably to the beginning of human history 
or beyond for predictions such as Cyrus and Josiah.  This leads to causal determinism of 
every event in history, a different scenario from Boyd’s occasional divine intervention, 
partly opened future, and biblical description of divine foreknowledge and 
predestination.
124
  
It becomes clear that not only Boyd’s concept of neo-molinism sustains Helseth’s 
criticism, but also his adoption of an indeterministic view of contemporary physics.
125
   
His argument from chance (intersection of independent causal chain that produces 
consequences which produce random events that each may result in numerous events 
infinitely),
126
 combined with the concept of complex constellation leads to a coercive 
situation.  James S. Wiseman contends that the idea that God intervenes within 
indeterminate scope “require[s] that God be envisioned as some kind of micro-managing 
ultra-supercomputer, literally ‘governing’ or ‘determining’ an unfathomable number of 
                                                 
124In William Lane Craig’s opinion, Boyd reverts to Calvinist determinism to 
account for divine providence (“A Middle-Knowledge Response,” in Divine 
Foreknowledge: Four Views, ed. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy [Downers Grover, 
IL: InterVarsity Press, 2001], 58-59). Other scholars believe open theism undermines 
confidence in divine sovereignty. See Geisler, Creating God in the Image of Man? 145; 
Jason A. Nicholls, “Openness and Inerrancy: Can They Be Compatible?” Journal of the 
Evangelical Theological Society 45 (2002): 629-649.   
125John C. Beckman, reacting to Boyd, points out that “chaotic systems are 
physically deterministic.  They are unpredictable to finite creatures, but God can 
exhaustively calculate their definite future behavior if He has exhaustive definite 
knowledge of the inputs and infinite calculating precision.”  He continues, 
“Unpredictability of chaotic systems does not imply an open future.  The unpredictability 
due to chaos is epistemological rather than ontological.  It is due to creaturely limitations 
and does not apply to God” (John C. Beckman, “Quantum Mechanics, Chaos Physics and 
the Open View of God,” Philosophia Christi 4 [2002]: 208, 210). 
126
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 136-142, 418. 
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events on the smallest conceivable scale throughout the entire universe.”127  Thus, Boyd 
makes God responsible for natural evils.  Imagine that four armed men walked into a 
nearby bank.  One chained the security personnel of the bank and took over the position 
of guarding the door to the bank, another took control of the customers and cashiers, 
another one took over the registers, and another guarded the two offices in the bank.  Two 
men in one of the offices who made attempts to call 911 were shot dead.  The armed men 
stopped their operations and took off upon hearing the approach of sirens.  On their way 
of escape they shot everything and everyone who hindered their escape.  By the time 
some of the armed men were arrested they had killed and wounded many people.  In an 
indeterministic world such as Boyd describes, God only intervenes when an agent 
oversteps the boundaries of a given libertarian free will or exhausts the given libertarian 
free will.  In light of this scenario, which of the agents overstepped boundaries or 
exhausted the given libertarian free will?  We may not know the answer because the 
extent and duration of the freedom of the people involved are not known, according to 
Boyd.  Whichever way one looks at the scenario, God intervenes in an event only when 
the event fits into His plan; therefore, He has a reason for every event in which He does 
                                                 
127
James S. Wiseman, in evaluating approaches to divine action in human history, 
argues that “commenting on the quantum based argument, Clayton has written that 
Robert J. Russell, who has influenced the thought of Murphy and others, ‘has been a 
leading advocate of the view that God could intervene supernaturally within the scope of 
quantum indeterminacy.  Given billions and billions of such minute intervention . . . God 
might be able to effect significant changes on the macroscopic level.’ My only 
reservation with this statement is that the phrase ‘billions and billions’ is actually a gross 
understatement, given that at least this many quantum events take place every few 
seconds within a single person’s brain or within a cubic centimeter of any material 
object” (James A. Wiseman, Theology and Modern Science: Quest for Coherence [New 
York: Continuum International, 2002], 124). 
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or does not intervene.
 128
  Thus, a single divine intervention in a world such as described 
by Boyd produces multifaceted and incessant good and evil effects.
129
  To this end, the 
important question is: To what extent does divine providential control of the flow of 
history maximize good without maximizing evil?  While Boyd recognizes that evils are 
the result of the misuse of the free will of moral beings, his treatment of natural evil fails 
to place significant importance on that affirmation.  For, in the words of Helseth, “the 
genuine freedom that is presumed to be the ultimate source of evil is precisely what is 
overridden by the unilateral activity of God when he so desires.”130  Thus, Boyd’s 
position turns God into a coercive, ambivalent, and arbitrary Being who makes a non-
coercive covenant, but achieves His purpose through coercion.
131
  It follows from the 
foregoing evaluation that Boyd’s concept of natural evil, like his theory of the origin of 
sin and evil, contains conflicting elements.   
                                                 
128David P. Hunt, in a response to Boyd’s concept of divine foreknowledge, 
comes to the same conclusion. According to him, “the idea that God becomes aware of 
contingent events only as they happen . . . is supposed to make God’s failure to prevent 
horrendous evil somehow more comprehensible. . . . The open theist’s God, despite his 
precognitive impairment, has perfect knowledge of what is going on now; in the case of 
Boyd’s kidnapped child, he has sufficient knowledge . . . to stop a crime in progress, to 
rescue the victim and so on. . . . I just don’t see how Boyd’s answer would differ from the 
‘he has a good sovereign reason’” (“A Simple-Foreknowledge Response,” 53). 
129
In discussing Gen 45:5 and 50:20, Boyd agrees with compatibilists that God 
ordains evil actions for greater good, but adds that this cannot be generalized. Boyd, 
Satan and the Problem of Evil, 396. 
130
Helseth, “On Divine Ambivalence: Open Theism and the Problem of Particular 
Evils,” 510.  
131“He may in fact temporarily orchestrate matters such that people’s resolve is 
strengthened so that they act in congruity with their evil character (instead of acting 
otherwise for ulterior motives), for in this instance the evil they intended would play into 
God’s design, despite the fact that it is in and of itself evil” (Boyd, Satan and the 
Problem of Evil, 389).  
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While Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy encounters inconsistency and 
incoherency on the evidential level of the problem of evil, it appears to fare well on the 
logical problem of evil.  In chapter 2 it was shown that the atheists’ greatest problem with 
theism is the logical problem of evil.  In Mackie’s reflection on this issue, he mentions 
that an adequate solution to the problem of evil must give up at least one of the four 
Christian propositions—omnipotence, omniscience, omnibenevolence, and God and evil 
exist.
132
  Among his suggestions of things that can be done to avert the logical problem of 
evil is to argue that “there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do.”133  Mackie 
identifies an important solution to the problem of evil to be that which ascribes evil to 
independent actions of human beings”;134 however, its feasibility lies in redefining 
omnipotence.
135
  Boyd’s discussion of omnipotence in terms of logical possibilities and 
impossibilities and his emphasis on the free will of moral agents, in a good measure, 
conform to Mackie’s position for a solution to the logical problem of evil.  Hence, the 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy rebuts the logical problem of evil.
136
  However, the 
Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy’s rebuttal of the logical problem of evil raises a question 
about its plausibility as a Christian response to the problem of evil.  
According to Mackie, a solution that “explicitly maintains all the constituent  
                                                 
132Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 201.  
133
Ibid.  
134
Ibid., 208.  
135
Ibid., 212. 
136
Boyd argues that omnipotence means God has the power to do everything with 
the exception of what is logically impossible. Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 53. 
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propositions” (the proposition is the omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God 
and the existence of evil), “but implicitly rejects at least one of them in the course of the 
argument that explains away the problem of evil” is fallacious.137  Reflecting on this 
concern in connection with Boyd’s eviscerated version of divine foreknowledge, which is 
a modification of the proposition of omniscience, the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy falls 
into the group of theodicies that Mackie classifies as fallacious solutions to the problem 
of evil. 
The appraisal of Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is not complete without evaluating 
Boyd’s concept of the eradication of evil.  Thus, the following section evaluates Boyd’s 
concept of the divine extermination of sin and evil. 
 
Eradication of Sin and Evil 
 
Virtually every theologian who searches for an explanation of the problem of evil 
affirms that God will eradicate sin and evil.  The debate among them has to do with how 
God will exterminate sin and evil without infringing on agents’ free will.  As noted in the 
analysis of the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, Boyd’s approach tends to bridge 
annihilationism and eternal torment.  However, his theory is not without difficulties.   
Paul K. Jewett mentions that contemporary objections to annihilation and 
everlasting torment of retribution are based on the claim that God’s nature is love.138  The 
                                                 
137Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” 202. 
138
Paul K. Jewett, “Eschatology,” The Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the 
Bible (1976), 2:354. 
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same can be said about Boyd’s rapprochement of the two views.139  We may recall from 
the analysis of Boyd’s self-determined free will theory that to endow moral agents with 
free will is the metaphysical idea associated with God’s decision to create a world that 
can participate in His love.
140
  Boyd’s construal of the punishment of the wicked on the 
basis of divine love and the nature of free will is a preservation of the wicked will in a 
separate reality from the reality of the righteous will, because the soul is immortal.
141
  
While there is an inescapable emphasis on divine love for sinners, it appears Boyd falls 
short in appealing to only divine love in this matter.  As Jewett has pointed out, “Love 
without justice is sentimental.”142  While Boyd objects to universalism and describes it as 
unscriptural,
143
 his own preference for divine love leads to a theory in which both the 
righteous and wicked will live eternally in different realities separated from each other.  
Thus, the wicked will die, but the soul will live in a different reality from the reality of 
the righteous. 
The fact remains that his rapprochement construal does not guarantee a complete 
destruction of evil for at least two reasons.  First, in a real way Boyd’s description of 
prehistoric victory over evil forces does not encourage hope in the ultimate divine victory 
over evil.  His concept of retribution separates good from evil in the same manner as the 
                                                 
139
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 326.  
140
Ibid., 51.  
141
 Ibid., 326. 
142
 Jewett, “Eschatology,” 354.   
143
Boyd conscientiously makes a difference between the realities of the wicked 
and righteous.  However, both kinds of wills live on to eternity anyway.    
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prehistoric warfare barricaded evil into a separate reality.
144
  On the other hand, granting 
Boyd’s concept of self-determined free will changing to compatibility free will at the 
close of probation and the wicked will becoming self-closed, the probability of evil 
resurfacing in the utopian world is very slim.  One then assumes that, since the 
individual’s choice for either God or Satan is established, there is no need for a neutral 
medium of relationality.  But in describing the punishment of the wicked, Boyd points 
out that the absence of an objective-share reality is part of the punishment of the wicked.  
Consequently, there will be a neutral medium of relationality in God’s established 
kingdom.  The metaphysical requirement for any neutral medium of relationality, 
according to Boyd, is ungodliness in nature.  Second, though the reality of the wicked 
will be hypothetical to the righteous, as Boyd points out, their eternal existence rebuts the 
cosmic significance of Christ’s victory over evil and there is no assurance of a morally 
secured future universe.    
In spite of all the difficulties mentioned in association with the Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy, the degree of conceptual constancy with which Boyd remains true to 
his own fundamental principles of theological understanding is remarkable.  His 
philosophical and scientific rigor in constructing a Christian response to the problem of 
evil makes the relationship between biblical materials and philosophical and scientific 
materials in doing theology a defining issue.  
                                                 
144See above for the similarities between Boyd’s and E. G. White’s concepts of 
“Victory over Sin and Evil.”  
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Great Controversy Theodicy 
 
White is overlooked in the history of Christian theology, yet her theological 
orientation is one of the watershed moments in the history of Christian theology.
145
  
White breaks from the regular way of doing theology
146
 to emphasize sola scriptura, 
which includes tota scriptura
147
and prima Scriptura.
148
 But extra-biblical materials also  
                                                 
145
Fritz Guy acknowledges White’s contribution to Christian theology when he 
writes, “Ellen White has contributed not only to the distinctiveness of Adventist thinking 
within the larger Christian tradition but also, and just as significantly, to the continuity of 
Adventist thinking with historic Christian theology. The importance of this formative 
theological influence can hardly be overestimated: apart from the uniquely influential 
contribution of Ellen White, Adventist theology would not—indeed, could not—be what 
it is” (Fritz Guy, Thinking Theologically: Adventist Christianity and the Interpretation of 
Faith [Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1999], 123).  
146
Boyd, God at War, 307, endnote 44. In his study of theological systems in the 
history of the theology of Christianity, E. Edward Zinke concludes that “what seems to be 
at the heart of the various methods we have been studying is the common characteristic 
that there is basic continuity between the natural and religious worlds, and that it is 
possible either to start from or to work within the frame work of the natural world in the 
process of characterizing theology.  The natural world is understood variously within the 
realm of theoretical reason or within the realm of the empirical experiences from the 
point of view of what is a priori within the human subject.  Religion finds itself in 
conformity with the resulting concept of the universe and is thus built in harmony with 
that concept.  Theology is thus made to be part of the human disciplines.  It operates in 
ways similar to those of other disciplines. To varying degrees Scripture has an impact 
upon theological method, but it does not create the basic framework out of which 
theology operates” (E. Edward Zinke, “A Conservative Approach to Theology,” Ministry, 
October 1977, 24J).   
147
I acknowledge that the cry sola scriptura of the Reformation rejected any 
imposition of external concepts and methods upon Scripture; however, White goes 
beyond making the Bible a normative authority by emphasizing how to obtain the biblical 
norms without neglecting any aspect of the Bible. She writes:  “The Bible contains all the 
principles that men need to understand in order to be fitted either for this life or for the 
life to come. And these principles may be understood by all. No one with a spirit to 
appreciate its teaching can read a single passage from the Bible without gaining from it 
some helpful thought. But the most valuable teaching of the Bible is not to be gained by 
occasional or disconnected study. Its great system of truth is not so presented as to be 
discerned by the hasty or careless reader. Many of its treasures lie far beneath the surface, 
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serve as resources without superimposing external principles, methods, or resources on 
biblical truth.
149
  Perhaps Herbert E. Douglass is right when he mentions that White’s 
organizing principle (the great controversy theme) “transcends the tension, paradoxes, 
and antinomies of conventional philosophy and theology.”150   
From another perspective, White’s approach to theology as a defining moment in 
the history of Christian thought can be seen in the elegant and coherent manner in which 
she encapsulates all the great biblical themes under the great controversy theme, thereby 
assigning all the biblical themes great importance, creating awareness of the importance 
of human moral conduct, and making the credibility of God the central issue in human 
history.  Thus, her explanation of the problem of evil, based on Scripture, is an alternative 
to theological systems based on external philosophical principles and methods, which are 
inadequate answers to life’s questions.151   
                                                 
and can be obtained only by diligent research and continuous effort. The truths that go to 
make up the great whole must be searched out and gathered up, ‘here a little, and there a 
little,’ Isa 28:10” (E. G. White, Education, 123).  
148
E. G. White, Selected Messages, 3:29.  
149E. G. White, “Be Separated.”  “When you search the Scriptures with an earnest 
desire to learn the truth, God will breathe His Spirit into your heart and impress your 
mind with the light of His word. The Bible is its own interpreter, one passage explaining 
another. By comparing scriptures referring to the same subjects, you will see beauty and 
harmony of which you have never dreamed. There is no other book whose perusal 
strengthens and enlarges, elevates and ennobles the mind, as does the perusal of this 
Book of books. Its study imparts new vigor to the mind, which is thus brought in contact 
with subjects requiring earnest thought, and is drawn out in prayer to God for power to 
comprehend the truths revealed. If the mind is left to deal with commonplace subjects, 
instead of deep and difficult problems, it will become narrowed down to the standard of 
the matter which it contemplates and will finally lose its power of expansion” (E. G. 
White, Testimonies for the Church, 4:499). 
150
Douglass, The Messenger of the Lord, 260.  
151
E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 522, 525; idem, The Desire of Ages, 478.   
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Fritz Guy points out that White draws attention to certain scriptural themes which 
are otherwise undervalued or overlooked in the history of Christian thought; among these 
themes is the warfare concept as a solution to the problem of evil.
152
  This seems to 
designate White as one who comprehensively articulates the warfare motif.  Not only did 
she expound on the warfare worldview, but she reintroduced it into a world awakening 
from the slumber of deism—a worldview that interpreted evil and the devil as outdated 
mythology.  Boyd eloquently accentuates White’s contribution to the history of Christian 
theology this way: “Ellen White . . . integrated a warfare perspective into the problem of 
evil and the doctrine of God perhaps more thoroughly than anyone else in church 
history.”153 
Besides White’s contribution to the history of Christian theology, her organizing 
principle plays a formative role in the Seventh-day Adventist Church.  According to Guy, 
White’s “theological inspiration of Adventist community” sets a “theological agenda by 
directing its continuing attention to the subjects that might otherwise have been ignored 
or misunderstood by Adventists.”154    
The elegance with which White presents her arguments and her contribution to 
theology does not necessarily indicate the plausibility of her explanation of the problem 
of evil.  Such an assessment depends entirely on the internal consistency and coherency  
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of her model of warfare theodicy.  The rest of this section engages in this task by 
critically examining the origin of sin and evil, natural evil, and the eradication of sin and 
evil, as formulated by White. 
 
Origin of Sin and Evil  
 
It was evident in the analysis of the Great Controversy Theodicy that White 
attributes the origin of sin and evil to rebellious angels and then to Adam and Eve.  She 
draws on biblical passages to establish the reality of angels, divine sovereignty over 
them, and the harmony that existed before the rebellion.
155
 Based on Isaiah’s song against 
the king of Babylon (Isa 14:12-15) and Ezekiel’s oracle against the prince of Tyre (Ezek 
28:11-19),
156
 she identifies the originator of sin and evil and describes how it began.  She 
also uses the literal reading of Gen 1-3 as the basis for her understanding of the creation 
of the earth and how it became infested with sin and evil.
157
  But developments in science 
and accompanying metaphysical changes have challenged this understanding of the 
origin of sin and evil. 
                                                 
155
Based on passages such as Job 38:7; Pss 8:5; 103:19-21; Heb 12:22; Matt 28:3; 
4; and Ezek1:14, she draws the conclusion that the reality of the existence of created 
heavenly beings and the sovereignty of God over them prior to the creation of the earth is 
an unquestionable fact. Relying on the great commandment to love God and fellow 
humans (Mark 12:30-31), she presupposes this commandment to be the foundation of 
God’s government over the entire universe. She then perceives that, when the 
commandment of God is observed, peace and tranquility ensue.  As a result, harmony 
existed between the created heavenly beings and their Creator and among the creatures 
before the intrusion of sin. See chapter 4, the section “Origin of Sin and Evil.” 
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See Chapter 4, the section “Creation.”  
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At the turn of the nineteenth century, the classical interpretation of Satan as the 
first rebellious angel of Isa 14:12-15 and Ezek 28:11-19 was challenged.  With the 
availability of critical methods and comparative materials, some biblical theologians 
rejected the Satan view for the mythological view.  They argued that the passages are 
replicas of the myths of the ancient Near Eastern cultures; therefore they have nothing to 
do with the origin of sin or Satan.
158
   
In his study of the biblical passages in view of the light of alleged origins and 
parallel materials of the ancient Near Eastern cultures and the biblical content, Jose M. 
Bertoluci has argued strongly that, although there are similarities in motifs and imagery 
between the two biblical passages and ancient world cultures, the biblical passages are 
unique compositions making use of widely known ancient cultures.
159
  According to him, 
no myth of Hele ben Shahar (Lucifer, son of the morning) or guardian cherub with so 
many details, such as in Isaiah’s song and Ezekiel’s oracle, has been found.160  
Furthermore, he contends that there are no substantial elements in the passages to relate 
the figure to a reasonable immediate historical figure.
161
  The events of the two passages 
transcend the earthly realm and show tension between the earthly and cosmic dimension 
and a struggle between good and evil.  Bertoluci explains that the Satan view is supported  
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by the language, the literary structure (chiastic and typology), the immediate and larger 
context of the passages and the Bible as a whole, and the prophets’ awareness of the 
existence of heavenly beings.  He writes, “God, through his prophets, chose the 
expressions, King of Babylon and King of Tyre to portray the being who was the 
originator of evil and propelling force behind every effort to disturb order in God’s 
universe.”162   
Griffin, who rejects a literal view of Satan, argues that “taken as a mythological 
formulation . . . the idea of a demonic power of universal scope expresses a deep truth, 
one that the church in our time needs to make central to its understanding of its mission.  
This is the idea that human civilization, and thereby each of us within it, is now under 
subjugation to demonic power.”163 
A literal understanding of the Genesis account of creation and the fall of humans, 
such as held by White, is rejected by some scholars because it is regarded as inconsistent 
with the scientific records of earth’s history.  The desire to defend the goodness of God in 
the midst of evil and the eagerness to harmonize the scientific discoveries with the 
biblical narrative of the beginnings has generated various theories of the origin of sin and 
evil on planet Earth.
164
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Jon D. Levenson has argued strongly that the literal reading of the creation 
narrative creates inconsistency, and such inconsistency is resolved when creation is 
perceived as out of circumscribed chaos.
165
  Logically, the doctrine of the fall is also 
rejected.  According to Arthur Peacocke, “the traditional interpretation of the third 
chapter of Genesis that there was a historical ‘Fall,’ an action by our human progenitors 
that is the explanation of biological death, has to be rejected. . . . There was no golden 
age, no perfect past, no individuals, ‘Adam’ or ‘Eve’ from whom all human beings have 
descended and declined and who were perfect in their relationships and behavior.”166  In 
spite of these arguments, White’s literal understanding of creation and the fall of humans 
in explaining the origin of sin and evil may prove weighty in light of advocates and 
statements from some opponents of a literal reading of Gen 1-3. 
Richard M. Davidson has pointed out that, in the reading of Gen 1:1-2, there is the 
possible openness to “no gap” and “passive gap” theories, but there is no indication of a 
chaotic condition.
 167
  As already mentioned, Walton argues that Gen 1:1-2 is a 
nonfunctional material that was originated by God at some point, and Gen 1:3ff. as 
functional creation in Gen1:3ff.
168
  Both authors describe Gen 1:1-2 as uninhabited waste 
with no life, including birds, animals, vegetation, and no predation.  Accordingly, the 
ecological imbalance, death, and animal suffering are the result of the fall described in  
Gen 3.   
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John Polkinghorne and David Griffin reject the literal and straightforward 
understanding of the fall, but they claim that, although the story is a myth, it carries deep 
truth about the human condition.
169
  In an attempt to reiterate the importance of the literal 
understanding of the fall of Adam and Eve, Walter Rauschenbusch maintains that, 
although lost to the rationalism of the Enlightenment, the biblical story of the fall of 
Adam and Eve is rich in significance.
170
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John Walton, The Lost World of Genesis One, 44.  
169
John Polkinghorne, in his attempt to reconcile the fall with scientific thought, 
writes, “The marvelously subtle story of Genesis 3 is not altogether inhospitable (under 
its mode of mythic discourse) to the accommodation of these [scientific] insights. . . . The 
fundamental aspect of the Fall is the moral act of the rebellious refusal of creaturely 
status, the desire ‘to be like God’ (Genesis 3.5). How that came about we do not know. It 
is clearly present in us today, transmitted culturally and even, conceivably, partly 
genetically” (John Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science 
and Theology [Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991], 100).  David Griffin 
makes a similar remark when he writes, “Although the world is essentially good and 
although human beings lived for a long time in what would, compared with later 
conditions, be recalled as a state of paradise, human existence did, only a few thousand 
years ago with the rise of civilization, suffer a fall into an alienated state.  In this 
alienated sate, the relative harmony of previous human communities was replaced by a 
mode of existence involving war, patriarchy, slavery, destruction of the environment, and 
a division between the rich and the poor, with the former oppressing the latter” (Griffin, 
The Two Great Truths, 34). 
170
In his defense of the doctrine of the original sin against scholars like Lyman 
Abbott (who claimed the “fall is not an historic act of disobedience by the parents of our 
race in some prehistoric age, through which a sinful nature has descended or been 
imparted to all their descendants. It is the conscious and deliberate descent of the 
individual soul from the vantage ground of a higher life to the life of the animal from 
which he had been uplifted” (Lyman Abbott, The Evolution of Christianity [New York: 
Doubleday, 1894], 227), Walter Rauschenbusch wrote, “It is one of the few attempts of 
individualistic theology to get a solidaristic view of its field work. This doctrine views 
the race as a great unity, descended from a single head, and knit together through all ages 
by unity of origin and blood. This natural unity is the basis and carrier for the 
transmission and universality of sin” (Walter Rauschenbusch, A Theology for the Social 
Gospel [New York: Abingdon Press, 1917], 57-58). 
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From the above comments of scholars who reject and those who affirm the literal 
reading of Ezek 28:11-19 and Isa 14:12-15, creation, and the fall, White’s concept of the 
origin of sin and evil, on the one hand, is consistent and coherent.
171
  In her dialogue with 
scientific discoveries of the nineteenth century, she refutes the idea that the earth slowly 
evolved from chaos and that creation came about as a result of natural cause.  However, 
in all these discussions she never used the term “ex nihilo” or “out of nothing.”  Even in 
her exposition on creation these terms are absent, though she affirms the traditional 
understanding of creation.  But, in her comparison of the Creator and human artist, she 
points out that the artist depends on materials already prepared for his/her work, but the 
Creator “was not beholden to preexistent substance or matter.”172   
In spite of the significance of the literal understanding of creation mentioned 
above, Griffin maintains that it incriminates God of unnecessary evils.
173
  While the issue 
of unnecessary evils will be discussed in the next section, it is important, at this point, to 
note that a coherent concept of the origin of sin and evil means a reliance on the biblical 
                                                 
171
Discussing the relationship between the fall in Gen 3 and Ezek 28, Joseph 
Blenkinsopp argues that, although both passages describe different events, they point to 
deviation from the original purpose of creation and the corruption of an intelligent 
creature. Joseph Blenkinsopp, Ezekiel, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching 
and Preaching, vol. 13 (Louisville, KY: John Knox Press, 1990), 125. 
172
Ellen G. White, The Upward Look (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 
1982), 340. 
173
Griffin argues that the traditional understanding of the creation story, which 
suggests creatio ex nihilo, implies that God “can unilaterally bring a world that is just like 
ours except for being free of at least most of those things that we normally consider 
unnecessary evils, such as cancer, earthquakes, hurricanes, nuclear weapons, rape, 
murder, and genocide” (Griffin, “Creation out of Chaos and the Problem of Evil,” 115). 
More will be said on what Griffin considers as unnecessary evils in White when I 
evaluate her concept of natural evil.   
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narrative of creation, the fall of Satan, and the fall of humans.  Evidently, White’s view of 
the origin of sin and evil has far-reaching theological implications that set her model of 
warfare theodicy apart from other Christian explanations of the problem of evil.  Her use 
of biblical narrative as the basis for her understanding of the origin of sin and evil is a 
reflection of her historical view of the first eleven chapters of Genesis.  The effect of this 
is the affirmation of the primacy of Scripture on the issue of origins.
174
  According to 
William R. Stoeger, theology and philosophy can affect natural sciences positively and 
vice versa.  However, he recognizes that natural science is burdened with limitations.  
Having listed the limitations of natural science (among the list is the ultimate question 
about origin),
175
 he reflects, “philosophy and theology cannot deal adequately with some 
                                                 
174Discussing the literal week of creation, White writes, “When professedly 
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(Livingston, Modern Christian Thought, 251). See also Leonard Brand, “The Integration 
of Faith and Science,” Perspective Digest 12 (2007): 5. 
175Stoeger lists the limitations of natural sciences as follows: “They cannot deal 
with ultimate questions, for example, why there is something rather than nothing, or why 
there is this type of order rather than some other type of order. . . . They therefore cannot 
deal with ultimate origins such as the ultimate origin of the regularities, relationships and 
processes we discover in reality. . . . They cannot deal directly with values, or with what 
endows our lives with value, orientation and meaning. . . . They cannot deal with events 
or situations which are particular, and therefore cannot be subsumed under a general law. 
. . . They cannot deal with personal relationships as such. . . . They are not equipped to 
deal directly or critically with experiences, data, or patterns which are claimed or 
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of these categories either.  But they have the methods both to explore the terrain involved 
and to focus our critical reflection on recognizing what it is that transcends our 
understanding and its importance for values and meaning.”176  
Stoeger’s reflection coheres with White’s insistence on making the biblical 
narratives on origins weightier than the natural science worldview.  Her argument is that 
nature is the creation of God and it reveals something about God.  However, nature 
marred by the curse of sin “can bear but an imperfect testimony regarding the Creator”; 
and human beings, whose reasoning power is darkened by sin, can “no longer discern the 
character of God in the works of His hand.”  On the other hand, the Bible is the inspired 
word of God, a clearer revelation of the personality and character of God.
177
  On this 
understanding of nature, humans, and the Bible, she believes that the “Bible is not to be 
tested by men’s ideas of science but science is to be brought to the test of the unerring 
standard.”178   
Though White believes there can be harmony between faith and science, she 
encourages that theologians must not adjust theological concepts to naturalistic world 
views and human philosophies that contradict the Bible, but allow such views to 
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transcendence” (William R. Stoeger S. J., “Evolution, God, and Natural Evil,” in Can 
Nature Be Evil or Evil Natural? ed. Cornel W. Toit [Pretoria, South Africa: University of 
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challenge an interpretation that leads to a conscientious study of the Scriptures, and vice 
versa, particularly on the origin of sin and evil.  This is evident in her emphasis on the 
biblical description of the origin of sin and evil in spite of scientific discoveries that 
render the biblical account invalid.  
In spite of the logical consistency of her theory of the origin of the sin and evil, 
some questions are left unanswered in light of her concepts of divine foreknowledge and 
sovereignty.  The analysis established that, in White, divine foreknowledge is exhaustive 
and definite.  In his research for his forthcoming book,
179
 Boyd claims to have uncovered 
the reason why some scholars argue for exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  According to 
his findings, exhaustive definite foreknowledge is argued on the basis of the erroneous 
Platonic principle that considers knowing as acting on something.
180
  
                                                 
178Ellen G. White, “Science and Revelation,” Signs of the Times, March 13, 1884, 
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179
Boyd says that his forthcoming book, The Myth of the Blueprint, is due to be 
published by InterVarsity Press by 2011 or 2012.  It is the promised third volume in the 
Satan and Evil series.  
180“First, Plato argued that we see not by light entering our eyes (as we now know 
is the case) but by light proceeding out of our eyes (Timaeus 45b). For Plato, seeing is an 
active, not a passive, process. Since knowledge was considered to be a kind of seeing, 
Plato also construed knowing as acting on something rather than being acted upon 
(Sophist 248-49). I’ve discovered that this mistaken view of seeing and knowing is 
picked up and defended by a host of Hellenistic philosophers. (As an aside, Jesus seems 
to have capitalized on this mistaken view of eyesight to illustrate a point [Mt 6:22; Lk 
11:34]).” 
“Second, several Neoplatonistic philosophers (Iamblichus, Proclus and 
Ammonius) used this theory of eyesight and knowing to explain how the gods can 
foreknow future free actions. They argued that the nature of divine knowledge is 
determined not by what is known but by the nature of the knower. Since they assumed 
the gods were absolutely unchanging, they concluded that the gods knew things in an 
absolutely unchanging manner, despite the fact that the reality the gods know is in fact 
perpetually changing. This allowed them to affirm that the future partly consisted of 
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While this may be true with other models of divine foreknowledge, such as the 
Calvinist model, the same cannot be said about White’s position.  Her conceptualization 
of divine foreknowledge appears to be different from these other views.  I have noted 
that, for White, God foreknows not by imposing His ideas on an object by predestining 
the cause of action the object must take, but the object providing what is to be known 
about it.
181
  Since, according to White, this activity took place prior to the existence of 
creatures, it is not analogical to human perceptual knowledge or other faculties, such as 
deductive and inductive reasoning and intuition.
182
  While her model posits some faculty 
that is unknown to humans, it enables her to affirm divine exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge and agents’ free will without suggesting fatalism or limiting one at the 
expense of the other.  According to Boyd, the affirmation of such a model of divine 
foreknowledge posits that “from all eternity he has seen what was coming. . . .  And he 
can even foresee the suffering, the unending plight of the damned. . . . But he cannot do 
                                                 
indefinite (aoristos) truths (viz. open possibilities) while nevertheless insisting that the 
gods knew the future in an exhaustively definite, unchanging way.” 
“The view is, I’m convinced, completely incoherent. But one can understand how 
these philosophers arrived at it in light of their mistaken assumptions about seeing and 
knowing as wholly active processes. What the gods see when they look at the future 
conforms to the unchanging nature of the gods rather than the changing nature of the 
future they see. Through the influence of Augustine and especially Boethius (who 
explicitly espoused the ancient view of seeing and knowing and repeated some of the 
Neoplatonic arguments), this way of “reconciling” foreknowledge and free will quickly 
established itself as the dominant view in the Christian tradition” (Boyd, “An Ancient 
Philosophical Mistake in the Debate about Open Theism,” Christus Victor Ministries, 
http://www.gregboyd.org/blog (accessed October 1, 2008). 
181See chapter 3, section “Content of Divine Foreknowledge.” 
182The Psalmist’s realization of God’s knowledge of man makes mention of the 
fact that God’s foreknowledge is perceptual activity performed in eternity. “Your eyes 
saw my substance, being yet unformed. And in Your book they all were written, The days 
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anything ahead of time to avoid them.”  Thus, the difficult question that arises from 
White’s concept of the origin of sin and evil in relation to divine exhaustive definite 
foreknowledge is why God created Lucifer, who He foreknew would rebel against Him.  
Why didn’t God alter the creation of Lucifer to avert sin and evil? 
White argues that God could have destroyed Lucifer at the beginning of his 
insinuation.  In this sense, God had alternative ways of dealing with Lucifer’s accusations 
against His government.  But God chose to allow Lucifer to live and respond to his 
insinuation.  As evidence in the analysis of the great controversy, White’s model of 
divine foreknowledge requires that divine sovereignty must be providential.  Hence, 
rather than conceiving omnipotence in terms of logical possibilities and impossibilities,
183
 
she dwells on the nature of God, who He is, and what He is, so that omnipotence means 
God is the source, the ground, and the possessor of all the power there is.  He acts within 
His rational and moral nature.  Thus, omnipotence is seen as God’s ability to call the 
worlds into existence and sustain them, and to react to the challenges of His enemies 
without making intelligent beings automatons or silencing them.
184
  From this  
perspective, one may be inclined to assume God would have chosen to create the earth 
with radically different material which would block Lucifer from interacting with planet 
                                                 
fashioned for me, when as yet there were none of them” (Ps 139:16). He also indicates 
that God’s cognitive activity is a mystery to him (Ps 139:6). 
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Some scholars have pointed out that discussing divine omnipotence in the 
context of contradictions, such as can God create rock so heavy that He cannot lift it, 
does not belong to a serious discourse on divine omnipotence.  See Addison H. Leitch, 
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Earth.  God could have set intelligent beings who are superior to angels as stewards of the 
earth.  But God chose a lower form of intelligent creatures, the human race, as stewards 
of the earth.  It is true that White mentions that planet Earth is part of God’s response to 
Lucifer’s assault on His character.  It is also evidence that her understanding of the  
difference between angels and humans has to do with the glory and power and not their 
intelligence and/or free will.
185
  Thus, God would not have been true to His nature had He 
chosen creatures with superior intelligence and/or free will to angels as stewards of the 
earth.  Although these are justified reasons for why God did not choose creatures superior 
to angels to be stewards of the earth, they do not answer the question, Why did God 
choose human beings who He foreknew would yield to Lucifer’s deception as stewards 
of the earth and not some creatures who could have withstood Lucifer’s deception?  
According to Nancey Murphy, such questions “call for a blank slate with regard to our 
general knowledge reality. . . . They are beyond our capacity fully to imagine them.  
Without even being able to picture the situation, we are entirely unable to form a 
judgment as to whether it is possible at all. . . . They are not just unanswerable but . . . 
imponderable because we do not even know what would be involved in trying to answer 
them.”186  Hence, the consistency and coherency of an explanation of the origin of sin 
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and evil do not suggest that all the philosophical questions pertaining to the origin of sin 
and evil and the nature of God are answered.   
The evaluation of the Great Controversy Theodicy, thus far, has demonstrated the 
internal consistency and coherency within White’s concept of the origin of sin and evil; it 
has shown that White’s concept of the origin of sin and evil leaves some questions 
unanswered.  The next section extends the evaluation of the great controversy to natural 
evils. 
 
Natural Evil 
 
I noted in the previous section that the evaluation of White’s concept of the origin 
of sin and evil raises the question of natural evil in its various forms.  The issue is 
whether White’s literal reading of creation and the fall of humans adequately explains the 
forms of evil that are not the result of human violation.  
Stoeger describes the difficulty in affirming the literal understanding of creation 
and the fall in light of natural evil when he argues that, if the reality of human freedom 
(ability to respond to God and to other creatures with love and commitment, leading to 
eventual personal and social communion with God) is accepted, there are no complaints 
about moral evil.
187
  According to his reasoning, the misuse of an angel (Lucifer) or 
human freedom is a tenable explanation of moral evil; however, attributing natural evil to 
misuse of free will “poses nearly insuperable scientific and theological problems – much 
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more serious than the problem it claims to solve.”188  Thus, White’s concept of the origin 
of sin and evil adequately and consistently deals with moral evil.  However, it encounters 
difficulties, according to Stoeger’s critique on the issue of natural events, such as “mass 
extinctions, pervasive transience, upheavals, catastrophes, deaths, disappearances, 
etcetera which have marked the history of the universe and of the world.”189    
In White, creation not only means creation was not made from preexistent 
substance, but it also implies that, while creation cannot be equated with God, nothing 
made is intrinsically evil.  I have also noted that it is fundamental to her understanding of 
the fall that ungodly characteristics or imperfections in nature developed with the 
disobedience of the human race.  In other words, the whole of creation has been affected 
by the sin of humanity.  Consequently, the whole host of natural evil directly or remotely 
results from the disobedience to the laws of God and/or human actions.
190
 
White’s understanding of natural evil appears to be in disagreement with the 
belief that evils in nature are the result of the laws that govern nature.
191
  According to 
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Don Howard, blaming nature or the laws of nature for natural evils is an evasion of 
responsibility.  He explains that “with the progress of science, ever more of the blame for 
much of the suffering previously deemed a consequence of natural evil will have to be 
accorded to human action or the lack thereof.”192  Howard’s comment seems to show that 
not only does White maintain constancy in relying on Scriptures in addressing issues of 
origins, but also science agrees with her concept of natural evil.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean her theodicy is coherent in its entirety.  There is, therefore, the need to 
subject natural evil in White to further evaluation in lieu of some issues that Marilyn 
                                                 
others, eds., Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural 
Evil (Vatican City State and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for 
Theology and the Natural Sciences, 2007). Some of these scholars recognize that science 
offers a far-off future that is bleak; therefore, for a complete explanation of natural evil in 
the context of natural sciences they suggest a robust eschaton on the basis of biblical 
eschatology. For example, after investigating several literatures on the explanation of 
natural evil in the context of evolution theory, Christopher Southgate observes that the 
approaches make the issue of natural evil more complex.  According to him, such 
explanations of natural evil encounter ontological and teleological difficulties.  Therefore, 
he proposes that an adequate theodicy in the light of Darwinism must incorporate a 
soteriology that emphasizes that “(a) God does not abandon the victims of evolution and 
(b) humans have a calling, stemming from the transformative power of Christ’s action on 
the cross, to participate in the healing of the world” (Christopher Southgate, “God and 
Evolutionary Evil: Theodicy in the Light of Darwinism,” Zygon 37 [2002]: 817). This 
article is developed into Southgate’s The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the 
Problem of Evil (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2008).  While I share 
Southgate’s passion for redemptive eschatology, eschatology does deal with the 
ontological and teleological difficulties of evolution theodicy.  The cross does not 
absolve a good and loving God from initiating such a horrendous process.  If, according 
to evolution theodicy, everything is evolving upward and getting better, neither the cross 
nor healing is necessary.  Intervening with the cross to redeem the process suggests that 
God was ignorant about what the process entailed when He initiated it.  Other difficulties 
can be mentioned, but ultimately the issue at hand has to do with whether an explanation 
of natural evil in the light of Darwinism portrays the seriousness of sin and evil and the 
importance of Christ and the cross.  
192Don Howard, “Physics as Theodicy,” 329.  
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McCord Adams raises against free will theodicies such as the Great Controversy 
Theodicy. 
First, Adams contends that “the dignity of human nature and self-determining 
action” in free will theodicies, such as White’s, “are taken to be so great as to outweigh 
or defeat evil side effects or means.”  However, she points out from observation that 
“human history is riddled with horrendous evil”; humans find it easy to cause evil, and 
their ability to cause evil exceeds their ability to experience them and power to 
understand them.
193
  Hence, she concludes that “free fall theodicies, so far from denying 
human vulnerability to horrors, make it an aspect of the primordial human condition.”194      
Second, Adams’s argument against free fall theodicies has to do with responsibility.  
According to her, the shifting of responsibility for evil from God to humans fails on the 
grounds that the human inability to experience evil in the same degree as they cause evil 
means they cannot bear full responsibility for evil and do not control the features of 
human nature and the environment.
195
      
Reflecting on the difficulties mentioned by Adams in the light of White’s 
understanding of the free fall, a few points come to mind.  Her model of warfare theodicy 
rebuts criticisms that Adams raises against theodicies that point to the misuse of free will 
as the origination of sin and evil.  It was evident in my analysis of the Great Controversy 
Theodicy that White believes that the first humans were liable to being affected by Satan,  
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but she does not agree that they were entrenched in horrors of evil.  Their character was 
not biased to evil and they had angels as their instructors.  In spite of the provision made 
for them, they obeyed Satan and drew the whole progeny and its environment into 
decay.
196
  It was also noted that, while creation was not restored, the discerning properties 
of free will, which were lost through disobedience, were restored to every human creature 
through prevenient grace.
197
  However, Adams observes that “we human beings start life 
ignorant, weak, and helpless, psychologically so lacking in a self-concept as to be 
incapable of decisions.  We learn to “construct a picture of the world, ourselves, and 
other people only with difficulty over a long period of time and under the extensive 
influence of other nonideal choosers.”198  White’s concept of prevenient grace does not 
deny that human beings are developmental creatures nor does it affirm that human 
beings’ immature beginnings199 mean every human being reaches adulthood in a state of 
impaired free will.  Rather, prevenient grace, in White, is analogous to a mother nurturing 
her newborn until the child can make decisions on his or her own.  Thus, prevenient grace 
awakens human beings to recognize the gap the human beings’ disobedience has created 
between them and God, and their need for God.
200
  
                                                 
196See chapter 4, the section “Creation.” 
197See chapter 4, the section “Nature of Free Will.”     
198
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of God, 37.  
199
Immature beginnings refers to the human state at the start of life as described 
by Adams.  
200
The idea of nurturing an infant from birth to the stage a child is mature enough 
to construct the world as a place containing the big powerful authority figure who holds it 
accountable for obedience and disobedience with rewards and punishment as a model of 
divine prevenient grace is borrowed from Julian of Norwich’s exposition on God’s love 
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According to Terrence W. Tilley, when free will is understood in a libertarian 
sense, an affirmation of prevenient grace is necessary to dissolve the compatibility issues 
between contracausal actions and default of free will flowing from the first human 
parents.  However, if prevenient “grace were said to ‘strengthen’ the will of some, but not 
others,” questions of inconsistency would arise regarding free will and divine 
sovereignty.
201
  Logically, to avoid such difficulties arising from affirming prevenient 
grace and divine sovereignty, prevenient grace must necessarily extend to all fallen 
human beings and have the potential to illuminate the mind and be resistible.  This is 
“evangelical synergism” by virtue of Arminius’s exposition on soteriology.202 
White seems to emphasize the universality and human ability to resist prevenient 
grace.  However, some issues are unresolved in White when considering the illuminating 
aspect of prevenient grace.  Her discussion of the many facets of prevenient grace—
convicting, calling, enlightening, and enabling—does not include all humans.  First, 
individuals who are born with severe mental retardation, persons who live a long life yet 
their mental capacity falls below the threshold of consciousness are not subjects of 
prevenient grace because they are mentally retarded and are without consciousness of sin. 
                                                 
for sinners (Julian of Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, trans. Clifton Wolters 
[London: Penguin Books, 1966]).     
201Terrence W. Tilley, “Towards a Creativity Defense of Belief in God in the Face 
of Evil,” in Physics and Cosmology: Scientific Perspectives on the Problem of Natural 
Evil, vol. 1, ed. Nancey Murphy, Robert John Russell, and William R. Stoeger (Vatican 
City State and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences, 2007), 201-202. 
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However, according to White, they will be saved.
203
  Second, White makes it clear that 
little children are “not subjects of grace,” do not “experience the cleansing power of the 
blood of Jesus.”204  Thus, little children do not experience the illuminating power of the 
prevenient grace when they die prematurely.  Indeed, on these two counts, White’s 
concept of prevenient grace’s ability to unbind the fallen free will, though universal, is 
not experienced by all humans who ever lived.  In her discussion on the resurrection of 
little children, she indicates that unruly children will not be saved.
205
  In White’s system, 
there is no post-mortem world in which these unruly children will have the opportunity to 
experience the illuminative power of prevenient grace.  Thus, she does not show how 
prevenient grace (the first step in salvation) is or is not initiated in the process of 
condemning the unruly little children who die before they reach the age of making their 
own decision.
206
  Thus, if people such as mentally retarded and infants are without  
                                                 
203In a letter to Sister Brown, White writes, “In regard to the case of A, you see 
him as he now is and deplore his simplicity. He is without the consciousness of sin. The 
grace of God will remove all this hereditary, transmitted imbecility, and he will have an 
inheritance among the saints in light. To you the Lord has given reason. A is a child as far 
as the capacity of reason is concerned; but he has the submission and obedience of a 
child” (E. G. White, Manuscript Releases, 8:210). 
204Ellen G. White, “Duty of Parents to Their Children,” Review and Herald, 
September 19, 1854, 6.  
205
Ibid.; idem, Selected Message, 3:314.  
206
The faith of the believing parents covers their little infants who die 
prematurely; however, unruly children of believing parents will not be saved. It seems 
that little infants whose parents are believers are saved based on how their parents 
brought them up. White states: “Parents stand in the place of God to their children and 
they will have to render an account, whether they have been faithful to the little few 
committed to their trust. Parents, some of you are rearing children to be cut down by the 
destroying angel, unless you speedily change your course, and be faithful to them. God 
cannot cover iniquity, even in children. He cannot love unruly children who manifest 
passion, and he cannot save them in the time of trouble” (E. G. White, “Duty of Parents 
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consciousness of sin and for that matter are not subjects of prevenient grace, how are the 
unruly infants condemned to death eternal? 
Although her concept of prevenient grace leaves some questions unanswered, the 
combination of a literal understanding of creation and the fall, libertarian free will, and 
prevenient grace in White has far-reaching theological implications which set her on a 
path of proposing a plausible free will theodicy in the context of warfare.  First, even 
though her system grants that fallen humans begin immaturely, before everyone 
(excluding severely mentally retarded persons) decides the path to take, the individual 
has the ability to choose either good or evil and the ability to experience evil and to cause 
evil.  Second, the imbalance between human ability to experience evil and cause evil is 
evidence that humans after the fall are born with evil propensities and they persist in 
resisting prevenient grace and all other forms of grace made available to humankind.
207
  
Third, because of human beings’ immature beginnings and prevenient grace, 
responsibility for evil is shared by God, Satan, and all other intelligent creatures who play 
                                                 
to Their Children,” 6). “Whether all the children of unbelieving parents will be saved we 
cannot tell, because God has not made known His purpose in regard to this matter, and 
we had better leave it where God has left it and dwell upon subjects made plain in His 
Word.  This is a most delicate subject. Many unbelieving parents manage their children 
with greater wisdom than many of those who claim to be children of God. They take 
much pains with their children, to make them kind, courteous, unselfish and to teach 
them to obey, and in this the unbelieving show greater wisdom than those parents who 
have the great light of truth but whose works do not in any wise correspond with their 
faith” (E. G. White, Selected Messages, 3:315). 
207
White uses Solomon as an example of what persistent disobedience to God 
causes when she wrote, “As he cast off his allegiance to God, he lost the mastery of 
himself. His moral efficiency was gone. His fine sensibilities became blunted, his 
conscience seared” (E. G. White, Prophets and Kings, 57). 
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a role in the cosmic conflict.
208
  In this way, the Great Controversy Theodicy is freed 
from the twin-anthropodicy criticisms; there is neither purely negative assessment nor 
justification of the human race in the Great Controversy Theodicy.
209
   
Another issue that Adams raises against the free will explanation of the problem 
of evil has to do with divine punishment.  According to her, “retribution is a matter of 
proportion,” but the “notion of proportionate return demanded by the lex talionis . . . 
breaks down in ordinary cases where numbers are large.”  However, in the case of evils 
that “we cause but unavoidably lack the capacity to experience,” proportionate return 
loses its definition from the kind.  Citing “an eye for an eye,” she argues that, even in a 
case where retribution is balanced, it does not serve justice.  In other words, “to return 
horror for horror does not erase but doubles the individual’s participation in horrors—
first as victim, then as the one whose injury occasions another’s prima facie ruin.”  
Consequently, Adams observes that retribution for evil does not “vindicate Divine 
goodness to perpetrators of horrors in the sense of guaranteeing each perpetrator a life 
                                                 
208White questions parents, “Will you suffer your children to be lost through your 
neglect? Unfaithful parents, their blood will be upon you, and is not your salvation 
doubtful with the blood of your children upon you? Children that might have been saved 
had you filled your place, and done your duty as faithful parents should” (E. G. White, 
“Duty of Parents to Their Children,” 5).    
209Crenshaw argues that “regardless of the theodicy that we choose, one thing 
seems certain. Both God and humankind present problems.  Theodicy therefore has a 
twin-anthropodicy. Any attempt to justify human conduct must confront evidence of evil 
every bit as horrendous as the evil we would see on the part of God. Evidence that men 
and women are fundamentally flawed is irrefutable. . . . Still, a purely negative 
assessment of the human community, like a straight verdict of guilt for the deity, must be 
judged myopic in light of the redeeming goodness of a few” (Crenshaw, Defending God, 
195).  
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that is a great good to him/her on the whole and a life in which participation in horrors is 
defeated within the context of the individual’s life.”  It multiplies evil’s victories.210   
White’s views on evils as punishment for sin, proving loyalty, and character 
development seem to ward off Adams’s third point.  Her view of divine sovereign 
activities in human history after the fall, which begins with prevenient grace, continues in 
the form of the ministry of Christ and the Holy Spirit in whoever chooses God.  Her 
argument describes God as a moral governor and recognizes a gap between humans and 
God which can be closed through divine sovereign activities and human cooperation.  On 
this interpretation of the gap between God and humans, she notes that God’s nurturing 
process may include pain and suffering that is necessary because of fallen human 
conditions.
211
  Therefore, her system sees evil as punishing and curbing sin, proving 
loyalty and character development as a restorative process for victims as well as 
perpetrators of evil.  However, the restorative benefits affect the individuals who respond 
to divine nurturing embraces no matter the immensity of the suffering and pain associated 
with the process may be.  
White’s view on divine permission for evil in an individual’s life as a restorative 
process raises two potential problems for her theodicy.  First, it seems to put her concept 
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Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of God, 40-42. 
211Adams argues that focusing on moral categories levels “divine-human agency 
under the rubric ‘morally responsible person,’ into viewing God and rational creatures as 
‘near enough’ peers not only to be networked by mutual rights and obligations, but also 
to make urgent the concern that significant causal input from God might threaten 
creaturely autonomy” (Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of 
God, 103). On the contrary, White’s idea of a moral governor and His sovereign activities 
and her recognition of the differences between God and fallen human beings make God a 
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of hell at risk of disintegrating.  More will be said about her concept of hell in the next 
section.  For now, it suffices to observe that, in White, the divine reason for punishing sin 
is different from His purpose for hell.   
Second, it seems to enforce the issue of the gratuity of evil.
212
  White claims that 
God has a purpose for our good when He permits evil in our lives, yet there appears to be 
gratuity of evil in the world.
213
  That is to say, the “compatibility of God and the apparent 
pointlessness of much evil is questionable.”214  Discussing the gratuity of evil, Michael L. 
Peterson argues that it is not a logical problem.  According to him, “What is being argued 
is a probabilistic conclusion based on an assessment of evidence in light of one’s moral 
values, ontological commitments, and so on.”  Hence, what is needed is a theodicy that 
shows “why apparently meaningless evil is not really meaningless and thus that we are 
intellectually responsible in holding to the existence of a providential God.”215  
In the light of Peterson’s understanding of the requirements of the question of the 
gratuity of evil, White’s treatment of gratuitous evil may be more convincing than 
scholars who, according to Peterson, respond to argument from the apparent gratuity of 
                                                 
personal being who, based on His nature, draws the fallen human race to Himself by 
using methods that do not coerce, but enable and empower. 
212E. H. Madden and P. H. Hare argue that “if God is unlimited in power and 
goodness, why is there so much prima facie gratuitous evil in the world?  If he is 
unlimited in power he should be able to remove unnecessary evil, and if he is unlimited 
in goodness he should want to remove it; but he does not.  Apparently he is limited either 
in power or goodness, or does not exist at all” (Madden and Hare, Evil and the Concept 
of God, 3). 
213
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214Michael L. Peterson, “Christian Theism and the Problem of Evil,” Journal of 
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evil by “calling it hopelessly inconclusive or purely emotional since it lacks deductive 
certainty”216 on two accounts.  First, White clearly says that “every trial is weighed and 
measured by the Lord Jesus Christ, and it is not beyond man's ability to endure through 
the grace given unto him. ‘God is faithful, who will not suffer you to be tempted above 
that ye are able; but will with the temptation also make a way of escape, that ye may be 
able to bear it.’”217  When these measures are received in faith, it will be a blessing.218 
Obviously, White’s position is that evils that God permits seem pointless when humans 
deny His divine embrace.  Second, she writes, “For the good of the entire universe 
through ceaseless ages, he [Satan] must more fully develop his principles, that his 
charges against the divine government might be seen in their true light by all created 
beings, and that the justice and mercy of God and the immutability of His law might be 
forever placed beyond all question.”219   
Given these two reasons the question is: Are proving principles of good and evil 
worth the quantity, intensity, and gratuitousness of evil we see around us?  Evidence in 
the analysis of the Great Controversy Theodicy is that White claims that evil is 
sometimes used as part of the process for character development because of human 
rebellion.  But the world is more a dangerous ally than a lesson book.  How do 
catastrophes fit into the claim that God’s permission for evil is to ensure progress in 
character development?  Hurricanes, earthquakes, tsunamis, etc., kill, ruin, and destroy 
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people more than progress individual character.  Are character development, proving 
loyalty, and curbing sin worth the price?  White may respond that, in the context of the 
great controversy, God may not bring good from all evil occurrences.  Should He turn 
every evil occurrence to good, He will defeat His purpose.  On the one hand, the 
effectiveness of His actions in the great controversy cannot be proven until the end of the 
conflict when all the issues of evil are revealed before all intelligent beings.  On the other 
hand, His foreknowledge of sin and evil and His ability to eradicate it and all its effects at 
the end of the conflict are the preconditions of divine permission to allow evil to unfurl 
itself to its utmost.
220
  In other words, for White, only a God who has the power to fight 
and overcome His enemy and right all wrongs that the conflict may cause will allow the 
enemy to introduce an open confrontation and develop his principles.  
Since White claims a biblical explanation to the problem of evil, it has become 
necessary to subject her Great Controversy Theodicy to further evaluation on the basis of 
biblical responses to the problem of evil.  James L. Crenshaw investigates the response of 
authors of the books of the Bible to the problem of evil.  Crenshaw discovers that the 
Bible provides various answers to the problem of evil.  He categorizes his discovery into 
three parts:  The first category is named “Spreading the Blame Around.”  Under this 
group, Crenshaw discusses approaches that consider life’s anomalies as divine testing for 
the loyalty of His people.  But, he also discovers, in one of the testing scenarios, that a 
rival figure, Satan, emerges to take responsibility for the test.
221
  The second  
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classification, “Redefining God,” identifies responses that see evil as the result of the 
misuse of human free will, divine punishment for failure to obey covenant stipulations, 
and divine willingness to forgive, and evil as a means of divine pedagogy.
222
  The final 
category, “Shifting to the Human Scene,” deals with explanations that do not blame or 
defend God for the problem of evil.  Rather, they emphasize absorbing suffering and 
faithful living in the midst of unanswered questions pertaining to the problem of evil.  
The problem of evil is concealed in unfathomable mystery due to divine hiddenness 
resulting from human disobedience and limitation in grasping the divine nature and 
governance over His creation.
223
  Crenshaw discovers that innocent suffering is seen as 
benefiting the wicked; however, evil is also seen as temporary with the confidence that 
heaven awaits the faithful.
224
  
Crenshaw’s findings from the study of biblical responses to the problem of evil 
resonate with White’s explanation of natural evil.225  However, Crenshaw and other 
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For similar findings and a more detailed discussion, see Antti Laato and 
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I discovered that White suggests that her explanation of the problem of evil is 
based on the Bible and not just the book of Revelation. She points out that her Great 
Controversy concept sheds light on the origin and final disposition of sin (E. G. White, 
The Great Controversy, xii, 492). Her discussion on the time of trouble deals with 
Satan’s activities against God’s people and Divine activities against Satan and his 
cohorts. Her discussion of Rev 16 credits God with judgment on the wicked. Finally, the 
problem of evil, depending on one’s approach, questions God’s goodness, power, and 
knowledge. On the basis of this premise, it is possible to argue that White may not be 
repeating the exact events in the book of Revelation, but her Great Controversy theory 
does not differ from the book of Revelation’s description of what will transpire on earth 
before the kingdom of God is established. 
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scholarly writers on theodicy have proven that none of the various responses in and of 
themselves are completely adequate.
 226
  According to Crenshaw, the theodicies under 
“Spreading the Blame Around,” are flawed in their quasi-nature, “the recognition that in 
the final analysis the biblical deity has ultimate power over the lesser being.”227  Despite 
the legitimacy of the “Redefining God” explanations, they are inadequate responses in 
the face of debilitating suffering and evil in excess.  These approaches to the problem of 
evil suggest there is vulnerability in the deity.  Consequently, there is the risk that “the 
possibility that the reason for religious allegiance has at the same time been 
jettisoned.”228  Even the responses under the “Shifting to the Human Scene” cannot be 
“deemed entirely satisfactory—first, because it necessitated an anthropodicy and, second, 
because it could offer only partial explanations for moral evil.”229 
White’s Great Controversy Theodicy seems to have circumvented these 
limitations.  Her description of the different ways in which God interacts with His 
creation is evidence that God responds to every particular evil occurrence differently.  
Furthermore, one thing to be noted about the Great Controversy Theodicy is that it does 
not focus on one of the above-mentioned approaches as a general explanation to every 
evil occurrence, which seems to be the cause of the limitations raised against each 
approach.  Hence, her theodicy does not face the difficulty of inadequacy of any of the 
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approaches described above.  The structural effect of this is a coherent explanation of the 
problem of evil, which may partly depend on how she correlates the theological elements, 
divine foreknowledge, free will, and divine sovereignty, underlying her Great 
Controversy Theodicy.  While some questions are unresolved, evidence remains that the 
Great Controversy Theodicy wards off philosophical and theological inconsistencies that 
come as baggage with the traditional understanding of the divine nature and the problem 
of evil and contemporary accentuation of the agents’ free will and the problem of evil.   
The first two sections of the evaluation of the Great Controversy Theodicy 
considered White’s concepts of the origin of sin and evil and natural evil.  The following 
section evaluates her theory of the eradication of sin and evil. 
 
Eradication of Sin and Evil 
 
Thus far, the evaluation of the Great Controversy Theodicy has focused on the 
origin of sin and evil and particular evil occurrences.  The purpose of this section is to 
evaluate the consistency and coherency of White’s concept of the eradication of sin and 
evil with other aspects of her Great Controversy Theodicy. 
An area that requires the attention of Christian philosophers and theologians, 
according to Adams, is evil and the problem of hell.  Adams points out that the atheist 
criticism of theism has refined the discussion of evil on their terms, and Christian 
philosophers’ and theologians’ response to such criticism within the confines of “secular 
value parsimony” has led to the neglect of discussing theism’s dark side—hell.  
According to Adams, to defend the logical compatibility of the coexistence of God and 
evil while “holding a closeted belief that some created persons will be consigned to hell 
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forever is at best incongruous and at worst disingenuous.”230  She observes that 
annihilation and conditional immortality, coupled with free will, has an advantage over 
the classical concept of hell.
231
  However, she points out that annihilation with a strong 
concept of agents’ freedom implies that God can neither “achieve the optimal overall 
good without sacrificing the welfare of some individual persons” nor “redeem all 
personal evil: some of the wicked He can only quarantine or destroy.”232   
The foregoing criticism raised by Adams applies to White’s understanding of 
divine eradication of sin and evil.  However, whether we point to the compatibility of the 
coexistence of God and hell or God’s inability to obtain overall good without destroying 
sinners, White’s concept of divine extermination of sin and evil is coherent with other 
aspects of the Great Controversy Theodicy.  In The Many Faces of Evil, John S. Feinberg 
observes that  
 if one couples the free will defense with annihilation and/or conditional 
immortality, one can argue that the punishment of annihilation is just, because a 
person freely chooses this destiny herself. She freely decides that she doesn’t want 
reconciliation to God and eternal fellowship with him. If the sinner is clear about the 
results of her decision on this matter and then, using libertarian free will, chooses to 
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reject God, then a case can be made that this is a just punishment and hence God is 
exonerated; the problem is indeed solved.
233
  
White’s conception of free will and divine activities in history creates consistency 
in her reflection on the divine eradication of evil.  For example, she emphasizes that God 
has created a moral world and He interacts with it on moral grounds.  Therefore, free 
human agents have the opportunity to identify themselves with God and escape the 
eternal consequences of sin and evil.  The failure to identify with God, in spite of His 
longsuffering and love towards the human race, leads to condemnation of self.  Thus, for 
White, annihilation does not appear to be evidence against the existence of God or 
question the appropriateness of worshipping God.  It is rather evidence of a Being who 
requires service and relationship on a voluntary basis.
234
   
Although White’s affirmation of annihilation is logically consistent with her 
system of thought, yet it poses some questions.  According to Feinberg, the concept of 
annihilation of the wicked does not do justice to some biblical passages.  He explains that 
Luke 16:19-31 portrays the wicked dead as consciously suffering.  If annihilation is 
accepted, in the light of judgment in Rev 20:11-15 what happens to the material parts of 
the dead and how will God bring those parts back to life for judgment?  In other words, 
although the concept of the annihilation of the wicked rebuts the logical problem of hell, 
that in itself is not a good reason to affirm it.
235
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Feinberg, Many Faces of Evil, 425-426. See Boyd, Satan and the Problem of 
Evil, 336, for a similar argument raised by Boyd against the concept of annihilation.  
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White maintains the coherency of annihilation with the biblical passages on death 
by arguing that the idea of eternal conscious suffering of the wicked is unbiblical. She 
asserts that “upon the fundamental error of natural immortality rests the doctrine of 
consciousness in death—a doctrine, like eternal torment, opposed to the teachings of the 
scriptures, to the dictates of reason and to our feeling of humanity.”236  She contends that 
the Bible describes the dead as unconscious; as such, affirmation of conscious suffering 
of the wicked after physical death is a denial of the biblical teaching of resurrection and 
judgment.
237
  Obviously, White’s position on the issue implies that her interpretation of 
Luke 16:19-31 is contrary to Feinberg’s understanding.238  She clearly states that Christ 
used the parable to convey that “it is impossible for men to secure the salvation of the 
soul after death”239 rather than to teach eternal conscious suffering of the wicked in hell.   
With regard to the question of what happens to the material parts of the dead and 
how God will bring those parts to life, White’s manner of conceptualizing human beings 
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E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 545. 
237
She uses the following biblical passages as the basis of her argument against 
conscious suffering of the wicked at death: Eccl 9:5, 6, 10; Isa 38:18, 19; Pss 6:5; 115:17; 
Acts 2:29, 34; 1 Cor 15; 1 Thess 4:13-18; John 14:2, 3; Acts 17:31; Jude 6, 14, 15; Rev 
20:12; Matt 25:21,41. ibid., 546-550.   
238“In this parable Christ was meeting the people on their own ground. The 
doctrine of a conscious state of existence between death and the resurrection was held by 
many of those who were listening to Christ's words. The Saviour knew of their ideas, and 
He framed His parable so as to inculcate important truths through these preconceived 
opinions. He held up before His hearers a mirror wherein they might see themselves in 
their true relation to God. He used the prevailing opinion to convey the idea He wished to 
make prominent to all--that no man is valued for his possessions; for all he has belongs to 
him only as lent by the Lord. A misuse of these gifts will place him below the poorest 
and most afflicted man who loves God and trusts in Him” (E. G. White, Christ’s Object 
Lessons, 263).   
239
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as animated bodies
240
 implies that she affirms the biblical teaching that the body returns 
to the dust and the spirit returns to the Giver at death.
241
  Her description of the 
resurrection depicts that the wicked dead will be resurrected with the same character and 
mortal body.
 242
  But, for White, the human mind cannot research into what has not been 
revealed;
243
 therefore, how God will bring the corruptible materials back to life for 
judgment is beyond human reasoning.  The practical effect of the foregoing discussion on  
                                                 
240“The Lord created man out of the dust of the earth. He made Adam a partaker 
of His life, His nature. There was breathed into him the breath of the Almighty, and he 
became a living soul” (E. G. White, “Training for Heaven,” Manuscript Release, 10:326). 
“In the creation of man was manifest the agency of a personal God. When God had made 
man in His image, the human form was perfect in all its arrangements, but it was without 
life. Then a personal, self-existing God breathed into that form the breath of life, and man 
became a living, breathing, intelligent being. All parts of the human organism were put in 
action. The heart, the arteries, the veins, the tongue, the hands, the feet, the senses, the 
perceptions of the mind--all began their work, and all were placed under law. Man 
became a living soul. Through Jesus Christ a personal God created man and endowed 
him with intelligence and power” (E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 8:264).  
241Ellen G. White, “Lessons from the Life of Solomon—No. 21, ‘Godly Sorrow 
Worketh Repentance,’” Review and Herald, February 8, 1906.  
242“In the resurrection every man will have his own character. God in His own 
time will call forth the dead, giving again the breath of life, and bidding the dry bones 
live. The same form will come forth, but it will be free from disease and every defect. It 
lives again bearing the same individuality of features, so that friend will recognize friend. 
There is no law of God in nature which shows that God gives back the same identical 
particles of matter which composed the body before death. God shall give the righteous 
dead a body that will please Him. . . . The natural substance in the grain that decays is 
never raised as before, but God giveth it a body as it hath pleased Him. A much finer 
material will compose the human body, for it is a new creation, a new birth. It is sown a 
natural body, it is raised a spiritual body” (E. G. White, “1 Corinthians,” SDA Bible 
Commentary, ed. F. D. Nichol [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1953-57], 6:1093). 
While the righteous receive incorruptible bodies because they will live for eternity, it 
seems right to conceive that, in White, the wicked who are resurrected to receive 
judgment, eternal death, will come out from the grave with the same personality and 
corruptible body they had before death.  
243
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White’s concept of annihilation is that it is internally consistent and coherent with 
biblical passages on death and resurrection.  However, her concept of the second death 
raises another concern.  White claims that, at the third advent of Christ after the 
millennium,
244
 all the wicked dead since the beginning of human history, including those 
put to death at the second advent of Christ, will be resurrected only to be destroyed by 
fire.  The concern here is not about the kind of reward the wicked receive, but rather the 
idea of God raising the wicked from death just to annihilate them by fire afterward is a 
moral dilemma.  Is the first death not enough to eradicate sin and evil and sinners?  This 
is why Feinberg poses the question:  Have proponents proven annihilation by fire to be a 
just punishment by God?
245
  The idea of controversy between good and evil, in White, is 
evidence that the works of God cannot be proven just or unjust until the end of the 
controversy, when all the issues of the conflict are revealed before every creature, then 
shall the justice of God stand fully vindicated.   
Richard Rice also raises other issues about White’s concept of how the 
controversy between good and evil will end.  According to Rice, the central issue of the 
great controversy, “whether the creatures perceive that God deserves to reign,” rebuts the 
“force of dualistic objection,” but it “raises some questions of its own.” 246  He observes 
that the central issue puts God on trial, and the idea presupposes that God is evaluated by 
some independent standard.  In his opinion, to judge God against some independent  
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standard of goodness is questionable because of God’s ontological status.  “We cannot 
determine if God is trustworthy unless we assume that God is trustworthy.”  According to 
him, “even if we grant the possibility of impartially investigating God’s trustworthiness, 
we have to wonder just why it takes the onlooking universe so long to see that.”247 
The foregoing issues raised the question of the coherency and plausibility of the 
Great Controversy Theodicy.  It appears White’s description of God on trial demonstrates 
consistency and coherency within the Great Controversy Theodicy.  First, her depiction 
of God on trial is based on eschatological prophecies in the Bible, specifically the book of 
Revelation.  Thus, the idea of God on trial is not off course, but on course with Scripture. 
Second, White’s portrayal of God on trial does not presuppose some independent 
standard by which God is judged.  Her conception of divine permission for Satan to make 
his principle known to the universe puts the warfare between good and evil in a context 
of an accusatory trial,
248
 a trial in which both God and Satan have the chance to present 
the strengths of their own principles, as well as the weakness of the opposition.  Thus, the 
evidences gathered are not examined in light of an independent standard, but in light of 
the standard on which the controversy developed.  As rightly pointed out by Rice, the 
                                                 
247Ibid. “The fact that God is the creator, however, means that God is involved in 
every aspect of reality. There is evidence to examine only because divine power sustains 
it. Our minds work the way they do because God has designed them that way. As a result, 
every claim to know something implicitly expresses confidence in God. It rests on the 
presupposition that God is trustworthy. Yet this is precisely what is at stake in the great  
controversy” (ibid.).  
248Adversarial trial “is used to adjudicate guilt or innocence. The assumption is 
that the truth is more likely to emerge from the open contest arguments with a judge as a 
neutral referee and as the arbiter of the law” (Allard Ringnalda, “Inquisitorial or 
Adversarial? The Role of the Scottish Prosecutor and Special Defences,” Utrecht Law 
Review 6 [2010]: 123).  
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fundamental issue of White’s model of the warfare theodicy is “God’s character.”249  She 
further explains that “the character of God is expressed in His law.”250  Hence, the law of 
God is the standard by which God will be judged.  Are the evidences provided in 
accordance with what God claims to be?  Are the evidences supportive of Satan’s 
accusations against God?  Did God provide all the necessary elements needed for His 
creatures to live in accordance to His governance? This is why White writes,  
 Every question of truth and error in the long-standing controversy has now been 
made plain. The results of rebellion, the fruits of setting aside the divine statutes, have 
been laid open to the view of all created intelligences. The working out of Satan's rule 
in contrast with the government of God has been presented to the whole universe. 
Satan's own works have condemned him. God's wisdom, His justice, and His 
goodness stand fully vindicated.  It is seen that all His dealings in the great 
controversy have been conducted with respect to the eternal good of His people and 
the good of all the worlds that He has created.
251
   
Third, the Great Controversy Theodicy assures that the results of the trial will not 
only be consensual but also free from bias because actions of moral agents are not caused 
by anything extrinsic to the self.  White’s model of free will and the origin of sin rebut 
the concern over the objectivity of creatures’ assessment.  The overall perception of the 
problem of evil as a conflict between God and Satan presupposes that, though God is the 
Creator and Sustainer of His creation, God does not control His intelligent creatures and 
not every one of them sees Him as trustworthy.  Otherwise, the problem of evil does not 
exist.  In addition, her conceptualization shows that the ontological status of God and 
Satan influences the decision-making process; however, they do not cause the decision  
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itself.  Since nothing external to oneself is a determining factor of a decision, it is 
possible that decisions that individuals reach by the end of the controversy between good 
and evil will be objective.  Thus, the result that will be reached in assessing the character 
of God and Satan will be an objective one.  
Fourth, in the abstract to his article “Adversarial and Inquisitorial Trial Models of 
Civil Procedure,” John A. Jolowicz points out that, in an accusatory trial, “the freedom 
accorded to the parties to conduct their litigation as they choose can lead to high cost, to 
delay, and to other troubles.”252  Much more high costs, delays, and other troubles ensue 
in controversies such as depicted by White between good and evil, a controversy in 
which God decides to work in love and Satan decides to work in disguise.   
The second issue that Rice raises concerns White’s concept of a morally secure 
universe at the end of the controversy between God and Satan.  He points out that 
White’s description of the end of the conflict between good and evil shifts the “premises 
of rebellion from perversity to ignorance.”253  He argues, “if sin is a matter of ignorance, 
we have a basis for confidence in the ultimate security of the universe, but we cannot 
explain Lucifer’s heavenly revolt.  On the other hand, if sin is essentially an act of 
perversity, then we can identify Lucifer’s rebellion, but we have no guarantee that some 
other being will not make an irrational . . .  decision to rebel against God in the future.”254   
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The idea of origin of sin and evil in White’s discussion of the problem of evil 
seems to dissipate the concerns of Rice.  In her description of Satan’s rebellion, it is 
unambiguous that the angels took sides upon the inception of Satan’s rebellion.  Taking 
sides, though Lucifer’s principles were not fully developed, suggests that the angels who 
joined Satan in his rebellion knew they were being perverse.  The actions of the angels 
loyal to God indicate that to some degree they knew the consequences of opposing God’s 
Law.
255
  Again her discussion of the interactions between Lucifer through a medium, the 
serpent, and Eve and between God and Adam and Eve implies that the first parents knew 
Satan’s principles are perverse to God’s commands placed before them.  Hence, 
intelligent beings are not oblivious to sin and evil.  In these two instances, Lucifer’s 
rebellion in heaven and his deception of the first parents, White points out that Satan uses 
“sophistry and fraud to secure his objects.”256  Furthermore, she argues that Satan 
continuously masquerades himself, mingles truth with falsehood, insinuate doubts 
concerning the law of God to develop his principles.  Thus, while Satan knows what he is 
doing and what he hopes to achieve, his followers and all other intelligent beings who are 
loyal to God lack the knowledge of the “true nature and tendency” of Satan’s 
principles.
257
  Therefore, White’s claim, that all evidence that accumulates will support 
God’s love and expose the absurdity of sin,258 does not change the definition of sin from 
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sin. And its utter extermination, which in the beginning would have brought fear to 
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perversity to ignorance.  It is rather a natural response that comes after Satan’s disguise is 
unveiled and his lies made open to all intelligent beings.  
Thus, the Great Controversy Theodicy explains sin as an act of perversity, but 
also emphasizes a morally secure universe at the end of the conflict between God and 
Satan.  First, White tells us that intelligent creatures will always possess free will because 
God prefers voluntarily service.  Her concept of free will assumes that the possibility to 
obey God correlates with the possibility to disobey God.  Second, we need to recall that 
the analysis of the Great Controversy Theodicy claims that, by the end of Christ’s 
ministry in heaven, the character of all the followers of Christ will have been sanctified.  
Therefore, they face Satan’s final afflictions without Christ’s intercessory ministry.  The 
point being made here is that, in the new earth, all intelligent creatures will be endowed 
with free will, which means that, though sin has been eradicated there will be the 
possibility of disobeying God.  However, the character of all the intelligent creatures will 
have been developed and their corruptible bodies will have been changed to incorruptible 
in a way that they will always choose to voluntarily serve God and fellow creatures in 
love.  Hence, on philosophical grounds, the great controversy provides us with results 
that seem to ensure the moral security of the future universe.  But the certainty of the 
moral security of the future universe cannot be proven on philosophical grounds, since 
philosophy is limited in ascertaining future events.  
                                                 
angels and dishonor to God, will now vindicate His love and establish His honor before 
the universe of beings who delight to do His will, and in whose heart is His law. Never 
will evil again be manifest” (E. G. White, The Great Controversy, 504). 
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The Great Controversy Theodicy wards off the issues concerning God on trial and 
the moral security of the future universe raised by Rice.  But the question of the 
plausibility of the Great Controversy Theodicy must await chapter 6. 
While White’s writing style does not reflect theological jargon, it demonstrates 
the simplicity of her ideas and neither constitutes an inconsistency in her presentation nor 
distribution of her thought; and in this sense it can be seen as strength in the propagation 
of her ideas.  With regard to theodicy, she has shown that one’s understanding of the 
problem of evil significantly shapes and influences one’s theology. 
This chapter began with a comparison and contrast between the trinitarian warfare 
and great controversy models of warfare theodicy.  Then it evaluated each model.  The 
next chapter gives the summary of the findings and conclusion of the study.
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CHAPTER 6 
 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Summary 
 
The purpose of this study has been to investigate the feasibility of warfare 
theodicy as set forth in the writings of Gregory A. Boyd and Ellen G. White, the most 
extensive presentations of the warfare model in the twenty-first and nineteenth centuries 
respectively.  Another goal of this research has been to identify how the two models of 
warfare theodicy relate to each other.  Chapter 1 introduced the problem of the Christian 
approach to the problem of evil.  It also described the historical background to the 
problem, its beginnings, features, and progress.  It is in this context that Gregory A. Boyd 
and Ellen G. White present their models of warfare theodicy as Christian responses to the 
problem of evil.   
In pursuit of the closely related goals, chapter 2 described three main Christian 
explanations of the problem of evil from the perspectives of Augustine, John Hick, and 
Process theology.  The chapter also surveyed criticism of these theodicies; they were 
found to be inadequate responses to the problem of evil.  
In chapters 3 and 4, I analyzed Boyd’s and White’s models of warfare theodicy.  
These sections have shown that the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great Controversy 
models of warfare theodicy (1) make the right understanding of free will, divine 
foreknowledge, and divine sovereignty necessary for establishing an acceptable Christian 
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explanation to the problem of evil; (2) show that sin and evil originated before human 
history; (3) do not separate natural and moral evils; (4) identify Christ as the absolute 
solution to particular evil occurrences, as well as evil in general; and (5) indicate that sin 
and evil will be vanquished at the end of the warfare between good and evil. 
In chapter 5, the warfare theodicy was evaluated.  First, the two models that were 
analyzed in chapters 3 and 4 were compared.  It was discovered that the models share 
some common theological elements, but also have sharp and substantial differences.  
Second, due to the striking divergence between the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great 
Controversy Theodicies, the reason for the difference was established and the two models 
of the warfare theodicy were subjected to further evaluation in terms of internal 
coherency and consistency.   
In this final chapter, a brief summary of key findings has been given.  As I bing 
this research to a close, it is essential again to ask the questions that were posed at the 
beginning of this study:  Are the trinitarian warfare and the great controversy models of 
warfare theodicy contradictory or complementary to each other?  How does the warfare 
approach deal with the tensions associated with Augustine’s, Hick’s, and Process 
theodicies?  Is warfare theodicy a feasible Christian response to the problem of sin and 
evil?   
 
Conclusion 
 
In different ways, the trinitarian and the great controversy models of warfare 
theodicy make great contributions to the plethora of materials on the problem of evil, 
specifically free will theodicies.  However, the study concludes that the authors’ differing 
outlooks on the use of science in theology has led to the substantial differences in their 
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models of warfare theodicy.  Their models may be related due to the similarities resulting 
from the fact that they address the same issues and the influence that White’s work might 
have had on Boyd.  But, given the degree of the differences that exist between them, they 
are two distinctive models of warfare theodicy.   
Concerning the question of the feasibility of the warfare theodicy, the Trinitarian 
Warfare and the Great Controversy Theodicies have made a useful contribution towards a 
satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil.  Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy is a notable attempt to bring the warfare concept to bear in a contemporary 
scientific worldview.  The Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy resolves the trilemma or logical 
problem of evil (omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God and the existence of 
evil) at the expense of divine foreknowledge and power.  Although the warfare concept 
has long existed among Christians, few have gone to the extent of making it the 
framework of their theology.  White has done this by thoroughly integrating the warfare 
concept into the problem of evil and the doctrine of God thereby drawing attention to the 
warfare concept which otherwise is overlooked in the history of Christian thought.   
Extremely important is that the two models of warfare theodicy are attempts to 
help people who tumble into fatalism and mistake it for an active faith escape from such 
confusion.  The attitude of accepting all evil occurrences as God’s plan through which He 
accomplishes His eternal purpose for His creation is discouraged, and participation in the 
ongoing war against the devil and his emissaries and all forms of evil is encouraged. 
They create an awareness of the supernatural realm and make suffering and evil become 
more coherent when viewed against the backdrop of an ongoing battle between God and 
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Satan.  They recognize the full implication of the reality of sin and evil, which will 
ultimately be overcome in the eschatological long run by God.   
The contributions of the two models of warfare theodicy are clearly invaluable. 
But two points are especially helpful in drawing an objective conclusion about the 
feasibility of a Christian response to the problem of evil.   
First, the evaluation of Augustine’s, Hick’s, and Process theodicies in chapter 2 is 
helpful.  Critical analysis of these theodicies shows that the presuppositions employed by 
each of these theodicies to develop a Christian response to the problem of evil are either 
founded on scientific discoveries or philosophical principles, or traditional beliefs.  It was 
also evident that each of these theodicies encounters internal difficulties, which make the 
theodicies inadequate Christian responses to the problem of evil.  As demonstrated in 
chapter 2, each of the three theodicies makes evil an inevitable consequence of free will 
or the necessary means to greater good, does not provide a workable plan that gives 
assurance of victory of good over evil, and cannot reconcile an omnipotent, omniscient, 
and omnibenevolent God and the existence of sin and evil without making God the cause 
of evil.  Hence, it was concluded that an adequate Christian response to the problem of 
evil must have three characteristics: (1) it must not explain away evil; (2) it must provide 
an eschatology that gives assurance of a complete victory over sin and evil, and (3) it 
must respond to the problem of evil without making God the cause of evil. 
Second, Feinberg points out that a theological system may not solve all the 
problems of evil, but it must be internally coherent and espouse plausible views.  Rice 
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also emphasizes that “[a] philosophical position must be coherent as well as plausible.”1  
In other words, while an acceptable Christian response may not deal with all the issues 
pertaining to the co-existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenelovent God 
and sin and evil, it must, of necessity, be internally coherent and consistent and plausible. 
From these perspectives, the study concludes that the Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy, in its current state, is a less satisfactory Christian response to the problem of 
evil, whereas the Great Controversy Theodicy is a more satisfactory Christian response to 
the problem of evil.  This conclusion to the study is based on four main reasons.    
The first reason for such a conclusion on the viability of the two models of 
warfare theodicy has to do with how well the two models avoid the difficulties that the 
Augustine, Hick, and Process theodicies encountered.  Like these three types of theodicy, 
the Trinitarian Warfare and the Great Controversy Theodicies do not solve all the issues 
involved with the theological/philosophical problem of evil.  In fact, Boyd emphasizes 
that the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is not without difficulties, but it is a more plausible 
answer to the question:  “How are we to conceive of an all-powerful God creating beings 
who to some degree possess the power to thwart his will, and thus against whom he must 
genuinely battle if he is to accomplish his will?”2  While White alleges that the Great 
Controversy Theodicy is a biblical explanation of the problem of evil, she does not claim 
that it answers all questions that arise in the face of evil.  In her view, Satan works in 
disguise; evidently, the issues of the conflict between God and Satan are shrouded in  
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mystery.  Hence, some of the issues of the problem of evil are not understood by 
intelligent beings.  However, according to White, all issues that seem to disorient the 
minds of intelligent creatures will be unveiled when the books are opened and “the  
working out of Satan’s rule in contrast with the government of God has been presented to 
the whole universe.  Satan’s own works have condemned him.  God’s wisdom, His 
justice, and His goodness stand fully vindicated.”3  But concerning the three 
characteristics of an adequate Christian response to the problem of evil, the study has 
identified three points about the two models of warfare theodicy that contribute to the 
conclusion: The Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is a less satisfactory Christian response to 
the problem of evil and the Great Controversy Theodicy is a more satisfactory Christian 
response to the problem of evil. 
1.  The Trinitarian Warfare model of warfare theodicy explains away some evils. 
Boyd’s assertion that some ungodly characteristics of nature are a metaphysical 
consequence of God’s decision effectively makes some evils necessary for and inherent 
in a divine teleological purpose—a world in which creatures respond to His love.4  
Though these inherently ungodly characteristics are experienced as evil, they are 
considered genuine evil only when Satan uses them against the human race; the inherent 
ungodly characteristics become genuine evil when they are horrific and catastrophic.   
White allows that God directs some evils for the purpose of helping humans reach 
their divinely intended ideal.  However, evil would not have been used in achieving this 
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goal had it not been chosen by the human race.
5
  Thus, inasmuch as an experience or an 
event is ungodly, it is not necessary. 
2.  As a response to the problem of evil, Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy fails to 
provide hope for the complete destruction of evil.  The Christian concept of salvation is 
God’s deliverance of His creation from sin and evil (moral, natural and social evils, 
physical illness, and the spiritual consequences of sinful behavior) including a restoration 
to His intended purpose (a world without sin, death, and without all kinds of pain and 
suffering).
6
  But in the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, this Christian understanding of 
salvation dissolves.  Boyd maintains that in the restored creation, ungodly characteristics 
in nature are necessary for free will to be genuine.
7
  In other words, he redefines salvation 
as God’s deliverance of His creation from sin and evil (moral, natural, and social evils) 
and a restoration to his intended purpose (a world without sin, evil, and death but with 
ungodly characteristics in nature).  In addition, he argues that the wicked soul endures 
eternally with a limited free will, without a neutral medium of relationality and 
nothingness as the content of their choices, in a different reality separated from the reality 
of the righteous.
8
  Hence, Boyd’s theory of how God will exterminate sin and evil does  
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not provide assurance of a complete victory over sin and evil.  It is not certain that the 
inherently ungodly characteristics in the restored creation or the barricaded wicked wills 
will remain benign or confined.
9
   
Although, in White, the certainty of the moral security of a future world without 
sin and evil cannot be proven on philosophical grounds, the eradication of sin and evil by 
annihilation shows a greater likelihood of victory over evil.  Putting aside the questions 
about the divine method of destroying sin and evil, it seems that we can be confident in 
the promises of God, who, without theological predetermination, foreknows actual free 
will choices of creatures and has plans to meet the consequences of all the choices that 
moral beings have made and will make.
10
  Thus, for White, evil became part of the 
process of developing character because of the human race’s initial misuse of free will.  
Once the battle is over, evil is exterminated. 
3.  The Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is unable to reconcile evil and the existence 
of God without making Him the originator of ungodly characteristics in nature.
11
  God 
purposefully put the ungodly characteristics in nature in order for intelligent beings to be 
morally responsible.   
                                                 
9
Boyd argues that a self-determined will eventually change to a determined will, 
but he insists that one of the qualities of the reality of free will is a neutral medium of 
relationality. For Boyd, the metaphysical requirement of a neutral medium is that ungodly 
qualities remain inherent in creation.  See Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 425.  
10Chapter 4, the section “Contents of Divine Foreknowledge.”  
11Chapter 5, the section “Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy.” 
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While White’s concept of free will underlying the Great Controversy Theodicy 
assumes the possibility of disobeying God’s law of love, God did not bring forth a 
creation characterized by ungodly features.  
Thus, the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy, as it stands now, encounters the same 
difficulties that the three main Christian responses to the problem of evil encountered.  
On the other hand, the Great Controversy Theodicy wards off these difficulties, 
maintaining internal coherency and consistency in its explanation of the problem of evil. 
The second reason for the conclusion reached—Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is a 
less satisfactory Christian response to the problem evil and the Great Controversy 
Theodicy is a more satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil—is an issue of 
methodology.  As a Christian response to the problem of evil, Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare 
Theodicy fails to maintain the normative status of Scripture in his arguments.  Boyd 
asserts that the elements of Wesley’s methodological quadrangle must be held in tension, 
ensuring that no one element is elevated above the others; however, the Scripture is the 
final arbiter of theological truth.
12
  Thus the subsequent analysis of Boyd’s theodicy 
revealed that, among other things, his agenda for formulating a Christian explanation of 
the problem of evil is to make the biblical motif of warfare reconcile with contemporary 
scientific discoveries.  In his effort to harmonize Scripture with radiometric dating of the 
earth, fossilized sequence, and prehumanoid animal suffering, Boyd reconstructs the 
account of creation in a way that it tells a story wherein the present earth is created after a 
battle of God with chaos, the formidable enemy.  While he argues that stories about  
                                                 
12
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 22.  
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Tiamat, Leviathan, or Yamm could be seen as erroneous, he insists that they express a 
profound truth.  Therefore, they could be appropriated into the inspired canon if it is 
made clear that Yahweh defeated these enemies and restored order to the cosmos. Thus 
the ancient Near Eastern traditions of the creation account are the standard of his 
reconstruction.
13
 Such a move, however, would undermine the normative role of 
                                                 
13In Boyd’s opinion, in “the Genesis account, the ‘waters have been not only 
neutralized, but demythologized and even depersonalized. Perhaps as a means of 
emphasizing God’s complete sovereignty in creation . . . and perhaps in order to express 
unambiguously the altogether novel conviction that the physical world is in and of itself 
‘good,’ the author presents the many ‘gods’ of this Near Eastern neighbor as strictly 
natural phenomena.”  
“Hence the ‘deep’ that in Enuma Elish was represented as the evil Tiamat is here 
simply water. Far from battling it, Yahweh’s ‘Spirit’ . . . simply ‘sweeps’ or ‘hovers’ over 
it. . . . So too, the stars, moon and sun, which Babylonian and Canaanite literature viewed 
as enslaved rebel gods, are here simply things that Yahweh has created. . . . The expanse, 
the earth and human beings, far from being carved out of the bodies of defeated gods, are 
simply spoken into existence by God with the rest of creation. . . . In creating the world, 
according to this author, Yahweh has no competitors.” 
“Not all Old Testament passages demythologize water in this fashion, however. 
Some texts follow the pagan Near Eastern traditions more closely and express the 
conviction that while the creation itself is good, something in the foundational structure 
of the cosmos exhibits hostility toward Yahweh. While God created the world under a 
‘cosmic covenant’ of peace . . . this primordial covenant has been broken, and the 
creation itself has fallen into a state of war. . . . To express this breach of covenant and its 
ensuing war in the context of ancient Near Eastern culture meant talking about 
personified hostile waters.” 
“From this perspective, the mythological Mesopotamian and Canaanite stories 
about Tiamat, Leviathan or Yamm could be seen as erroneous, but not altogether 
erroneous. Insofar as they express the conviction that something about the cosmic 
environment of the earth . . . was, and still is, hostile toward Yahweh and toward 
humanity, the biblical authors could understand these stories to express a profound truth. 
Insofar as they expressed this truth, this dissolution of the cosmic covenant, they could be 
appropriated into the inspired canon, so long as it was made clear that Yahweh, not the 
divine heroes of the surrounding cultures, defeated these foes and restored order to the 
cosmos” (Boyd, God at War, 84-85). 
Discussing the idea that biblical authors’ used concepts and symbols of their day 
to express their thought, Noel Weeks states (in relation to Gen 1-11): “When it is said 
that God employed symbols common in that day is it meant that both the symbol and 
what is symbolized were already known or that only the symbol was known with a 
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Scripture.  Boyd transposes the meaning and/or the context of later passages (Isa 34:11, 
45:18; Jer 4:23) unto  Gen 1:2;
14
 he then identifies a similar background of ancient Near 
                                                 
completely different connotation? The distinction is an important one. For this argument 
to be convincing the former must be the case. Otherwise one is saying that God gave the 
symbol a completely new meaning. And if he did that we are no longer dealing with 
symbols common at the time, but with new symbols. Then the necessity of interpreting 
them against the Near Eastern cultural background is removed. Whether there is any 
ultimate relationship” [sic] between biblical and Babylonian accounts as we now have 
them they belong to different ideological worlds. The symbols are not the same because 
the ideology is different. The goddess Tiamat defeated in a war by the god Marduk, if she 
may be called a ‘symbol’; must be seen as symbol within the context of Babylonian 
polytheism whereas the creation of heaven and earth belongs within the context of 
biblical thought. It is meaningless to say that God used the same symbol but changed its 
meaning. It is then no longer the same symbol” (Noel Weeks, “The Hermeneutical 
Problem of Genesis 1-11,” Themelios 4 [1978]: 14-15).  
Gerhard F. Hasel also discusses the similarities and differences of some terms and 
motifs (těhôm, separation of heaven and earth, creation by word, creation and function of 
the luminaries, the purpose of man’s creation, and the order of creation) in Gen 1 over 
against similar or related terms and motifs in ancient Near Eastern cosmologies for the 
purpose of discovering the relationship between them. He concludes his discussion by 
stating that the “examination of crucial terms and motifs in the cosmology of Gn1 in 
comparison with ancient Near Eastern analogues indicates a sharply antimythical 
polemic. With a great many safeguards he employs certain terms and motifs, partly taken 
from his ideologically incompatible predecessors and partly chosen in contrast to 
comparable concepts in ancient Near Eastern cosmogonies, and fills them in his own 
usage with new meaning consonant with his aim and world-view. Genesis cosmology as 
presented in Gen 1:1-2:4a appears thus basically different from the mythological 
cosmologies of the ancient Near East. It represents not only a ‘complete break’ with the 
ancient Near Eastern mythological cosmologies but represents a parting of the spiritual 
ways which meant an undermining of the prevailing mythological cosmologies. This was 
brought about by the conscious and deliberate antimythical polemic that runs as a red 
thread through the entire Gn cosmology. The antimythical polemic has its roots in the 
Hebrew understanding of reality which is fundamentally opposed to the mythological 
one” (Gerhard F. Hasel, “The Significance of the Cosmology in Genesis 1 in Relation to 
Ancient Near Eastern Parallels,” Andrews University Seminary Studies 10 [1972]: 20).  
14According to Noel Weeks, “If we take the theory of evolution as established and 
modify our interpretation of Genesis accordingly, then we introduce a problem for the 
doctrine of Scripture. It is nonsense to speak of the unique and total authority of Scripture 
at the same time as we change our interpretation of Scripture to accord with theories 
drawn from outside Scripture. Hence evangelicals have tended to seek for principles 
within Scripture itself which will allow them to interpret Genesis in a way that is 
compatible with evolution” (Weeks, “The Hermeneutical Problem of Genesis 1-11,” 13). 
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Eastern accounts of creation in the Genesis account of creation which leads to his 
affirmation of the  restoration theory of creation.  Thus, Scripture is interpreted in the 
light of contemporary science.
15
  However, this approach of harmonizing Scripture and 
science makes the Mesopotamian accounts original accounts of creation and 
compromises the uniqueness of the biblical account of creation.
16
  As already pointed out, 
Boyd also makes quantum physics take a constitutive role in determining Christian 
doctrine, such as divine foreknowledge.
17
  Thus, the proposal to make Scripture the final 
arbiter of theological truth is oversimplified.  Some scholars, like Boyd, value the support 
science can lend to theology, yet they are concerned about making science take a 
constitutive role in determining Christian doctrines.
18
  This is why Gregory R. Peterson 
                                                 
15“Whatever truth is to be found in physics, cosmology, psychology, sociology, 
biology, anthropology, and so on is God’s truth and can only help us credibly proclaim 
the truth of God’s Word to the world. . . . In this light, it is important to recognize that 
this century has witnessed a revolution in all of these fields of learning in terms of how 
we see the world. We have been shifting from a static to a thoroughly dynamic 
understanding of reality. . . . There is no reason for theology to resist the paradigmatic 
shift occurring in our culture. On the contrary, there are actually good grounds for 
embracing and celebrating much of it” (Boyd, God of the Possible, 107-109). 
16Weeks writes, “As in the case of evolutionary theory there is a problem created 
by the fact that much work in the ancient Near Eastern field specifically excludes God’s 
activity. Hence the ideology and concepts of Israel must be considered as derived from its 
neighbours. As long as this view is prevalent the uniqueness of biblical thought is 
depreciated and denied” (Weeks, “The Hermeneutical Problem of Genesis 1-11,” 15).  
17See chapter 3, the section “Conditional Prophecy,” and chapter 5, the section 
“Reason for the Difference.”  
18John Polkinghorne, “Physical Process, Quantum Events, and Divine Agency,” 
in Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert John 
Russell, Philip Clayton, Kirk Wegter-McNelly, and John Polkinghorne (Vatican City 
State and Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory and the Center for Theology and the 
Natural Sciences, 2001), 181-190; Philip Clayton, “Tracing the Lines: Constraint and 
Freedom in the Movement from Quantum Physics to Theology,” in Quantum Mechanics: 
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 212-234; Robert John Russell, “Divine Action 
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argues that “science is not metaphysics, and to reify any particular scientific theory is to 
deny the empirical character of science itself”;19 particularly, the use of physics in 
establishing a specific view of divine providence and human freedom due to unresolved 
problems in the field.
20
  Relying on William Pollard, the one who first initiated how 
quantum mechanics might relate to the issue of divine action, Polkinghorne asserts that 
“we must await further scientific advance before more adequate metaphysical conjecture 
can be made.”21    
From a scientific point of view, one would have assumed that Boyd would 
restrain himself from establishing his theological concepts on the basis of contemporary 
scientific discoveries.  The fact, however, that a close examination of his Trinitarian 
Warfare Theodicy has shown that his affirmation of the biblical concept of free will 
objects to biblical assertion of divine foreknowledge of future free will choices led to the 
conclusion that other presuppositions must be at work in his thinking that determine the  
                                                 
and Quantum Mechanics: A Fresh Assessment,” in Quantum Mechanics: Scientific 
Perspectives on Divine Action, 293-328; Thomas F. Tracy, “Creation, Providence, and 
Quantum Chance,” in Quantum Mechanics: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 
235-258. Jeffrey Koperski shows concern for science playing a consitive role in 
establishing Christian doctrine when he writes, “Chaos coupled to quantum mechanics 
proves to be a shaky foundation for models of divine agency” (Jeffrey Koperski, “God, 
Chaos, and the Quantum Dice,” Zygon 35 [2000]: 545); “It is unnecessary to think of 
God trying to change the course of events by keeping within the limits of quantum 
indeterminacy” (Peter E. Hodgon, “God’s Action in the World: The Relevance of 
Quantum Mechanics,” Zygon 35 [2000]: 514). 
19Gregory R. Peterson, “God, Determinism, and Action: Perspectives from 
Physics,” Zygon 35 (2000): 884.  
20Polkinghorne, “Physical Process, Quantum Events, and Divine Agency,” 188-
190.” See Tracy, “Creation, Providence, and Quantum Chance.”   
21
Polkinghorne, “Physical Process, Quantum Events, and Divine Agency,” 190.  
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selection and interpretation of biblical materials.  To the extent that Boyd illogically 
believes that former biblical authors borrowed concepts from later biblical authors, he 
groups all the biblical evidence of a God-world relationship, especially divine 
relationship to free will creatures as dynamic.  Taking the language of these passages as 
univocal, Boyd establishes that God’s relationship to free will creatures is the same as the 
intra-relationship within the Godhead.  Thus, before creation the only necessary reality 
God knows and loves is Godself.
22  
 God is temporal; He sees the past and present 
exhaustively and the future as a realm of possibilities.  In other words, he uses passages 
about divine relationship to His creation to oppose the biblical description of divine 
exhaustive definite foreknowledge of the future free choices, all in an attempt to adjust 
Christian dogmatic structure to the growing paradigmatic shift taking place in our 
contemporary culture.  It is reasonable that Scripture itself should be allowed to dissolve 
the tensions between its affirmations.  It seems Boyd’s decision to use contemporary 
scientific discoveries and process philosophy to dissolve the tension between biblical 
affirmation of libertarian free will and exhaustive definite knowledge of future free will 
                                                 
22
While he takes biblical passages that described divine actions in humans at face 
value, he suggests a sympathetic reading of passages such as Jer 3:6-7, 19-20; 7:31; 
32:35; Isa 1:1-5; Ezek 12:2. According to him, there is “no compelling reason not to take 
this language at face value. But only a most unsympathetic reading of Jeremiah's and 
Isaiah's language . . . would conclude that this language entails that God holds false 
beliefs. . . . When God says he ‘thought’ or ‘expected’ something would take place that 
did not take place, he is simply reflecting his perfect knowledge of probabilities. When 
the improbable happens, as sometimes is the case with free agents, God genuinely says he 
‘thought’ or ‘expected’ the more probable would happen. Because God is infinitely 
intelligent, we cannot conceive of God being altogether shocked, as though he did not 
perfectly anticipate and prepare for this very improbability. . . . But relative to the 
probabilities of the situation, the outcome was surprising” (Boyd, “Christian Love and 
Academic Dialogue,” 237). Furthermore, Boyd treats biblical passages using phrases of 
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choice leads to inconsistency and incoherency in his system.  Therefore, his advocacy of 
a dialogue between theology and science appears to prevent Scripture from taking the 
normative role in determining Christian doctrine.  Hence, Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
appears to be a less satisfactory Christian explanation to the problem of evil.  
It may be argued in favor of Boyd that his work is philosophical theology and not 
biblical theology.  Philosophical theology employs philosophical resources to exam 
doctrines of Christian faith.  In other words, philosophy does not play a constitutive role 
in determining Christian doctrines, rather it is used as a means of defending Christian 
doctrines; the reverse defeats the purpose of philosophical theology and subordinates 
theology to philosophy.  Hence, Boyd does not need to subordinate Scripture to 
philosophy and scientific discoveries in order for him to reach his purpose of making 
biblical warfare meaningful to the contemporary scientific mind-set.  
On the other hand, it was evident in the analysis of the Great Controversy 
Theodicy that White calls for a dialogue between theology and science.  In fact, she 
encourages harmonization of science with Scripture, but discourages any harmonization 
that will compromise biblical models and/or make science take precedence over 
Scripture.  She recommends a diligent and intentional study in situations where there is 
disparity between Scripture and science.  In other words, science and Scripture must be 
held in tension, taking care that science is not elevated over Scripture.  Thus, human 
philosophical principles only aid in expressing the biblical truth, but do not take a 
constitutive role in determining Christian doctrines.  In theory and in practice, White  
upholds the primacy and normative role of Scripture.  Evidently, in the context of the 
                                                 
body parts for God as figurative and/or poetic, but those with emotional phrases are 
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scientific worldview—views of origins put forth in human philosophy, she affirms the 
viability of Scripture, making the Great Controversy Theodicy a more satisfactory 
Christian response to the problem of evil. 
The third reason for the conclusion reached—the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is 
a less satisfactory response to the problem of evil and the Great Controversy Theodicy is 
a more satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil—is Boyd’s and White’s 
models of divine foreknowledge, which are a corollary to the methodologies employed in 
the Trinitarian Warfare and Great Controversy Theodicies.  Associated with Boyd’s aim 
to make the biblical motif of warfare intelligible to the contemporary scientific 
worldview is his purpose to dissolve tension from all Christian doctrines that are held in 
contradiction to each other.  He contends that, while the “Scripture may lead us to accept 
paradoxes . . . it never requires that we accept contradictions, which are devoid of 
meaning.”23  Consequently, Boyd anticipates that every consensual theologian will 
hermeneutically work to dissolve the proposed contradiction that exists between 
affirming libertarian free will and divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge.  He seeks 
consistency of the alleged logical contradiction that exists in affirming divine exhaustive 
definite foreknowledge and libertarian free will with his established model of free will,
24
 
which is an interpretation of Scripture in the light of contemporary scientific discoveries 
and philosophy.  As a results, Boyd rejects divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge of  
                                                 
considered literally. 
23
Boyd, Satan and the Problem of Evil, 21 (emphasis his).  
24See chapter 3, the section “Free Will.”  
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future libertarian free will actions for divine foreknowledge of future as a realm of 
possibilities.  Thus he limits the content of divine foreknowledge of future free will 
actions to possibilities.  
However, the problem of evil is considered crucial for theists because of their 
claim that God is omnipotent, omniscient (includes exhaustive definite foreknowledge), 
and omnibenevolent.
25
  Therefore, any attempt to reject or eviscerate these doctrines in 
the process of explaining the theoretical and/or practical aspects of the problem of evil 
dismisses the reality of the problem of evil and does not give a response to the problem.  
As Adams points out, discussing the problem of evil in the context of the logical 
compatibility of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence “risks irrelevance and 
equivocation”26 because it results in theories that compete with respect to coherency, 
clarity, and explanatory power to the detriment of expressing the educational and the 
spiritual significance of Scripture.  Thus, the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy cannot be 
considered as a more satisfactory Christian explanation of the problem of evil.  
On the contrary, the Great Controversy Theodicy may be considered a more 
satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil.  It seems that White’s familiarity 
with the despondent and desperate result of focusing on the logical incompatibility of an 
omnipotent, omniscient, infinite, and omnibenevolent God and the existence of evil may 
have contributed to her search for biblical evidences for a satisfactory response to the 
                                                 
25
Daniel Howard-Snyder, “God, Evil, and Suffering,” in Reason for the Hope 
Within, ed. Michael J. Murray (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 78-81. 
26
Marilyn McCord Adams, Horrendous Evil and the Goodness of God, 205.  
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problem of evil.
27
  For this reason, the Great Controversy Theodicy is an attempt to make 
Scripture as practical as possible in considering the problem of evil.  Scripture, for her, is 
given for the human reasoning powers to search it.  However, underlying its simplicity 
are rhetorical paradoxes which can be understood only with the help of the Holy Spirit.
28
  
                                                 
27“To many minds the origin of sin and the reason for its existence are a source of 
great perplexity. They see the work of evil, with its terrible results of woe and desolation, 
and they question how all this can exist under the sovereignty of One who is infinite in 
wisdom, in power, and in love. Here is a mystery of which they find no explanation. And 
in their uncertainty and doubt they are blinded to truths plainly revealed in God's word 
and essential to salvation. There are those who, in their inquiries concerning the existence 
of sin, endeavor to search into that which God has never revealed; hence they find no 
solution of their difficulties; and such as are actuated by a disposition to doubt and cavil 
seize upon this as an excuse for rejecting the words of Holy Writ. Others, however, fail of 
a satisfactory understanding of the great problem of evil, from the fact that tradition and 
misinterpretation have obscured the teaching of the Bible concerning the character of 
God, the nature of His government, and the principles of His dealing with sin” (E. G. 
White, The Great Controversy, 492).    
28“The idea that certain portions of the Bible cannot be understood has led to 
neglect of some of its most important truths. The fact needs to be emphasized, and often 
repeated, that the mysteries of the Bible are not such because God has sought to conceal 
truth, but because our own weakness or ignorance makes us incapable of comprehending 
or appropriating truth. The limitation is not in His purpose, but in our capacity. Of those 
very portions of Scripture often passed by as impossible to be understood, God desires us 
to understand as much as our minds are capable of receiving” (E. G. White, Education, 
170). On the basis of Deut 29:29, White contends that Scripture is the revelation of God 
Himself. Hence, in this context, the mysteries are not to be taken as hidden or secret; 
rather they should be understood as difficult to understand or explain. For this reason, I 
use the term rhetorical paradoxes—an out of the ordinary juxtaposition of different ideas 
for the purpose of challenging human reason to search diligently and intentionally. Thus, 
her idea is neither suggesting that the Bible contains truths that are contradictory at the 
human level but from God’s perspective the biblical truths in question are self-consistent, 
nor supporting the ideas of theologians like Vernon C. Grounds who argues that the Bible 
“logically requires defiance of logic at crucial junctures,” and D. A. Carson who points 
out that “there are no rational, logical solutions to the sovereignty-responsibility tension” 
(Vernon C. Grounds, “The Postulate of Paradox” [paper delivered at the Evangelical 
Theological Society annual meeting in March, 1978] and D. A. Carson, Divine 
Sovereignty and Human Responsibility [Atlanta: John Knox, 1981], quoted in David 
Basinger, “Biblical Paradox: Does Revelation Challenge Logic?” Journal of Evangelical 
Theological Society 30 [1987]: 211). White writes, “God desires man to exercise his 
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“The highest intellect may tax itself until it is wearied out in conjectures regarding the 
nature of God; but the effort will be fruitless.  This problem has not been given to us to 
solve.  No human mind can comprehend God.  Let not finite man attempt to interpret 
Him.  Let none indulge in speculation regarding His nature.  Here silence is eloquence.  
The Omniscient One is above discussion.”29  This is already evident in White as she 
avows divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge, libertarian free will, and divine 
sovereignty.  Indeed, while her treatment does not resolve the alleged contradiction 
between exhaustive definite foreknowledge and libertarian free will, she refused to 
reinterpret Scripture to satisfy human reason.  What this means is that, borrowing the 
words of David Basinger, “we as humans do not have all the pieces of the puzzle.”30  
How God foreknows future free will choices without causing them has not been revealed.  
Therefore, she affirms divine exhaustive definite foreknowledge and libertarian free will,  
                                                 
reasoning powers; and the study of the Bible will strengthen and elevate the mind as no 
other study can. Yet we are to beware of deifying reason, which is subject to the 
weakness and infirmity of humanity” (E. G. White, Steps to Christ, 109). “If it were 
possible for created beings to attain to a full understanding of God and His works, then, 
having reached this point, there would be for them no further discovery of truth, no 
growth in knowledge, no further development of mind or heart. God would no longer be 
supreme; and man, having reached the limit of knowledge and attainment, would cease to 
advance. . . . God intends that even in this life the truths of His word shall be ever 
unfolding to His people. There is only one way in which this knowledge can be obtained. 
We can attain to an understanding of God's word only through the illumination of that 
Spirit by which the word was given” (ibid.). 
29
E. G. White, Testimonies for the Church, 8:279. She is not advocating that 
human reason cannot discern matters of faith; rather it is carnal and stupid when it asserts 
itself above Scripture and/or in searching within things about God that have not been 
revealed to humanity.  When human reasoning asserts itself above Scripture, it puts the 
entire tenor of Scripture into the array of inconsistencies and incoherencies when it 
pursues this path. 
30Basinger, “Biblical Paradox: Does Revelation Challenge Logic?” 210. 
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leaving them in tension without allowing either one to cancel out the other.  
Consequently, White’s Great Controversy Theodicy seems to be a more satisfactory 
Christian response to the problem of evil. 
The fourth reason for the conclusion reached—the Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy 
is a less satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil and the Great Controversy 
Theodicy is a more satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil—has to do with 
the problem of a long-term applicability of the two models of warfare theodicy.  It is 
assumed that theological concepts must be expressed in the context of their historical 
milieu; however, the biblical truth they express must be universal.
31
  It appears to me that 
the Triniatrian Warfare Theodicy fails to meet this requirement, as it rejects the biblical 
model of divine foreknowledge to hold to the contemporary scientific concepts.  If time 
renders these contemporary scientific theories invalid, as in the case of the issue over 
                                                 
31Osadolor Imasogie has argued that “theology, if it is authentic, must participate 
in universality.” He continues, “It is only as theology responds to the existential needs of 
a people within the specific cultural and historical milieu of their self-understanding that 
the universal of it can be enhanced and enriched” (Osadolor Imasogie, Guidelines for 
Christian Theology in Africa [Achimota, Ghana: Africa Christian Press, 1983], 19, 20). A 
theological system must serve two needs:  “the statement of the truth of the Christian 
message and interpretation of this truth for every generation. Theology moves back and 
forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in 
which the eternal truth must be received” (Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology [New York: 
Harper and Row, 1967], 3). Erickson also defines theology as “that discipline which 
strives to give a coherent statement of the doctrines of the Christian faith, based primarily 
on the Scriptures, placed in the context of culture in general, worded in a contemporary 
idiom, and related to issues of life.” He continues, “Theology must also be contemporary. 
While it treats timeless issues, it must use language, concepts, and thought forms that 
make some sense in the context of the present time” (Erickson, Christian Theology, 23).   
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geocentric and heliocentric theories of the cosmos, Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy also 
becomes irrelevant.
32
  Thus, Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is exposed to  
obsolescence.
33
  So long as the Scripture stand against all odds, as it has proven to, the 
Great Controversy Theodicy remains a relevant Christian explanation of the problem of 
evil at all times.  Thus, the relevancy of the two models in any era makes the Trinitarian 
                                                 
32
When modern science discovered overwhelming evidence for the heliocentric 
theory of the cosmic, the theological geocentric concept derived on the basis of the 
biblical story of creation and Aristotle’s view of the earth—borrowed from Alexandrian 
astronomer Ptolemy in the 2nd century--became invalid.  As a result, people lost 
confidence in the Christian faith. Gregory R. Peterson, commenting on the objection of 
determinism on the basis of quantum mechanics, writes, “Polkinghorne rejects a 
deterministic interpretation because the implications are so philosophically and 
theologically unpleasant. . . .We now know that determinism of the Newtownian sort is 
dead, and the apparent indeterminism of quantum mechanics has been embraced 
precisely because it seems to deliver us from Newton’s grand machine. But if that is the 
only lesson we have learned, then we have learned the wrong one; for the primary 
mistake is to grant the achievements of science in any given period the final say on this 
issue at all. . . . In both cases the reasons given for both determinism and indeterminism 
are only partially informed by the science itself” (Gregory R. Peterson, “God, 
Determinism, and Action,” 884); “If we cast our theological lot with a particular 
interpretation, we take the risk that new developments in physics or in the philosophy of 
physics will significantly undercut our theological constructions. . . . The particular 
interpretive approach one favors should not be presented as the conclusion to be drawn 
from quantum mechanics. . . . Proposals about the theological relevance of quantum 
theory should be regarded as tentative and provisional hypotheses that reflect the current 
uncertainty of the relevant science and the extraordinary difficulty of interpreting it” 
(Thomas F. Tracy, “Divine Action and Quantum Theory,” Zygon 35 [2000]: 896). 
33
John B. Cobb, Jr., may have caught a glimpse of the repercussions of doing 
theology with human philosophical principles as the supplier of major tenets in his study 
of contemporary theology.  He explains that the content, form of affirmation, 
intelligibility, and acceptance of Christian faith of each theological thinker are 
philosophically informed. However, he observes that, in an age where no one 
philosophical idea claims ascendancy, the difficulty in employing philosophical 
principles as the framework for a theological system is apparent (John B. Cobb, Jr., 
Living Options in Protestant Theology: A Survey of Methods [Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1962], 121). 
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Warfare Theodicy a less satisfactory and the Great Controversy Theodicy a more 
satisfactory Christian response to the problem of evil.  
 
Recommendations 
 
The conclusion that the Great Controversy Theodicy is a more satisfactory 
Christian response to the problem of evil does not end the discussion on the subject.  The 
frequencies of natural disasters and the magnitude of crimes pose diverse existential 
challenges that seem to make the problem of evil one of the crucial theological issues. 
Thus, there will be ongoing discussion on the problem of evil.  
Closely related to the idea of the problem of evil being one of the crucial 
theological issues is scholarly expositions on the problem of evil.  Expositions on the 
problem of evil are mostly restricted to responding to the atheists’ arguments against 
God, the compatibility of the co-existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, and 
omnibenevolent God and evil.  Thus, theological discussions on the problem of evil have 
turned into defensive apologetic pieces that allow atheists to define the discussion of the 
problem of evil on their own terms.  While the issue raised by the atheists cannot be 
ignored, theologians’ use of human criticism to address the issue has led to theories that 
modify biblical truth, partial responses to the problem of evil that go beyond themselves, 
and ultimately relegate the practical issues of the problem of evil to the pastoral domain.  
But, Christian faith does not warrant such a divorce between theoretical and practical 
issues, for it is within the practical issues of the problem of evil that the theoretical issues 
arise.  Thus, focusing on either the theoretical or the practical issues is not a 
comprehensive Christian approach to the problem of evil.  While it is the responsibility of 
theologians and philosophical theologians to convince atheists and skeptics of the 
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existence of a good God in the face of contemporaneous crimes and disasters, it is not 
within their power to convert them with logical abstractions.  Granted, this opens the door 
for a study or development of a contemporary Christian approach to the problem of evil 
that combines both the theoretical and practical issues.  This recourse allows Christian 
discourse on the problem of evil to focus on the reality of the evils humankind faces, 
sustains faith in the context of suffering, eliminates inconsistency, curbs the insensitivity 
of Christian discussions on the problem of evil toward victims of sin and evil, and avoids 
the generalization of a single approach, such as evil as punishment for sin and as an 
explanation of every evil occurrence. 
We have seen that Augustine’s, Hick’s, and Process theodicies are attempts to 
respond to the problem of evil in the context of their historical milieu.  However, their 
attempts have resulted in inconsistent and incoherent theories and/or compromise of the 
Scriptural perspective.  Boyd’s Trinitarian Warfare Theodicy is an attempt to 
communicate the biblical concept of warfare in the context of contemporary scientific 
worldview, non-substantial dynamic categories.  But, his attempt also yields an 
inconsistent and incoherent model of warfare theodicy and compromises the normative 
role of Scripture.  White’s Great Controversy Theodicy is also a notable response to the 
problem of evil in the context of the scientific worldview of her era, but her effort yields 
a consistent model of warfare theodicy and maintains the normative role of Scripture.  All 
these proponents of these theodicies and many other scholars believe in a dialogue 
between theology and science.  The challenge that is before us is precisely this: What is 
the praxis for communicating biblical truth in the context of any scientific worldview 
without compromising Scripture?  Are there universal presuppositions which one brings 
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to hermeneutics when communicating biblical truth in any scientific worldview?  This 
dissertation has not addressed these questions. But, it seems appropriate to challenge 
theology to develop universal presuppositions which one brings to hermeneutics when 
communicating biblical truth in the context of any scientific worldview.  It is in this sense 
that the Great Controversy theme may serve as a catalyst. 
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